NASA is currently undergoing dramatic and necessary change. Two fundamental factors dominate the nature of that change.
The first factor is a major change in anticipated budget. NASA's budget, which is currently $14.5 billion, had been increasing at the annual rate of 14 percent from FY88 through FY92. It is now projected to decrease to less than $11.5 billion in purchasing power by FY99.
The second factor is that NASA Administrator, Daniel S. Goldin, appointed in April 1992, responded to the new environment and has established five significant initiatives:
1. A new Strategic Plan was developed that reflects FY94 budget realities and focuses activities on five basic thrusts, which are called Strategic Enterprises.
2. A greater customer orientation was encouraged to make activities increasingly responsive to national needs.
3. A shift was made away from the pursuit of big science and engineering programs toward "aster, better, and cheaper"ones.
4. Added emphasis was placed on technology transfer.
5. Additional steps were taken to increase and support work force diversity.
The NASA Federal Laboratory Review Task Force supports these initiatives. NASA should follow through on what has been started with a sense of urgency.
During our site visits to the NASA Centers and Headquarters, the Task Force witnessed many examples of pioneering technical work being performed by outstanding people. This gave us great pride. The purpose of the Task Force, however, was not to dwell on the many things that are "right" with the Agency, but rather to offer recommendations on how NASA can best respond to budget reductions and still improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its research and development (R&D) efforts ($8.7 billion of NASA's total FY94 budget). There are some significant opportunities, and we offer our recommendations in a constructive spirit.
This summary begins with general findings and recommendations, which is followed by findings and recommendations specific to each Strategic Enterprise.
Downsizing of personnel and infrastructure is one of the most important and urgent actions NASA should take given a declining budget. The dilemma is clear. NASA has a fine body of technical people, but there is too much overhead, too many people, too many layers of organization, and too much infrastructure. NASA can elect to retain as much of its staff and infrastructure as possible within the budget mandates, sacrificing programs and hoping that future budgets will improve. Alternatively, it can decide to preserve as many of its critical programs as possible by downsizing quickly to match the new fiscal realities. The Task Force urges the latter course; an output or results-driven approach will serve the Nation and the Agency far better in the long term. It is to NASA's advantage to move swiftly and use the downsizing as an opportunity to focus capabilities and rebalance efforts. Eight specific actions are recommended to help NASA emerge from the process in the strongest possible position.
One. The Task Force observed that each NASA Center participates in two to four different Strategic Enterprises, including some activities that are a distinct departure from their traditional strengths.
* NASA should narrow the breadth of the Center missions to those critically needed for NASA's future.
Two. There are many redundant capabilities among the Centers. Advances in information systems and data processing make it practical for work and test sites to be remotely located. This permits a series of consolidations to be made and allows NASA to retain or build critical mass capabilities despite the declining budget.
* NASA should reduce redundant capabilities among its Centers.
Three. The Task Force recommends that unique and essential capabilities of NASA be preserved. In this spirit, the Task Force recommends caution before Center closure is undertaken as part of a consolidation initiative. Such action should not be undertaken until there has been thorough consideration of NASA's operations and R&D activity, and then only with a knowledge of potential Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) downsizing of similar capabilities. There are, however, overlaps in capabilities at NASA and other agencies.
* NASA must enter into joint discussions with DoD regarding the best use of facilities and capabilities, and reach preliminary agreements before DoD Base Realignment and Closure recommendations are complete (July 1995).
Four. Planning, both short term and long term, takes on added importance as NASA enters this period of significant change. The NASA Strategic Plan is a good first cut. The absence of budget and schedule information, however, makes it less useful as a managing document.
* NASA must link the Strategic Plan with realistic schedules and resources. NASA budgets should be justified in terms of accomplishing the NASA Strategic Plan elements. In maintaining global leadership, NASA must also couple the Strategic Plan with a process that permits new and competing ideas to be developed and evaluated.
Five. The roles and missions, particularly between NASA Headquarters and the Centers, are complicated and not well aligned with the Strategic Enterprises. There are excessive layers of organization and a Headquarters organization that is attempting to provide too much of the program management.
* Headquarters must retain the responsibility for Strategic Enterprise leadership in creating vision, objectives, strategies, policies, initiation of programs, education programs, international partnerships, congressional relations, budget, and approval of program plans from the Centers.
* Centers must be delegated authority and accept responsibility for management of programs; Headquarters should retain management of the Space Station and other major cross center programs such as the Space Shuttle.
Six. After settling roles and missions, proper benchmarking and metrics information must be developed so that performance can be measured with agreed-to standards. It is vital that the Agency have a clear understanding of its capabilities, and where performance improvement is needed.
Although some activities have been started to develop metrics for evaluation of technical performance, the process has not matured to the point where the information is available to help formulate sound management decisions and more efficient management processes. This deficiency must be corrected.
The current NASA financial management system is oriented toward Congressional Budget Line Items and does not provide information in the form needed by managers and Strategic Enterprise leaders. Furthermore, financial management systems vary considerably among Centers.
* Useful metrics should be developed for evaluating NASA R&D capability and comparing it with other sources, such as other agencies, industry, academia, and capabilities in other countries. This will lead to the development of meaningful criteria for evaluating the performance of management in the Centers and Headquarters.
* NASA must develop a financial management system that serves the needs of both its Strategic Enterprise leadership and program managers. It should be standardized throughout NASA so that data will be consistent and comparable.
Seven. The Task Force noted several imbalances between and within Enterprises. For example, the aeronautics programs have suffered over the years from a lack of emphasis in the Agency, and important long-term technology funding has been reduced.
* Imbalances among activities should be addressed in the downsizing process.
Eight. Technology transfer is aspecial type of imbalance that should be addressed. There aretwo types of technology transfer, technology "out" and technology "in." At present, NASA seems too insular in its R&D, and in the future a greater effort must be made to acquire technology from outside the Agency. In those areas where NASA is behind, it should stop playing catchup. Commercial global communications, navigational satellites, and miniaturized optical sensors may be areas where NASA can get useful expertise.
* NASA should plan and implement an outreach process for timely technology transfer within a broader definition of the activity. This involves stopping in-house work and depending on outside sources for the expertise where it is more advanced than NASA's. Metrics to quantify the impact of the technology transfer effort should be used universally.
One. It was recognized that the current Civil Service system makes it too difficult to properly encourage highly productive personnel, and it tolerates underproducers.
* NASA should improve incentives for the Civil Service work force. It should evaluate Civil Service personnel options, such as the DoD China Lake and DOC Boulder Reinvention Laboratory demonstration programs. Coupled with the application of "industrial funding," it should be possible to give considerably greater recognition to the high performing members of the staff than to underachievers. When linked to a total salary budget cap consistent with the expected budget decline, this should lead to significantly improved staff performance.
Two. The JPL contract with the California Institute of Technology involves 168 task orders, and 21 NASA employees at the JPL site.
* JPL should submit a formal mission management plan at a programmatic level of accountability. On approval of the plan, NASA should terminate its micro mismanagement of JPL.
Three. The Task Force appreciated the value of JPL's affiliation with the California Institute of Technology and its advisory subcommittee as a resource for technical information exchange and impartial counsel.
* NASA should create an advisory council for each Center, with membership from industry, academia, and other parts of the Federal Government.
Four. There is great appeal in combining NASA research capabilities with the expertise and intellectual resources of a university, or consortium of universities. While not a cost-saving approach, this should help retain and build technical strength in an environment of budget reductions.
* NASA should consider the possibility of a university Space Act or similar contractual agreement at several of its Centers. The arrangement could be Center-wide or restricted to that portion of the Center for which there is a particularly good fit.
Five. Peer and other independent review processes are necessary to help mold the most effective program. Independent reviews are vital to identifying and developing preeminent R&D. There is clear evidence that these techniques are widely used within NASA, although improvements can be made. The process is unduly long in some instances.
* Research should have peer review at each key milestone of a program. Technology developmentshould include peer review at the earliest stages of fundamental work. External advisory group review should be provided in the later phases. Peer group membership should be rotated to maintain a balance of representation and encourage new and diverse viewpoints. Review cycle time should be shortened.
Six. The Task Force observed that Center Directors have discretionary budgets of $0.5 to $2.5 million, or about 0.1 percent of their R&D budget for outside contracting. Although the Civil Service Centers augment these budgets with in-house staff, it still gives them too little funding flexibility to take timely advantage of opportunities.
* Center discretionary fundsshould be increased several fold and applied toward advanced technology or other leading-edge activities, not toward the solution of program budget problems. The JPL funding level should be set to provide approximately the same flexibility as would exist at the other Centers.
Seven. The number of reviews and audits endured by NASA programs has become excessive. Audits and reviews consume management so much that they place programs at risk. Two categories of reviews were found: planned and unplanned reviews, initiated by NASA and by external sources, including the General Accounting Office (GAO) and Congress. Although the expenditure of public funds requires proper oversight, reviews and audits are not under control.
* NASA should follow and not exceed its planned program review procedure (NMI 7120.4). When an additional review is anticipated, the Agency should examine past reviews on that subject and the actions taken. The value of the new proposed review should be strongly justified prior to its approval. Duplications, such as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, should be stopped. It is recommended that this general topic be included in the April 15 NSTC Final Report of the Federal Laboratory System.
Eight. The singleaction likely to have the most significant impact on the effectiveness with which the Federal Government spends its R&D funds is selection of the top leaders for Government service. NASA will need excellent technical managers to help lead its R&D efforts as the current management retires. Current regulations and practices are viewed as a severe disincentive to attracting and retaining some of the best and brightest from academia and industry. It is further observed that efforts to correct imbalances in work force diversity can lead to inefficiencies, unless these selections are made from the best qualified.
* The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) should include this management issue in its April 15 Federal Laboratory Review Report, with the recommendation that improved policies and incentives be developed to better attract our top leaders toward Government service and retain them.
* The decline in the Aeronautics research and technology (R&T) base should be reversed in order to strengthen NASA's focus on long-term aeronautics R&D goals.
Systemic changes are needed in this period of post-Cold War downsizing and consolidation of the Nation's aeronautical infrastructure.
* NASA should take the lead in catalyzing a highly integrated Aeronautics Team America, including NASA, DoD, the Federal Aviation Administration, industry, and academia in a cooperative partnership based on mutual dependence. R&D output should be the focus.
The 1994 National Facilities Study report recommended specific facility closures and consolidation plans for wind tunnels. Additional opportunities are possible for other areas.
* Closure/consolidation teams of NASA, DoD, industry, and academia should be formed to develop specific recommendations for consolidation of national infrastructure assetsÑfor example, in the areas of air-breathing propulsion and flight-test facilities.
Dominant among the aeronautical facilities needs for the next century are two new high Reynolds number wind tunnels for development testing of jet transports. These tunnels, one subsonic and the other transonic, would provide a combination of simulated flight conditions and testing productivity unmatched worldwide.
* To avoid further erosion of the U.S. transport aircraft industry leadership, a high Reynolds number, high-productivity subsonic/transonic National Wind Tunnel Complex for development testing should be built. Industry and Government need to develop a funding plan that does not adversely affect the NASA Aeronautics Enterprise R&D program.
The HEDS laboratory system is a unique national asset. It is the only system in the world that supports human access to space employing a reusable vehicle. The system also provides unique capabilities for scientific research; flight development and support; and the integration of life and physical sciences with engineering. As the Report of the Advisory Commmittee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program described it:
...by far the greatest body of space expertise in the world resides within NASA...NASA, and only NASA, realistically possesses the critical mass of knowledge and expertise upon which the nation's civil space program can be sustained....
The core of the HEDS laboratory system is comprised of four NASA Centers---the Johnson Space Center (JSC), the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and the Stennis Space Center (SSC). HEDS R&D activities also are conducted at several of the other Centers, including the Ames Research Center (ARC) and the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) as well as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
It is essential that a HEDS capability remain viable and focused on a succession of challenges if the United States wishes to retain its leadership position in space flight.
* NASA must retain a capability to conduct the human exploration of space and the R&D effort to support the national need. NASA must continue to examine what is required to accomplish the HEDS mission.
* Focused program goals should be developed for life sciences research. The current basic scientists at ARC should have more formal ties to local academic institutions, and the coordination of goals with JSC should be strengthened.
* The life science research program carried out jointly with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) should be strengthened and expanded. In addition, in-house expertise must be maintained to address those problems not appropriate for NIH and to provide advice and support to the science community on payload requirements.
* NASA must use Civil Service talent and Center core capabilities to perform in-line tasks and to provide hardware and software elements to the Space Station program to the degree possible, while continuing to limit the numbers engaged in contractor oversight.
* As NASA reduces operations costs, R&D funding should be increased and focused toward processes to further reduce operations costs and to develop new technology for human exploration of the Solar System. Also, realistic life cycle costs of a proposed program must be considered in the initial design to permit optimization of total program cost.
While there are many excellent characteristics of MTPE, there are also four opportunities for significant improvement.
The activity that NASA is undertaking is only loosely linked to national needs. The urgency for the results, while apparently real, is not well articulated.
* NSTC and the Office of Science and Technology Policy should develop an interagency process for establishing priorities, need dates, and supporting rationale for scientific information provided by the MTPE Enterprise to support policy decisions. NASA should use the results of this process to establish program priorities and schedules.
Program management functions were found to be distributed between Headquarters and GSFC, which causes inefficiency and confusion.
* The roles of those involved in the Enterprise at Headquarters and at the Centers must be clarified. The authority and responsibility for program implementation must be at the Center level.
The MTPE program, with its long-term operational challenge, has a special need for taking advantage of continuing technological advances.
* Advanced technology must be planned for and infused into the MTPE programs and missions for long-term efficiencies. The plan should include a roadmap with milestones and resources.
Maximizing use of existing data seems to be a weak link in the interagency coordination and cooperation of USGCRP, because of either security classifications or the "not invented or measured here" syndrome. * Relevant results of the DoD Airborne Reconnaissance Office program should be integrated with MTPE. Appropriate data from other agencies and organizations should be actively sought out and considered.
The Task Force found that the vision and knowledge for strategic planning in the Scientific Research and MTPE Enterprises are at NASA Headquarters. The Task Force also found programs in these two Enterprises ongoing in almost all Centers. In response to downsizing, NASA Headquarters staffing will decrease significantly over the next 5 years and Center staffing is also expected to decline. The Task Force made the following recommendations for the Scientific Research Enterprise based on these findings.
* JPL should be the lead Center for the management of programs within the Scientific Research Enterprise. GSFC should continue to support this lead Center through its astrophysics, space physics, and fundamental earth science programs. Scientific research activities at other Centers should be evaluated for transfer to GSFC or JPL, consolidation, or closure.
* NASA should coordinate the research content in the MTPE and Scientific Research Enterprises with a single integrated plan.
* Space technology strategic planning should be structured to achieve premier technology in three areas, in priority order. First, NASA should focus on developing technology for meeting the critical needs of other Strategic Enterprises. Second, attention should be directed toward the infusion of externally developed technologies, such as unclassified NRO, DoD, and DOE developed technologies, into NASA programs. Third, NASA should pursue the transfer of technology to potential users outside the Enterprise. Use of "Mosaic-like" technologies on the Internet provides a low-cost means to improve this transfer.
* NASA should continue its effort to develop an Agency-level Space Technology Strategic Plan. This plan should define key technology areas and prioritize both short-term and long-term research and technology programs that address the requirements of all of its customers. The plan should require that NASA Centers develop definitive roadmaps and expected timetables for each key technology area. The roadmaps should incorporate technology demonstration requirements, where necessary, to bridge the "gap" between technology development and technology utilization. A separate section of the plan should be developed to address the accomplishment of the access to space objectives of the Agency. These should be made available to all of NASA under "Mosaic-like" networks.
* In the areas where the NASA technology contributions have not been preeminent in terms of output, and other sources of technology development in the same area exist, NASA should consider reducing or eliminating its capabilities and/or activities.
* Smaller missions and technology demonstration missions, such as Lewis and Clark, appear to offer a unique opportunity to mitigate the current impacts of the problem of infusion of new technology into flight missions. NASA should continue to pursue these missions and exploit their potential for bridging the gap between technology development and technology utilization.
The Task Force recommendations for downsizing should be implemented prudently to preserve NASA as a critical national resource. In this spirit, closure of facilities, consolidation, and reduction of activities should stop short of affecting NASA's ability to remain preeminent in aeronautics and space. NASA can be energized by implementing these Task Force recommendations to rekindle the excitement and pioneering spirit, and attract a new generation to pursue careers in science, engineering, and technology.
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