The Defense Security Service (DSS) has received numerous reports of suspicious requests for foreign video crews to visit cleared U.S. companies. The pattern is similar in most cases in that a foreign television news crew requests to do a documentary involving a U.S. company, and the documentary is on an advanced or critical (dual-use) technology of known collection interest to the foreign country.

As a modus operandi, the use of a video film crew is one of the best methods to collect technical information. It falls under the more general modus operandi technique known as a "foreign visit." Cleared U.S. industry reporting to DSS of security countermeasures concerns continues to indicate the foreign visit is the second most frequently used modus operandi to collect information after the "unsolicited request for information." While the foreign visit is more risky to the collector, it is also potentially the most damaging to cleared U.S. companies. A foreign entity, who gains access to a cleared facility, usually fills some collection requirements. More specifically, a foreign film crew can provide a historical audio and video record that can be reviewed numerous times; it provides a record of "ground truth" to calibrate other imagery or measurement and signature intelligence collection systems; it can record biographic data; it catches audio "slip-ups" and background noises; and it provides excellent background cover for human intelligence (HUMINT) operators to ask questions. It is one of the best modus operandi for intelligence collection because a trained human collector, in conjunction with a video camera, combines human intelligence, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) disciplines into one collection package resulting in a "multi-discipline" collection effort. Depending on the type of film used (infrared), a video camera can also record differences in temperature, thereby adding measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) to the collection equation.

While some of these foreign visit requests are likely legitimate, two incidents were assessed to be for the purpose of conducting economic espionage. Both incidents likely involved foreign companies attempting to dominate a particular technology area or a foreign government attempting to acquire technology and avoid the costs and time associated with lengthy research and development. Often foreign companies are world leaders in one aspect of a technology such as hardware but lacking in other aspects such as software, making them less efficient and noncompetitive with industry leaders. In one request, the foreign individual involved made repeated inquiries to where "classified research" was taking place.

In another instance, the foreign video crew hired a U.S. consultant to act as a potentially unwitting "researcher" for identifying and locating U.S. targets of interest. This also fits a known modus operandi of many non-traditional threat countries of hiring consultants and researchers to identify and locate technology for exploitation.

Oddly enough, while U.S. employees are often prohibited from bringing cameras into cleared facilities, exceptions are too frequently made that allow foreign video film crews into the same facilities. Who is the greater threat? The best security countermeasure is to prohibit access by any foreign video film crew into a cleared facility. Often a video presentation can be prepared by the company public affairs or marketing office, under controlled conditions, for public release.

DSS Public Release #981210-04