Aldrin
The center lead dried out in flight. I was shaved in that area, but it dried out anyway. The one on my right chest, must have interfered in some way with the suit, because when the suit was taken off, there was a small laceration on the outside toward the rear of that particular sensor. I think that's been documented in the medical examination.
1.2 Suiting
Aldrin
We seemed to have plenty of pad in the time frame for suiting. We were sitting around suited up at least 20 minutes before moving out to the pad
Armstrong
We had a reasonable amount of pad time to handle the little problems you might have at time. The timeline on suiting was good
1.3 Life Support Equipment
Collins
No problem with life support equipment or transportation out to the pad.
1.6 Personal Comfort
Collins
The only personal comfort problem I had was that my suit fit was too tight through in the region of the UCD. During CDDT, I was really very, very uncomfortable for a couple of hours with the UCD pushing into me. This problem goes back to that first suit fit at the factory. ILC is very concerned abut the mobility inside a pressurized suit, and I think they went a little bit overboard in cutting that thing on the tight side. I didn't really put the UCD on; you know what I mean. They've got a house UCD up there, and you sort of slap that inside the suit and then you get a fit check. The only time it hurt me was when I actually had the UCD securely held and I was strapped into the couch and my legs were up. The only thing I could suggest is that when anybody goes to the factory, they take their own UCD and put the damn thing on and, during that fit check, go through some kind of an imitation of the watch position with the correct leg-to-body angle which you have in that couch for launch position. Put your own UCD on and see whether that's going to be comfortable or not. I fiddled and diddled with it between CDDT and launch, and it was still fairly uncomfortable for launch; for CDDT, that damn thing almost did me in. Don't let them cut the suit too tight, and try to get a good fit check at the factory.
1.5 Elevator and Flight Deck
Aldrin
From the center-couch position, it's a very pleasant time period because I'd sit in the elevator and walk around up there on the flight deck and contemplate just about everything, including the outside world. CDDT was a very pleasurable experience, looking out over the whole beach.
1.8 Ingress
Armstrong
While we were completing the countdown procedures, the number 2 rotation hand controller was raised to the launch position. At that point, it somehow managed to attach itself the shock attenuator release on the lower left strut. It released after a good bit of work and coordination between Mike and Fred, the BCMP. It was re-locked. No new procedure there, it just requires care and properly installing those handrests to avoid a recurrence of that problem. It would be well for the BCMP to assure himself that he knows how to re-lock any one of the strut releases that might come disengaged in this time period.
Collins
The crew should know about the strut softeners just in case one of them gets pulled loose inadvertently in flight. You should know how to reset them. This should be added to their list of things to learn.
Aldrin
I don't feel that we really need life preservers on for launch. They interfere with what little mobility you have. It appears to me that in any abort condition you don't need to make use of the life preservers and that it would be a fairly simple thing to get them out of the little pouches that are in the L-shaped bag.
1.10 Comfort in Couch
Armstrong
Temperature was good in our spacecraft during both CDDT and launch. I didn't suffer any of the abnormally low temperature conditions that had been reported on some of the previous flights.
Collins
The reason was that we were flowing glycol through the secondary loop. I believe this was the first time they tried this. The secondary glycol loop pump was on and it was flowing through the suit circuit heat exchanger. I dont't know what Apollo 10 did, but I remember Apollo 9 described this deal of going bypass on the heat exchanger for 15 seconds and all that. We didn't have to mess with that at all. Our procedure worked very well. I don't know who thought it up to use the secondary loop, but it made the system very comfortable, and I recommend that they continue to do it the way we did it.
1.12 Vibration or Noise Sensations
Collins
They called out everything. Every time we were going to feel something, they were very good about calling it up.
Aldrin
We did observe some booster valving. They called it out, and it was quite obvious when there was valving taking place.
Armstrong
Our prelaunch COMM checks were all reasonably good.
Aldrin
It's unfortunate that, because of the location of that center panel, we do have to split the COMM and take the center couch off the pad COMM. I can't say we really suffered much on account of it, but it would be nice if there were some way to make that switch position change – either figure out some way to loosen the belt and get back up there and readjust the COMM, or change positions im some way.
2.4 G&C Verification
Armstrong
GDC align was good.
2.5 Ground Communications and Countdown
Armstrong
Communications were excellent throughout the prelaunch phase. We had no problems with controls and displays that I can recall.
2.10 Crew Station Controls and Displays
Aldrin
They had that attenuation strut positioned very nicely so that I could see the altimeter. On the simulator it's very difficult from the center couch to see the altimeter. They had rotated this handle on the X strut on the left of my seat so that I could see just about the entire altimeter, which is good. I think that ought to be a standard procedure.
2.11 Distinction of Sounds in the Launch Vehicle
Collins
They called all those out. I thought they did an excellent job of warning us of what to expect. Not that it really makes a heck of a lot of difference because you got to sit there anyway, but it's nice to know.
2.12 Vehicle Sway prior to Ignition, Swing Arm Retract
Aldrin
Well, it wasn't much of a jolt when that swing arm moved out and came back again.
Armstrong
No. It was reasonably smooth. I didn't really note any vehicle sway prior to ignition.
Aldrin
There really wasn't much of a cue at all that I could recall. I can't remember feeling much of anything before T zero. How about the rest of you?
Collins
No. It was very quiet. You could feel the engines were starting up because there was a low amplitude vibration.
3.2 COMM Audibility at Ignition
Armstrong
COMM audibility at ignition was good. Noise vibration intensity prior to release was minor.
3.3 Noise/Vibration Intensity Shock and Crew Sensation prior to Release
Collins
There was low noise, moderate vibration. I'd say light to moderate vibration. I didn't really notice much vibration until we released. Crew sensation prior to release is just about what you'd expect from Titan or from previous crew briefings on the Saturn V. It was quite mild prior to release, I thought.
3.4 Holddown Release
Armstrong
Now, release itself, I think we have a little bit of difference there. I felt that I could detect release, and I think your comments were that perhaps you weren't quite so sure what the moment of release was.
3.5 Lift-Off
Aldrin
I can't recall any sudden change that occurred at that point, but it seems to me that there was a gradual sensation of upward movement. Then the vibration – well, it was more of an oscillation, I think, than a vibration. It certainly wasn't just longitudinal; it was a fair amount of motion in both the Y-direction and in the Z-direction. I don't know what the frequency was, but I'd call it a couple of cycles per second. It was a little surprising to me, and this started rather suddenly.
Collins
About the time of lift-off, that's what I thought. I couldn't detect lift-off by the conventional means of sensing a transverse acceleration. However, the moment of lift-off was very apparent because this vehicle, which had been rigidly held, was now sudenly released and we were getting all manner of oscillations – X, Y and Z, as near as I could tell. All of a sudden, this thing changed character from a static to a dynamic situation, and that was what I would call the instant of lift-off.
Armstrong
Concerning the noise/vibration intensity at lift-off, it was my impression that the combination was rather severe until approximately the time of "Tower clear", at which time there was a significant decrease.
Collins
Yes, but would you say noise? I would say vibrations. I thought the noise level was much less than I had expected. The vibration was more.
Aldrin
How about a rumbling? That is physically felt as much as heard.
Collins
You don't hear it in your ears. You feel it in your whole body. Whether that's noise or whether that's vibration, I don't know.
Armstrong
I would agree that the noise was low level.
Collins
In terms of interference with communications, though, I think you would also have to say that it is low level.
Armstrong
That's true
Aldrin
Subjectively, the first 10 to 12 seconds until tower clear took longer than I thought it would. I would have thought a long 10 or 12 seconds would have been over just like that.
Collins
It was a long, long time before anybody gave "Tower clear".
Armstrong
It was right on time. I was looking at the event timer.
Collins
Was it 14 seconds – something like that to tower clear?
Armstrong
I'd say 12.
Armstrong
I thought that the COMM came through quite clear.
Armstrong
Instrument observation was no problem during this time. In fact, some were a lot better because the lighting in the cockpit is better than in the simulator.
Aldrin
But we all agree that there was a decrease in the vibration, oscillation or rumbling that could possibly be attributed to reflections off the tower.
Armstrong
I think maybe it's just reflections off the ground.
Collins
Ground reflections.
Armstrong
It goes away at about the tower-clear time.
Armstrong
I thought they were.
3.13 MACH 1 and MAX g Noise Levels
Armstrong
Well, I think I was surprised at how little these were apparent to me, and particularly Alpha. Alpha never came off zero throughout the launch, and I wondered if they were operating.
3.14 Control Response in High g Region
Armstrong
It was as smooth as glass going through the high g region.
Aldrin
What causes it, we don't really know, but it could be the vehicle length away from the ground; characteristic length, or whatever you call it.
3.6 Launch Vehicle Lights
Armstrong
Launch vehicle lights, roll program, pitch program, roll complete were on time, as were the rate changes. My impression in the seat throughout this phase, as well as the subsequent first stage, was that of going over rough railroad tracks in a train in which vibrations occur in all three axes.
Collins
That was a rougher ride than I expected.
Armstrong
There were sharp bumps in each of the three axes periodically.
Collins
Yes, that's right, and the gain of the system was pretty high, also.
3.11 Cabin Pressure (Decrease)
Collins
The valves worked as advertised and started decreasing as scheduled.
Armstrong
You can hear those valves relieving, I think, from all three crew stations.
Aldrin
While they were relieving, you couldn't hear too much else.
Collins
I didn't think it was that bad.
3.15 Emergency Detection System
Armstrong
No problems.
3.16 Vehicle Response to Gimbaling
Armstrong
The outboard engine gimbaling was not really noticed.
3.17 Noise Level Variation
Aldrin
We were anticipating that, but it was just a motion as I recall. There were several little jolts to your relaxing of the four g's. That's how I recall it.
Collins
I would say that we were well briefed on that. I mean there weren't really any surprises.
3.22 Distinction of Sounds and Sensations
Armstrong
There were sounds and sensations during the staging.
3.23 S-IC Two-Plane Separation
Armstrong
Skirt SEP, as I recall, was heard or felt or some observable characteristic, in addition to the light going out at the time, and I can't remember if it was a bump or a noise, but there was in addition to the fact.
Aldrin
This would give you a clue if the lights were not working, if something had happened at that point.
3.24 S-II Engine Ignition
Armstrong
S-II engine ignition went smooth.
3.25 Gaseous Products
Aldrin
Now, that stuff that went oozing forward.
Collins
That staging – well, it was just like staging on the Titan. It seemed like to me that at staging the windows lit up with yellow, almost like a flash of light.
Aldrin
Well, let's see – S-IC. I didn't like it either, because we were tossed forward, and I couldn't look out the hatch. You're the only one that had a window at that point. I don't remember anyone saying too much about that. We'll get to that a little later on the S-IIC.
3.26 POGO Oscillations during S-II Boost
Armstrong
I didn't note any
Collins
Smooth – smooth as glass.
Armstrong
S-II ride was the smoothest I've ever seen.
Collins
It really was. It was beautiful.
3.27 Initiation of Iterative Guidance Mode
Armstrong
Guidance initiate was as expected.
Collins
Tower went as advertised.
3.28 Q-Ball Transients at S-II Ignition
Armstrong
No Q-ball transients were noted at S-II ignition. I may have been looking at them.
3.30 Scale Change, Vehicle Response and Observation
Armstrong
Scale change was not utilized. There were no unusual noises or vibration at this point in the flight. It was all smooth.
3.32 Second IGM Phase Response
Armstrong
The PM ratio shift was observable. You could feel g's decrease.
3.33 LET and BPC Jettison
Armstrong
Tower jettison – you could watch it go. There wasn't any question about it.
3.34 Guidance Initiate
Armstrong
Guidance initiate was about as expected. The S-IVB staging and engine cut-off were ...
Aldrin
Anybody notice any exhaust coming back on the windows when the BPC went? It seemed to be a pretty clear separation.
Armstrong
I didn't note any. I wasn't looking out the window at that point.
Collins
I was, and I didn't notice any. Those windows, 2 and 4 were clear. They didn't have any deposits on them.
3.37 S-II/S-IVB Separation
Collins
The staging sequence is a long slow one. I'm sure it was about equal to the simulated values we were used to. It seems like a long time in flight to get the S-IVB ignited. The S-IVB guidance was as expected.
Aldrin
Any comment about the gimbal motors coming on?
Armstrong
The motors were put on at 6 minutes and all came on.
Collins
Well, you can confirm them with the fuel cell flows, and that's not something that reaches out and grabs you. If you watched those meters carefully, you could definitely say that all four gimbal motors came on.
Aldrin
I was looking at this sort of thing later. I found that observing them several times right at the time they were coming on, you look at the current and you see that it's a fairly small but observable change in the fuel cell current, and then just about a half second later you begin to see the rise and flow. You can catch both of them if you look at the current first and then the hydrogen and oxygen flow.
Collins
I just looked at hydrogen flow. They say that you have to be watching closely. If you are, you can definitely say that they all four came on.
3.42 Auxiliary Propulsion System
Armstrong
That was particularly noted during powered flight.
3.43 POGO Oscillations of S-IVB
Armstrong
No POGO oscillations.
Aldrin
There's a rougher ride on the S-IVB than on the S-II.
Armstrong
No doubt about it.
Collins
I wouldn't call it POGO, but it just wasn't as smooth.
Armstrong
It was a little rattly all the time.
Collins
It was a lot smoother than Stafford described his ride. I think we had a different S-IVB than he had.
Aldrin
PU shift was noticeable.
Collins
That was very noticeable.
Aldrin
That was quite a jolt. About as much as one engine out.
Armstrong
That's probably about right.
Aldrin
About the same change in thrust.
3.44 Separation Lights
Armstrong
Separation lights as advertised.
3.45 Distinction of Sounds & Vibrations
Armstrong
Sounds and vibrations we've commented on.
3.50 Communications
Armstrong
Communications with the ground for the GO/NO-GO went without a problem. There was a short time period in there when we didn't hear anything. I think we gave them a call just to made sure that we still had COMM.
Aldrin
Following the trajectory throughout boost was quite easy with the card that we had, and I found that we were within 20 to 30 feet per second VI, and it seems to me, 5 feet per second most of the time H-dot. Guess the altitude was a little lower, wasn't it? We might note that we did elect to have this trajectory card over part of the DSKY, which did cover up some of the status lights. The right-hand column of status lights were covered up. The ones in the LEB were observable in case any of those came on.
Armstrong
Engine cut-off was smooth, and we were standing by to do a manual cut-off with the LV stage switch chould cut-off not occur on time.
Aldrin
We didn't seem to elbow each other quite as much as we had in some simulator runs. The suits are big and the elbows kind of stick out, but I didn't notice any interference with our activities.
Collins
The only interference I noted was that Neil's suit pocket interfered with the abort handle. He was worried about that, and I was worried about that.
Armstrong
The contingency sample pocket where it was strapped on the leg was riding right against the abort handle. We adjusted that as far to the interior of the thigh as we possibly could to minimize the interference, but we still were continually concerned with the fact that we might inadvertently press that thing against the top of the abort handle.
Aldrin
Before we go on, did you all note any numbers? I have written down here: apogee 103.9, perigee 102.1.
Collins
They tell me that they have better sources.
Aldrin
I'm just wondering why in our checklist we're not able to write down the CSM weight and gimbal motor numbers. We certainly ought to know what those are before flight and just confirm that those numbers have been set in.
Collins
I don't know why you fool with them at all. They come up to you on the first PAD prior to the first burn.
Aldrin
Everybody in the world knows what they are, and they ought to be in the checklist.
Collins
I don't even know where they list them. The only other thing that I had on the launch phase was there was some peculiarity in the servicing of the oxygen quantity. Oxygen tank number 1 had 90 percent on my gauge, and oxygen tank number 2 had 95 percent with a 5 percent differential, and they kept talking about some mission rule which allowed a maximum of 4 percent differential. All this was a little confusing to me. It sounded as if we got shortchanged in oxygen tank number 1. I'm not sure if that's true, and it even occurred to me that there might have been a slight leak in tank number 1. I'm sure that there wasn't, or they wouldn't have launched us. A few words on that subject would have been nice. I think as a general rule if the loadings are not nominal, it would be nice to let the crew know that they're a little off nominal. It sounded like we launched in violation of the launch mission rule.
Armstrong
Differential between oxygen tanks?
Collins
Yes. It was 5 percent, and it sounded like the mission rule was 4 percent MAX. And I was perfectly happy to launch with that if that was the only problem. I didn't want to bring it up on the loop and make a federal case out of it. On the other hand, it would have been nice to know.
Armstrong
It only took 1 hour and 15 minutes to get through a perfectly normal launch with no problems
Armstrong
It appeared that the platform was in reasonably good shape and its values compared favorably with the MSFN ephemeris. Everything went smoothly.
4.2 Post-Insertion systems Configuration and Checks
Collins
The insertion checklist is fine, as far as I'm concerned. After the insertion checklist, the items in the checklist on page L-2 and L-9 need some work to get them in the proper sequence.
Aldrin
It's pretty hard to follow through on the time with all those things happening according to the time schedule that's on there, especially when you get down to the LEB.
Collins
The one who goes down to the LEB is sort of jumping from one place to another and back and forth. Some improvement could be made on the order in which those items are. I sort of got lazy and decided not to fight the checklist world and I just had my own order in which I as going to do them regardless of the order of the chicklist. The follow-on crews ought to look at this section and have things rearranged to their liking for a minimum amount of moving around.
Aldrin
For example: Step 7 on 2-9, the 20 minutes ECS post-insertion configuration, we were doing other things at that time and I don't believe that we were in position to be doing that until after we passed Canaries. Each person is sort of operating on his own. We know we're going about in the various systems checks, and that doesn't fit into a real good timeline.
Collins
An example here on page L2-8, item 4, EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE valve to BOTH. That check is made prior to anybody's going into the LEB. That's impossible to do; obviously, you have to be down in the LEB to see it. The man who goes down to the LEB – if he goes through steps sequentially as written in the checklist – would start jumping from one place to another back and forth. Some improvement could be made in the order. Now, I sort of got lazy and decided not to fight the checklist world. I just had my own order in which I was going to do them regardless of the order that is in the printed checklist. But to really be precise about it, the following crews ought to look at this little section and get things rearranged to their liking and for a minimum amount of moving around.
4.3 Initiation of Time Base 6 – Awareness
Armstrong
Okay. Initiation of time base 6. I think we'll postpone that.
4.4 ORDEAL
Armstrong
Now then, ORDEAL: We used a system where the CMP was already in the LEB and under the couches, released the latch on the ORDEAL, and let it float up to the CDR who was still strapped down in the couch that was no problem.
Collins
Here again, that probably should be a checklist item if people want the CMP to do that, as we did it. Then it probably ought to be written in his list of things to do.
Armstrong
That worked well for us, I think.
Collins
Worked fine.
Aldrin
Optics Cover Check.
Collins
The only thing I can say as a general rule is it goes back to this thing about becoming ill. And that is, if you're really worried about anybody becoming ill, the guy you're going to worry about is the one who's rattling around down in the LEB. I our flight, that was I and I was also the one who would be doing the transposition and docking. So I was trying to move around with minimum head movements and go minimum distances and so forth. But on the other hand, if you're not going to be sick, well then, all those things go away. It's sort of a nebulous area. I don't know what to do about it.
Aldrin
Well, it's something you can't afford to get ahead of yourself and be moving around too fast. If there's any question at all and I think we all played it very cautiously until each of us in our own particular way realized that it was just no problem. As we adapted to it, we could go about any kind of movement that we wanted without any particular concern, but the stakes are pretty high and you can't afford to let these things get the best of you.
4.5 Optics Cover Jettison (Debris)
Collins
I heard a little noise, but I saw no debris and I could not verify that they had jettisoned. I looked through both instruments and I couldn't see that they had jettisoned.
4.6 SCS Attitude Reference Comparison
Collins
Okay.
Armstrong
It went well. No problems.
4.7 SM and CM RCS
Armstrong
We did hot RCS checks on the service module RCS prior to TLI. The intent here was to assure ourselves that we did, in fact, have an operable control system and that our hand controllers could, in fact, talk to something before committing ourselves to a lunar trajectory. We did that in MINIMUM IMPULSE and it was extremely difficult to hear the thrusters firing. It was impossible to read an effect on any indicator in the cockpit.
Collins
This is with helmet and gloves on.
Armstrong
Helmet and gloves on. So we were pleased when the ground said they could, in fact, see the thrusters firing. We did have to repeat one which they didn't see.
Aldrin
I don't recall why we had the helmets on at that point.
Armstrong
We didn't take them off?
Collins
We took them off and we put them back on.
Aldrin
That should have been with at least one man with his helmet off so he could hear it.
Armstrong
Right.
Collins
Well, on the other hand, if you scheduled it over the States and the ground verifies it, you don't much care.
Armstrong
I was satisfied that we did, in fact, prove the point that we wanted to prove.
4.8 COAS Installation and Horizon Check
Armstrong
Unstowage; COAS installation: I don't recall any points there.
4.9 Unstowage and Camera Preparation
Armstrong
We had the TV camera preparation also in the same time period; any comments there?
Collins
Well, again, this camera preparation probably should be written into the checklist on page L2-9, in a bit more detail than it is.
Aldrin
Well, on 2-13 in detail, but do you want it sooner?
Collins
Well, this is when you're unstowing it, because really all it says is cameras and that really means the 16-mm plus the 70-mm and the various lenses. You hand them up and you get the bracket from Neil. It's really sort of an assembly process there. This is sort of a dealer's choice, but I suggest that the following crews give some thought right on page 2-9 to deciding what cameras they want to unstow or what they want to do with them and how they're going to do it. Otherwise, they're going to have another trip back down to the LEB which really ins't necessary.
4.10 Docking Probe
Armstrong
I think they're attempting to recall anything that might have gone abnormally.
Collins
There were no findings in that docking probe.
4.12 Communications
Armstrong
Communications were more or less in and out in earth orbit. Sometimes there was quite good S-band through the various stations; other times, it was only medium.
4.14 Comments on Earth-Orbital Operations
Collins
I think, in general, that's a very nice timeline. We hammered away at it enough to where we're only checking those things that really should be checked and there's plenty of time available to check them in a leisurely fashion. I think that's a nice timeline.
Aldrin
How about the alignment? On the Saturn?
Collins
The platform alignment?
Aldrin
Yes, torquing angle we got from the ground and the alignment they gave us.
Collins
Yes, I didn't know what to say about that. I think that's probably within normal tolerance.
Aldrin
Yes.
Collins
The alignment at ORB RATE is no problem as other flights have reported.
4.18 EMS Delta-V
Armstrong
Okay. EMS DELTA-V. No problems.
4.19 Scale Change
Armstrong
Scale change, systems, engine alignments, GO for TLI, and then....
Collins
Glad to get it – no problems.
Aldrin
Well, I think it's worthy to note that we did intend to have the TV camera out. It did not seem to crowd the timeline, trying to get those pictures coming up on the West Coast. We still seemed to have a very comfortable approach to TLI.
Collins
That's right. Of course, that's where we said we weren't going to fool with the television if we were rushed or behind the timeline.
4.23 Drift Test
Armstrong
The drift test has to do with your alignment, I guess. – and also with the GDC drift, which was acceptable.
4.24 Crew Readiness and Comfort
Armstrong
I think we were ready for TLI. We were unrushed and had no problems there.
4.25 Subjective Reaction on Weightlessness
Armstrong
Well, perhaps a little bit of fullness in the head.
Aldrin
I didn't notice that quite as soon coming on as in Gemini.
Armstrong
Yes, I didn't feel that it was as marked as I had remembered.
Collins
It's so slight, that if you have anything else in your mind, you just try to ignore it. I mean, it's not any big effect.
Aldrin
Well, there's the feeling that your face tends to lift up a little bit.
Collins
Yes, it does. Your eyes are puffy.
Armstrong
A sensation of head-down position. I guess I had that sensation and expected it and thought it ought to be there, because we were head-down.
Armstrong
Vertigo spatial disorientation.
Aldrin
No problems.
Collins
None.
Aldrin
As far as I was concerned, there wasn't anything really to be alarmed about in the least. I do think that the fact that you've been through it makes a good bit of difference. There was a good bit made of this sort of thing before the flight, and I think someone who had not flown before would have been a little bit overly concerned.
Armstrong
Yes, we were probably a little bit overly apprehensive about this area, because there had been so many comments on it in recent flights; we just didn't run into any problems.
Armstrong
No, the yaw was perfctly on, but the pitch showed approximately a 1-½-degree bias from the value that we would have expected. That is to say, with the ORDEAL set in a LUNAR/200 configuration, and being at the proper point on the minute each minute prior to ignition. The pitch attitude was indicating about 1-½ degrees higher, that is, 1-½ degrees to the right or plus 1-½ degrees from zero. We expected approximately zero. I think this would be wise to look at that carefully with DCPS training guide with respect to the adequacy of that procedure and see where that little bit of difference occurs. Other than that, the TLI monitoring went just as expected.
Aldrin
But that was an instrument that was used to make changes if we were in control. The closing of the loop was really the observation of the H-dot which was surprisingly close. At each 30-second period, we closed the DSKY and looked at the H-dot and it was amazingly close. Of course, there get to be some pretty good H-dots at about 4 minutes and 30 seconds at about 2200 H-dot; and I don't think it was off more than 10 ft/sec at that point, so much closer than we've seen in any simulations, right in the groove.
Armstrong
Had we gone to manual TLI, then we would have probably been a little bit off in pitch. I think we had soon seen that our H-dot was beginning to get out of bounds and we made a correction, but we should understand that a little better.
5.2 S-IVB Performance and ECO
Armstrong
S-IVB performance and engine cut-off were outstanding.
Aldrin
The time of the burn.
Armstrong
Burn time was not quite book value, there. Did we write that down in our checklist? Burn time? Give them a burn status report?
Aldrin
As I recall, it was a little longer than normal.
Armstrong
No, as I remember, it was like a couple of seconds off in burn time, but I just don't recall now what the difference was; but other than that, it went very well.
Aldrin
Let me just note some numbers here that was recorded at freezing the DSKY after cut-off and you are bound to miss that by a couple of seconds. The expected VI was 35575 and I reported 35579; the H-dot expected was 4285 and I have 4321; and, of course, H-dot was building fairly rapidly and that's not quite a mile a second, so the expected altitude was 174 and we read 176. The EMS was 3.3 plus.
Armstrong
Yes, we knew, when the EMS showed only 3 ft/sec off in a 10,000 ft/sec burn, it was going to be pretty good to us.
5.3 Unstowage & Preparation of Cameras
Armstrong
No problem.
5.4 S-IVB Maneuver to Separation Attitude
Aldrin
It was right on schedule and no comment.
5.5 Preseparation Configuration
Aldrin
No problems.
5.6 MCC GO/NO-GO for PYRO ARM
Aldrin
Well how about that high O2 flow anomaly that I think the ground picked up?
Armstrong
Yes, I guess that's right.
5.9 S-IVB/IU Control System Performance
Armstrong
Good.
5.11 S-IVB Tank Pressures
Armstrong
Good.
5.12 EDS Operation
Armstrong
All on time.
5.13 PYRO Operation
Armstrong
No problem.
5.14 Separation from SLA
Collins
The only comment on separation from SLA is the general comment about the EMS during the separation, turnaround, and the docking was that the EMS numbers got confused. The EMS got jolted and did not record some acceleration that it should have or it recorded some that it should not have; I don't know which is the case. I used the EMS as an indicator after turnaround as to how much DELTA-V to apply thrusting back toward the booster. When I got to that stage of the game, the EMS numbers made no sense at all. They were 1-½ ft/sec in error, and at docking, that situation continued. The EMS number that I jotted down at docking was 99.1. There's no way that the EMS could read 99.1 at docking. As I recall, I thrusted away from the booster until the EMS DELTA-V counter read 100.8, just like the procedures said. Then I thrusted minus X until the DELTA-V counter read minus 100.5. I think I thrusted plus X until it read minus 100.6. The point where the EMS was in error came after that. That's what I don't understand. When I completed the turnaround maneuver, the EMS should have read minus 101.1 and it didn't. It read down in the 90's. At docking, when it should have read 101 plus, it read 99.1. So there is a funny there in the EMS.
5.15 High Gain Antenna Activation
Armstrong
That took us quite a while.
Collins
You did that later.
Aldrin
Yes, we didn't get that done until after docking.
5.17 Transposition
Collins
Transposition and docking, in general, worked in flight just as it worked a couple of times in the simulator. I went MANUAL ATTITUDE PITCH to ACCEL COMMAND, and I started to pitch up. After 10 or 20 degrees of pitch-up, when it was definitely established that the attitude error needle in pitch was full scale high (indication that the DAP wished to continue the maneuver in the same direction in which I had started it), then I went PROCEED and MANUAL ATTITUDE PITCH to RATE COMMAND. Then, just as in the simulator, the DAP rolled itself out. It ceased its pitch rate. I don't understand that. At the time, Buzz said that I had forgotten one PROCEED. As I recall, I went through this turnaround procedure exactly as the checklist was written. In the simulator; sometimes it worked like magic and other times it wouldn't. In flight, it worked just exactly like a bad simulator did. MIT or G&C people should check and see what if anything is wrong with this procedure. If I were going to fly this flight over again, I would say it doesn't matter if you pitch up or down. You ought to put those NOUN 22 values in there, hit PROCEED twice, and let the spacecraft turn itself around. You're going to get around within 30 or 45 seconds anyway. It's such a neat, simple, clean, easy procedure to do that way. The way we've got it designed, to make sure that we go pitch-up instiad of pitch-down, sort of mixes apples and oranges. Let the DAP do it, then you take control away from the DAP, then you give it back to the DAP; and, for reasons unknown to me, sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn't.
Armstrong
I'd say that the manual procedure is probably the best. That would be my preference.
Collins
This is something that I'm sure Apollo 12 and other flights will want to massage. I'm firmly convinced that the way to save gas on that maneuver is to let the DAP do it. Make it a totally automatic DAP maneuver. The price you pay for that is that you never know whether it's going to pitch up or down. This is not important. In an effort to save gas and to assure that we always pitched up, I ended up wasting some gas.
5.18 Stabilization & Alignment at 50 Feet
Collins
My procedure was worked out so I'd be 66 feet away from the booster at turnaround. Because of these delays and because of the fact that the DAP kept trying to stop its turnaround rate, I would say that we were about 100 feet away from the booster when I finally turned around. This cost extra gas in getting back to it. I don't know how much extra gas, they said 12 to 18 pounds over. I don't know how much they allocated. I think it was 60 or 70 pounds. That whole maneuver probably cost 80 pounds. In the simulator, doing it completed automated, I can probably do it for 30 to 35 pounds. The difference between 30 to 35 pounds and probably 80 pounds was just wasted gas.
5.19 Docking
Collins
Docking, as in the simulator, was very easy. I did have a slight roll misalignment. I knew I had a slight roll misalignment, but everything else was lined up. Rather than diddle with it and make a last-minute correction, I just accepted it. It turned out later to be 2 degrees in the tunnel.
5.20 Photography during Transposition & Docking
Aldrin
We used the 16-mm camera. We used the settings that were listed in the checklist. We'll just have to look at how the film turned out before we can say too much more about that. I did use a fair amount of film and I think the pictures should come out reasonably well.
5.21 CSM Handling Characteristics during Docking
Collins
Absolutely normal. I docked in CMC, AUTO, NARROW DEADBAND with a 2-deg/sec rate. I went to CMC, FREE, at contact. Docking alignment was fine.
5.23 Adequacy of Sunlight
Collins
More than adequate. There was plenty of sunlight. CSM docking lights were not required. The COAS reticle brightness, even with that filter removed, was still quite dim at points during the docking. It is discernible if you really look closely. At the end when you need it, it's more visible than it is 20 to 30 feet out. I would say that the COAS is marginable, but satisfactory.
5.24 Cabin Purge and LM/CSM Pressure Equalization
Collins
I believe all that went just about exactly as per the numbers.
Aldrin
We went PRESSURE EQUALIZATION valve to OPEN. where it says go to A, we went to 3.8. That's where it stabilized. Repressure O2 only brought it up to 4.4. That gave us a DELTA-P of near zero. There wasn't any cycling back and forth. There was just one cycle open and that's as far as it went.
Collins
That cycling back and forth only applies if you have a problem when you don't have in the full volume of the LM.
5.25 Configuring for LM Ejection, Docking Probe, Venting Latches, Umbilicals, Power, and Temperature
Collins
Okay. The only funny here was when I opened the hatch to get into the tunnel, there was a peculiar odor in the tunnel. This odor was not exactly the same as burned electrical insulation.
Aldrin
You commented that the wiring in the cables seemed to retain this odor.
Collins
I think that this is just normal. Fabric will retain an odor where metal will not.
Aldrin
I've noticed that same odor as characteristic of some of these new materials we have. A lot of the bags, when you get them right close to you, have this same burned-insulation odor. I'm not sure if that's it, but that might explain it.
Collins
I don't know. My first impression was that something was burning or had been burned inside that tunnel. I went over every inch of wiring and all the connectors. I got a flash light and looked at everything. It all looked absolutely normal. We chose not to discuss it with the ground because we hadn't popped any circuit breakers and everything looked normal. It seemed like evidence of a past problem rather than an existing one.
Aldrin
I think it would be a good idea for subsequent crews to sniff around and smell what this probe and umbilicals smell like beforehand.
Collins
They don't smell anything like that. This was a sharp odor. I mean this was enough to knock you down when you opened the tunnel. It was one strong odor.
Aldrin
This stuff had been exposed to a vacuum.
Collins
It had been exposed to the boost environment, too. I don't know how stuff would get under there with the BPC on. The BPC doesn't leave until you're darn near in a vacuum. Despite that, I thought that perhaps there was some odor associated with the high temperature of boost that had somehow gotten through the BPC and through that little tunnel vent line into the tunnel area. It sure smelled, and it smelled a couple of days later coming up on LOI. When I went in to activate the LM, the odor was just as strong.
All these latches made. Latch number 6, which is the one that had acted up a little bit down at the Cape during tests, was the only one that needed one actuation to cock rather than two. Other than 6, all the others said that they were going to require two pulls to cock and they did. All that hardware worked well.
We followed the checklist. We extracted in CMC, FREE, and then went to DAP control and fired the aft thrusters for 3 seconds. We went to CMC and DAP control 5 seconds after spring actuations. Neil and I both read a memo put out by MPAD, saying that for some failure modes you weren't supposed to do that; instead use SCS control. Ken Mattingly and I spent a lot of time the last couple of days before the flight trying to check all that out. It turned out to be sort of a witch hunt. For future flights, they might check into which is the best control mode for extracting the LM. I think it's okay the way we did it; but, if one of the springs gets hung up and throws you sideways, it may be better to do that maneuver under SCS control rather than CMC,FREE.
5.28 Vehicle Dynamics of CSM/LM during Ejection from S-IVB
Collins
There were no abnormal dynamics. The thing backed out absolutely symmetrically as far as I could tell.
5.29 Adequacy of Attitude Control and Stability
Collins
The S-IVB was always very stable prior to, during, and after LM separation. SM RCS plumes had absolutely no effect on visibility or on S-IVB stability.
5.32 Evasive Maneuvers
Collins
We thought at one time we might be somewhat rushed during that time period. It turned out that was comfortable and we were prepared to do the evasive maneuver. We could have done it 5 or 10 minutes earlier than it was called for. Luckily, it is not a maneuver that is time-critical. I think the present scheme of causing the S-IVB to over-burn by 2 meters per second, and then intentionally burning the SPS for 3 seconds to compensate for that over-burn appears to be a sound procedure. I recommend no changes to it.
Aldrin
I did notice the oxidizer unbalance to start out because it was bouncing around, but I have a note down here on the evasive maneuver that it changed from minus 180 to 130 decrease. That's only 3 seconds of burn, but you could see that this thing was in its decrease position all the time, which is what we expected. We just left it alone during that short burn. We got the first gimbal motor off a little bit before I was able to confirm it, so we had to go through a little rain dance of turning that back on and then back off again. That took a little extra time, and we used up a little extra amp-hours out of the batteries, but the ground did confirm it or at least try to confirm that we did get that gimbal motor off.
5.34 S-IVB Slingshot Maneuver
Collins
Now, we never saw that. It seems like the attitude they gave us was not correct.
Aldrin
It was quite a while before we picked up the S-IVB, and it was rolling with a little bit of oscilation, a little coning effect. It definitely had a good roll to it moving away. This was during the non propulsive part of the vent and you could see two streams coming out of either side as the oxidizer was vented out. Exactly opposite to each other were two cones going out. I guess the cones were 30 degrees out one side and 30 degrees out the other, so it was definitely observable.
Collins
But something appeared to be wrong with the attitude they gave us. I don't know whether they miscalculated or what, but they gave us an attitude to see the slingshot out the hatch window. We confirmed that we were looking through the correct window, and it wasn't there.
5.35 S-IVB Venting Operation
Collins
I don't know what to say about that. I guess it went normally.
5.36 Propellant Dump during Slingshot Maneuver
Aldrin
We didn't make use of that procedure of keeping – we didn't use it to any advantage of having the other state vector keep track of the S-IVB. It sounds Mickey Mouse, but it could have been some assistance in telling us where the S-IVB was.
Armstrong
Yes.
Aldrin
A range rate and a VERB 89. I don't know whether it's of any value; the other guys considered it anyway.
Collins
I think that thing of watching the S-IVB is just the dealer's choice anyway. There's no need to watch the S-IVB. It's just that if you're going to go to all the trouble of getting the ground to compute three angles with which you should be able to see the S-IVB out a certain window, then you ought to get the correct angles.
5.37 EDS Deactivation
Collins
Nothing to say about that.
5.39 S-IVB Closeout
Collins
I dont't know what to say about that.
5.40 Dosimeter
Collins
In general, we got very little radiation. Of course, we were going through the Belts about this time. I don't recall that we looked at the radiation-survey meter. Did we do that? Did anybody look at that? I don't believe that was called out. We gave daily dosimeter readings, which as far as I'm concerned fall in a sort of a gee-whiz category. It's just information of very little value to anybody. They have other sources for it, and I suppose it goes on somebody's graph somewhere for posterity. Other than that, I don't have anything to say about it.
Armstrong
It wasn't called out.
Collins
And the dosimeter we just gave them a once-a-day reading on that dosimeter.
5.41 Workload and Timelines
Collins
Just in general, I thought all these workloads and timelines were quite reasonable and had been well worked out by previous crews and I'd recommend no changes to them. I thought that whole first 3 or 4 hours worth of activity was well thought out, and we were never rushed and we were never behind.
Aldrin
Well, our positioning of different people in different seats was a little unique, so its a little different, I think, for other flights.
Collins
Yes. Well, our seat position is a separate subject in itself. As far as being hurried, we were not, although the first 5 hours of the flight I thought were quite reasonable, and that's all I have to say.
Collins
We realigned the IMU in Earth parking orbit. The next time we realigned it, we were, I guess, inertially fixed.
I remember now that our X-torquing angle was 0.172 degrees the first time, which seems excessive to me. We asked the ground to verify and they said it seemed excessive to them and to go ahead and redo it. So I went through P52 a second time. Instead of a minus 0.172 I got a minus 0.171. The results were repeated; therefore, the ground said go ahead and torque them, and we did. I don't understand why that torquing angle was that large. I guess it was an uncompensated X-drift, which they later compensated for more accurately, because the platform was well within its limits during the remainder of the flight. Yet this does seem like a large torquing angle.
Another general comment about the IMU was I couldn't get consistent star angle difference numbers. At various times in the flight, I got either 5 balls 0.01 or 0.02, and there was no correlation. As a matter of fact, there was negative correlation. The more time I took and the more precise I attempted to be, the more often I got 0.01. On a couple of marks, when I got 5 balls, I know that I was not precisely centered when I took the mark. So, I think that there was some small bias in the sextant.
6.2 Doff PGA's
Collins
There were, as far as I can recall, no surprises in doffing the PGA's.
Armstrong
Buzz took his off first.
Aldrin
We were going to stow that from the back, and I was going to be the last one to put it on. Anyway, you were going to put yours on before I did.
Armstrong
As a result of a day that we spent in the CMS practicing taking the suits off and stowing them in the right place, in the right order, and so on, we decided to put all suits in the L-shaped bags: Mike's in the top, Buzz's suit in the bottom section to the rear towards the upward edge or the head end of the couch, and mine in the lower part of the L-shaped bag in the lower section. That worked fine.
All three suits did go in the L-shaped bag satisfactorily and could be stowed there. We left them out though for some period of time prior to stowing them to allow them to air out since they had been worn for a significant period of time prior to this. We wanted to try to dry them out before putting them in the bags tor three days. That worked as planned, and we think that's a reasonable procedure.
Aldrin
Folding them, taking a little bit of care, seemed to pay off when you got to the point of wrestling with them to stuff them in, if you did it in a somewhat methodical way like putting one arm ring inside the helmet ring, and putting the other one in the chest. I actually took all the zippers off, then folded it over the gas connectors, and then ran both legs over and around and got it as tigh as possible before putting it in. Well, it went in side ways. It seems to fit into position quite well. No doubt about it; it was a bit of a wrestling match to do this and stuff it in. It just took a little bit of extra time and effort.
Armstrong
Maybe we're a little over protective, but I doubt that you could really damage those airlock connectors and helmet rings and so on. It was our intent to treat those with as much caution as we could, since we were really committed to their successful operation later.
6.3 Optics Calibration
Collins
Optics calibration worked all right.
6.4 Photography; Earth and Moon
Collins
We didn't photograph the Moon at this time; the Earth we did.
6.5 System Anomalies
Armstrong
At this time, I think, we were starting to home in on the O2 flow discrepancies.
Aldrin
Yes.
Armstrong
I'm not sure we understand it completely. The gauge was not, apparently, indicating the correct flow level and was varying with time. That's an indication for what we think might be a particular flow varying with time. It is evidenced by the fact that the quad accumulator cycle flow rate continued to decrease until it got down to about 0.3, and then it went back up to 0.4.
Aldrin
It would register around there each time. Then it seemed to go up almost to the safe value. That led me to believe that there was nothing wrong with our gauge.
Collins
Sounds like the gauge was operable but out of calibraion.
Aldrin
Right.
Collins
We spent a lot of time with EECOM before the flight discussing what items to check and what items not to check. I suppose as long as we have space flights, we're going to have philosophical disagreements on how exhaustively we want to check all the equipment. My personal philosophy is that if you don't have some reason to believe that it's broken, leave it alone. Don't fool around with it. FOD, of course, has a number of mission rules that require verification of each and every component of each and every system to make sure that they're not going to violate one of the mission rules. I can understand their viewpoint. Maybe the truth lies somewhere in the middle. We ended up after many, many discussions including the operation to made sure that the glycol was flowing satisfactorily through the secondary radiators without any leaks and to make sur that the secondary water boiler was functioning properly. We did that pre-TLI. Then pre-LOI, we checked only for gross radiator leaks and did not check secondary water boiler operation.
Aldrin
It wasn't really a difficult time-consuming task. It went very smoothly.
Collins
It's a question of whether you want to do it. For example, on the secondary glycol radiator leak check, the secondary glycol loop has been bypassed, that is, no fluid has been allowed to go through the radiator. You put the valve from bypass to flow for 30 seconds, turn the pump on, and allow fluid to flow through the radiator. Then you confirm that there is no leak by checking the accumulator quantity and making sure that it does not decrease. So what happened? In this case, accumulator quantity decreased by about 4 percent. This had never come up before. The ground suspected that it was due to thermal characteristics in contractions or expansions in the system, and not a leak. It dropped and then stabilized. I preferred to leave that equipment alone rather than mess with it.
I guess there was no leak. On the other hand, we could have gotten into a big argument over a suspected leak even to the point where you might have to delay TLI by a revolution. If you don't have concrete evidence that something has malfunctioned, and it's your backup system, leave it alone. Don't mess with it.
6.7 Chlorinate Potable Water
Armstrong
We did this once a day before bedtime. The little injector assembly got more and more difficult to operate as each day went by. The chlorine tents to stick and corrode the screw threads. What started out to be a fairly low torque application, towards the eighth day got to be a fairly difficult task to screw the container down so that the chlorine capsule in it would get squashed. We also got some leakage the first day due to the fact that I did not have the threads fully engaged. It felt to me as if I did have the threads engaged. However, when I started screwing it down, I found I didn't. Chlorine was escaping, and I had to get the towel out and mop it up. After that, I didn't have any trouble with it.
Aldrin
I found myself invariably wanting a drink of water after we chlorinated the water. You couldn't do that unless you put some in the bag ahead of time. We should have done that. It just didn't occur to us until afterward.
Collins
I certainly don't think it's worth changing the system for mainline Apollo. For future spacecraft, you'd certainly like some built-in way of assuring yourself of a germ-free water supply without having to go through this kind of procedure.
6.8 Communication Setup for Rest Period
Aldrin
The way that the flight plan handled it was a little involved. We were in a translunar switch setup. It would say each time for rest period go to lunar coast except for such and such. In the LM, we had a fairly simple way of handling it. We just labeled, straight on down the line, the position of the switches. We could probably come up with something similar to this. It could include just a certain set number of switches that are all S-band. You just make a quick check of all these and have them in the right configuration, instead of having to refer back to the systems management book. Keep that checklist out of the flight plan, and keep it in the checklist.
Armstrong
The checklist is pretty long, so you end up with a fairly complex piece in the flight plan and also a complex list in the systems book.
Aldrin
But the flight plan does have two sleep mode options: HIGH GAIN or OMNI. So, you really have more than you need in the flight plan.
Armstrong
We insist that we only go in the OMNI mode during sleep periods. We decided that it would be best.
6.10 Ease of Operations of Communications
Collins
They were all right. There were also times when we had communications dropout that I don't think were explained. I had the feeling that there were a lot of ground antenna switching problems. There would be times when we really should have had sound and we didn't. It was due to some sort of a ground problem. It seemed to me that there were a lot more of those problems on this flight than there were on Apollo 8.
Armstrong
You probably noticed that in the Center, too, handovers and switching.
Aldrin
We chose not to control it on board, switching from one OMNI to the other. We let the ground handle the whole thing, and they just have a choice between two OMNI's. They are going to run into some dropouts invariably.
Collins
The PTC rate we used was 0.3 deg/sec. For the crew to switch OMNI's manually and go around A, B, C, D during the time when they're awake is really too much of a job because you're having to switch OMNI's approximately every 5 minutes.
Aldrin
It's 18 minutes.
Collins
So, I think it's a correct decision to let the ground switch between opposites B and D OMNI antenna rather than having us switch manually A, B, C, D; but I guess the ground needs some refinement in that procedure because we did have a number of cases of COMM dropouts, and later on in lunar orbit, it was even more so.
6.12 Preferred PTC Mode & Technique for Initiation
Collins
There are all sorts of real varied funnies in the check list (page L9-6) for how to get into PTC. Now, just for example, during the period when you are waiting for the thruster firing activity to quiet down, there's a 20-minute nominal wait period for thruster firing to diminish. And for instance, if the crew wants to see how the thruster firing activity is coming along, the way of verification is VERB 16 NOUN 20, monitoring the gimbal angle, and watching the lack of change in the gimbal angles. Yet, if you do that and leave VERB 16 NOUN 20 displayed on the DSKY, when you proceed 8 or 10 steps later to the point where you start to spin the spacecraft up, instead of getting 0.3 deg/sec rate, you will get a rate in excess of 1 deg/sec. And this fact is not well known. This is something that we found in the simulator shortly before the flight and penciled into the checklist. But I would just say in general that that checklist should be reworked. There are many little pitfalls. For example, if you find yourself in an inertial attitude, and all you want to do is spin up around that attitude, the checklist implies that you can just go into it at that intermediate point, but that is not the case either. You must pretend that you are in the wrong attitude, ask the computer to maneuver you to the right attitude and then go through the entire checklist from that viewpoint, or it won't work properly. These are just two pitfalls that I happen to know about right now.
Armstrong
It seems to me that the point is that this is a very good procedure that worked extremely well, and we're going to find that it's extremely easy to use but has not stood the test of time yet. It needs a lot more experience in use before we could use it reliably and repeatedly every time without causing a later problem that we couldn't predict.
Collins
That's right. Anoter little facet of it is that after the PTC is initiated, then there are certain no-no's in regard to the use of the DSKY's having to do with collapsing deadband and other problems internal to the computer. So, I think some explanation and expansion in those pages in the checklist is in order.
Armstrong
It's probably worth noting here, while we're thinking about it, there seems to be some advantage to writing a program to do this job. At least it should be considered, rather than the one we're using at the present time. It could obviate many kinds of minor difficulties that we didn't mention until now.
6.14 Ease of Handling Optics and Spacecraft for Navigational Sightings
Collins
With P23, as I practiced it in the simulator and made use of the AUTO optics to maneuver the spacecraft to each star substellar point, the flaw in this technique is that the spacecraft roll angle is unconstrained in that with large trunnion angles, the computer may pick a roll attitude which causes the star to be occulted by the LM structure. Now, the flight planners came to me a couple of weeks before the flight and said that to get around this disadvantage of the AUTO optics, they wanted to use ground-computed angles to which to maneuver, and then these ground-computed angles would have a roll angle which would assure that the star would not be occulted by the LM structure. And at that time, I told them that all my training had been built toward using AUTO optics for these maneuvers. I asked them to go back and find stars whose trunnion angles were small enough that this would not then be a problem (the LM structure occulting it). Flight planning talked to the MPAD people and said that they could not find such stars with the proper in plane/out of plane geometry. But the ground-computed angles would locate satisfactory substellar points and all subsequent maneuvers would be very small. Now, I should have called a halt right there and sat down with the flight planning people and with the MPAD people, and I should have gone through each star, each maneuver, each gimbal angle, each subsequent substellar point, and ironed out just exactly step by step how many maneuvers would be required; the size of them and exactly what was being furnished to me in regard to roll angles. However, I didn't. That's one of the things that fell through the crack. So, in flight when I maneuvered to the ground-supplied angles, I found that I was nowhere near the substellar point as determined by the fact that the sextant reticle was not parallel to the horizon at that point. And here I think we had some kind of a communications breakdown with the ground, because I kept telling them that this was not at a satisfactory substellar point, that the reticle was not parallel to the horizon. They kept telling me that it was all right to go ahead and mark anyway.
Aldrin
They didn't really mean that. We're sure they didn't.
Collins
Now, I'm not sure what they meant. Maybe you hit the nail on the head. What they meant was that the spacecraft did not have to be rolled in such a manner that the spacecraft roll was paralel to the substellar point. In other words, what they were saying is that the computer program could accommodate a change in spacecraft roll simply by torquing the optics around to go off at a peculiar angle. Nonetheless, when you look through the sextant to get accurate marks, you must have the reticle pattern parallel to the horizon or you are not measuring the true angle between the star and horizon. Here's the star and the horizon, and instead of measuring this angle, you're measuring this angle or that angle or some other oblique angle that is larger than the true angle, which is the angle from the star normal to the horizon. So this initial run on P23 got very confused. The following day, the problem went away because we were far enough away from the Earth, and the fact that their angles were not at the substellar point became immaterial because the Earth was small enough that a very small maneuver on my part could locate the substellar point. But when you are close to the Earth, and the Earth is very large, and you have an obvious roll on its alignment in the reticle, then it requires a very large maneuver to maneuver the spacecraft over to the substellar point. I'd be happy to draw it on a blackboard some other time for the proper people. I was reluctant to make these large maneuvers, because I thought something was wrong. And they kept saying go ahead and mark, that it was all right, and so I did take some marks and the DELTA-R's and the DELTA-V's were excessive. I don't know what else to say now. I'd sort of like to get a blackboard and talk this over with flight planning and with the people from MPAD, if necessary, and see where we went wrong. It's my fault in that I didn't get all the interested parties and sit down and go through step by step and maneuver by maneuver exactly where we were going to go and what we were going to do.
Aldrin
I think it's one of these areas that it would have been nice maybe, for you anyway, to have had an abbreviated simulation with Houston as part of our training. One big problem there is that you just can't always count on the simulator giving enough fidelity.
Armstrong
Yes. I think that's one of the areas where the simulator probably falls a little short.
Collins
In my mind, it's a question of time available. I had so much stuff to learn, and I had divided up the time, and P23 was a relatively small slice of the overall training. I didn't want to really spend the time to sit down and go and hammer this stuff all the way through, although it appears I should have. That's another thing. That state vector was another heartache.
Armstrong
The state vector may have been bad initially but especially when you get two large errors in a row. We incorporated it, and from that point on, the state vector wasn't any good.
Collins
That's right. The state vector was mediocre to begin with and it rapidly got worse.
But each star has its own distinct substellar point, and you take a measurement on two stars in a row. This requires that you maneuver from one substellar point to another. I kept telling those people that before the flight and they kept saying, "Oh,no. They're all right close together." I think there's some confusion on their part and maybe some on mine.
Aldrin
I think it's all unfortunate that the first mark, the first star set that we had, was changed in the flight plan.
Collins
Well, that's another thing. We didn't mark correctly. Sometime between the last time we simulated it and the first time we pulled this out in the flight, star number 2 had been moved from the number 1 position down to number 4 position, and they had done it just by changing the 1 to a 4 and drawing a little arrow. When you read me the numbers, you didn't note that I read star number 2 and it was the same old star I had always marked on first. That was just a bad area. A little bit of work could have cleaned that up before the flight, and I just didn't have the time or the inclination to sit down and hammer it out with the people required, and I should have.
Well, we were fine the next day only because the Earth was so much smaller. If you have a little Earth and you're supposed to be marking on this point and you're at this point, it's no big deal to move from here over to here. But the Earth is big and you're supposed to be marking on this point, and you're really over there; that requires a big maneuver. The same problem existed the next day. However, a tiny maneuver on my part solved the problem; whereas the day before it was a huge maneuver, and I was reluctant to make that maneuver.
As a general comment, I've found that the telescope was a very poor optical instrument in that it required long, long periods of dark adaptation before any star patterns were visible. In most cases, it was not convenient to stop and spend the amount of time necessary to make any use of the telescope. Thus, we kept our platform powered up continually. My procedure was to ignore the telescope and to take at face value what the sextant said. In other words, if the sextant AUTO optics came up with a star in the sextant field of view, I accepted it as a matter of fact that it was the correct star. We marked on that star without any further verification. I suppose this could rise up and bit you, but I felt save and comfortable with it, and it worked throughout the flight.
6.15 Adequacy of Procedures to Prepare for and Accomplish the Translunar Midcourse Corrections
Collins
Now by that I assume they mean the ground-supplied sequence, and that I felt was fine. Got any comment about that?
Armstrong
Well, they may also be referring to P30 and P40 sequence and so on. And it was our intention to do those very carefully in just the way that they are detailed in the procedures; not because the burn was all that important and we compensated for it if we made an error, but rather because the analysis of that burn on the ground was going to be the thing that determined that we have a good SPS for LOI. Because that was the case, we wanted the ground not to be at all confused about what procedures we would use and just how the burn was made. So we tried to stick precisely with the same procedures you'd use for an SPS burn.
Collins
In general, I thought all the P30's and P40's worked out very smoothly.
6.16 Midcourse Correction
Armstrong
Well, the first midcourse was cancelled to allow the DELTA-V value to grow in size so that the second midcourse correction would be reasonably longer, allowing engine operation to be well stabilized and more accurately analyzed on the ground.
Aldrin
Midcourse 2 was 21.3 feet per second.
Armstrong
The results of that were very, very good and the residuals were very small, 0.30 and 0.20. But there was some question about the fact we had a relatively large EMS residual; namely, 3.8 ft/sec in about a 20-ft/sec burn. The predicted knowledge of tail-offs apparently was badly in error or else the knowledge of the EMS itself in the tail-off region was badly in error. That never was corrected throughout the flight. We saw this condition through the rest of the SPS burns.
Aldrin
Did it say anything about the sextant star check? They updated that. It was pretty much out of sequence.
Armstrong
The first one they gave us. Then the second one was in that direction because, of course, the LM was there.
Collins
It was our desire that insofar as possible an inertial attitude check be made (in the absence of the burn) so that if you made the burn they knew you were in fact pointing in the right inertial direction. Of course, the LM is out in front of you and you can't look down the X-axis of the optics, so you're constrained not to point any closer to the X-axis than the LM will allow. However, the initial values that they gave us were sort of like down the Z-axis. Of course, you could have the optics pointing down the Z-axis and then you could be free to pass that test and still have the spacecraft pointing 180 degrees out from where you want it to be. It will still pass that test, so in our view that wasn't particularly good. You were really just checking your alignment of the platform, which is really not what you're trying to do. You're trying to check that the spacecraft is pointed the way you want it pointed so that was the reason for our request for additional star checks.
6.17 Adequacy of CSM/MSFN Comm Performance and Procedures for Coast during AGA Reflectivity Test
Collins
Okay. Adequacy of all this stuff for the AGA reflectivity test. I understand we didn't have that and we cancelled that.
6.18 Television Preparation and Operation
Collins
I thought in general the onboard color television system was well designed and was easy to operate. Buzz, you got anything to say about that?
Aldrin
It was quite easy to hook up and put together. We ended up putting the two together making use of tape instead of the Velcro that was on there, to get the monitor right close to the camera. I think initially we were a little tangled up in wires. There were wires all over the place, and we were running around from one strut to the other. We found out that it was set to have the monitor attached right to the camera itself, so from that point on, we taped the monitor beside the camera.
Armstrong
Well, we have a couple of comment we'll get into sometime later with respect to television, but with respect to its operation, it's unquestionably a magnificent little piece of equipment. However, you cannot operate it without anny planning at all. You do have to think about whether the vehicle is rotating or not, in what area you're going to take pictures, where the lighting is going to be from, and through what windows, and all that sort of thing. This takes some planning to enable you to assure yourself that you are going to get a good TV picture of whatever you decided you are going to take a picture of.
Collins
That's right, and the monkey is on the back of the crew, functioning as script writer, producer, and actor, for the daily television shows. We had no time nor inclination preflight to plan these things out so they were all sort of spur-of-the-moment shows. And maybe that's a good way to do business and maybe that's not. I don't know. Maybe other flights with perhaps more time to devote to this should give some thought to what has previously been done and what are the best things to cover and when is the best time to present them. The next crew should spend a simulator session working out things like angles and light and what have you.
Aldrin
There is no doubt that you want to do it right, because there's a big audience looking on.
Armstrong
It inspires you a little bit when all of a sudden you have about 10 minutes left to go for a scheduled TV broadcast and the ground says there are 200 million people waiting to see you. They're all watching. Now what are you going to be showing?
Collins
We're trying to paint the picture of having this highly trained professional crew performing like amateurs. They don't know where to place the camera or what to do or what to say. It hasn't been well worked out. I feel uncomfortable about this.
Armstrong
It's just fortunate that the camera is as good as it is and it compensates for the inabilities of the operators.
Aldrin
I think that some of the better things that we did were just monitoring and just trying things out before we got to the point of putting on the show. I think there is the ability of people on the ground to see what's coming across, look at it, select what they want, and then assemble it together and release it. I'm sure everyone wants to have a real-time picture and voice along with it, but you're going to suffer somewhat in the quality you get. For example, activity in the LM, when we were just trying to see how it was working. All of a sudden we found that we were going out live and we were completely happy with that. This was one of the better shows we did.
Armstrong
I agree with that, but on the other hand there is another side to that discussion that doesn't involve somebody thinking about how that situation can be handled. We can put out something that the agency is willing to stand behind and can be proud of without the crew having to make a lot of last-minute quick guesses as to what they ought to be doing.
6.19 High Gain Antenna Performance
Collins
It was okay I guess.
Aldrin
It seemed to work fine. I placed it in AUTO, threw the switch over to MEDIUM or NARROW, and just a couple of seconds later the signals transferred.
Armstrong
There was one observation here that seemed to me to be different from the simulator. In the spacecraft, I could seldom if ever detect a difference in signal strength between MEDIUM and NARROW. In the simulator, it's always decidedly different. The conclusion to be reached is that either the simulator is not an accurate representation of signal strength or that we really weren't getting any difference between MEDIUM and NARROW beam. We were, in fact, stuck in one or the other irrespective of switching.
Aldrin
I would expect there wasn't as much difference between WIDE and MEDIUM, but when you went to the NARROW, you could see it. It wasn't consistent. In any case, it was unlike what we were used to and as long as the signal was received, I guess it's not a problem.
Collins
I think that's a function of distance, too. Now in lunar orbit, there was a noticeable difference between MEDIUM and NARROW. But there were some funnies in that high gain antenna. We were playing with it some time and we didn't have control over it and the ground had one of the OMNI's selected. We thought we were controlling it and we weren't. Another funny was that there were ground switching problems where the thing was not receiving a proper signal.
Aldrin
I remember one time the ground said go ahead and turn the high gain off. I complied and we lost COMM. I don't think they expected it; the next time they had control, we were on OMNI at that time. It wasn't at all clear to me at all times who had control and who was running the show.
Collins
That's right and it was a great temptation to go to command reset to make sure that we had control, except that threw six or eight other switches that we were reluctant to change. I suspected at times that it was not working properly. I never absolutely caught it malfunctioning. I think those suspicions mostly had to do with the fact that we didn't have control of it or the ground had some sort of a sighting problem.
Armstrong
The confusion in my mind often was that I wasn't really sure what our configuration actually was. You can't tell by the switches and trying to interpret what you see in terms of displays you have available and what you hear through your earphone doesn't always lead you to the right conclusion and that's a little bit disconcerting.
6.21 S-Band Squelch
Armstrong
It worked very well, I thought.
6.22 Daylight IMU Realign and Star Check
Armstrong
I think we already covered that by saying that with the LM on in the daylight the telescope is nearly useless and you have to rely on the sextant. Now, we never went into that mode that Apollo 10 discovered of pointing the plus X axis at the sun. We never had an occasion or need to do that. Therefore, we can't comment on it. Just staying regular PTC attitude, normal to the sunline, the telescope was just about useless.
6.23 Venting Batteries and Waste
Aldrin
When we started a battery charge, we would look at the vent and find it was usually down fairly low. I don't think there was any time when we saw it above 1.6 and as soon as we went to VENT, it would drop down to 0.2 or 0.3. I don't know how serious that is. Nobody seemed to be concerned about that. I'm sure that the ground has a readout, but they never indicated or suggested to us that we vent the batteries.
6.24 Radiators
Collins
We never flowed through the secondary radiators because the primary worked fine. The cabin temperature (translunar) was slightly warmer than we would like it, although the gauge readings were quite cool. We were running 60 degrees cabin temperature and 57 degrees suit temperature.
Armstrong
High 40's in the suit and low 60's in the cabin.
6.25 CM/LM Delta Pressure
Collins
Well, the LM pressure would slowly decay, but remain well within tolerance. I don't have any good numbers. It was a tight LM.
6.26 Re-Establishing PTC
Collins
We've already discussed that, I think. We always used 0.3 deg/sec roll and we never tried the 0.1. It would be advantageous, in regard to antenna switching if stability is satisfactory, and 0.1 deg/sec would probably be a better mode than 0.3. It would also save some gas. However, we did not investigate that. Perhaps that ought to be something for future flights to look into. I think that theory has been mentioned to FOD.
Aldrin
Maybe.
6.27 High Gain Antenna PTC Reacquire Check
Collins
We did it coming back.
Aldrin
When it worked, it worked like a charm. There were a couple of times when it didn't seem to want to work.
6.28 Optics Calibration
Collins
Optics CAL the next day worked fine.
6.29 Fuel Cell Performance and Purging
Collins
The fuel cells performed perfectly. Purging didn't present any problems. We followed the checklist on the heaters and they worked normally.
6.30 LM and Tunnel Pressure
Collins
LM and tunnel pressures were normal.
6.31 Latch Verification
Collins
Latches, as I say, were all verified. Latch number 6 required one actuation to cock. That was the only anomaly and it was within the realm of normal.
6.32 Inspection of Tunnel Mechanics
Collins
I'm not sure what that means, but everything in the tunnel was normal.
6.33 Removal of Probe and Drogue
Collins
Probe and drogue removal was absolutely normal. Have you anything to say about that?
6.34 IVT to LM
Aldrin
Well, as far as I'm concerned there was no disorientation in going from one spacecraft to another. It was quite easy to go from one to the other. It would take a little readjusting to get yourself into position when you first entered one vehicle or the other. You weren't sure what you were looking at. But there was no disorientation associated with that.
Armstrong
I didn't observe any problems with that.
6.35 16-mm Camera
Aldrin
We may not get back to this again, but I think that the exercise we had in the LM was extremely valuable from our standpoint. It was conducted from a very comfortable timeline. We had no particular schedule to meet; we used the camera to document. In addition, the television set at this time was quite valuable.
6.37 IVT to CM
Collins
From the CMP position, it was of great value to have a one-day head start on the removal of the probe and the drogue. If problems arose with the probe or the drogue, you have time to troubleshoot with the ground. I was glad to get that probe and drogue out a day early.
Armstrong
It was something you know that hadn't previously been done quite this was. It just seemed that it would make us more comfortable, going back and forth to the LM, that if there was anything wrong, we'd have some chance to talk and think about it and give the ground some time to think about it. That didn't turn out to be necessary because it was perfect, but still I think all of us felt a lot more comfortable having spent some time going back and forth and checking the stowage and looking over everything. The repetition just took the pressure off the next day's IVT.
Aldrin
Working in the very relaxed environment of the constant wear garment, there were no problems. We didn't really need to be restrained. I used the restraints and all it seemed to do was pull my pants down. You did have to be a little concerned about floating away from what you were doing, however, it was no great problem to push yourself back down to where you wanted to be.
Armstrong
This enabled us to get a little ahead in stowage.
Aldrin
Concerning transfer items: we brought several books back – updates and a couple of procedures.
Armstrong
So, all in all, I guess it worked out well. We recommend it as a useful procedure.
6.38 Eating Periods
Collins
They were well spaced and I thought adequate time was given to eating. Quality of the food will be discussed later.
6.39 Workloads
Armstrong
The workload during the translunar coast is very light as it should be.
Aldrin
In comparison to the preflight workload, it gave us a couple of days to relax. I think it's important to store up the rest.
Collins
I think so too.
6.40 Rest Periods
Aldrin
We're all good sleepers. The first one was not as good as the second or third, but the first sleep period was still surprisingly restful as far as I'm concerned.
Collins
I think particularly when you get into the later flights of extended EVA's and lunar activity, somehow the crew must place themselves in a frame of mind of looking on the separation of the LM as the beginning of the flight plan and to relax, get plenty of sleep, and conserve their energies in all the events leading up to that point. To arrive in lunar orbit tired can create problems and it's possible to do that if you don't approache it in the right frame of mind.
Armstrong
I think Mike's hit the nail on the head. We did precisely that. We got a lot of rest and got into lunar orbit eager to go to work and that's a particularly fortunate position to be in.
Collins
This is something we've talked about before the flight and I don't know how you can get yourself in that frame of mind but I think it is a frame of mind. You have to get yourself convinced that there will be a nice relaxing couple of days going to the moon.
Aldrin
The first unusual thing that we saw I guess was 1 day out or something pretty close to the moon. It had a sizeable dimension to it, so we put the monocular on it.
Collins
How'd we see this thing? Did we just look out the window and there it was?
Aldrin
Yes, and we weren't sure but that it might be the S-IVB. We called the ground and were told the S-IVB was 6000 miles away. We had a problem with the high gain about this time, didn't we?
Collins
There was something. We felt a bump or maybe I just imagined it.
Armstrong
He was wondering whether the MESA had come off.
Collins
I don't guess we felt anything.
Aldrin
Of course, we were seeing all sorts of little objects going by at the various dumps and then we happened to see this one brighter object going by. We couldn't think of anything else it could be other than the S-IVB. We looked at it through the monocular and it seemed to have a bit of an L shape to it.
Armstrong
Like an open suitcase.
Aldrin
We were in PTC at the time so each one of us had a chance to take a look at this and it certainly seemed to be within our vicinity and of a very sizeable dimension.
Armstrong
We should say that it was right at the limit of the resolution of the eye. It was very difficult to tell just what shape it was. And there was no way to tell the size without knowing the range or the range without knowing the size.
Aldrin
So then I got down in the LEB and started looking for it in the optics. We were grossly misled because with the sextant off focus what we saw appeared to be a cylinder.
Armstrong
Or really two rings.
Aldrin
Yes.
Armstrong
Two rings. Two connected rings.
Collins
No, it looked like a hollow cylinder to me. It didn't look like two connected rings. You could see this thing tumbling and, when it came around end-on, you could look right down in its guts. It was a hollow cylinder. But then you could change the focus on the sextant and it would be replaced by this open-book shape. It was really weird.
Aldrin
I guess there's not too much more to say about it other than it wasn't a cylinder.
Collins
It was during the period when we thought it was a cylinder that we inquired about the S-IVB and we'd almost convinced ourselves that's what it had to be. But we don't have any more conclusions than that really. The fact that we didn't see it much past this one time period – we really don't have a conclusion as to what it might have been, how big it was, or how far away it was. It was something that wasn't part of the urine dump, we're pretty sure of that.
Skipping ahead a bit, when we jettisoned the LM, you know we fired an explosive charge and got rid of the docking rings and the LM went boom. Pieces came off the LM. It could have been some Mylar or something that had somehow come loose from the LM.
Aldrin
We thought it could have been a panel, but it didn't appear to have that shape at all.
Collins
That's right, and for some reason, we thought it might have been a part of the high gain antenna. It might have been about the time we had high gain antenna problems. In the back of my mind, I have some reason to suspect that its origin was from the spacecraft.
Aldrin
The other observation that I made accumulated gradually. I don't know whether I saw it the first night, but I'm sure I saw it the second night. I was trying to go to sleep with all the lights out. I observed what I thought were little flashes inside the cabin, spaced a couple of minutes apart and I didn't think too much about it other than just a note in my mind that they continued to be there. I couldn't explain why my eye would see these flashes. During transearth coast, we had more time and I devoted more opportunity to investigating what this could have been. It was at that point that I was able to observe on two different occasions that, instead of observing just one flash, I could see double flashes, at points sepatated by maybe a foot. At other times, I could see a line with no direction of motion and the only thing that comes to my mind is that this is some sort of penetration. At least that's my guess, without much to support it; some penetration of some object into the spacecraft that causes an emission as it enters the cabin itself. Sometimes it was one flash on entering. Possibly departing from an entirely different part of the cabin, outside the field of view. The double flashes appeared to have an entry and then impact on something such as the struts. For a while, I thought it might have been some static electricity because I was also able, in moving my hand up and down the sleep restraint, to generate very small sparks of static electricity. But there was a definite difference between the two as I observed it more and more. I tried to correlate this with the direction of the sun. When you put the window shades up there is still a small amount of leakage. You can generally tell within 20 or 30 degrees the direction of the sun. It seemed as though they were coming from that general direction; however, I really couldn't say if there was near enough evidence to support that these things were observable on the side of the spacecraft where the sun was. A little bit of evidence seemed to support this. I asked the others if they had seen any of these and, until about the last day, they hadn't.
Armstrong
Buzz, I'd seen some light, but I just always attributed this to sunlight, because the window covers leak a little bit of light no matter how tightly secured. The only time I observed it was the last night when we really looked for it. I spent probably an hour carefully watching the inside of the spacecraft and I probably made 50 significant observations in this period.
Aldrin
Sometimes a minute or two would go by and then you'd see two within the space of 10 seconds. On an average, I'd say just as a guess it was maybe something like one a minute. Certainly more than enough to convince you that it wasn't an optical illusion. It did give you a rather funny feeling to contemplate that something was zapping through the cabin. There wasn't anything you could do about it.
Armstrong
It could be something like Buzz suggested. Mainly a neutron or some kind of an atomic particle that would be in the visible spectrum.
Armstrong
With respect to preparation for LOI, our flight plan was written in such a way that it depended on doing midcourse 4 and option 1 P52 to get the landing site REFSMMAT into the computer and then an option 3 REFSMMAT P52.
Aldrin
Was that before midcourse 4 was performed?
Collins
Yes, midcourse 4 was with the landing site REFSMMAT.
Armstrong
Then we did our simulation of LOI where we checked the gimbal motors and a 360 degree pitch maneuver to look at the Moon, followed by preparation for LOI. The midcourse 4 was cancelled. We did not do the option 1 P52 that established our new REFSMMAT. ... set up the computer for the LOI. When we got around to the P52 in the flight plan, which occurred at 73 hours, we did option 3. We recognized that we had never done a new P52 to an option 1. We are not sure that we could at that point in time.
Collins
Did they have an uplink?
Armstrong
I'm not sure they had uplinked the necessary data into the computer. In any case, we recognized that we were not operating the way the flight plan had intended, due to this cancellation of midcourse 4; therefore, we got that information from the ground. We did a P52 option 1, a P52 option 3, and our simulation of LOI where we brought the gimbal motors on and checked that everything was really copacetic. During this process we got gehind the timeline because we did things differently than we had intended in the flight plan. Consequently, we cancelled the 360 degree pitch maneuver to photograph the Moon. We did not feel very bad about that since shortly before, when we went into the Moon shadow, we did look at it extensively throught the windows and took a lot of pictures with the high-speed black and white film. I think we accomplished what we wanted to do in looking at the Moon from a relatively close range. We agreed to cancel the 360 degree pitch maneuver. We were then slightly ahead of the timeline in preparation for LOI. We spent a little more time discussing that among ourselves than we had planned, since it was different than our simulations.
Aldrin
There was something else. Was it just the two different alignments that got us a little bit behind?
Collins
I think it was not having a REFSMMAT.
Armstrong
There was something else. I do not recall right now what it might have been. We did that secondary loop check, and a secondary radiator flow check.
Collins
We could not see the stars. Was there a star check at a certain time? We were sitting around on one foot and then the other waiting for something. There was a time in the pad when the star check was only valid after 11 past the hour.
Aldrin
That appears at some time. I don't see that written on this particular set up.
Armstrong
I might mention on the sextant star checks that, on most occasions, we manually drove the optics CDU's to the ground-computed values for the star and checked the attitude in that manner. That always worked for us. We were always able to see the star in the sextant field of view by manually guiding the optics rather than using the computer to designate the optics.
7.3 SPS Burn for LOI-1
Armstrong
Now we will go up to LOI. LOI was on time, and the residuals were very low. Again we saw a large value of DELTA-VC's – 6.8. Buzz will now comment on the PUGS.
Aldrin
We had been briefed on the experiences that Apollo 10 had had with the operation of the PUGS oxidizer blow valve, whereby they had responded to the initial decrease that the system gave them by placing the switch to DECREASE. Subsequently, it went to INCREASE. They followed it but were never able to catch up with it. It was suggested to us that the best procedure was to monitor this in the first 25 seconds, again expect it to be in DECREASE, and then expect that maybe even by going to FULL INCREASE you could not keep up with the system. With tis in mind, I watched it throughout the burn. As soon as it started toward the -100, when it was around -120, I was convinced that it was in the upward swing toward INCREASE. I threw it to FULL INCREASE well before the normal ground rules required, and the valve went to MAX. Despite the fact that it was in INCREASE, the needle eventually went into the INCREASE position. I don't think we got over a 100. At the end of the burn we were three or four-tenths behind.
Aldrin
Even by leading it as much as I did, I still ended up being a little bit behind. That was pretty small compared to what it could have been.
Armstrong
How about the burn itself, Mike?
Collins
I was just about nominal.
Armstrong
Buzz, give the pad value for burn time.
Aldrin
6 02.
Armstrong
Burn time was about 5 57. So it was 5 seconds ...
Aldrin
Yes. Fairly early in the burn, we could tell that.
Collins
I remember you were predicting that.
Aldrin
Three or 4 seconds early is what we predicted.
Collins
Start transient was very small, and steering was extremely quiet and accurate. The chamber pressure, which we had noticed to be a little bit low in the first SPS burn, climbed slowly and actually ended up slightly over 100. I put some specific comments on the voice tape. I thought it was a nominal burn.
7.5 Orbit Parameters
Armstrong
In postburn NOUN 34, we had a 60.9-mile perigee and a 169.9-mile apogee.
7.6 Block Data Updates
Aldrin
The LOS that we used, in addition to star checks, to tell us if we were in the right position relative to the Moon and the Earth was like the horizon check and is an additional cross check. These calculations turned out to be within a second of the ground-precdicted time. When the ground said we were going to lose signal at 75 41 23, it was a second later that signal strength dropped down. It was very comforting.
Aldrin
We could see the horizon coming up a good bit before. I guess it was the one for TEI that was a little confusing as to which way we were pointed.
Armstrong
You were the only one confused.
7.8 Adequacy of Contact with Ground Operational Support Facilities for LOI
Aldrin
Before the burn, I had noticed a difference in the A and B N2's. I didn't record which one was higher. They were well within what we consider nominal; it stuck in my mind that there was a difference. It wasn't too surprising when the ground called us after the burn and said that they had observed tank B nitrogen had dropped down somewhat during the time of the burn. I think it dropped to 1900.
Armstrong
The values I have are B – 1950 psi and A – 2250 psi postburn. The helium was 1500 psi. Those came up a little bit after the temperature stabilized.
Aldrin
We'll talk a little more about that. Evidently there was not any particular leak. It might have been a thermal condition that one tank had been exposed to.
Armstrong
The flow through that particular solenoid valve could have been greater than emphasized.
Aldrin
We started that one on B and then went to A. I don't know if that would be any explanation.
Armstrong
I can't think offhand why that would affect it. The only thing I think about is the size of the orifice through which the gas is passing or the chamber size that, somehow, it was feeding ...
Collins
I don't think we were ever concerned that we had a problem on the B side.
Armstrong
No.
Collins
We were glad the ground was looking at it. It seemed to be all right to us.
7.10 Acquisition of MSFN
Armstrong
In the post-LOI, we had a MSFN contact on time and did a P52 option 3 and 2 drift check. Those numbers were reported.
7.15 SPS Burn for LOI-2
Armstrong
LOI-2 was a bank A only burn. I assume this was to conserve nitrogen pressure in the B cell. This was a 17-second burn. Residuals were reasonable – 3.3, 0, and 0.1. The DELTA-VC again was 5.2.
7.17 Orbit Parameters for LOI-2
Armstrong
Postburn NOUN 44 was 54.4 by 66.1.
Collins
Did you want to talk about that orbit being targeted 55 by 65 rather than 67?
Armstrong
Yes, I think we made it clear on a number of occasions preflight that we were not in agreement with the change, just prior to flight, to the 55 by 65 orbit. We did not disagree with the intent of what they were trying to achieve; it's just that this did not have the benefit of its effect on a number of other areas of the flight plan. I still feel as though that was somewhat of a mistake. There were some other sides to the discussion that had not been fully reviewed by all the parties.
Speaker
What about items between the two maneuvers?
Aldrin
One item that came up was the request to look at the crater Aristarchus to see if we could see any glow or evidence of some observations that had been made by people on the ground. That does bring to mind that as we were coming in on LOI and I could see the edge of the Moon coming back into the daylight, it appeared to me that at one point (which I can't identify) there was one particular area along the horizon that was lit up. I doubt that it was anywhere near Aristarchus. There appeared to be one region that was a little unusual in its lighting. Maybe our films will catch that. We'll just have to try to identify that one when we see the pictures. I don't think that there is any particular connection, but I thought I'd mention it because it did strike me as a little unusual.
Armstrong
As long as we're talking about Aristarchus, I'd agree with Buzz's observation that the brightest part of the area that was somewhat illuminated might agree with the zero phase point of earthshine. This would mean you're getting a lot of local reflection from earthshine. That certainly –
Aldrin
You talking about once we were in lunar orbit?
Armstrong
Yes. I would certainly agree, particularly with the highly illuminated parts of the inside of the crater wall. I think it was also true that the area around Aristarchus, that is in the plains, was also more illuminated.
Aldrin
It wasn't just the crater, it was the whole general area.
Armstrong
It's not necessarily obvious that this also would happen to agree with the zero phase point of earthshine.
Collins
It could. We had nothing to compare it with.
Aldrin
This was not in sunlight; it was in earthshine. That wouldn't have been zero ...
Armstrong
Offhand, it doesn't agree with anything I can think of, and it seemed to extend for quite a distance around that area. Although I called that a fluorescence, it's probably not a very good term. It certainly did not have any colors that I could associate it with. There was just a higher local illumination level over the surface at that point.
Aldrin
I was a brighter area than anything else we could see in either direction. I don't know if you could compare that with any of the brighter areas we saw in the sunlit portions – say on the back side; it didn't look like it was the same thing at all. Not having anything to compare it with in the way of earthshine illumination, we really couldn't tell much.
Armstrong
We could say the effect was there, and it was a very pronounced effect. It's a more obvious effect than looking the Earth's zodiacal light. It's a more pronounced effect than zodiacal light which is also observed easily with the eye. Our post-LOI-2 P52 option 3 was a good one with an extremely low torquing angle (torqued at 81.05). After this, we prepared the tunnel for LM ingress.
Aldrin
Let's go back to the first time we went into the darkness on the front side, in higher orbit before LOI-2. This was before we got to the region of the landing site. It wasn't illuminated at that point. I guess it's a question of your eyes being light-adapted to the lighter things that you are looking at that are in sunlight. The contrast when going into the terminator was very vivid. There was just nothing to be seen, yet you would wait a short while and then you'd pick up earthshine, and you could see quite well. As soon as the sunlit portion of the Moon disappeared from your eyes, you could get dark adapted. Then we could start looking at things like Aristarchus. There was as much earthshine on the dark side of the terminator as there was later on, but your eyes could just not adapt to it, and it was just pitch black. After a short while you would be able to pick up fairly reasonable lighting coming from the Earth. I don't know what you would relate that to, or if you'd say that's at all adequate for any landing operation. I doubt that. It certainly did enable you to make observations.
Armstrong
I think that adequately states it.
Aldrin
We didn't do an extensive amount of observing in earthshine.
Armstrong
I thought it was about 5 to 10 minutes past the terminator before I was really observing things in earthshine very well.
Aldrin
I think earthshine is four or five times as bright as moonshine on the Earth.
Armstrong
I don't remember making the comparison. It was done on previous flights. Some of the people on previous flight thought it might be conceivable to make landings into earthshine. I don't guess I would be willing to go that far yet. It looked like the amount of detail that you could pick up, at least from orbital altitude, wasn't consistent with what you really need in order to do a descent.
Aldrin
You might do things like telescope tracking or even sextant tracking. ... characteristic features in the sextant, though we didn't try to do that.
Armstrong
It's difficult to pick out things in earthshine, unless it's a very pronounced feature like Copernicus, Kepler, or some of the bigger craters. You could see those way out ahead and track them continually. For smaller features that are not well identified with large features close by, I don't think you would be able to pick them up. We are ready for the second hatch removal now.
7.21 Removal and Stowage of Hatch for IVT to LM
Collins
We stored the hatch in the conventional place, that is, in the hatch stowage bag underneath the left-hand couch. That was an easy and convenient place to stow it since they enlarged that bag and it fit very well. It was out of the way.
7.24 Removal of Probe and Drogue
Collins
We stowed the probe, as one of the previous flights suggested, under the right-hand couch with the nose of the probe in the plus-Y direction. It was strapped underneath the foot of the right-hand couch with two straps which were specifically designed to stow it. We just stuffed the drogue in between the LEB and the probe and held it in place with a couple of general-purpose straps. It seemed to work well.
Armstrong
I was thinking ahead about our overall LM stowage which was different from our preflight plan with respect to leaving the probe and drogue stowed in the command module overnight.
Aldrin
After LOI-2.
Armstrong
Subsequent to this time.
Aldrin
It seemed that all the pluses were in favor of doing that.
Armstrong
I agree; I really did not think it was a big thing. We did it to try and save time at the start of the DOI day. We had it removed and it was stowed. That meant that on one night, we had to arrange a sleep configuration with the probe and the drogue stowed in the command module.
Speaker
Who slept with this?
Aldrin
I did. It was a little cramped under the right seat with the probe and drogue, but I was able to sneak in underneath it. I think I made one exit over the hatch end of the seat. I guess the only thing that leaves you a little bit open to having the probe and the drogue in the command module is if you've gotten separated from the LM.
7.29 Transfer of Equipment
Aldrin
In our activation checklist, we have a CSM to LM transfer list. We reviewed this, added a few things, and put some notes on it. I think it would behoove follow-on crews to pay close attention to this type of list, especially if they use this list to record anything that is brought back into the command module from the LM. We brought the purse back in with us. The transfer storage assembly, along with one transfer bag, was used to keep track of everything that was going to be transferred to the LM the next day. We elected to take a few snacks in with us and also added tissues to the transfer list. In thinking about it, I don't believe we had any tissues in the LM.
Armstrong
There were, but we couldn't recall where they were.
Aldrin
I still don't recall where they were. We had a couple of towels but we certainly needed the tissues. We found that out the first day we went in translunar; when we pulled the window shades down, the windows were covered with moisture. In order to get any pictures and to test the cameras, we had to bring in some tissues and wipe the windows off. We found considerable use for the two packs of tissues that we took in. I think that is something that ought to be added to the LM stowage.
Armstrong
It is probably worth mentioning that, due to various attitude constraints, sun positions, and so forth, you frequently find yourself putting the LM window blinds up an down in lunar orbit. When you put them up, you are going to start to collect moisture on those windows in some attitudes. Invariably, when you take the window shades down, you have partially degraded windows.
Aldrin
It took a long time. You couldn't just wipe it off once; it came right back because the glass had cooled so much.
Armstrong
It would clear if it was left exposed to the sunlight for a significant period of time, but we didn't always have that much time before we had to be tracking or looking at the ground or doing something else. Having the tissues or towels there to dry those windows off so that we could use them as windows was important.
Aldrin
Another item that we added to the transfer list, and we asked for approval from the ground for this, was the monocular. We felt we could use it more in the LM than Mike could in the command module so we took that in with us. We did use it on the surface, looking at and observing certain rock before and after the EVA. I certainly will recommend that crews have something like that on board the LM, in the way of a magnifying device.
Armstrong
It is useful also before EVA to help plan your EVA routes and objects of interest.
Aldrin
I might mention that when we went in there the first day, I did go over the circuit-breaker checklist that we were going to do on LOI day and I also went over the complete switch checklist. In essence, we got ourselves 1 day ahead. On LOI day, I went over the circuit breakers but did not go through the complete switch list again. That gave us a little more time to go through the rather brief COMM procedures that we had. I might mention here that the systems test meter in the command module showed that the LM power position was always within limits. It did oscillate rather rapidly between about 0.3 or 0.4 and about 2.2 volts; generally around 1.2. The on and off cycling of the LM loads was much more rapid than I had anticipated.
Armstrong
Every few seconds, the voltage level of the LM bus would change significantly.
7.31 Power Transfer to LM
Aldrin
I have logged the times of transfer to LM power, 83 hours even, and transfer back to CSM power, 83:38. The intervening time was spent checking out the COMM. All of this was done on low voltage tap. We checked the OPS pressures both on the first and second days and they were well up there – 5750 and 5800. The REPRESS valve certainly does make a loud bang when you move it to CLOSE. There doesn't seem to be any way to avoid that, especially when you go to CLOSE; it seems you are relieving some pressure. When you go to REPRESS, it is possible that you could avoid it by being very deliberate when you open it. I wasn't able to do it any of the times that I activated it. The COMM seemed to be very loud and clear. I guess that's about it for the LOI day activation.
Armstrong
Just about this same time we had a P22 – our first P22. Comment on that, Mike.
7.33 Landmark Tracking
Collins
It went normal. I gave on my map the location of the crater on which I marked. I'll give that to the appropriate people. All procedures, the update, the map, the acquisition, everything was nominal.
Aldrin
I'm not sure whether it was this pass or the one before that you were back in the command module and we had a good view of the landing site coming up. I'm sure it must have been because we were too busy to be gazing out the window on DOI day. I'd recommend that both LM crew members be in the LM on LOI day. Even though you thought you had a good view, I was convinced that I had a much better one than you did.
