ES, IG-98-036, Contingency Planning at Goddard Space Flight Center

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AT
GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
IG-98-036

Executive Summary

Background
NASA represents one of the larger, more complex, and diverse information system environments in the Federal Government. The Agency operations use information systems to support earth and space mission functions for a full array of processing environments, including scientific and engineering computing in academic, research center, production plant, and space vehicle environments. To ensure continued operations when emergencies occur that interrupt computer support, managers must develop and test contingency plans.

Objectives
The objective of the audit was to determine whether Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) had a management-approved contingency plan for the Packet Processor II (PACOR II) Data Capture Facility, the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) Mission Operations Center, and the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center. (See Appendix B for a description of each facility.) Specifically, we determined whether the contingency plans included appropriate procedures for emergency response, backup operations, and testing of the plans. We also determined whether plans were tested annually and whether personnel responsible for plan execution were adequately trained. (See Appendix A for additional information on objectives, scope, and methodology.)

Audit Results
Emergency response procedures, testing, and personnel training for the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center and PACOR II were adequate. Backup operations for the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center were also adequate. Initially, GSFC lacked formal security and risk management plans for the SOHO Mission Operations Center. GSFC management and the Consolidated Network and Mission Operations Support contractor completed these plans for the SOHO Mission Operations Center on April 22, 1998.
However, GSFC's lack of a SOHO Mission Operations Center contingency plan could increase the time required to respond to an emergency. The lack of backup operations and recovery procedures for PACOR II could affect the conduct of the Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission and cause delays in processing science data for its customers if processing capability is lost. Also, failure to analyze the potential effects of man-made and natural disasters on information systems increases the possibility of extended downtime and inability to support customer requirements.

Recommendations
Management should develop and implement a contingency plan for the SOHO Mission Operations Center; identify the effects of partial or total loss of information systems capability due to natural or man-made disasters; coordinate with system users on acceptable risks; and develop recovery strategies and procedures.

Management's Response
Although management concurred with the recommendations and agreed to implement them, management did not provide details on corrective actions for each recommendation. Therefore, we request additional comments on the final report.

Background	NASA represents one of the larger, more complex, and diverse information system environments in the Federal Government. The Agency operations use information systems to support earth and space mission functions for a full array of processing environments, including scientific and engineering computing in academic, research center, production plant, and space vehicle environments. To ensure continued operations when emergencies occur that interrupt computer support, managers must develop and test contingency plans.
Objectives	The objective of the audit was to determine whether Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) had a management-approved contingency plan for the Packet Processor II (PACOR II) Data Capture Facility, the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) Mission Operations Center, and the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center. (See Appendix B for a description of each facility.) Specifically, we determined whether the contingency plans included appropriate procedures for emergency response, backup operations, and testing of the plans. We also determined whether plans were tested annually and whether personnel responsible for plan execution were adequately trained. (See Appendix A for additional information on objectives, scope, and methodology.)
Audit Results	Emergency response procedures, testing, and personnel training for the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center and PACOR II were adequate. Backup operations for the Hubble Space Telescope Data Operations Control Center were also adequate. Initially, GSFC lacked formal security and risk management plans for the SOHO Mission Operations Center. GSFC management and the Consolidated Network and Mission Operations Support contractor completed these plans for the SOHO Mission Operations Center on April 22, 1998. However, GSFC's lack of a SOHO Mission Operations Center contingency plan could increase the time required to respond to an emergency. The lack of backup operations and recovery procedures for PACOR II could affect the conduct of the Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission and cause delays in processing science data for its customers if processing capability is lost. Also, failure to analyze the potential effects of man-made and natural disasters on information systems increases the possibility of extended downtime and inability to support customer requirements.
Recommendations	Management should develop and implement a contingency plan for the SOHO Mission Operations Center; identify the effects of partial or total loss of information systems capability due to natural or man-made disasters; coordinate with system users on acceptable risks; and develop recovery strategies and procedures.
Management's Response	Although management concurred with the recommendations and agreed to implement them, management did not provide details on corrective actions for each recommendation. Therefore, we request additional comments on the final report.