The Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS) laboratory system is a unique national asset. It is the only system in the world that supports human access to space employing a reusable launch vehicle. The system also provides unique capabilities for scientific research, flight development and support, and the integration of life and physical sciences with engineering. As the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program described it:
". . . by far the greatest body of space expertise in the world resides within NASA. . . . NASA, and only NASA, realistically possesses the critical mass of knowledge and expertise upon which the nationŐs civil space program can be sustained. . . ."
The core of the HEDS laboratory system consists of four NASA Centers: JSC, KSC, MSFC, and SSC. HEDS R&D activities also are conducted at several of the other Centers, as shown on the map that lists assignments for HEDS R&D and operations. The HEDS Enterprise spent approximately $7.8 billion in FY94, of which about 45 percent is R&D.
The primary mission of the HEDS Enterprise and its laboratory system is grounded in the National Space Act of 1958 (as amended), the enabling legislation that created NASA. Those goals relevant to human space exploration include:
* The expansion of human knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena in the atmosphere and space.
* The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space.
* The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.
* Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof.
Identifying space exploration as one of the national needs emphasizes the importance of the HEDS laboratory system. Overall, the specific roles and missions of the HEDS laboratories, as spelled out in their individual strategic plans and/or the NASA organization handbook, have a basis in the NASA Strategic Plan. The NASA Strategic Plan, the Strategic Management Plan, and the core competencies of the individual laboratories must serve as the basis for justifying the continued operation of each facility in the individual laboratories as well as any capital investment in new facilities or upgrades to existing facilities.
As to the national needs beyond space exploration, the Task Force members saw ample evidence of the commitment by the individual laboratories in several of these areas. Recent efforts in technology transfer, such as the ventricular assist device at JSC, the outreach efforts of MSFC, the development of corrosion-resistant polymer coatings at KSC, and the hybrid rocket testing at SSC, provide excellent examples. In terms of environmental protection and cleanup, the research that KSC conducts to clean up past contamination sites, to understand how gas and substances move through the biosystem, and to move away from ozone-depleting substances is critical in allowing the high technology necessary for human spaceflight to coexist with a complex environmental system. Informa-tion from the NASA life sciences program can potentially contribute to the understanding of human diseases on the Earth.
In each of these cases, and others, NASA makes a contribution beyond its primary goal of space exploration. NASA must be careful, however, to ensure that these ancillary activities do not draw critical resources away from the primary HEDS mission-the human exploration of space.
Recommendation: NASA must retain a capability to conduct the human exploration of space and the R&D effort to support the national needs. NASA must continue to examine what is required to accomplish the HEDS mission.
Clinical research is focused at JSC, which also is responsible for the health of the astronauts. First-class fundamental biomedical investigations of the effects of hyper- and hypo-gravity are carried out at ARC, but only minimal interactions occur between the groups at the two Centers. The life scientists at ARC constitute a group of investigators whose research covers multiple areas but with no identifiable program. Informal collaborations with local colleges and universities have been properly and successfully used to maintain scientific competence. Formal collaborations with individual institutes at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has been instituted at an increased level and promises to be of benefit to both organizations.
Recommendation: Focused program goals should be developed for life sciences research. The current basic scientists at ARC should have more formal ties to local academic institutions, and the coordination of goals with JSC should be strengthened.
Recommendation: The life science research program carried out jointly with NIH should continue to be strengthened and expanded. In-house expertise must be maintained to address those problems not appropriate for NIH and to provide advice and support to the science community on payload requirements.
* Perform applied and fundamental research to meet both short-term operational requirements and long-term goals.
* Develop and maintain a cadre of scientists sufficiently knowledgeable regarding "cutting-edge" scientific issues and sufficiently experienced regarding NASA project exigencies, facility availability, and program needs to optimally facilitate the NASA flight program and the research efforts of the academic and industrial communities ("customers") that use NASA's unique facilities.
The application of outside peer review to life sciences research over the past year and a half has followed a particularly stringent model, which is more restrictive to in-house research than is apparent from other Federal and many non-Federal parallels. This approach to peer review was mandated by Congress and supported by National Academy of Sciences subcommittees. Under it, the NASA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications cannot obligate any funding unless life sciences proposals have been subjected to external peer review via the model employed. Congress monitors the performance in this area through quarterly reviews. Peer review, per se, is critical to the development and optimization of scientific effort and is laudable in informing the NASA community of study design standards of non-NASA researchers. However, the application of peer review according to the currently employed model may preclude the development of strategically critical, coherent baseline scientific efforts and may inhibit development of opportunities to do high-quality original scientific studies in space. It may also eventually limit the desirability of NASA as a workplace for talented young scientists, resulting in an increasingly aging science staff.
A related issue involves the strategic differences between operational research (necessary to support crew safety for flight) and fundamental research (aimed at long-term HEDS objectives). Both are essential, and protocol design characteristics for both are intrinsically similar, although their goals may be very different. Nonetheless, data collected from operational research form the basis for hypotheses to be tested in basic science/fundamental studies. Currently, both types of research often compete for funding from the same source. As a result, what should be a cooperative relationship between the two areas becomes, instead, a competitive one. This approach could also inhibit the development of strategically critical, coherent scientific efforts. In part, this problem may result from a lack of clearly stated announcements of opportunity specifically distinguishing between operational research and basic science/clinical science research.
Recommendation: Recognizing NASA's unique strategic requirements and mandates, peer review should be structured to mirror other Federal review models and to minimize the disruption of coherent core assets. Therefore:
* Baseline funding should enable the retention of core assets, which are critical for supporting national core research programs in life and microgravity space sciences.
* A peer review process must be developed that matches the overall program of NASA; this process will need to evolve as experience is gained.
* The current, particularly stringent peer review system for life sciences and microgravity must be reviewed to determine its efficacy and costs in programmatic terms.
Recommendation: Announcements of opportunity should distinguish clearly between focus on operations research and focus on research in basic and clinical sciences. Peer review panels and processes should be constructed according to the focus of the effort (operational or basic/clinical science).
Recommendation: The external peer review process should not be used to select technology development work in support of HEDS advanced programs. The external peer review process may be appropriate for early research directed toward fundamental technology prior to selection of a particular technology for prototype development.
NASA is currently undergoing an extensive review of its facilities in preparation for the closure or "mothballing" of some of them. This process is driven by the need to budget adequate funds to maintain existing facilities. As determined in a 1990 study ("Committing to the Cost of Ownership: Maintenance and Repair of Public Buildings") by the National Research Council, "An appropriate budget allocation for routine [maintenance and repair] for a substantial inventory of facilities will typically be in the range of 2 to 4 percent of the aggregate current replacement value of those facilities (excluding land and major associated infrastructure)" (p. xii). There also are a number of other studies and reviews under way, such as the Zero-Base Review, that are also considering the issue of redundancy and options for closure, consolidation, and so on.
The Task Force commends NASA for its efforts, as well as its willingness to work with other agencies, to effectively utilize capabilities within NASA and elsewhere. After all, it was NASA that initiated the National Facilities Study. NASA must continue to pursue this effort. It is often easy to find justification for retaining a particular facility because of its proximity to related activities and interested users; however, the current and anticipated budget climate dictates that hard choices be made.
Recommendation: NASA must continue the process of workforce and facility evaluations; findings of these evaluations should be implemented in a timely manner for human spaceflight.
Because of management practices under the original Space Station Freedom program, the Vest Committee recommended that the Civil Service workforce on the program be reduced by 25 to 50 percent. This results in a range of 1,150 to 1,725 full-time equivalents on the program. We understand that the current onboard strength is around 1,200 to 1,300 full-time equivalents. Although the program has been able to operate within this guideline, the Task Force is concerned about the long-term implications to workforce development.
NASA has a pressing need to train the next generation of NASA technical staff and managers. If the younger members of the NASA workforce are not given the opportunity to perform technical work involving real products, they will never build the skills necessary for the United States to pursue the human exploration of space. The Space Station represents an opportunity for many of the young engineers and scientists at NASA to become involved in a development project that will both hone and expand their technical and managerial abilities.
In terms of the Vest Committee recommendation, it is important that the contractor oversight function be limited to the minimum needed to satisfy the Government's fiduciary and technical responsibilities. Any additional civil servants must be applied to in-line tasks and to provide Government-furnished hardware and software elements and in-line analysis products. Such an approach, which is largely research and program management funded, frees up R&D funds to be used in contracted tasks.
Recommendation: NASA must use Civil Service talent and Center core capabilities to perform in-line tasks and to provide hardware and software elements to the Space Station program to the degree possible, while continuing to limit the numbers engaged in contractor oversight.
Following conceptual design, projects undergo a review to determine whether technical requirements can be met within the projected cost and schedule. Then, throughout the life of the program, additional milestone reviews are conducted with participation from other Centers, NASA Headquarters, and customers, in accordance with NMI 7120.4, "Management of Major Systems Programs and Projects." These include a Systems Requirement Review, a Preliminary Design Review at 30-percent design completion, a Critical Design Review at 90-percent design completion, a Design Certification Review, a Systems Acceptance Review, a Flight Readiness Review, an Operational Readiness Review, and a series of flight- and ground-safety reviews. These reviews, coupled with monthly project manager reviews to assess progress against cost and schedule, are designed to ensure that the project delivers its products in a timely and cost-effective manner.
There are a number of mechanisms for independently evaluating the quality and performance of major R&D programs at NASA. The NASA Advisory Council and the National Research Council, as well as Agency- and Center-level independent review groups, conduct independent assessments of existing programs and proposed new programs. These nonadvocacy groups evaluate both the readiness and soundness of the technology and science, as well as the performance of the program throughout its life. In addition, independent review boards and the NASA Program Management Council evaluate major programs annually in terms of how they achieve performance, cost, and schedule goals, which are established early in the program life cycle.
In addition to the established independent review groups, NASA has a history of ad hoc independent reviews. Three examples of such reviews are the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, this Task Force review, and the Task Force on the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission. These review teams are created in situations where the need for an independent analysis of overall policy or a specific program has been identified among senior NASA management or by external entities. The review team, composed of outside experts or a mix of such experts and NASA civil servants, is given a fixed period to complete the review and provide, in writing, findings and recommendations.
The review process requires that the affected NASA managers take a step back and review their efforts from a perspective that is hard to maintain in the day-to-day sequence of events. The reviewers, in turn, are in a position to take a more objective and global view of both the issues and the details. This process, more often than not, produces sound recommendations that help focus policy in the case of the Agency-wide reviews or enhance mission success in the case of program/project reviews. Those Center Directors who were specifically asked their opinion on the value of independent reviews all stated that the reviews produced real benefits.
Although the independent reviews do produce benefits, there are several aspects of the process that merit further consideration. First, there is no centralized approach to cataloging the recommendations made by independent review groups and their resolutions. Second, there does not appear to be a process in place to examine the management or process deficiencies that these reviews identify, either directly or through patterns evident across multiple reviews. As a result, NASA is gaining less than it could from the independent review process.
Another aspect of independent reviews is the burden they place on the NASA organizations that must respond. For example, the NASA Centers invested significant effort in producing materials for this review and conducting the briefings for the Task Force members. When the effort involved in responding to this review is coupled with the myriad of other reviews, both scheduled and ad hoc, to which the Centers and Headquarters are subjected, the review process can become overbearing. The Space Station program recently prepared a list of more than 20 standing external review teams to which it must respond. The time that technical staff and managers invest in responding to reviews is time that is not spent on the program's specific goals and milestones. There is also a significant amount of overhead involved in establishing the review groups, particularly the ad hoc.
Recommendation: To streamline the independent review process for the Space Station and to gain greater benefit from it, the following suggestions are offered:
* Assign the responsibility for tracking independent reviews, the recommendations they make, and the status of those recommendations.
* Identify a review coordinator for the program as the focal point for all review activity, to limit the disruption to program and Center personnel by eliminating multiple requests for data from different sources, to provide continuity among different reviews, to develop a repository for data frequently requested by review groups, and to provide the status of review recommendations. The intent, however, is not to create additional bureaucracy that would impede the ability to conduct reviews.
* Require that there be a specific assessment of the expected value to be obtained from any review not specified in NMI 7120.4.
Recommendation: As NASA reduces operations costs, R&D funding should be increased and focused toward processes to further reduce operations costs and to develop new technology for human exploration of the Solar System. Realistic life cycle costs of a proposed program must be considered in the initial design to permit optimization of total program cost.
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