NASA Is a National Resource NASA Is Undergoing Dramatic and Necessary Change
The Vision Is Developed, but the Agenda Is Not Yet Complete
Task Force Premise/Views on the Purpose and Practices of NASA
Recommendations
Use Downsizing to NASA's Advantage
Improve Efficiency and Quality of R&D Efforts
The NASA Federal Laboratory Review Task Force was impressed with the NASA's aeronautics and space activities, which contribute strongly to our national needs. NASA initiates, develops, and supports aeronautics technology with resultant improvements in aircraft performance, safety, and efficiency. These activities are directly related to the future economic health of an industry, which, in 1991, had an aggregate income of $90 billion and generated a $26 billion positive trade balance, the largest of any industrial sector in the economy. As the major contributor to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, NASA is undertaking programs that lead to a fundamental understanding of our planet's climate changes. NASA has pioneered exploration of the Sun, the planets, and the Universe and is now pursuing low-cost techniques for getting two probes to Pluto before the planet moves in its orbit farther away from the Sun and the atmosphere of that planet condenses. It was able to use the Hubble Space Telescope and Galileo probe to gather important information from a unique and unexpected event, the collision of Comet Shoemaker Levy 9 with Jupiter. NASA also is developing a space station that has been redesigned to reduce cost and improve capabilities. With the teaming arrangement including the United States, Russia, and 11 other countries, the International Space Station program provides a positive contribution to international stability. NASA's pioneering efforts in aeronautics and space have produced a multitude of benefits to mankind, including attracting students to science and engineering.
The benefits of some NASA programs, however, were expressed in technical terms, which did not bring out the true payoff in clearly understandable terms with a proper sense of urgency and value to the public. The Task Force has suggested a way to improve the communication.
The external factor is the major shift in budget outlook. NASA's budget, currently at $14.5 billion, had been increasing at roughly 14 percent per year from FY 1988 through 1992. Outside reviews, such as the 1990 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, were suggesting that for a "reinvigorated space program," real growth in the NASA budget of approximately 10 percent per year (through the year 2000) and reaching a peak spending level of about $30 billion per year (in constant 1990 dollars) was an affordable goal. Realities have changed, and the current NASA management assumes a budget decreasing to less than $11.5 billion in purchasing power by 1999.
The internal factor is that NASA Administrator, Daniel S. Goldin, appointed in April 1992, has initiated the following five significant changes, which the Task Force observed are having a major impact at the NASA Centers and Headquarters:
* Requested a general Strategic Plan that reflected current budget realities. It was drafted by a planning team, iterated, and finally endorsed by NASA management at Headquarters and all Centers in May 1994. This was a very necessary action. It set forth a vision and mission consistent with the 1958 Space Act, and it defined five Strategic Enterprises to refocus NASA's mission. As shown on the separation page, these are Aeronautics, Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS), Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE), Scientific Research, and Space Technology.
* Emphasized customer orientation as a driving force for many of NASA's actions. This included defining its customers to include the commercial sector, science and education communities, other U.S. Government agencies, and, ultimately, the American people.
* Directed a shift from big science and engineering programs toward "faster, better, cheaper" programs. This included the revamping of some of the larger programs, such as the International Space Station and Earth Observing System, toward smaller scale concepts.
* Reinforced technology transfer outreach as an objective of the Agency.
* Initiated strong positive steps to increase and support workforce diversity.
Implementation plans for these five changes are observed to be in early stages of development throughout the organization. For example, existing projects are being reshaped and new smaller scale programs, such as the pair of relatively low cost spacecraft "Fire" and "Ice" to explore solar phenomena and Pluto Fast Flyby with short development schedules, have been promoted within the NASA Strategic Enterprises. At the same time, some imbalances in priorities are being addressed. For instance, Scientific Research has increased 3 percent since 1992; emphasis on Space Station and Space Shuttle operations cost reduction has resulted in projections that the total HEDS budget will be reduced from over 50 percent of the NASA budget to about 33 percent of the reduced NASA budget in the next 4 years. In general within the Strategic Enterprises, priorities have been shifted toward those most strongly aligned with current customer needs (such as the quantitative measurements of ozone breakdown in the upper atmosphere caused by human actions on Earth) and some steps have been taken toward meeting long-range needs (such as initiation of the Reusable Launch Vehicle program for low-cost access to space).
In addition, development of the NASA Equal Opportunity Management Plan, published September 1994, was a strong step in assuring that the NASA workforce would become more diverse and balanced in relationship to the Relevant Civilian Labor Force. The plan is endorsed by the NASA Administrator and all top-level management, including Center Directors. For example, there is a goal to "recruit and hire individuals consistent with targeted disabilities at an annual rate of 5 percent (of total number of annual hires) until the workforce representation is 2 percent." There is evidence of positive action to increase employment of disabled persons, but the metrics need to be improved to measure the progress. NASA should also aggressively continue its efforts to remove physical barriers in the workplace. To date, challenges have not all been met. For example, females are underrepresented in the technical/scientific areas of the workforce and males are underrepresented in the administrative and clerical areas. There appears to be a "glass ceiling" above which women and some minorities do not advance.
In his February 6, 1995, budget press conference, the NASA Administrator clearly articulated a goal of achieving a $5 billion budget reduction by restructuring NASA. The implication of this goal is that each of its Centers will have to reduce staff. Perhaps some will be closed. In so doing, the Centers of the new NASA will have to learn to share the functional capabilities across the Agency more than they have in the past. They also will have to use industry, universities, and other Government agencies more effectively.
New paradigms are needed to determine the distribution of work among the various sectors. Even before the February 6 announcement, the Task Force detected that the Centers are having difficulty in coping with the transition from the era of large programs, like Cassini and Hubble, to the future "faster, better, cheaper" programs.
The Strategic Plan and other initiatives represent very significant new directions for the Agency, and it is no surprise that much more is required to reorient all activities. A good body of technical people make up the NASA organization, but there is inefficiency, a high overhead, with too many people and too many layers of organization. Infrastructure is excessive. A National Facilities Study was accomplished, in partnership with the Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Transportation (DOT), which helped point the way toward reducing infrastructure, but there is much more to be done. The Task Force would like to see these actions taken much more quickly so that the longer range R&D activity might be further strengthened within anticipated NASA funding limits.
These findings led to a first observation: One of the most important steps for NASA to take now is to aggressively follow through on what has been started.
Following its review of the 1958 Space Act and its Amendments, NASA R&D plans, and the activities being undertaken at the NASA Centers, the Task Force has formed its own view of the purpose of NASA. In brief it believes that the purpose is to use the best talent available to pioneer missions in space and aeronautics that the Government has determined to be in the national interest and that would not be pursued without governmental support.
* Supports NASA's Government role as the leader for aeronautics research and technology development. It supports the broader NASA role for civil space R&D and operations leadership.
* Firmly believes in the principle that NASA's role requires a partnership of cooperation, reliance, and confidence among academia, industry, and NASA Headquarters and Centers. This partnership must involve a strong dependence on contributions from university and industry activities because their resources are far larger than those at NASA Centers.
* Emphasizes that cooperation and coordination with DoD, DOT, DOE, and other agencies, plus international organizations, are necessary for NASA to meet its responsibilities.
It is apparent now that budget pressures force NASA to make a major strategic decision. There are two general alternatives. NASA could choose to retain as much of its existing staff in the face of a reduced budget, pull some contract work in-house, defer mission plans, and hope that subsequent budgets will improve sufficiently so that it will be able to reinstate programs. But there are excess personnel for the anticipated budget levels and there are excess layers of management within the current organization. The alternative is an output-driven approach, which preserves as many of the critical programs as possible by downsizing quickly to match the current fiscal realities. Even with this approach, we believe NASA will have to terminate some of its lower priority objectives. The Task Force believes firmly that the output-driven approach will benefit the Nation and NASA far more than the first alternative.
NASA should adopt the output-driven approach, move swiftly, and use the downsizing process as an opportunity to refocus its capabilities and improve the balance of its efforts. Eight specific actions are recommended to help NASA emerge from the downsizing process in the strongest possible position.
Reduce Breadth of Center Missions
The Task Force observed that most Centers support two to four different Strategic Enterprises. While there are understandable explanations for this situation, it is a significant departure from the original purposes for establishing the various Centers. In general, Langley Research Center (LaRC) and Ames Research Center (ARC) were established for aeronautics. Lewis Research Center (LeRC) was set up for air-breathing engine R&D and Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) was for aircraft flight testing. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was meant for rocket propulsion and launch system development while Stennis Space Center (SSC) was to handle rocket propulsion testing. Johnson Space Center's (JSC) purpose was piloted spacecraft development and operations and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was to address scientific spacecraft development and operations in Earth orbit. Later, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was assigned pilotless spacecraft missions beyond Earth orbit.
Recommendation: NASA should narrow the breadth of the Center missions.
The Task Force has not attempted to perform the necessary study to determine what the "best" long-term goals should be for each Center; that is a task for the Agency. Nevertheless, one of the options NASA should consider would be to have each Center concentrate on what it is capable of doing best to support NASA's plans for the future, while phasing out most, if not all, the secondary roles. Secondary sites should be evaluated for possible closure or transfer. (Examples of secondary sites are: Center for International Studies in the Environment, Crows Landing, Downey, Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Palmdale, Plumbrook, Wallops Island, Yellow Creek, etc.) While initially disruptive, there would be several advantages to this approach:
* Focus would be restored to the Centers, which would then have a better capability to retain critical staff and facilities in the declining budget environment.
* Overhead cost would be reduced.
* Multiple reporting chains between NASA Headquarters and the Centers would be decreased.
Consolidate to Reduce Duplication of NASA capabilities
Although the Task Force found little apparent overlap in actual mission activities, it did find that the Centers have considerable overlap in capabilities. The present situation provides some advantages to NASA management because it provides geographical distribution of the Agency's work and provides the potential for healthy internal competition for future R&D business. There are, however, considerable similar functional capabilities at the Centers. Some of these capabilities may be necessary; some may not. Examples include large liquid rocket propulsion testing at SSC and MSFC; aeronautics model design and manufacturing at LaRC, LeRC, and ARC; high-performance computer hardware facilities at ARC, JPL, GSFC, LaRC, LeRC, and MSFC; aircraft flight test and flight platform operations at ARC, DFRC, GSFC, JSC, LaRC, LeRC, and SSC; high-temperature structure testing at DFRC and SSC; Expendable Launch Vehicle work at GSFC, KSC, and LeRC; cockpit simulation facilities at ARC and LaRC; structures and materials laboratories at LaRC and MSFC; microelectronics laboratories at GSFC and JPL; and spacecraft fabrication and assembly facilities at GSFC and JPL. Budget reductions force considerations of mutual dependence and reliance on other Center capabilities.
Advances in information and data processing make it possible for work and test sites to be remotely located. Geographically dispersed facilities can be effectively coupled and managed in the new information age. As a result, full test and support capabilities no longer need to be located at single Centers. The payoff from a reduced number of facilities is not only the cost saving, but also the opportunity to strengthen the capabilities of supporting staff. It is recognized that the concept of mutual reliance between Centers and across Enterprises is counter to normal NASA practices, which are quite defensible under less austere conditions. The Task Force believes, however, that in the long term, the payoff in efficiency merits NASA management's examining the examples above and the much greater list of candidates which its technical people could generate to develop a practical plan for intercenter sharing of capability.
Recommendation:The current duplication of NASA capabilities should be evaluated for practical consolidation opportunities.
Consider Interagency Opportunities
The Task Force recommends that unique and essential capabilities of NASA be preserved. In this spirit, the Task Force recommends caution before Center closure is undertaken as part of a consolidation initiative. Such action should not be undertaken until there has been thorough consideration of NASA's operations and R&D activity, and then only with a knowledge of potential DoD and DOE downsizing of similar capabilities.
Many of the major NASA experimental facilities were observed to be operating well below their nominal capacities. Many were in need of repair or could benefit from upgrades.
The major reduction in the DoD budget and the fact that DoD and NASA have similar space and aeronautical facilities require that the two agencies rapidly reach agreement on facility closures that are in the national interest. The interagency National Facilities Study contains this recommendation and identified some of the facilities to consider.
Recommendation:As a matter of urgency, NASA must enter into joint discussions with DoD regarding the best use of facilities and reach preliminary agreements before DoD Base Realign-ment and Closure recommendations are sent to the White House (July 1995). Similar discussions should be initiated with DOE.
Aeronautics, rocket propulsion testing, spacecraft assembly, space technology, and computational facilities are good candidates for initial discussion, along with the study recommendations contained in the National Facilities Study.
It is quite possible that a process such as DoD's BRAC would be useful to NASA to minimize some of the normal political pressures that develop when facility consolidations are anticipated. Since this is such a slow process, background preparation should be started as soon as NASA's evaluations indicate a potential need.
Strengthen Planning
NASA's Strategic Plan, signed by key officials (including all Center Directors and JPL) in May 1994, has not been fully implemented throughout the Agency. As would be expected, the acceptance is far greater in areas where the plan did not represent a significant departure from previous activity than it is in areas where significant change is involved. The Task Force believes there are three reasons for delayed acceptance:
* The Strategic Plan, by design, does not include a timetable for accomplishing major mission objectives and identify planned resources. (The reasoning was that the resources and, therefore, timetable will be a function of the NASA budget as negotiated each year with Congress.) We understand that this information will be contained as part of the annual NASA Strategic Management System and Strategic Enterprise Plans, whose first editions are scheduled for February 1995.
* NASA budgets are not yet collected and accounted for by the Strategic Enterprises. Civil Service personnel are carried in separate budget categories. This makes it quite difficult to focus activity toward NASA's top-level Strategic Enterprises and to compare costs for performing work at JPL or outside contractors. Until the Strategic Enterprise definition has a clear budget association, it will be quite difficult for it to have great significance.
* Of less fundamental importance, the Task Force members did have initial difficulty understanding the designation of Space Technology as a Strategic Enter-prise, since it would be expected that each Strategic Enterprise would engage in technology development as necessary to accomplish its mission. This seemed to cause some uncertainty within NASA also. The Task Force recognizes and supports the concept of a separate Space Technology organization and budget because of the shielding it provides to long-term work when project budgets are tight. Working processes must, however, be clarified for inter-Enterprise operations.
Similarly, the use of the title Scientific Research for exploration of the Solar System and beyond caused a certain amount of confusion, at least for the Task Force, since scientific research is carried out in several Strategic Enterprises. We understand that it will be renamed and this news is greeted with relief.
Recommendation: NASA needs to link the Strategic Plan with realistic schedules and resources. NASA budgets should be justified in terms of accomplishing the NASA Strategic Plan. In addition, NASA should clearly define which national needs are met by its Strategic Enterprises.
Clarify Roles and Responsibilities
NASA and its infrastructure were configured by the early large projects, Apollo and Space Shuttle. Although Apollo is history and the Space Shuttle is now operational, the Agency has attempted to preserve the R&D capabilities for future large projects. NASA currently must develop and then operate the Space Station and Earth Observing System projects, which still require capabilities from several Centers and involve considerable interagency activity. Clarity and consensus are needed on how this should be accomplished.
The current organizational structure of NASA Headquarters is complicated and not well aligned with the Strategic Enterprises. Although we understand steps are being taken to correct some of the misalignment, the interrelationships between Headquarters management and the Centers, which may have anywhere from two to four Strategic Enterprises within their jurisdiction, are unclear. The uncertainty is magnified for the Space Station and Space Shuttle programs where program management is colocated at JSC but management personnel wear "Headquar-ters badges."
At present, there are excessive layers of organization and too many employees. The Centers plan to trim to their new levels by attrition and reducing, but not halting, new hires. Headquarters is preparing for a major downsizing, but over the next 5 years. Both plans seem unnecessarily slow. (The JPL situation is in contrast to this. Their trustees directed a downsizing that has resulted in being below targets and able to selectively hire, as necessary, to get the right skill mix.)
Recommendation:To clarify and improve the roles of Headquarters and the Centers, the Task Force recommends the following:
* Headquarters should have the responsibility for Strategic Enterprise management and leadership. This includes vision, objectives, strategies, policies, approval of plans as submitted by the Centers, international arrangement/commitments, budget development, education programs, and interaction with Congress.
* The Centers should be responsible for the implementation of programs. Headquarters should retain management of the International Space Station program and other major multicenter programs, but Headquarters management should be the exception. A transition plan is needed to strengthen Center leadership in this area.
* As a first step, assign the management of the Aeronautics, Scientific Research, Space Technology, and Mission to Planet Earth programs to the appropriate Centers. These Centers would have responsibility for program management and execution. Each Center Director would be held responsible for the successful conduct of programs assigned to the Center. The Director should review the programs of his managers and respond to the Headquarters Associate Administrator responsible for the Strategic Enterprise. Although NASA must review the work of contractors, it should be done by a relatively small staff. NASA should not create a parallel organization that second-guesses or performs parallel analysis. Centers with a supporting role should be responsive to the assigned program managers at the lead Center who must also monitor funding and performance at the supporting Center. The Associate Administrator responsible for the Enterprise will be responsible for budget plan approval. With clear definitions of responsibility, meaningful metrics can be used to measure the performance of each Enterprise element.
When program rebaselining efforts and contracts are stabilized, the second step is to consider a consolidation of additional HEDS program management functions within JSC or MSFC.
The responsibility that is placed on Center management by this approach is large. Attracting and retaining the very best leadership team at each Center are key to making this approach work. Each Center team must also have exceptional capability to function as part of the overall NASA team because as budgets decrease, interdependency among Centers, industry, and universities will have to increase.
Establish Proper Benchmarking
After roles and missions are established, effective metrics and benchmarking must be instituted so that performance can be evaluated with agreed-to standards. No effective metrics for measuring performance of Headquarters or Center management were presented. There are two fields of metrics that are needed-technical management, and financial management.
Preeminent R&D capabilities and performance were frequently asserted but generally the technical and management leaders did not provide the data to prove the case. In some cases, even though personnel were aware of competing capability, they frequently did not apply the data to a rigorous comparison to point up areas where they should work for additional improvement.
Preeminent capability must be coupled with demonstration of need for the capability in accomplishing current and anticipated missions. Furthermore, a thoughtful set of performance measures is fundamental to productivity improvement. We did not find a comprehensive set of metrics tailored to indicate the output vs. input of the myriad functions comprising NASA. We did, however, find some noteworthy attempts to develop such metrics. For example, the Scientific Research Enterprise is trying to quantify the quality and quantity of the science output of its programs. The science output is compared with world-class science performed outside NASA and an attempt is made to determine whether NASA's science quality and quantity is favorably proportional to the NASA investment.
We also found that NASA tracks the technical, cost, and schedule performance of its programs. However, we found that only in the case of JPL, through an award fee process with NASA, do results have an important role in the evaluation of management. In the JPL award fee process, JPL is also held accountable for institutional management performance (i.e., controlling overhead and the like) and its adherence to NASA policies (i.e., responsiveness to the "faster, better, cheaper" strategy as well as NASA outreach strategy.) We found no evidence that any other Center management is held similarly accountable for its internal management performance.
Recommendation:NASA must improve its understanding of its own capability in relation to other agencies, industry, academia, and international sources. This understanding is vital to developing sound decisions for outsourcing and developing long-range plans. It is also a key to establishing sound agreements between Headquarters and Center management. NASA should intensify its attempts to quantify the effectiveness of its programs and internal processes, and to use the data in its program and Center evaluation process. A process similar to that used for JPL's award fee should be used in evaluating all the Centers.
A representative set of performance measurements for Strategic Enterprise Leaders and Center Directors is provided in Appendix D.
The second category, financial metrics, was also lacking. NASA is properly concerned about the adequacy of its financial management information systems. Improvements to the accounting systems are presently in development, but they are not directed to serve the general manager. They do not address the strong need to provide information in the form that Strategic Enterprise Leaders, Center Directors, and their managers need to manage their Enterprises and programs and to make decisions. In particular, current financial information systems do not tie together cost accounting information with the cost data contained in the numerous Center-unique systems for generating procurement, equipment supply and inventory, personnel management, budget formulation, and program execution. NASA does not employ a common, standard systems approach across its field installations.
At the aggregate level, NASA is able to meet the external reporting requirements for project and program information, consistent with the congressional authorization and appropriation account structure. However, Civil Service manpower and supporting costs are reported to Congress separate from the individual projects. This makes it difficult to structure the budget and accounting data to support the Enterprise management approach and make it serve as an effective management tool.
Recommendation:NASA needs to develop a financial management information system that serves the needs of its Strategic Enterprise leadership and program managers. It should be standardized throughout NASA so that information will be reported on a consistent and comparable basis, and to minimize collection and reporting costs. The NASA program managers and field Center Directors need to determine their essential information requirements in clear and unambiguous terms so that the system design meets their needs. NASA should also undertake a comprehensive scrub of current data formatting and reporting requirements to eliminate non-value-added requirements. In addition, NASA should challenge those external reporting requirements of no value to NASA managers, such as the budget and accounting information on expenditures for Federal Information Resources Management.
The Task Force appreciates that this is a challenging job, which requires focused attention by management, as well as planning to avoid costly false starts and serious schedule delays. Development of a single thread demonstration using a "rapid prototype" approach is one effective way to make sure the right requirements are incorporated. Off-the-shelf software should be considered to cut down cost and delays, and to take advantage of commercial upgrades.
Correct Imbalances
In spite of consistent inquiry, the Task Force was shown little evidence of capability and staff planning to meet the long-term needs. For example, technology development plans for low-cost access to space seemed modest in spite of the strong need for new systems; aeronautical programs, including support for important new wind tunnels and pioneering projects such as the x-series of aircraft, were limited; and funding of long-range R&D activity throughout the Agency has been reduced. The natural reluctance to share restructuring types of information with outside groups is understandable and the Task Force would be pleased if, in fact, this planning has been initiated. If this is not the case, the Task Force strongly urges that such planning be treated as a matter of high priority.
Recommendation: Use the downsizing as an opportunity to adjust imbalances between Strategic Enterprises and within Enterprises, and to improve the long-range/short-range balance. These added steps will best be accomplished if NASA can get ahead of its mandated personnel staffing decrease and have some capability to add exceptionally capable personnel where needed.
Strengthen Technology Transfer
All Centers exhibited a positive response to the NASA Technology Transfer initiative. Some Center's activities were distinguished by the proactive step of seeking out users in need of technology. This impressed the Task Force as a technique for making an outreach in areas expected to pay off, in contrast to responding to organizations which happened to contact NASA. The MSFC methodology for quantifying outreach impact (dollars and jobs to the economy) was impressive and brought the results to a bottom line that should help communicate its value.
The challenge, however, goes far beyond that which the Centers demonstrated. Technology transfer should also include the transfer of technology into NASA from other Federal agencies, industry, and academia, and the evidence of working these aspects was much weaker. Classified sources must be actively involved or a valuable resource will be omitted. Despite some assurances to the contrary, the Task Force observed that some of the technology work on which NASA is spending time and money has been solved in the past by other communities. NASA needs two-way streets of technology transfer with other agencies, private industry, and academia, and it has the responsibility to help encourage transfer between academia and industry.
Recommendation: NASA should develop a technology plan that addresses the key needs of its Strategic Enterprises. Then it should evaluate whether or not NASA is in the forefront in providing this capability. For those cases where it is not, it should make the necessary arrangements with industry, other agencies, or academia to obtain the expertise rather than continuing unproductive efforts.
Global communications, satellite navigation, some sensors, and photovoltaics technology may be examples of rich fields of opportunity for technology transfer into NASA. Metrics to quantify the impact of the technology transfer effort should be used universally.
As NASA implements the necessary downsizing, it should also mount a vigorous effort to improve the efficiency and quality of its R&D efforts. Rapid advances are being made in other parts of the Government and the private sector, and NASA must place the necessary management attention on keeping pace. The Task Force suggests eight specific actions.
Improve Civil Servant Incentives
Current Civil Service regulations limit the flexibility of management to adjust resources in response to budget changes. Some of this is intentional to protect employees from arbitrary and capricious acts of managers and supervisors. But the regulations also make it difficult for highly talented and productive civil servants to be encouraged within the system and underachievers are tolerated within the system.
The Task Force considered several alternative Center structural approaches during its review:
Civil Service as Currently Configured and Implemented. This is the structure for nine of the ten NASA Centers. As practiced, the current system has been found to be inefficient and lacking in flexibility to tailor the workforce to the job at hand. It is difficult to: (a) quickly establish the required staff and capabilities to perform the work, (b) recognize outstanding performers, and (c) weed out nonperformers when compared to an industry standard. NASA could do more within the existing system with thoughtful planning and judicious use of the flexibility provided within the regulations. The Task Force realizes that NASA could make more use of the tools available to it in the restructuring and downsizing process, but we believe that even with aggressive efforts it will not be sufficiently responsive.
Modified Civil Service. The Department of the Navy personnel demonstrations at the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center Research and Development Division and at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (China Lake) provide one model for a way to overcome some of the disadvantages of the Civil Service system by putting more local control and flexibility into the personnel structure. Separation rates for marginal or unacceptable performers were over six times higher than employees with outstanding and superior ratings, and Office of Personnel Management analysis indicates that the total labor cost was kept competitive during the demonstration process. DoD plans to expand this approach for its service laboratories.
Perhaps as a result of previous downsizing actions and the methods for accomplishing the downsizing, an imbalance between direct and indirect personnel has developed at most NASA installations. The indirect Civil Service workforce averages 25 percent of the direct Civil Service workforce Agency-wide. MSFC is presently operating at 13.9 percent. This apparent imbalance should be investigated; standardized measures should be developed for evaluations, and the indirect workforce should be reduced. As a specific portion of this investigation, NASA should review its procurement processes and requirements to assure conformance with the "faster, cheaper, better" paradigm.
Recommendation: As a matter of priority, NASA should:
* Evaluate options, such as the "China Lake" demonstration project and more recent plans developed by DOC's Boulder Reinvention Laboratory and other areas in DoD, to develop approaches to permit more rapid response to reshaping Civil Service staffs.
* Consider establishing "industrial funding" with a base budget (perhaps 25 percent) to maintain core competency. This model is used successfully at NRL, China Lake, and the Air Force's Phillips Laboratory. When coupled with a financial management system that includes civil servant costs, this provides a strong incentive for improved efficiency. GSFC and MSFC would be good candidates to consider as part of the demonstration.
* Analyze the indirect activity and reduce the apparent imbalance that exists between the NASA direct and indirect civil servant workforce if detailed analysis validates this concern. As a target, NASA should seek to limit its indirect Civil Service workforce to below 12 percent.
Elevate JPL Contracting for Added Value
Government Owned, Contractor Operated. JPL as an FFRDC is unique among the "Center" structural approaches. However good as this management approach might be in theory (and in practice in the past), the current situation is that NASA has increased its oversight on JPL to the point of micro mismanagement. The JPL contract is a 5-year contract. NASA, however, still places 21 civil servants at the site. Furthermore, it has 168 task orders, which are updated annually as required, to get its work done, in spite of JPL's remarkable track record of accomplishments. The end result is that the Government has managed to lose a lot of the value that should be available from a competent technical organization backed up by the California Institute of Technology and the Board of Trustees' Technical Oversight Committee.
NASA Headquarters does not require any formal management plan integrating the sum total of activities performed by the Laboratory. This indicates a problem with the contract and its management.
Recommendation: Develop a more reasonable arrangement with the California Institute of Technology and JPL by:
* Requiring JPL to submit a formal mission management plan at the programmatic level of accountability suitable for its function as project implementor of the Scientific Research Enterprise and certain projects within Mission to Planet Earth, to be reviewed and approved by NASA.
* Ceasing micro mismanagement of JPL and expecting responsible leadership from JPL once the above is instituted.
Establish Advisory Councils
An arrangement with excellent potential was observed at JPL with its access to a California Institute of Technology Trustees' Oversight Committee. While peculiar to the FFRDC arrangement for JPL, similar arrangements could offer great value to the other NASA Centers. An advisory committee at NASA Centers can serve as a resource to provide impartial inputs and perspective on technical issues, including technology transfer, customer needs, and alternative technical approaches.
Recommendation: Establish an advisory council for each Center, with membership from industry, academia, and other parts of the Government to provide suggestions and advice on the full span of Center operations.
Pursue Privatization
There is great appeal in terms of coupling NASA research capabilities with the expertise and intellectual resources of a university, or consortium of universities.
Recommendation:NASA should consider the possibility of a Space Act Agreement or a similar contractual arrangement with a university at one or more of its Centers. The main motivation for this approach is to improve quality and focus Center activities on their fundamental strength. The arrangement could be Center-wide or restricted to that portion of the Center for which there is a particularly good fit. ARC is one possibility, because of its very strong credentials in biomedical research, high-performance computing, fluid physics, and space science. The nonaeronautics part of LeRC is another possibility. Both possibilities would permit ARC and LeRC to focus on their fundamental strengths in aeronautics, as previously suggested. Again, however, every effort must be made to prevent the tendency over time to micromanage both the university and the Center.
Continue/Strengthen Peer and Other Nonadvocacy Review Processes
Peer and other independent selection and review processes can help mold the most effective program. Independent review processes are very important to developing and conducting preeminent R&D programs, and there was considerable evidence that these techniques are widely employed within NASA.
There seemed, however, to be too many instances when the same people were used in reviews. There are many more scientists and engineers in universities and aerospace companies than in NASA. It makes good sense to use them as a mechanism to bring in fresh minds, ideas, and young investigators.
Recommendation:Peer selection and review serve as a particularly important feature for the scientific research segment of the NASA program because it is the evaluation technique accepted by the scientific community as the best method for establishing high standards of excellence. It is an established process employed in many scientific research fields when wise use of public money is at stake. There are several steps in scientific research that need to be considered.
The first step is to select fields of activity, and peer review is essential for that. It is desirable to include external (non-NASA) persons on the peer review committee, but it can be valuable to include NASA personnel, too, for their perspective.
The Task Force recommends that peer committee membership be rotated so that a balance of representation, fresh inputs, and diverse viewpoints can be made over time. The review cycle time should be shortened to fit the Government's decision process.
Selection of scientific research proposals can also be made most objectively by the right peer selection process and, again, the makeup of the peer committee is important. A composition of both outside and inside NASA members and the careful rotation of members for the widest possible technical representation make good sense. External competition for most (perhaps 70 to 80 percent) of the work is recommended to get the best possible minds at work on the critical issues. As NASA downsizes, the tendency might be to keep more of the work in-house. We recommend that Headquar-ters issue guidance to prevent such a trend.
With regard to technology development, NASA is responsible for selecting the fields of activity that offer the most favorable benefit, and it is important to obtain active participation from an advisory group that is representative of the users. After these fields have been established, it is recommended that not only NASA technologists but also outside technologists have the opportunity to compete for a significant segment of the applied research or technology work.
The peer selection process may be appropriate for basic research before selecting a particular technology for applied research or prototype development. The participation of an external advisory group to review the progress of technology R&D programs for quality and relevance is appropriate and desirable.
Specific review recommendations are provided in the later Strategic Enterprise sections of this report.
Increase Center Discretionary Budgets The Center Directors, with R&D budgets between $0.5 and 2.5 billion, have discretionary budgets that range between $0.5 million and $2.5 million, or about 0.1 percent of their R&D budget. Although this budget is augmented in the Civil Service Centers with staff, this is not true for JPL. In both cases, the funding is far lower than in industry where Government support of industry's discretionary funding (IRAD) is over 2 percent, or 20 times larger.
Recommendation: Individual Center discretionary funds should be increased at least several fold, with the stipulation that the money is applied toward advanced technology and other leading-edge activities, not for solving program budget problems. At least half of this budget should be expended externally. The consequences of such investments should be reviewed by a peer group every 2 or 3 years.
Reduce Reviews and Audits Burden
The expenditure of public funds requires appropriate oversight. Excessive reviews and audits, however, place an overbearing demand on management and the supporting functions. As a consequence, program management is distracted, and the programs are put at risk.
Two types of reviews and audits were found: planned reviews and unplanned reviews. Each type can be either internal or external.
Internal reviews are those that NASA performs in response to Public Laws and Executive Orders or for its own knowledge of programs.
Some planned program reviews are based on NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 7120.4, which establishes management policies and responsibilities for major system programs and projects as well as minimum numbers of program reviews.
There are several recurring reviews, such as the Functional Review, Accounting Review, Procurement Review, Self Assessment Review, and budget review. These reviews occur once every 2 or 3 years, with the exception of the annual budget review. A budget review takes about 6 months and involves all Centers and Headquarters.
In FY94, 98 internal audits were conducted at JPL. Some were requested by JPL; others were requested by NASA.
In FY94, there were several major unplanned internal reviews that involved all the field Centers, and many of them are still in process (for example, Administrator's visit, Chief Scientist visit, Chief Engineer visit, Zero Base Review, Streamlining (National Performance Review), Project Reliance, Institutional Restructuring Review, and National Facilities Study). Similar reviews are likely to be scheduled in 1995.
External planned reviews are those that outside organizations, such as General Accounting Office (GAO), conduct on NASA activities. GAO concluded 37 reports on NASA activities in FY94. The subjects of these audits vary from "Model to Predict Global Warming" to "Position Classification." GAO is known to be working on 20 reviews in FY95, although the results of a recent GAO conference on NASA may alter this information.
In FY94, the Office of Inspector General (IG) of NASA performed 116 audits in the Centers (including JPL) and Headquarters. The subjects of the audits varied from "Methods of Determining U.S. Aeronautical Research Needs" to "NASA Accounting and Financial Information System." The IG plans to conduct 134 audits in FY95.
The Space Station alone has 22 external and internal committees identified to provide independent review, although several of these are not active. Some of these are overlapping. The congressionally mandated Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is a time-consuming duplication of the ISSA Program Independent Assessment Panel, which provides the same service but in more depth.
A rough and incomplete summary of the reviews is:
Special Visits & Reviews
(All Centers) 80
Program Reviews
(All Centers) 125
GAO 40
OIG (NASA) 120
Congress 150
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TOTAL 515
The bottom line is that audits and reviews are out of control.
Recommendation: NASA's program review should follow and not exceed NMI 7120.4, unless approved by the NASA Administrator. When additional reviews are anticipated, there first must be an evaluation of past reviews on that subject and the actions which resulted. The value of the proposed review must be strongly justified prior to approval.
It is more difficult for NASA to object to external assessments, but particularly in today's budget climate, duplications such as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel should be stopped. It is recommended that this topic be included in the April 15 NSTC Final Report of the Federal Laboratory System.
Improve the Ability to Attract and Retain the Best Personnel
NASA will need high-quality technical managers to lead its future R&D efforts as the current management retires and moves on. It is important that Government agencies have the best possible leaders to act as stewards for public funds.
One important source for future leadership will be in the next generation of civil servants who are trained and rise through the ranks. This source should be augmented by outside sources, such as industry and academia, which can provide background and expertise not developed by a long-term career in Government service.
Over the years, it has become increasingly difficult to attract the best people that the country has to offer to serve in Government positions. NASA is no exception. A major consideration is the new civil servant restrictions on reentering private industry. These restrictions were imposed to prevent unacceptable procurement practices from developing. The cure, however, has apparently turned out to be worse than the disease, because the Government is now losing the services of the best and brightest in industry and academia. It is further observed that efforts to correct imbalances in workforce diversity can lead to serious inefficiencies, unless these selections are made from the best qualified.
Specific government practice recommendations are offered by the many studies of this issue-for example, the Volker Commission, the NAS/NAE-Dam Committee, etc.
Recommendation: The Task Force believes it is important for NSTC to include this topic in its April 15 report, along with the recommendation that barriers be removed and improved incentives developed to make it possible to attract and retain top leaders from industry and academia toward Government service.
A "New NASA" will emerge following the downsizing process. The New NASA" must be as strong as it can be in an era of austere budgets. The recommendations for downsizing should be implemented prudently to preserve and strengthen the unique and essential capabilities of NASA as a critical national resource. In this spirit, closure of facilities, transfer, consolidation, or reduction of activities should stop short of affecting NASA's ability to remain preeminent in aeronautics and space.
To implement the plan for the "New NASA," it is imperative that NASA take the following steps to promote mutual respect, cooperation, and trust among Centers and between Centers and Headquarters.
* Develop a set of clearly articulated expectations for the entire NASA management team.
* Establish team performance as a basis for a reward system.
* Create an "integrated management team" to guide activities involving two or more Centers. NASA has initiated a strategic posture that can be energized by the Task Force recommendations to help rekindle the excitement of the pioneering spirit, and attract a new generation to pursue careers in science and technology.
The next five sections present the Findings and Recommendations that are applicable to the individual Strategic Enterprises.
Go Back to Approach.
Go Foreward to Aeronautics.
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