The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, declares that "the aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially to one or more of nine objectives, which include:
"The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles,"
"The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere,"
"The preservation of the United States' preeminent position in aeronautics and space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes."
The research and development activities of the NASA Aeronautics Enterprise are carried out at four centers (ARC, DFRC, LaRC, and LeRC) and are currently organized into six thrust areas with the following goals:
Subsonic Aircraft Technology--develop, by 2001, high-payoff technologies for a new generation of environmentally compatible, economic U.S. subsonic aircraft and a safe, highly productive global air transportation system.
High-Speed Aircraft Technology--ready, by 2005, the technology base for an economically viable and environmentally friendly high-speed civil transport.
Hypersonic Aircraft Technology--develop and demonstrate hypersonic technology for air-breathing, single-stage-to-orbit flight. High-Performance Aircraft Technology--ready the technology options for new capabilities in high-performance aircraft.
Critical Technologies--develop advanced concepts, physical understanding, and theoretical, experimental, and computational tools to enable advanced aerospace systems.
High-Performance Computing and Communications--accelerate the development, application, and transfer of high-performance computing technologies to meet the engineering and science needs of the U.S. aeronautics, earth science, and space science communities, and accelerate the implementation of the National Information Infrastructure.
The FY94 Aeronautics Enterprise budget was $1.54 billion, representing 10.6 percent of NASA's total budget.
The aviation industry contributes strongly to the national economy. In 1991, the industry had combined sales of $90 billion, employed close to a million people in the United States, and generated a $26 billion positive trade balance. The national transportation infrastructure annually supports approximately 1 trillion passenger miles and 57 billion cargo ton miles. The projected worldwide commercial market for aircraft approaches $1 trillion over the next 20 years. Yet there are disturbing trends that challenge whether "the United States' preeminent position in aeronautics" still holds true. For example:
* The annual shipment of general aviation aircraft fell from about 17,000 units in the late 1970's to about 1,100 units in 1990.
* In the 1980's, the U.S. share of the commercial air transport market dropped from 87 to 64 percent.
* In 1994, civil aviation imports rose by $755 million to $4.5 billion, while the total of all aerospace exports dropped by nearly $1 billion.
Presidential Review Directive/NSTC-1 defines five national needs, calling for the evaluation of "the effectiveness and comparative advantages of the laboratories under review in responding to these national needs." The following table relates the NASA Aeronautics Enterprise thrusts to the national needs. As the matrix indicates, the NASA Aeronautics Enterprise has implemented a research plan that generally supports the national needs. The current focus on economic competitiveness and environmental protection, primarily through the programs in high-speed research and advanced subsonic transport activities, is very timely and is rightfully receiving high priority. At the present budget level, however, there is concern that the near-term focus on competitiveness may be a deterrent to the longer term technology development mission of NASA. To be blunt, NASA holds the mortgage for the Nation on future developments in aeronautics. NASA must be considered a national asset for aeronautics research and development activities, and for the economic benefit and technological leadership they give the United States. In light of the continued loss of U.S. share of the worldwide air transportation market, NASA should increase its proportional investment in the Aeronautics Enterprise.
Recommendation: The proportion of NASA's investment allocated to Aeronautics should be increased to maintain and enhance the U.S. share of the global air transportation market.
The research and technology (R&T) base supports the core aeronautics facility infrastructure and basic research programs, both fundamental and strategic. From FY93 to FY95, the aeronautics R&T base declined from $452 to $366 million. The long-term technology base is being short changed. If this trend is not corrected in the immediate future, it is likely that in 15 to 20 years, the Nation will regret that more research was not initiated in the late 1990's. To cite a few examples of lessons already learned:
* The digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) technology for the F-18A, F-16 C/D, and B-777 evolved from the NASA F-8 DFBW effort initiated in the 1970's.
* The 1990's flight deck and related systems technology may be traced back to the 737 TSRV program started in 1971.
* Linear stability theory research begun at JPL in the 1960's is the basis for boundary layer transition prediction used by industry in the design of energy-efficient wings for the focused Subsonic and High-Speed Aircraft Technology programs.
* Active turbine cooling for the Pratt and Whitney JT9D engine on the Boeing 747 started as an R&T Base project.
* The winglets on the MD-11, B-747-400, and Gulfstream IV aircraft emerged from NASA R&T base projects started in the 1970's.
* The multiyear ARC/Army rotorcraft program has been responsible for the development and validation of modern specifications, design guidance, simulation and flight-experiment protocols, etc., for rotorcraft flying qualities.
The General Findings and Recommendations section recommends several actions to increase NASA's productivity and efficiency. Such improvements could free up human and financial resources that could be redirected to supporting longer term R&D.
Recommendation: The decline in the Aeronautics R&T base should be reversed in order to strengthen NASA's focus on long-term aeronautics R&D goals.
An important part of the NASA aeronautics mission is to provide support to military aircraft requirements. In light of this charter and in light of level or reducing budgets in DoD science and technology investments, NASA's contribution in this area has now become too low. The NASA portion of the High-Performance Aircraft Technology budget related to military aircraft has declined from 23 percent in 1991 to 7 percent of the total aeronautics R&T budget in 1994. A review of the NASA investment in this area, in close cooperation with DoD, is needed to ensure that the future defense needs in aeronautics technology are properly considered and research issues addressed.
Recommendation: Working with DoD, NASA should reexamine its investment in military aircraft technology and reverse the downward funding trend to maintain future technology readiness.
The balance of long-term versus short-term focus of the Aeronautics Enterprise program requires continual review and evaluation. The Task Force recommends that the advice of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council be solicited on an ongoing basis to determine the level of investment in long-term aeronautics R&D. The board should base its recommendations on input from the NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee, Federal Aviation Administration, DoD, and other interested parties, taking into account NASA's Strategic Plan and national aeronautical needs.
Recommendation: The National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board should take an active role in advising NASA on the level of its investment in long-term aeronautics research.
The U.S. aeronautical industry investment in R&D is sharply declining as the defense budget downsizes, the commercial aircraft orders decrease in the present recession, and the U.S. share of the worldwide aircraft market drops. As an example, between 1990 and 1993, the cumulative drop in U.S. gas turbine engine company investment in base R&T was more than $2 billion (over 30 percent). Another example is that the total investment for all aerospace industry R&D dropped from a peak of $24.94 billion in 1988 to $13.31 billion in 1992. In addition, industry investment in R&D has shifted to a shorter term focus. Aerospace industry investment in development rose from $4.8 billion in 1988 to $5.3 billion in 1992, while its investments dropped from $104 million to $58 million for basic research and from $3 billion to $1.8 billion for applied research in the same period.
NASA provides resources that are critical to the health of aeronautics R&D in the United States. NASA has specialists who are skilled in the aeronautics disciplines, and the NASA facilities are of critical importance to the Nation's capability in aeronautics. If the United States is to maintain preeminence in aeronautics, NASA must exert leadership. It can only do this if its technical capability grows, rather than declines, in the present period of downsizing.
NASA is using support service contractors to supply technician and technical support at all Centers. Many of the contractors who are providing technical support represent the core competency experience base for NASA. This practice is of major concern. Support service contractors do not contribute to the long-term human assets of the NASA Centers. In the present period of budget reduction, support service contractors are the first to get cut, meaning that NASA loses its core competency in some areas.
The future human resource base for aeronautics is represented by those who are now in school. The previous sharp downturn in aerospace in the 1970's led to a "missing generation" of aerospace engineers, the impact of which will be felt for another 20 years. The United States is in danger of creating a second "missing generation" as undergraduate and graduate enrollments drop. Universities have long served as a significant source of knowledge and ideas which eventually lead to improved methods, processes, and products. In the post-Cold War era when the country faces stiff economic competition, university researchers need to have stronger linkages with industry and Government to address relevant national needs.
NASA, DoD, and the Federal Aviation Administration each contribute to aeronautics R&D for the Nation and, in some cases, have overlapping capabilities, laboratories, and test facilities. However, there is increasing pressure to level or reduce the science and technology investment throughout the Federal Government. This and industry's decreasing investment in R&D strongly suggest that a new paradigm for accomplishing aeronautics R&T may be appropriate. The Task Force recommends that NASA provide the leadership and catalyze an "Aeronautics Team America" approach and look to NSTC for coordination. The keynote must be one of cooperation and mutual dependence among Government, industry, and academia. The focus should be on R&D output. Improved strategic planning, introduction of metrics, and benchmarking need to be encouraged and nurtured to bring about improvement and change. The change must be systemic and not just a perturbation.
An excellent paradigm for the Aeronautics Team America approach may be found in the NASA/Army rotorcraft activities. The Army has collocated its R&D activities at NASA's ARC, with additional facilities at LaRC and LeRC. Researchers work side-by-side and, together with industry and academia, share expertise, facilities, and funding to cover the entire range of helicopter disciplines, from inception to flight testing. DFRC offers a similar paradigm for fixed-wing aircraft, albeit with many more partners. DFRC is an integral part of the national flight test and development facilities at Edwards. It plays a key role in joint flight research in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and industrial partners, as well as in the conduct of flight development and research with other NASA entities.
Recommendation: NASA should take the lead in catalyzing a highly integrated Aeronautics Team America approach to aeronautics R&D that:
* Provides the vision for deploying the financial, human, and facility resources of NASA, DoD, and the Federal Aviation Administration to eliminate unnecessary, redundant capability as the Federal infrastructure downsizes.
* Partners with industry and academia in achieving national aeronautics goals.
* Establishes a cooperative relationship among all parties that creates a sense of mutual dependence.
* Focuses on R&D output.
* Is coordinated by NSTC.
NASA should carefully define its needed core competencies to implement the Strategic Plan. As the NASA employee base is downsized, its technical capability and productivity should be increased simultaneously. Support service contractors should be completely phased out, selectively and responsibly, of the role of providing core technical competencies at NASA Centers, perhaps hiring highly productive support service contractors as regular NASA employees. The overall NASA employee and remaining support service contractor complement must be sized to meet the reduced NASA budget. The Nation would be better served in the long run with support service contractor resources being redirected to engaging academia and the aerospace industry in enhancing the role they can perform to build a truly national program for NASA. An aggressive, well-funded thrust using NASA Research Announcements should be initiated to solicit novel, creative ideas from academia and industry for addressing post-Cold War national needs. Academia should be generating new ideas, independent of those arising from NASA researchers. Industry should be strongly involved in externally funded R&D to effect technology transfer. This combination of academia, industry, and NASA each executing what they do best, but working together, can lead to a strong national program for the long term in an era of consolidation and downsizing of the national infrastructure.
Recommendation: NASA should develop and implement an Aeronautics Enterprise plan that simultaneously:
* Increases the technical capability and productivity of NASA employees as the workforce downsizes.
* Selectively and responsibly phases out support service contractors for core science and engineering skills.
* Sizes the NASA employees plus remaining support service contractor complement for the reduced NASA budget.
* Increases the participation of academia in well-funded basic and applied research programs to generate new knowledge and ideas.
* Engages the aeronautics industry in well-funded research that enhances technology transfer.
NASA has many unique and critical facilities, including wind tunnels, aeropropulsion tunnels and rigs, flight simulators, structures and materials test stands, flight-test aircraft and platforms, and air traffic management simulators. The aeronautical portion of the National Facilities Study (NFS) involving all relevant Federal Government and industry organizations represents a start toward national planning for test facility infrastructures in the post-Cold War period of consolidation and downswing. The wind tunnel portion of the NFS was the most comprehensive and included specific recommendations for investment and facility closure. These recommendations are being, and should be, implemented by NASA and DoD. Air-breathing propulsion facilities were considered in less depth, and plans for infrastructure reductions and consolidations need to be developed. The NFS did not consider flight-test facilities where consolidation of the national infrastructure is possible.
The Aeronautics Committee of the Task Force had neither the time nor the correct representation to prepare recommendations for closure and consolidation of specific facilities based on reasonable cost estimates, but it did arrive at the following observations:
* There are opportunities for closure and consolidation of air-breathing propulsion test facilities. To give some illustrative, but not inclusive, examples:
The 10-foot by 10-foot supersonic wind tunnel at NASA LeRC and the 16-foot supersonic wind tunnel at Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) both were designed for propulsion testing. It is likely that only one tunnel is needed.
The NASA LeRC Propulsion Systems Laboratory altitude engine test cells likely duplicate capability that exists in industry.
The Plumbrook facility of LeRC is presently operated for uses external to NASA and should perhaps be privatized or shut down. A problem would exist, however, in finding a use for, or decommissioning, the nuclear reactor.
* There are also opportunities for consolidation of flight-test facilities. All four of the NASA Aeronautics Centers have flight vehicles, some being used for aeronautics research, some being used as scientific experimental platforms of other enterprises, and some being used for transportation or educational purposes. In addition, there are a number of aircraft at some NASA Centers that are used for other Enterprise functions. Consolidation of test aircraft at one or two NASA Centers would be possible. Some opportunities that need to be investigated include:
The possibility of closing the ARC flight line (formerly the Navy's Moffett Field) for fixed wing aircraft, moving it to DFRC, and retaining only rotary wing capability at ARC. The possibility of closing ARC's Crows Landing.
The possibility of relocating the new 757 TSRV vehicle being obtained by LaRC to one of the consolidated NASA test aircraft centers.
The possibility of phasing out aeronautical testing use of Wallops Island.
The possibility of combining some military functions at Edwards AFB with similar NASA functions at DFRC.
* There may be opportunities for consolidation or closure of facilities in areas other than wind tunnels, air-breathing propulsion, and flight testing. The Task Force did not have the time or expertise to identify such areas.
The next step would be to form facility closure/consolidation teams with the charter to develop specific recommendations to meet specific cost saving goals. These teams should include relevant NASA and DoD representatives, as well as external experts from industry and academia. The chair should be selected to avoid bias in the decision outcome. Each team should be provided the necessary support to develop accurate cost estimates. Savings will only result if the consolidation results in a reduction in personnel, which must be recognized at the outset as a goal. Such a team represents the post-Cold War Aeronautics Team America approach.
Recommendation: Closure/consolidation teams of NASA, DoD, industry, and academia representatives should be formed to develop specific recommendations for consolidation of national infrastructure assets (for example, in the areas of air-breathing propulsion and flight-test facilities).
NASA must also exert leadership in developing new facilities needed to "preserve the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical science and technology." The most important issues at present surround the national need for high-productivity, high Reynolds number wind tunnel facilities for the development of transport aircraft. The near completion of the transonic European Wind Tunnel, with a capability of 50 million Reynolds number, places the domestic aircraft industry at a disadvantage with respect to European competitors. The highest Reynolds number facility in the world, the NASA LaRC National Transonic Facility, does not have suitable productivity for development testing. Its greatest potential is to provide basic research data in the high Reynolds number range that cannot be obtained in other facilities. Such data are desperately needed to reduce risk in setting high Reynolds number facility requirements and in scaling wind tunnel results to flight conditions. The absence of published data has left the aerodynamics technical community uncertain about the National Transonic Facility's capability.
The April 1994 National Facilities Study, and a subsequent review by the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board issued later in 1994, recommended construction of a subsonic and a transonic high Reynolds number wind tunnel, constituting the National Wind Tunnel Complex. A recent AIAA Information Paper, "The New National Wind Tunnel Complex," published on January 20, 1995, gives an excellent overview of the need, capability, and financing/siting issues. The Task Force recommends, as part of Aeronautics Team America, that these tunnels be built to maintain the world-class capability of the Nation's aeronautics industry. For the maximum impact on the next commercial transport product cycle, the effort should commence soon. However, there are several issues to consider.
* Even with the high Reynolds number capability of the National Wind Tunnel Complex, flight conditions will not be achieved for large transport aircraft. To reduce the risk of scaling from tunnel to flight conditions, basic high Reynolds number research studies should be initiated immediately and, in parallel, using the existing National Transonic Facility and other national facilities. This program should involve the best talent available in NASA, academia, and industry, and it should be started now for technology readiness before the tunnels come on-line.
* Flow quality is of equal importance to high Reynolds number and high productivity in obtaining high fidelity data. Flow angularity, freestream noise, and wall and model support interference can all introduce uncertainties of the same order of magnitude as Reynolds number effects. Flow quality is being addressed by the National Wind Tunnel Complex Program Office, and it should be a high priority with the program management.
* The estimated cost of the National Wind Tunnel Complex is several billion dollars, and it is beyond the level of the present Aeronautics Enterprise budget to support. The National Facilities Study considered several funding options and concluded: "Further studies should be conducted to look at innovative funding approaches and government/industry consortia arrangements."
Recommendation: To avoid further erosion of the U.S. transport aircraft industry leadership, Aeronautics Team America should build a high Reynolds number, high-productivity subsonic/ transonic National Wind Tunnel Complex for development testing. Also, the following should be done:
* In parallel, a basic high Reynolds number research program using the National Transonic Facility and other appropriate facilities should be initiated immediately to develop knowledge and reduce risk for scaling wind tunnel results to flight conditions.
* Considerations of flow quality must be given equal priority with high-productivity and high Reynolds number capability.
* Industry and Government need to develop a funding plan that does not adversely affect the NASA Aeronautics Enterprise R&D program.
In the last few years, NASA has made a concerted effort to satisfy its external customers' requirements for testing productivity and test facility quality. There is still significant room for improvement in the productivity, efficiency (including the management of technician activities and personnel responsiveness), and, in some cases, flow quality of NASA facilities.
Recommendation: NASA should aggressively continue its efforts to improve customer service and satisfaction in the use of its facilities.
The designated Centers of Excellence shown on the NASA Laboratory System map for the NASA Aeronautics Centers seem logical on the surface. These are: ARC for information and airspace operations systems, DFRC for flight research, LaRC for airframe systems, and LeRC for air-breathing propulsion. Existing overlaps among Centers, however, have required the definition of "lead roles" and "subroles" for the various Centers. While some degree of technical competition among groups is healthy, the Task Force notes that future intercenter negotiation and possible conflict could result in a loss of NASA core competency. A few specific areas of concern to the Task Force are:
* LaRC has the lead role for aerodynamics, which has been broken down into subroles of "research" and "applied" aerodynamics (LaRC) as well as "developmental" aerodynamics (ARC). Strong programs in the research and applied aerodynamics areas at ARC could be lost.
* LeRC is the Center of Excellence in air-breathing propulsion. LaRC has the subrole for hypersonic propulsion activities with specific characteristics (for example, inlet Mach number above 6 and no rotating machinery). New initiatives in high-speed engines that defy narrow technical definition could lead to unnecessary conflict between the two Centers.
* The issue of flight testing at DFRC, the designated "default center" for NASA flight research, versus flight testing at another Center (where the related ground-based studies occur) is another area of potential conflict.
* LaRC has the lead role for crew station design and integration, yet flight deck/ATM and human factors studies are conducted at ARC.
* There is a lack of clarity on the designation of a lead Center for the highly successful NASA/Army rotorcraft program, which could serve as a model for future interagency collaboration in the Aeronautics Team America era.
There is an apparent strong lack of cooperation and trust among the organizational units that must negotiate and compromise in good faith to implement the Center of Excellence roles and missions. Furthermore, both the historic rivalries among Centers and a lack of trust in Headquarters have led to a failure to resolve many of NASA's aeronautics research issues. This finding is of great concern to the Task Force. It is clear that a successful implementation of the NASA Aeronautics roles and missions will require strong leadership, and recognition of teamwork as well as technical excellence.
An "integrated management team" approach to areas in which there are significant overlaps is recommended to clarify Center roles and conduct future multicenter, multidisciplinary programs. These teams should be led by a NASA technical manager and consist of technical managers from the relevant Centers with specialization in the areas of overlapping activities. (The term "technical manager" is used to describe an individual with a substantial degree of technical expertise and experience.) The team should work together, bringing all points of view to the process, to determine the distribution of research activities to the Centers. The teams must be accountable to the appropriate Headquarters Aeronautics Enterprise manager. This "integrated management team" approach will be impossible to implement, however, if there continues to be a lack of cooperation and trust among the Centers and between the Centers and Headquarters.
Recommendation: To implement the designated Centers of Excellence and promote cooperation and trust among Centers and between Centers and Headquarters, NASA should take the following actions:
* Focus competition on R&D output and technical excellence.
* Establish team performance as a basis for the reward system.
* Appoint managers with technical competence to command the respect of the research staff.
* Convene "integrated management teams" led by a technically qualified NASA manager and consisting of technical managers from the relevant Centers and specializations. Integrated management teams would guide the evolution and distribution of work in areas where there is significant overlap among Center activities and be accountable to the relevant Headquarters Aeronautics Enterprise manager.
From the beginnings of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, NASA's predecessor, there has been strong in-house technical expertise in the NASA aeronautics program. Although the relative strength of the in-house expertise to external capability has shifted as the aeronautics field expanded in the Cold War period, NASA continues to have considerable in-house capability.
For the evaluation of externally proposed research, NASA in-house personnel have the capability to undertake technical evaluation and judgment in many technical areas. Although the application varies with the type of proposal (unsolicited, competitive procurement, NASA Research Announcement), NASA Aeronautics has the in-house capability to perform peer review. Portions of some programs managed by the Aeronautics Enterprise (High-Performance Computing and Communications, ERAST, AGATE) do use external peer review. The Aeronautics Committee of the Task Force considered the adoption of the peer review procedures used by the scientific community, which involve primarily external peers at the source selection stage. After a vigorous debate, the Aeronautics Committee decided that a combination of external and internal peers should be used to review basic research proposals. The use of in-house peers avoids some of the pitfalls of external peer review, including the selection of qualified yet biased peers, the possible compromise of the proposer's intellectual ideas to competitors, and the expense, burden, and delay in convening external peer panels. Use of some external peers incorporates views external to NASA. The Aeronautics Committee recommends using only in-house peers for review of technology proposals, particularly those which involve proprietary data. A periodic audit of the source selection process by an external advisory board could provide oversight if needed.
Recommendation: Peer review for source selection of externally conducted basic research should use a combination of external and NASA peers.
For formulating program plans and directions, peer (or technical) review is conducted using external experts. This normally occurs through such bodies as the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board and the Aeronautics Research and Technology Subcommittees of the Aeronautics Advisory Committee.
Recommendation: Peer review should continue to be used for R&T program planning, and it should be strengthened using the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board and the NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee.
Review of in-house technical work in progress is conducted at sporadic intervals by technical subcommittees of the NASA Aeronautics Advisory Committee and by ad hoc external "peer review" panels formed for specific technical areas. The latter peer reviews are targeted to occur every 3 to 5 years, but in fact they often happen in 5- to 7- year intervals. Peer review of externally conducted research in progress does not occur on an organized basis. The Task Force recommends that peer review of research in progress is essential to maintain quality and stimulate excellence in the Aeronautics Enterprise. However, for such peer review to be effective, it should occur on more frequent time scales, and should be a less burdensome process than the present ad hoc peer review panel process. A suggestion is made that intercenter teams could peer review in-house research at more frequent intervals, thereby increasing communication.
Recommendation: Peer review of in-house and externally sponsored research in progress should be routinely conducted on 1- to 2-year time scales. The reviews should be less formal and more frequent than at present. In-house research could be reviewed more frequently by intercenter peer teams.
Large focused programs, such as the High-Speed Research and the Advanced Subsonic Transport thrusts, undergo technical review, normally without the benefit of academic or other external experts from nonparticipating organizations. This limits the range of technical expertise brought to the review process and the understanding of academia about the research needs evolving from the focused programs.
Recommendation: Focused R&D programs should include academia and other external experts from nonparticipating organizations on reviews of research in progress.
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