Approach

Because of the broad scope of the NASA Federal Laboratory Review Terms of Reference (TOR), it was important initially to focus the review on the desired results from the study, rather than on the fascinating details of ongoing research and technology activity. Because NASA had recently adopted a new Strategic Plan (in May 1994), the review was conducted for each of the newly established Strategic Enterprises. Even though the transition to this way of working was in process, it still provided the best indicator of future directions for the Agency. Under its Chair, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Task Force consisted of three committees, as shown in Appendix B, which considered one or more of the NASA Strategic Enterprises. An Executive Committee was established to guide the review and get the job done.

The Task Force first reviewed R&D in each of the five Strategic Enterprises-- Aeronautics, Human Exploration and Development of Space, Mission to Planet Earth, Scientific Research, and Space Technology. It then proceeded with reviews of the ten NASA Centers involved in R&D;-Ames Research Center (ARC), Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Langley Research Center (LaRC), Lewis Research Center (LeRC), George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC), and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). JPL is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) located on NASA property and using NASA facilities.

Each of the Centers prepared briefing documents before the onsite reviews. These documents responded to the TOR topics. In particular, they addressed the extent to which the Centers felt their R&D activities contributed to the national needs and the TOR "issues to be considered" (see Appendix A). The Task Force developed subset questions to gain a better understanding of the issues.

This approach made it possible for the Task Force to start with the best preparation possible, resulting in productive onsite visits. In most cases, outside users or associates of the Centers provided inputs, and in all cases, the Task Force had an opportunity for discussion with a cross section of Center personnel (providing an added perspective). Appendix C lists many of the people who briefed or met with the Task Force. The site visits usually resulted in additional data requests to which the Centers promptly responded. There were also separate followup or advance visits by Task Force members, which was an effective means to reinforce communication. Results of the fact-finding meetings were reported in a public session at the December 14-16 Task Force meeting. The following guidelines were developed after discussions with NASA and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) personnel to concentrate the review on areas most likely to be productive:

* The TOR "issues to consider" were included in each Center review, with special emphasis placed on customer needs satisfaction, extent of Center alignment with the NASA Strategic Plan, use of peer and other independent review processes, and unique contributions/capabilities of each Center for performing R&D; work. Appendix A contains a responsiveness chart, which indicates where specific TOR issues are addressed in this report.

* The review was directed toward the NASA laboratory system. It is vital to bring in interagency considerations, but a baseline review of the NASA laboratory system was required first.

* Program operations work was considered to the extent that it affected R&D;activities.

* Emphasis was placed on how NASA conducts its R&D;, in-house and under contract with outside performers, rather than performing a detailed program or budget review.

The Task Force completed its fact-finding process in mid-December 1994. It then developed a series of findings and options for corrective action. These options were tested for validity with senior management at both Headquarters and Centers, and then they were discussed and adopted at the January 26, 1995, Task Force meeting.

In January, following President Clinton's State of the Union Address, the Task Force judged that the NASA budget outlook was likely to be far more austere than previously anticipated. Although exact budgetary figures were not released, more drastic steps might be required. The Task Force concluded that in the time remaining it could not, in all good conscience, be more specific regarding the closing of specific functions and facilities. In any event, the need for further reductions only underscored the importance of aggressive actions in implementing the recommendations.

The remaining part of the activity was to prepare documentation, which was delivered in draft form to NAC on February 10. Following NAC input, approval, and final editing, the document was printed in this completed form.

Go Back to Introduction.
Go Foreward to General Findings & Recommendations.

Table of Contents

NASA Privacy Statement, Disclaimer,
and Accessibility Certification