MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee/House Science Committee Hearing on

Space Shuttle Safety: October 1, 1997

Members Present:
Chairman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) Ranking Minority Member Bud Cramer (D-AL), Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), Nicholas Lampson (D-TX), Tim Roemer (D-IN), David Weldon (R-FL), Bart Gordon (D-TN), Matt Salmon (R-AZ), Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Mark Foley (R-FL), Merrill Cook (R-UT), George Nethercutt (R-WA)

Witnesses:

Wil Trafton, Associate Administrator, Office of Human Space Flight
Paul M. Johnstone, Chairman, Aerospace Safety and Advisory Panel (ASAP)
Jim Adamson, Chief Operating Officer, United Space Alliance (USA)
Allen Li, Associate Director, General Accounting Office (GAO)

Chairman Rohrabacher held a 1-1/2 hr. hearing of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee of the House Science Committee on Wednesday, October 1 on space shuttle safety. The focus was primarily on the funds that had been transferred from the shuttle upgrades program to the International Space Station (ISS) in FY97 and for plans to transfer additional funds in FY98. The chairman emphasized that decisions about funding should be made by the oversight committee, rather than by "unelected government officials." He also expressed his concern about the impact on shuttle safety, asking, "How many times can the cookie jar be raided?" Full Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner stated that "NASA keeps changing its tune" about how much funding is necessary for shuttle safety and quoted various past testimony from Mr. Johnstone, Mr. Trafton, and Mr. Oswald. He stated that he was very concerned that funding request inconsistencies would affect the credibility of ISS supporters in Congress. Congressman Roemer described his concern stemming from a Space News article that claimed that ISS would have an estimated $500-600M cost overrun, and wanted to know from where that would come. He stated that NASA seemed cavalier about the program, and that he also fears that NASA's "lackadaisical attitude" would erode Congressional and public confidence in NASA. Congressman Weldon focused on the importance of pursuing opportunities for shuttle commercialization.

Mr. Trafton stated in his testimony that safety not only is not jeopardized, but is NASA's number one priority. Only two of the last 32 launches were outside the first five-minute launch window, and the shuttle program has received a clean bill of health from ASAP. He also stated that shuttle and ISS have become symbiotic programs, and that the safety of shuttle is also critical to the space station program. Mr. Johnstone reported that ASAP's findings on shuttle safety have not altered since his testimony on March 13, 1997; the next ASAP report will be published in February 1998. He stated that the transfer of funds from the shuttle upgrades program does not affect risk, and ASAP will continue to watch the program closely, adding that NASA and its contractors have been very cooperative in ASAP's fact-finding study. Allan Li's testimony supported Mr. Trafton's statement that safety is NASA's number one priority and that the $190M transfer in FY97 did not impact current upgrades. NASA has used carryover funds in the past to fund upgrades. The following questions remain: who should pay for upgrades in the future - NASA or USA? How long will the shuttle be required? Are there viable alternatives? Mr. Adamson testified that the funds transfer had absolutely no impact on shuttle safety, and that the shuttle has never been safer. The transition from NASA to USA is on track and proceeding well, he stated.

Questions focused initially on the funding transfer, with Chairman Rohrabacher claiming that he was "astounded by the amount of money floating around" that is not directed by Congress. He was also astonished at the amount of shuttle uncosted carryover for FY97. He addressed Mr. Trafton's statement that "shuttle is doing its part" to support ISS, stating that it is actually the taxpayers' who are doing their part, not shuttle, and that it is not the right of government employees to move funds. Mr. Li described the difference between obligated and unobligated carryover, and that the percentage of carryover is not significant, with Mr. Trafton stating he would fire his shuttle director if he ever came in at the end of a fiscal year with no reserves because no program can be run without some reserves. He emphasized that NASA has gone through all the "proper channels" to transfer funds. Chairman Rohrabacher also focused on the age of shuttle technology and the problems inherent in using it for a number of decades, including the difficulty in finding contractors for replacement parts. Congressman Cramer questioned Mr. Johnstone about ASAP's review process, and about the different types of upgrades - those for safety, obsolescence, cost efficiencies, and performance improvements. Congressman Nethercutt asked if additional funds would be transferred from shuttle to ISS in FY98, to which Mr. Trafton responded that NASA would transfer $50M in FY98 and additional funds may be necessary later. The congressman referred to a POP '97 program report that stated that the $190M transfer to ISS was a setback to the upgrade plan. Mr. Trafton replied that all the center POPs, which were their hopes for the coming two years, were taken into consideration when the budget was created. Congressman Cook discussed his concern about the planned studies on liquid flyback boosters, to which Mr. Li responded that the amount budgeted is appropriate to help discussion by the committee of such a big issue. Mr. Trafton informed him that the Space Transportation Council was formed by NASA to look at future plans and that their report on liquid flyback boosters would be delivered to the Administrator. The hearing ended with all four witnesses responding to a question by Congresswoman Jackson-Lee that shuttle safety is being properly funded and that the transfers from the shuttle program to the Space Station program had no impact on shuttle safety.

Statement of

Wilbur C. Trafton
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

before the

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science
United States House of Representatives

October 1, 1997

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for this opportunity to come before you to address the Subcommittee regarding our cost reductions initiatives within the Space Shuttle program coupled with our transfer of $190M in FY 1997 to the International Space Station (ISS). I will also explain how that transfer of funding will not compromise safety.

I feel that I can speak for all of us involved in Human Space Flight activities, from those of us here in Washington - to the Program managers at our various field centers -- to the technician on the floor of the Vehicle Assembly Building in Florida, flying the Shuttle safely is our number one priority. We all accept the fact that there is a certain amount of risk involved with flying humans into space but it is our job-all of us-to mitigate that risk. The Shuttle team, NASA and contractors, is a responsible, highly motivated, well trained, and extremely dedicated group of individuals. Our main goal is to assure that each and every Shuttle mission is prepared for and conducted in the safest manner possible.

Funding Transfer to the ISS

Some have asked how the Shuttle program can afford to transfer $190M to the ISS without affecting Shuttle safety? I would like to take a few minutes to explain that this transfer has had absolutely no effect on the safety of this treasured national asset or the crew members that fly aboard the Shuttle.

We began Restructuring the Space Shuttle program in FY 1992 consistent with the Agency Strategic Plan of reducing operations costs and to accommodate future declining budgets. Since that time we have reduced our budget by 30% equating to almost $1.3B in savings per year against FY 1992 budget levels. Restructuring will continue in the future and the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) awarded last October is a large part of that. In fact, as you remember in the FY 1997 Congressional Budget, about $400M of our future run-out savings was due to SFOC. We have continued to assume those savings in both our FY 1998 and 1999 requests. During this restructure, the Space Shuttle program has tried to mitigate perturbations as much as possible. The two principle

factors in this accomplishment are: (1) funding stability provided by the Congress over

the last two years and (2) cost effective management by the Program as shown in Attachment # 1.

In addition to the Restructuring efforts, a variety of unusualcircumstances occurred in FY 1996 which forced additional conservatism in the carryover estimates provided to GAO in support of the July 1996 hearing. It was the program's assumption that there was no new money available, therefore, they would need to fund any additional requirements. Specifically, low carryover estimates were provided due to impacts related to:

While the estimating assumptions were headed one direction, other factors

contributed to actual spending being driven lower in the opposite direction, including:


Before the transfer, we had a projected carryover into FY 1998 of $550 million, plus or minus $50M. As you know, the carryover level required varies from program to program, with the amount dependent on procurement type and the level of risk. On average, a carryover of about 8 weeks is considered reasonable. The Shuttle program carryover Metric is 15%, a figure which is consistent with the Agency-wide average. To that number, we added about $70 million. In the Shuttle program, we also had about $70M set aside to continue a number of program approved upgrades and a $50M margin for program uncertainties.

Regarding the generation of the $190M transferred to ISS, these funds came primarily from prior year efficiencies in operations and from development projects' content deletions or re-phasing. As savings occurred, funds were transferred from the projects into reserve accounts, to mitigate perturbations on the projects in case of future funding reductions.

Now, at the end of FY 1997 and after the transfer of the $190M, we will be carrying $399M into FY 1998, which is sufficient to fund all of our projected Shuttle program requirements until the FY1998 Appropriation is received.

Of the $399M, our planned uses are as follows:


SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY

Budget planning and formulation for the Shuttle program is always accomplished consistent with our established program priorities : 1) Fly safely; 2) Meet the manifest; 3) Improve Supportability and 4) Reduce costs. Safety is our number one priority and we all work together to ensure that the processes used to ensure safety remain strong and effective.

Following the Challenger accident and guided by the findings of the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident - the "Rogers Commission Report" - NASA conducted an extensive, across-the-board effort to return to safe, reliable space flight. Numerous hardware, software, and process safety improvements were incorporated and both risk identification and reduction programs were put in place. The Space Shuttle program was reorganized to ensure that all necessary information was available to managers at all levels, i.e., communication channels were greatly enhanced. The Program Compliance Assurance and Status System (PCASS) and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) system were set up to implement the information flow required.

All program documentation was reviewed, and previous waivers and deviations were revoked. Reestablishment required detailed analyses by both contractor and civil service personnel at all levels of management. Failure Modes and Effects Analyses were performed for every item, resulting in a Critical Items List. Fault trees were generated to characterize each subsystem in all the propulsion elements of the Shuttle. Disposition of every item reviewed was made through the Program Requirements Control Board system at each level of the program, with final disposition made by the Space Shuttle Program Director chaired Board. A detailed systems analysis was also accomplished for flight software. A review of every line of code was performed beginning with the Flight System Software Requirements (FSSR's). The FSSR's were reviewed and rewritten to enhance safe operation. In addition, an Independent Verification and Validation organization was established to verify that all new flight software was built according to these requirements. Also, hardware and software upgrades are continuing to provide a safer and more reliable vehicle. These additional upgrades will be carried to completion and the other enhancements will be sustained.

Critical to the success of the program following the Challenger accident are the processes which have been implemented to ensure complete and open communication of safety related issues. The commit-to-flight process epitomizes these principles. Each project reviews every technical issue and anomaly which could have any effect on the upcoming flight. Any technical issue is subjected to independent assessment by the government workforce. Through a series of open reviews, all significant issues and open items are elevated to a Flight Readiness Review Board chaired by the Lead Center Director for the Space Shuttle. This review is conducted "face-to-face" with all projects and senior government and contractor management in attendance. Through this process, full and open discussions of all potential issues are conducted and the issues are thoroughly assessed by all levels of program management, engineering, and safety and missions assurance.

In addition to the formal open communication system, a system is in place to provide a mechanism for anonymous, voluntary and responsive reporting of concerns or risks. The NASA Safety Reporting System (NSRS) is available to both NASA and contractor employees and has served as an effective supplemental reporting channel to augment existing means. The organization that processes the NSRS inputs is a private contractor. Shuttle related ground and flight safety concerns reported through the NSRS are worked directly by senior safety and program personnel. NASA believes that this system remains an effective "safety valve" that contributes to the overall Shuttle safety program. Also, it should be noted that anyone, at anytime, can stop the launch of a Space Shuttle if they suspect an issue of flight safety. No Shuttle will be launched until all concerns are successfully dispositioned.

We have also put into place a number of proactive initiatives which are designed to enhance safety awareness and training. For example, each October there is a program-wide Safety Awareness Day at all four of the field centers involved with the Shuttle program. Each Center approaches the day's activities in their own way with a variety of speakers, films, contests, and educational forums that are all focused on safety.

Additionally, organizational safety homepages have been developed and are on line. The Shuttle Program Bulletin, a US Alliance newsletter and numerous safety brochures are available throughout the workplace. A very active Space Flight Awareness program, focused on safety, provides a mechanism to reward individuals and organizations for superior performance. The Astronaut Corps is instrumental in the success of Space Flight Awareness by sponsoring highly regarded Awards and a Launch Honoree program to reward employees for their demonstrated dedication to flight safety.

All of these communication channels have been and will be maintained or improved even as we continue the transition toward Shuttle privatization. They are also endorsed, supported by, and actively participated in by the astronaut corps, which in itself is a tremendous motivational tool.

Audit, Surveillance and Insight

While government workers do not intend to continue to provide day-to-day oversight of routine operations, we will maintain in-depth knowledge of the integrity and health of contractor processes and products to insure safety and mission success. We will maintain technical insight into contractor activities, gathering product or process data that provides adequate visibility into the integrity of the process. To provide this greater insight into contractor operations, the NASA Engineering and Quality Audit (NEQA) program, an improved approach to audit using engineering and quality personnel to verify stability of processes, has been implemented. The NEQA program uses a two-phase audit approach (contractor self-audit and NASA on-site audit), providing a method for evaluating processing systems and procedural interrelationships, the effects of management systems, and hardware controls. In addition to NEQA, in-plant surveillance will be utilized, including but not limited to selected high risk areas such as proof test results, systems tests, checkout, and validation process control, training, and configuration management.

All technical issues and any problems or anomalies (occurring either during ground processing or in flight), which are outside of our experience base and/or have not been previously addressed will be subjected to independent assessment by government personnel. All such issues and the corresponding independent assessments will be included in the Flight Readiness Review process.

Metrics

Metrics have been established to monitor parameters which indicate the health of the program and are indicative of safety related trends. These include in-flight anomalies, cannibalization error rates, and operational problem reports. These metrics and others will continue to be monitored and corrective action taken where problems are indicated. Thus far, in-flight anomalies have decreased from a per flight average in 1993 of 14.3 to a current average of 6.75--an improvement of over 50%. The same trend is true for monthly mishap frequency at Kennedy Space Center--a decrease of over 40% in three years. Other metrics are revealing similar trends, leading to the conclusion that we are doing things better but not at the expense of safety. We work closely with NASA Safety and Mission Assurance personnel at Kennedy and all other Shuttle facilities where hardware is built, processed or operated to assure that the Program meets their stringent requirements and is operating with established metrics.

Role of Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA)

Currently NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) conducts an independent commit-to-flight process which stresses assessment of all Shuttle processing activities and known issues and constraints. It consists of three incremental mission specific S&MA reviews prior to each Space Shuttle launch. Pre-launch Assessment Reviews, Flight Readiness Review tag-ups, and Launch Minus 2 Days tag-ups keep all organizational levels of S&MA apprised of status, progress, issues, concerns, and remaining open work to be accomplished before a mission is certified to fly. The S&MA commit-to-flight process has been refined over time and is robust and stable. It has been successfully executed since Return-to-Flight and it will continue to ensure that all critical path processes are verified for flight readiness.

NASA S&MA is transferring responsibility and accountability to the contractor S&MA for selected tasks currently performed by NASA and/or the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC). NASA S&MA will assure that the transitions are conducted in a controlled, effective and reliable manner. NASA S&MA studies have shown that redundant Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIP's) dilute accountability and do not ensure achieving a successful process. The GMIP's will be reduced or phased out of stable processes over the next few years. The contractor will perform 100% of the critical inspections while the government S&MA and engineering organizations will conduct a robust surveillance program.

NASA S&MA will rely more on validating the processes the contractor uses to conduct in-plant work and less on inspecting the final product. NASA SMA is a key member of the aforementioned NEQA audit team. Also, DCMC and NASA resident office S&MA personnel will be co-located in work teams, work centers, and work areas as necessary to monitor processes, documentation, and hardware.




Independent Assessments

The Shuttle program has continued to increase safety margins. This has been confirmed by a number of independent assessments since 1993. Most recently, the Administration, together with the NASA Administrator, requested that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) perform an independent and in-depth review to verify the program's health. The study identified twenty-two recommendations in the areas of Maintenance of Independent Safety Oversight, Lead Center/Communications, Downsizing, Space Flight Operations Contract, and Manifest/Shuttle upgrades. As of August 18, 1997, only one recommendation remains open pending a follow-up visit to the Kennedy Space Center. The Panel found that the program was robust and recommended that we continue to be cautious and to encourage more open communications between management and workers on the line. We appreciate the thoroughness and professionalism with which the ASAP conducts their reviews and look forward to working with them in the future to assure and safe and reliable Space Shuttle program.

Conclusion

In closing, I would like to re-emphasize that Space Shuttle safety, the Agency's #1 priority, has not been jeopardized by the transfer of funds to the International Space Station program. The assembly of the ISS is the Agency's #2 priority and is absolutely dependent on the Space Shuttle for successful completion. Therefore, it is critical to maintain or increase Shuttle safety margins to better support ISS assembly, and we plan to do so. However, at this point in NASA's Human Space Flight endeavors, the Shuttle and Station programs have become symbiotic. The vast majority of the Shuttle's 7-8 flights per year after FY 1999 are devoted to ISS assembly and servicing. Any significant perturbation to Station would reduce Shuttle to well under the minimum rate of 5-6 flights per year recommended to maintain a safe and proficient workforce. Therefore, consistent with the Conference Agreement accompanying the FY 1998 VA-HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations bill, we are prepared to transfer an additional $50M of Shuttle funding to ISS in FY 1998, consistent with the Agency priorities.