Part 3 (A)
Developing Software Ground Rules
April 29, 1964 through June 1964
1964 April
1964 May
1964 June
April 29
ASPO defined weight and volume allocations for scientific equipment.
Exact location of this equipment could not be specified, but each module
had to have the following capacities:
- CM and LEM ascent stage: 36 kilograms (80 pounds); 0.06 cubic meter
(2 cubic feet)
- LEM descent stage: 95 kilograms (210 pounds); 0.27 cubic meter (9
cubic feet), minimum; 0.45 cubic meter (15 cubic feet), design
objective.
Any additional space gained by jettisoning expendable equipment could
also be used for storage. (See June 8.)
Requirements for thermal protection for the scientific equipment were
not yet defined, nor was the packaging concept. Electrical outlets on
the LEM, furnishing power to the equipment, would of course have to be
within the reach of an astronaut while he was standing on the moon's
surface outside the spacecraft.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Scientific Equipment," April 29,
1964.
April 29
MSC established new LEM abort guidance ground rules, which defined the
operation and reliability requirements of the stabilization and control
system's abort guidance section. Grumman was to continue studies on the
abort pitch programmer and on the capability of the LEM to perform
rendezvous.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract
NAS 9-1100, Abort Guidance Section of the Stabilization and Control
Subsystem," April 29, 1964.
April 30
Communications links between CM, LEM, and earth stations.
MSC authorized major revisions in the CM communications system to
provide better voice and data relay between the CM, the LEM, and ground
stations.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 201," April 30, 1964.
April 30
Following a series of 15 acceptance firings at Rocketdyne's Santa Susana
test facility (conducted during March and April), the first hot-firing
production J-2 engine was delivered to Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC).
The engine then began "battleship" testing (i.e., fitted to a
heavyweight stage of the vehicle built especially for static testing) at
DAC's Sacramento test site.
Akens, et al., History of Marshall . . . January 1
through June 30, 1964, Vol. I, pp. 148, 224.
During the Month
Grumman awarded Bell Aerosystems Company the contract for the LEM ascent
stage reaction control system propellant tanks. The contract was worth
about $3.5 million.
Missiles and Rockets, 14 (April 27, 1964), p. 23.
During the Month
Grumman recommended using a self-stabilized trim gimbal system in the
descent stage of the LEM, which would save about 34 kilograms (75
pounds) of reaction control system propellant.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 15," LPR-10-31, p. 24.
MSC Structures and Mechanics Division began vibration tests on SM
boilerplate (BP) 22 to determine resonant frequencies, mode shapes, and
structural damping characteristics. The results would be used in
evaluation of data from the BP-22 flight test of the launch escape
system at WSMR, scheduled for 1965.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, April 19-May 16, 1964," p. 56;
MSC News Release 64-86, May 1, 1964.
May 1
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea reported to the Senior Staff that NASA was
not imposing any requirement for the crew to get out of the CM quickly
should some problem arise with the launch vehicle while on the pad.
Given such an occurrence with the crewmen perched almost 122 meters (400
feet) high - and atop a fueled Saturn V - it was believed more rational
to make a standard abort (using the launch escape system) or to hold the
countdown until the vehicle could be made safe.
MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 1, 1964," p. 3.
May 1
MSC Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division personnel visited
Jet Propulsion Laboratory to review the Surveyor landing radar test
program and to investigate the use of either a reflector or a
transponder on the Surveyor to help in the selection of landing sites
for the LEM. At that time, the possibility did not appear promising
because reflector usage seemed impractical and because power
requirements were far above what was available. Additional study on the
matter was planned.
MSC, "ASPO Management Report for Period April 23-30, 1964";
"ASPO Management Report for Period April 3-May 7, 1964."
May 1
Grumman completed negotiations with RCA for the attitude and translation
control assembly (ATCA) for the LEM. The ATCA imposed thrust demands on
the vehicle's stabilization and control system based upon information
from the guidance equipment.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, April 19-May 16, 1964," p. 45.
May 4
The Apollo Mission Planning Task Force presented its Phase I progress
report to ASPO. (See November 29, 1963, and January 16, 1964.) ASPO, in
assigning this task, had defined its principal objectives: the
determination of mission-related, functional requirements for spacecraft
subsystems; the examination of current subsystem capabilities to meet
these requirements; the evaluation of the capability of the spacecraft
to fly missions which met the program objectives; the determination of
flexibilities available within established control weights; and the
provision of mission plans which would be the basis for other analyses
and reporting.
The task force further refined program objectives:
- to land two astronauts and scientific equipment on the
near-earth-side of the moon and return them safely to earth; and
- to perform experiments within the restrictions of 113 kilograms (250
pounds) and 0.3 cubic meter (10 cubic feet) of scientific payload, which
would be landed on the lunar surface, and 36 kilograms (80 pounds) and
0.06 cubic meter (two cubic feet), which would be returned to earth.
Mission related spacecraft design rules were studied. Seventeen rules
for spacecraft operations and seven for contingencies were selected.
Although trajectory ground rules were considered more operational than
design in nature, the group included 16 as necessary to define the
performance capabilities of the spacecraft design. A reference
trajectory, provided by MSC, assumed a launch date of May 8, 1968, and a
41,000- kilogram (90,000-pound spacecraft injected into a 66.4-hour
translunar-coast/free-return trajectory.
GAEC, "Apollo Mission Planning Task Force, Phase I Progress
Report," LED-540-7, Vols. I, II, III, May 4, 1964.
May 4-11
MSC ordered Grumman to halt all work on a radiatively cooled nozzle for
the LEM's ascent engine. (See January; also see September 19-October 16,
1963.) The Center took this action largely to avoid schedule slippage
(because the work was drawing valuable people away from the
"mainstream" effort, an ablative nozzle). Also involved in the
cancellation were such factors as high risk and cost; the lack of
previous experience with this type; and the minor saving in weight at
best.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 7-14, 1964."
May 5
MSC Operations Planning Division (OPD) reviewed power usage aboard the
LEM if the fuel cell assembly (FCA) failed. OPD concluded that Grumman's
requirements were too stringent (i.e., turning off all equipment not
needed for lunar landing should one FCA fail and turning off everything
not needed for crew safety following an abort should two FCA's fail).
OPD planned to review all subsystems to determine their duty cycles
after an FCA-dictated abort.
MSC,"ASPO Management Report for Period April 30-May 7,
1964."
May 6
NASA selected RCA for negotiation of a contract for C-band radar
equipment to be used on tracking ships by NASA and the Department of
Defense, under the U.S. Navy Instrumentation Ships Project Office,
during lunar missions.
NASA News Release 64-107, "NASA Selects RCA Radar for Tracking
Ships," May 6, 1964.
May 7
ASPO notified Grumman that a number of components must remain as common-
use items, because they were used in conjunction with government
furnished equipment that was interchangeable between the two spacecraft:
oxygen and water disconnects on the portable life support system and
quick-disconnects for the suit umbilicals. ASPO added suit umbilicals
and carbon dioxide sensors to the common-use list.
ASPO decided that the Gemini pressure suit would be used in Apollo Block
I earth orbital flights and, on May 19, notified North American
accordingly. This decision grew out of continuing mobility problems with
Apollo prototype suit, especially restrictive inside the spacecraft.
(See April 28-30.)
MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 8, 1964," p. 4;
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964."
May 7-14
At MSC's request, Grumman studied the use of the LEM stabilization and
control system in aligning that vehicle's inertial measurement unit
before spacecraft separation. The company found that the maneuver would
consume 5.33 kilograms (11.74 pounds) of fuel from the vehicle's
stabilization and control system (SCS), compared with 2.83 kilograms
(6.24 pounds) for the same alignment with a free LEM. Grumman advised
that the best procedure would be to use the CSM to position the LEM
telescope field of view. The LEM could then begin the necessary drift
for sighting, using less than 0.23 kilogram (0.5 pound) of SCS fuel.
Also, Grumman studied the feasibility of an overhead window at the
command pilot's station in the LEM. The contractor was pursuing the
question of the optimum window size and location and the type of reticle
required. (See April 24 and May 22.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 7-14, 1964."
May 7-14
North American completed the environmental requirements for the CM
television camera. The camera must be able to function under conditions
of 100 percent humidity, including unhooking and reconnecting the cable.
Also, because of the humidity requirement and the "outgassing"
properties of commercial lenses (that is, the gases which they could
possibly give off inside the spacecraft's cabin), North American decided
that a special zoom lens would have to be developed, which would cost
around $110,000.
Ibid.
May 8
NASA and The Boeing Company signed a contract for five Lunar Orbiter
spacecraft. Under the incentive provisions, Boeing could receive up to
$5.3 million more than the basic $80 million cost if all Lunar Orbiter
missions were successful. (See December 20, 1963.)
NASA News Release 64-109, "NASA Signs Contract with Boeing for
Lunar Orbiter," May 8, 1964.
May 8
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea told the Center's Senior Staff that it was
imperative to decide whether to use the gas-cooled space suit or the
liquid-cooled undergarment. (See February 1.) Studies had shown that the
current gas-cooled suit would not meet the heat load requirements and
improvement would be difficult. Shea felt that parallel developments
should not be carried out. A more conservative approach might be to
adopt the liquid-cooled garment, which could readily handle the heat
load, although it entailed some increase in weight and cost, if it could
be developed and qualified within the next four years. On May 22, Robert
O. Piland, Shea's Deputy, reported to the Staff that liquid-cooled
undergarments had been selected for the Block II spacecraft. (See July.)
In line with selection of the liquid-cooled undergarment, Hamilton
Standard was directed to stop work on the gas-cooled and begin work on a
watercooled portable life support system (PLSS). On June 3, Grumman was
officially notified that the PLSS was being redesigned to include a
liquid transport loop for removal of heat from inside the space suit.
This would be done by the liquid-cooled garment and incorporation of
flexible tubing through which a coolant would be circulated. Current
PLSS interfaces would be used to the greatest practical extent. It was
expected that the new undergarments would first be used in manned flight
about mid-1967.
MSC, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 8, 1964," p. 4;
"Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 22, 1964," p. 4; MSC,
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964"; letter, W.
F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract NAS
9-1100, Portable life support system changes," June 3, 1964.
May 11-18
After a 444-second firing, Rocketdyne's first LEM descent engine
prototype thrust chamber developed a hot gas leak at the injector
flange. Studies were under way by the contractor to determine the cause
of the leak.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 24;
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964."
May 12
Verne C. Fryklund, Jr., Chief of the Lunar and Planetary Branch in
NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications, reported that the Lunar
Orbiter program was being coordinated with Apollo's requirements for
moon maps. This agreement was reached through a series of meetings of
Fryklund with William B. Taylor, of OMSF's Advanced Manned Missions
Program Directorate; and Lee R. Scherer, Lunar Orbiter Program Manager.
Fryklund set forth general requirements for maps for the Apollo program.
Because most Lunar Orbiter data were intended for Apollo's use, Fryklund
said, these requirements must be borne in mind when Lunar Orbiter's
information was analyzed and distributed. MSC was interested primarily
in the equatorial area of the moon (10 degrees above and below the
equator), and established rather stringent demands for accuracy around
selected landmarks. These requirements were dictated by Apollo's need
for selenodetic and topographic information, essential for lunar
navigation and landing site selection and for scientific activities by
the astronauts on the lunar surface. Although each mission might
ultimately require special maps, Fryklund advised, major requirements
could be met by a common series of charts and photomosaics.
Memorandum, Fryklund, NASA, to Distr., "The Lunar Orbiter Program
and the lunar mapping requirements of Project Apollo," May 12,
1964.
May 13
Apollo's first flight test using the Little Joe II launch vehicle,
Mission A-001, using CSM boilerplate (BP) 12, was launched from WSMR.
The test was conducted to determine aerodynamic characteristics of the
launch escape system (LES) and its capability to pull the spacecraft
away from the launch vehicle during an abort at transonic speeds and
high dynamic pressure. Thrust termination subjected the spacecraft to an
environment more severe than expected, above the qualification test
level of many of the CM's components.
he planned sequence of events for the BP-12 sub-orbital flight is shown above.
Except for a parachute failure, spacecraft and LES functioned
flawlessly. All but one test objective was met: because of excessive
spacecraft oscillation at the time the main parachutes were deployed,
one riser was dragged across the spacecraft structure and severed. The
shroud lines of the now-freed parachute burned a gore in one of the two
remaining parachutes. Although the damaged gore failed, these two main
parachutes deployed normally. BP-12 landed 3,530 meters (11,600 feet)
downrange about five minutes and 50 seconds after liftoff. At impact,
its rate of descent was 7.9 meters (26 feet) per second, 0.06 meters
(two feet) per second faster than planned but still within human
tolerances.
"Postlaunch Report for Apollo Mission A-001 (BP-12)," pp. 1-1,
2-1, 3-1, 6-1.
May 14-21
MSC decided to provide equipment in the LEM for recording the
astronauts' voices, and was studying ways to achieve a capability for
time correlation with a minimum increase in power and weight.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964."
May 18-25
The first test of a fully ablative thrust chamber for the LEM descent
engine was held at Space Technology Laboratories. The chamber, with a
wall thickness of 22.4 millimeters (0.88 inch), was fired for 488
seconds. Although some charring occurred, there was no streaking or
gouging. Data showed good performance at low thrust.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; MSC,
"Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 24-30, 1964."
May 21
General Electric (GE) issued a report on postlanding tilt angles for the
LEM (the result of a study ordered by ASPO). The Apollo Systems
Specification, put out by OMSF, called for the LEM's ability to lift off
from the moon from an angle of 30 degrees; MSC's LEM Technical Approach
stated that "the Lunar Touchdown System [i.e., the landing gear]
will be required to land the LEM in a near vertical position
satisfactory for lunar launch and normal egress." GE's study was an
attempt to reconcile this difference. There was some concern that, for a
variety of reasons, a 30-degree tilt might be undesirable: the
spacecraft could tip over; once stage separation occurred, the vehicle's
ascent portion could shift slightly; and the crew's visibility and
mobility - including their ability to get in and out of the craft -
might be impaired. Added to this were possible constraints imposed by
the performance of many of the LEM's operational systems (e.g.,
communications, ascent propulsion, stabilization and control). In sum,
GE reported that it had found no constraints that negated the 30-degree
figure, and recommended that MSC's Technical Approach be revised to
correspond with OMSF's specification.
General Electric Company, Apollo Support Department, "Study of the
Postlanding Tilt Angle of the LEM," TIR 545-S64-03-006, May 21,
1964, passim, but especially pp. 1-4, 32-34; MSC, "ASPO
Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; interview, telephone,
Richard H. Kohrs, Houston, March 9, 1970.
May 21
NASA completed negotiations with General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) for two
additional Little Joe II test vehicles and associated ground equipment.
(See February 18, 1963.) The amendment (worth $1,352,050) increased the
contract's total estimated cost and fee to $12,478,205, and brought to
eight the total number of Little Joes (excluding the qualification
vehicle) that NASA bought from GD/C.
MSC,"Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964,"p. 42;
Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project Apollo: Final
Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-7, 4-4.
May 21-28
North American completed zero-g egress tests, using the proposed small
configuration CM side entry hatch with a crewman wearing a pressurized
Gemini space suit and an operational portable life support system.
Weightless tests were also conducted on the crew couch zero-g restraint
harness. The subjects had considerable difficulty attaching the harness;
additional development and testing were necessary.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-26, July 1,
1964, p. 7; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4,
1964."
May 22
ASPO directed Grumman to provide an overhead window in the LEM to permit
the pilot to dock at the upper docking hatch. The forward access hatch
was retained for lunar surface ingress and egress and on-the- pad access
capabilities. The contractor would remove the forward docking interface
and tunnel.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; MSC,
"Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, May 22, 1964," p. 4.
May 22
MSC received results of RCA and Ryan Aeronautical Company studies on
modifying either the LEM landing or rendezvous radar to achieve the high
accuracies needed to circularize the LEM's lunar orbit. The contractors
concluded that, as currently designed, radar performance would be
marginal. Attempts to obtain this degree of accuracy could cause
schedules to slip, because of the lack of knowledge of lunar
reflectivity. As a means of reducing the effects of surface variations,
RCA and Ryan recommended lessening the spectrum of the radar. (See
February 27-March 4 and March 16.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964"; MSC,
"Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May !7-June 20, 1964," p.
58.
May 22
MSC informed Grumman of two major revisions to the ground rules for crew
transfer between the two spacecraft:
- Definite tasks were replaced with a general requirement that a
"pressurized crew,' should be able to prepare the docked spacecraft for
translunar operations.
- The requirement for a crewman to pressurize his space suit and, with
the aid of a second crewman, move through the transfer tunnel without
damage to the suit was changed: the crew must be able to transfer
through the tunnel in a pressurized suit as a degraded mode of
operation.
Transfer in an unpressurized suit continued to be the primary and
extravehicular transfer the emergency mode. Crew transfer tests at North
American indicated that no significant hardware changes were necessary
to implement these revisions.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Revision of the Apollo-Docking Interface and Ground Rules,"
May 22, 1964.
May 26
At Hamilton Standard, MSC representatives reviewed status of the Apollo
space suit (A3H-024). Tests showed that a suited astronaut could not put
on the thermal coverall while wearing a portable life support system.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4, 1964."
May 26
ASPO notified Grumman that the carbon dioxide sensor was a crew safety
item. Since failure of this component could cause loss of the crew, it
must be designed to meet crew safety reliability. NASA's contract with
The Perkin-Elmer Corporation, manufacturer of the; sensor, had been
amended to include testing required for crew safety items.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, carbon dioxide (CO2) sensor
requirement," May 26, 1964.
May 26
ASPO directed North American to provide a station in the CM where the
astronauts could put on and remove the portable life support systems.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 21-28, 1964."
May 27
Meetings at Grumman (on May 21-22) had disclosed that the contractor had
changed from an all-welded LEM cabin to one that was partially riveted.
Although this change had not been coordinated with MSC, the Center
nonetheless agreed to it, provided the structural integrity of a cabin
thus fabricated could be demonstrated under all load, temperature, and
vacuum conditions. MSC recommended that representatives from Grumman
visit MSFC to review welding and sealant techniques developed for Saturn
launch vehicles.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4, 1964."
May 28
Apollo Mission A-101, the first flight of an Apollo spacecraft with a
Saturn launch vehicle, was launched from Cape Kennedy. The purpose of
the flight was to demonstrate the compatibility of the spacecraft with
the launch vehicle for earth orbital flights. A-101 also was the first
Apollo flight test conducted at Cape Kennedy, and consisted of CSM
boilerplate (BP) 13 and the Saturn SA-6 vehicle.
Launch azimuth was 105 degrees. S-I's first stage number eight engine
shut down prematurely at T+1 16.9 seconds, delaying S-I cutoff and
separation, which occurred at T+148.8 seconds (2.7 seconds late). The
S-IV second stage ignited at T+150.9 seconds, and the LES was jettisoned
10.3 seconds later and was propelled safely from the flight path. S-IV
cutoff took place at T+624.5 seconds (l.26 seconds earlier than
predicted). Orbit insertion was completed at T+629.5 seconds, with a
31.78 degree equatorial plane. The payload weight at orbit insertion was
7,622 kilograms (17,023 pounds). Deviations from planned flight path
angle and velocity were minus 0.05 degrees and plus 3.6 meters (11 feet)
per second, respectively. Orbital parameters were 182 and 227 kilometers
(98.4 and 122.5 nautical miles); the orbital period was 88.62 minutes.
Although there were a few cases of excessive delay in transmission, data
coverage and availability were, in general, quite good. Electromagnetic
interference was minor and did not degrade or invalidate the data. The
instrumentation and communications systems performed satisfactorily;
battery performances exceeded expectations. LES separation caused no
detectable disturbance of the flight vehicle. The sequencer system,
explosive bolts, and tower jettison all functioned properly.
Aerodynamic, thermodynamic, acoustic, and vibration data contained no
surprises. As expected, stresses on the LES were considerably less than
those imposed during abort; loads on other spacecraft structures all
were within design limits.
BP-13 and the spent S-IV stage circled the earth 54 times before
reentering the atmosphere east of Canton Island in the Pacific Ocean on
June 1. No spacecraft recovery was planned.
NAA, "Project Apollo Flight-Test Report, Boilerplate 13," SID
63-1416-3, August 1964, pp. 2-1, 2-2; "Postlaunch Report for Apollo
Mission A-101 (BP-13)," pp. 2-1, 3-2 through 3-5, 4-l through 4-3,
7-1.
May 28
MSC issued a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to Bissett-Berman Corporation
of Santa Monica, Calif., for studies of Apollo mission planning,
guidance and navigation system analysis, and related tasks. The contract
was valued at $915,357.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 42.
May 28
MSC instructed North American to continue the Apollo food studies (being
done under subcontract by the Stanford Research Center) on diet
selection, nutritional value, packaging design and materials, and
rehydration. North American was asked to furnish a final report
documenting the project and to provide MSC Crew Systems Division with
one set (i.e., food supply for three crewmen for a two-week Apollo
mission) for evaluation of both the food itself and of packaging
concepts. The contractor also was asked to report its findings on
studies of snacks for the crewmen.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 174, Revision 1," May 28,
1964,
May 28-June 4
MSC reported that Grumman was studying how much restraint the LEM crew
needed during lunar landing, and was conducting manned drop tests to
help define requirements. The program was divided into two phases, one
on vertical and the other on off-axis landing. In the first part,
already completed, the subject had needed no restraints. The second
phase, however, was much more severe, and it was believed that restraint
would probably be essential.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 28-June 4, 1964";
"Quarterly Status Report No. 8," p. 35.
During the Month
At the CSM mockup review at North American on April 28-30, MSC officials
were concerned about the complexity of the couch restraint system.
Because of the decision that primary landing would be on water (see
February 28), the system was reviewed. Based upon load analyses,
supplemented by manned tests at Holloman Air Force Base, a simpler
system (principally a combination lap belt and shoulder harness) was
found acceptable.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 14-21, 1964";
"Quarterly Status Report No. 8," pp. 12-13.
MSC notified Grumman that primary LEM ingress and egress was through the
forward hatch. To aid the LEM crew in getting down to the lunar surface
and in climbing back into their vehicle, the Center said, a narrow
platform must be provided from the hatch to the landing gear knuckle
(which became the "front porch"), and a handrail and ladder
down the strut to the foot pad.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 4-11, 1964."
June 1-5
Technicians of MSC's Landing and Recovery Division began initial testing
with a prototype flotation collar (similar to those used with both
Mercury and Gemini spacecraft). Boilerplate 25 served as the test
vehicle.
MSC, Space News Roundup, June 24, 1964, p. 3.
June 2
NASA signed a production contract worth $1.82 million with Sperry
Gyroscope for accelerometers for the CSM's navigation and guidance
system. (See Volume I, May 8, 1962.) [Sperry Gyroscope had been chosen
during the first half of 1962 to develop these devices, and a
developmental contract had been signed on June 1 of that year.]
NASA Contract NAS 9-2847, June 2, 1964.
June 3
ASPO confirmed for Grumman that no conclusive requirement for a LEM
emergency detection system (EDS) had been established. The LEM should be
designed to preclude any potential failure which could cause a time-
critical emergency. Malfunctions which were not time-critical would be
monitored by the caution and warning system while the LEM was manned.
Equipment which operated during unmanned periods should be designed to
present minimum hazard and to shut down or discharge in a safe condition
in cases of malfunction.
ASPO therefore directed Grumman to take no further action on an EDS for
the LEM; to analyze possible failures continuously to ensure that safety
requirements were met; and to advise ASPO if, at any time, those
analyses indicated increased criticality which might warrant
reconsideration of an EDS.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Lunar Excursion Module Recommendation
Concerning LEM Emergency Detection," June 3, 1964.
June 4
After studying several configurations for the probe and drogue docking
concept, North American recommended one particular design: three radial
attenuators attached to three pitch arms, a probe head, a sliding center
probe, a stored gas retracting mechanism, and three probe-to-tunnel
mounting arms. This configuration would be about 15 percent lighter than
the single, center probe, attenuator configuration.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 4-11, 1964."
June 4-11
North American assessed the ultraviolet energy emitted from the shock
layer surrounding a spacecraft during reentry. The contractor sought to
determine how much that energy added to the radiative heat load imposed
on the vehicle, and what effect it would have on the amount of ablative
material on the CM. North American's first estimates placed the figure
at about 20 percent for lunar return velocities (a figure that
thermodynamics experts at MSC called "very conservative"),
which would cause about a 4.5-kilogram (10- pound) increase in ablator
weight. Because ultraviolet emissions were insignificant at orbital
speeds, MSC's Structures and Mechanics Division recommended that their
effect be considered only for the design of the Block II CM's
heatshield.
Ibid.
June 8
ASPO redefined the allowances for scientific equipment in the LEM ascent
stage. Major changes were the increase of storage space from 0.06 to
0.09 cubic meter (two to three cubic feet) and of weight from 36 to 45
kilograms (80 to 100 pounds). (See April 29.)
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Scientific Equipment," June 8, 1964.
June 8
A test of the landing impact and stability test program was conducted at
North American's drop facility. CM boilerplate 2 was tested with the
centerline perpendicular to the water at a vertical speed of 10.4 meters
(34 feet) per second. For the first time, a self-contained
instrumentation package was installed in the dummy in the center couch.
The other two dummies were not instrumented. Onboard cameras documented
the general motions and responses during impact. No motion of the
dummies in couches or restraint harnesses was observed, indicating that
support and restraint were excellent. The simulated heatshield ruptured,
as expected.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-27, August
1, 1964, pp. 5-7, 17; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June
4-11, 1964"; interview, telephone, Glenn W. Briggs, RASPO/NAA,
January 12, 1970.
June 9
In response to a Grumman request, ASPO provided information on LEM crew
provision requirements. Caloric requirements, management, packaging, and
reconstitution of food supplies were spelled out in detail.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM crew provisions," June 9, 1964.
June 9
MSC announced the letting of a $67,261 contract to Geonautics, Inc., for
a study of LEM navigation using lunar landmarks for reference.
Geonautics would evaluate crew techniques and procedures for choosing
safe landing sites, navigational devices and displays in the LEM,
navigational data on the spacecraft's position and trajectory, errors to
be expected using various methods of navigation, and the value of
available lunar maps.
MSC News Release 64-109, June 9, 1964.
June 9
Micro Systems, a subsidiary of Electro-Optical Systems, received two
North American contracts valued at $1.85 million to provide temperature
and pressure transducer instrumentation for the CM.
Space Business Daily, June 9, 1964, p. 212.
June 9
Intending to rely on redundant and backup systems to ensure the
spacecraft's reliability, MSC ordered North American to discontinue all
effort on the inflight test and maintenance concept for the CM,
including spare parts.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 213," June 9, 1964.
June 9
MSC clarified design criteria for the launch escape vehicle (LEV).
During initial portions of the first-stage flight, when range safety
considerations precluded thrust termination (estimated to be 40
seconds), the LEV must be capable of aborting safely. Also, the LEV
structure must be designed to withstand loads arising from tumbling or
oscillating.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 4-11, 1964."
Early June
MSC geologist Ted H. Foss described a simulated lunar surface (modeled
after the Kepler crater in the Oceanus Procellarum) to be constructed at
MSC. It would be used for geological training of astronauts and for
studying their mobility in space suits. The 100-meter
(328-foot)-diameter area would be covered mainly with slag. Plans for
several craters about 15 meters (50 feet) in diameter and 4.6 meters (15
feet) deep were later altered to include a large crater 19.5 meters (64
feet) in diameter and 4.9 meters (16 feet) deep and a smaller crater
12.2 meters (40 feet) in diameter and 3 meters (10 feet) deep. There
would be a major ridge, 102.4 meters (336 feet) long and 3.7 meters (12
feet) high, and about 75 small craters less than 1.2 meters (4 feet) in
diameter. [The mock lunar surface was completed in December.]
MSC, Space News Roundup, June 10, 1964, p. 7; MSC News
Release 64-194, December 21, 1964.
Early June
NASA notified Grumman, MIT, and North American that RCA would furnish
the CSM rendezvous radar to be used with the radar equipment on the LEM.
A purchase order for the additional units was issued.
"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 8," p. 46.
June 11
MSC directed North American to make a number of changes to the Block II
CSM configuration, some of which were mandatory for Block I vehicles as
well. This action followed reviews of the contractor's CSM Block II
Technical Report at Houston and at NASA Headquarters (by Apollo Program
Director Samuel C. Phillips and OMSF chief George E. Mueller) during
May. (See April 16.)
Basically, these changes (including a number to the spacecraft's
subsystems) were imposed by the requirements of a lunar mission. Most
pertained to the CM per se: provisions for docking (including visual
aids) and redesign of the transfer tunnel; capability for extravehicular
transfer; and adding portable life support systems and scientific
equipment. Micrometeoroid protection had to be added to the SM. (See
September 30.)
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Addressees, "CSM Block II
changes transmitted to NAA for implementation," June 19, 1964, with
enclosure: letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information
Systems Div., Attn: E. E. Sack, "Block II changes," June 11,
1964, with enclosures.
June 11-18
North American canceled its contract with Avien, Inc., for the CSM S-
band high-gain antenna system. (See June 21-27, 1963.) Between July 16
and August 15, North American awarded 90-day study contracts to Hughes
Aircraft Company and GE to determine the best approach for developing
these antennas for Block II spacecraft. The studies were scheduled for
completion in October.
MSC, "Apollo/E and D Technical Management Meeting No. 5," June
3, 1964, p. 1; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 11-18,
1964"; NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID
62-300-28, September 1, 1964, p. 8.
June 12
MSC and Space Technology Laboratories (STL) completed negotiations
(begun May 12) on a $4.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a
Mission Trajectory Control Program, a continuing project begun in
September 1963 to analyze Gemini missions. STL would develop computer
programs for flight control trajectories, orbital maneuvers, and
analyses of guidance systems, range safety, and mission error. NASA
Headquarters approved the contract on August 18 and announced the
contract award on August 20.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, July 19-August 22, 1964," p.
42; "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, May 17-June 20, 1964," p. 43;
NASA News Release 64-206, "STL to Compute Gemini, Apollo Missions
Simulations," August 20, 1964.
June 12
MSC approved Grumman's subcontract (valued at $9,411,144) with Pratt and
Whitney Aircraft for the LEM fuel cell assembly.
On this same day, the Center awarded a letter contract with a total
estimated cost and fee of $3.315 million to AC Spark Plug for the LEM
guidance and navigation and coupling display unit. (See October 18,
1963.)
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 37.
June 15
Space Business Daily reported that MSC was developing a packaging system
for bringing back uncontaminated lunar specimens for study. First, the
Center would explore methods for collecting, storing, and shipping
geological, chemical, and biological specimens in their original
conditions to earth laboratories. MSC then would award a contract for
production of the system.
Space Business Daily, June 15, 1964, p. 239.
June 16
ASPO notified Grumman that the use of reclaimed high explosives was
undesirable, since this might reduce the reliability and quality of
pyrotechnic systems. To trace any lot of reclaimed material to its point
of origin was virtually impossible, nor could adulterants such as TNT,
which might have been added for original military use, be easily
removed. MSC therefore directed North American to use only virgin, newly
manufactured high explosives in Apollo pyrotechnic devices and systems.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, High explosives in the Apollo
Spacecraft," June 16, 1964.
June 16
A realignment of CSM guidance and navigation subsystems functions was
mandatory for Block II spacecraft. MSC therefore directed North American
and MIT to conduct a program definition study of these systems. MSC
outlined Block II responsibilities, systems changes (both required and
desired), and implementation requirements and assigned responsibilities
in these areas to the appropriate contractors.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. 216," June 16, 1964, with
enclosure: "Notes for CSM Block II, Definition Discussions,"
June 4, 1964.
June 17
NASA selected Collins Radio Company for an estimated $20 million
fixed-price-plus-incentive-fee contract to fabricate, install,
integrate, and test unified S-band tracking, data acquisition, and
communications equipment for Manned Space Flight Network stations.
Chosen from 14 competing firms, Collins would provide NASA with nine
systems, each with a 9-meter (30-foot)-diameter parabolic antenna. Six
of these would be integrated into facilities being prepared for Gemini
flights and three would be installed at new Apollo stations. About 30
partial systems would also be integrated into existing ground stations
for tracking Apollo flights.
NASA News Release 64-116, "NASA Negotiating Apollo Communications
Systems Contracts," May 14, 1964; NASA News Release 64-146,
"NASA Selects Collins Radio to Provide Apollo Tracking
Systems," June 17, 1964.
June 18-25
At MSC, tests were completed on the modified space suit with the new
prototype helmet. Tests in the CM mockup indicated that the new helmet
gave better visibility than previous helmets. The range of nodding
provided by the neck joint, however, was not considered adequate. Both
the suit and helmet were shipped back to Hamilton Standard for
additional work.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 11-18, 1964";
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 18-25, 1964."
June 18-25
Beech Aircraft Corporation completed qualification testing of the
hydrogen pressure vessel for the CSM electrical power system cryogenic
storage. All four vessels exceeded burst pressure specification
requirements. Two Inconel oxygen tanks also were burst tested, with
satisfactory results.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 19;
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 18-25, 1964."
June 18-25
MSC and Honeywell studied feasibility of the astronauts' exercising
manual control of the spacecraft during SM propulsion engine firing to
eject from earth orbit. Investigators found that, although the task
became increasingly difficult as the maneuver progressed from attitude
to position changes, manual control nonetheless was entirely feasible.
North American had studied six possible methods of providing electronic
redundancy in the stabilization and control system (SCS) to perform just
this function, but in the end recommended manual rate command. Based
upon this recommendation and the earlier study, on August 19 MSC decided
to incorporate this manual rate control capability in Block I SCS
systems.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 18-25, 1964"; MSC,
"Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, July 19-August 22, 1964," pp.
20, 47; NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-29,
October I, 1964, p. 11; interview, telephone, Kenneth J. Cox, Houston,
March 10, 1970.
June 19
Qualification testing on the launch escape motor began with a successful
static firing by the Lockheed Propulsion Company. Twenty motors were
tested during July and August; all performed satisfactorily. (See August
30.)
Lockheed Propulsion Company, "Apollo Launch Escape and Pitch
Control Motors, Monthly Progress Report No. 28," LPC No. 588-P-28,
September 30, 1964, p. 5; "Apollo Monthly Progress Report,"
SID 62-300-27, p. 15.
June 20
NASA announced a realignment of CSM guidance and navigation system
contractors, effective July 25. (See February 16-March 21.) Two of the
prime contractors, Kollsman Instrument Corporation (supplier of the
scanning telescope, sextant, and map and data viewer) and Raytheon
Company (manufacturer of the onboard computer), became subcontractors to
AC Spark Plug, prime contractor for the inertial measuring unit and for
assembly and test of the complete system. Under separate contracts, MIT
continued to direct overall design, development, and integration of the
system, while Sperry Gyroscope provided accelerometers. All contracts
for the guidance and navigation system were managed by MSC.
NASA News Release 64-148, "AC Spark Plug Becomes Prime Contractor
for Production of Apollo Guidance and Navigation System," June 20,
1964; MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, July 19-25, 1964," p. 3,
June 21-July 18
Two amendments to the LEM contract were forwarded to Grumman for
signature. One, for $1.257 million, was for additional flight
engineering support at MSC; the other, for $4.252 million, was for a
data acquisition system to be installed in the Apollo Propulsion System
Development Facility at WSMR.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p.37;
MSC News Release 64-151, September 11, 1964,
June 24
The hydrogen-fueled J-2 rocket engines for the upper stages of the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles were completed on the assembly line at the Canoga Park, Calif., plant of Rocketdyne Division of NAA. The J-2 developed a thrust of 1,000 kilonewtons (225,000 pounds) at altitude. It operated in a cluster of five engines in the S-II stage and singly in the S-IVB stage of the Apollo launch vehicle. (Rocketdyne photo)
NASA Headquarters approved the definitive contract with Rocketdyne for
the production of 55 J-2 engines (used in the S-IVB stage of the Saturn
IB and Saturn V launch vehicles). Negotiations had taken place from
April 13 to May 15. Initial value of the contract was $89.5 million.
Akens et al., History of Marshall . . . January 1
through June 30, 1964, Vol. I, pp. 145, 226; David S. Akens, Leo
L. Jones, and A. Ruth Jarrell, History of the George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center from July 1 through December 31, 1964
(MHM-10, undated), Vol. I, p. 132.
June 24
The Army Map Service reported the completion for NASA of the first
complete topographic map of the visible face of the moon.
The San Diego Union, June 25, 1964.
June 24
North American conducted the first hot fire tests of the SM reaction
control system, with steady and pulsed firings. Only one engine was
fired. The only problem encountered was with the oxidizer shutoff valve,
which would have to be completely redesigned.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 25-July 2, 1964."
June 25
Grumman engineers, meeting with ASPO officials in Houston, outlined the
contractor's philosophy about onboard checkout of the LEM and equipment
required to do the job. Scheduled at times when the astronauts were not
heavily pressed with other activities, company engineers said there
should be three major checkouts of the LEM to come:
- after lunar orbit injection,
- immediately after lunar landing, and
- just before lunar launch. Of course, the astronauts would monitor
the various systems during activity with the LEM to manage and operate
its subsystems.
The contractor did not visualize any need for "centralized onboard
checkout equipment" - caution and warning lights, controls and
displays, help from the ground network, among others, should satisfy the
needs. Grumman asked MSC for authority to delete the requirement for
centralized checkout equipment, and ASPO concurred with their
recommendations on July 27.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM on-board checkout equipment," July
14, 1964, with enclosure: "Minutes of Meeting At MSC Discussing LEM
On-Board Checkout Equipment, June 25, 1964"; letter, Rector to
Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM On-Board Checkout
Equipment," July 27, 1964.
June 25
LTV was awarded a $1,125,040 contract for a dynamic crew procedures
simulator to study task assignments in simulated space flight. The
trainer was capable of yaw, pitch, and roll movements and duplicated
vibrations and noise incurred during liftoff, powered flight, and
reentry. Visual displays simulated views of starfields, earth or moon
horizons, rendezvous target vehicles, and landscapes.
MSC News Release 64-122, July 1, 1964; MSC, "Consolidated Activity
Report for the Office of the Associate Administrator, Manned Space
Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 38.
June 25-July 1
Zero g tests of the CM/LEM crew transfer tunnel were performed in KC-135
aircraft at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, verifying data obtained
during crew-transfer zero-g simulations conducted at North American in
February and March. The task of controlling equipment proved difficult.
For example, the docking probe was temporarily lost during removal.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, July 2-9, 1964."
June 26
MSC awarded a letter contract (with a total cost and fee estimated at
$1.234 million) to Kollsman Instrument Corporation for optical
components for the LEM guidance and navigation system. (See October 18,
1963.) Negotiations for a definitive contract began July 10.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 21-July 18, 1964," p. 37.
June 26
ASPO, Bellcomm, Inc., and MSC's Mission Planning and Analysis Division
completed a study on reentry range requirements. Because of the
deceleration limit of 10 g's, the minimum reentry range was 2,200
kilometers (1,200 nautical miles [n.m.]). A range flexibility of about
1,600 kilometers (1,000 n.m.) was essential to allow for weather
conditions. An additional 1,600 kilometers (1,000 n.m.) was required by
the emergency reentry monitoring system. Therefore, the heatshield must
be designed to withstand reentry heating over a 5,920-kilometer
(3,200-nm.) range.
During mid-July, ASPO learned from the Landing and Recovery Division
that the minimum acceptable CM maneuverability during reentry was 1,600
kilometers (1,000 n.m.) for water landings. "This requirement was
based on storm size, weather predictability, and reliability of storm
location and direction of movement." Landing errors associated with
reentry on backup guidance demanded that the spacecraft be capable of a
6,500-kilometer (3,500-n.m.) reentry.
Memorandum, Aaron Cohen, MSC, to Owen E, Maynard, "Reentry Range
Requirement," June 26, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management
Report, July 16-23, 1964"; memorandum, Claude A. Graves, MSC, to
Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Div., "Operational entry range
requirement," June 18, 1964; memorandum, Carl R. Huss, MSC, to
BE4/Historical Office, "Comments on Volume II of The Apollo
Spacecraft: A Chronology," March 30, 1970.
June 28-July 4
MSC authorized Grumman to procure a "voice only" tape recorder
with time correlation for use in the LEM data storage electronic
assembly. The unit would be voice operated and have a capacity of 10
hours recording time.
MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, June 28-July 4, 1964," p. 3.
June 30
After acceptance testing, AiResearch Manufacturing Company delivered the
first production CM environmental control system to North American.
The Garrett Corporation, AiResearch Manufacturing Division,
"Monthly Progress Report, Environmental Control System,
NAA/S&lD, Project Apollo, 16 June 1964-15 July 1964,"
SS-1013-R(26), July 31, 1964, pp. 1, 15.
June 30
MSC directed North American to make whatever changes were necessary in
the Block I design to make the spacecraft compatible with the Gemini
space suit. (See May 7.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, June 25-July 2, 1964."
During the Month
MSC's Operations Planning Division requested OMSF to revise its
spacecraft specifications to
- delete the requirement for data storage in the LEM (this function
would be performed by the CSM data recording equipment via an RE link);
and
- drop the requirement for one portable life support system (PLSS) for
each crewman (a third PLSS would only allow the CM pilot to enter the
LEM without benefit of a hard dock, and studies had shown that this
situation probably would never arise).
Early in July, MSC requested OMSF to change two other requirements from
tentative to firm:
- LEM tilt angle at lunar liftoff should not exceed 30 degrees (MSC
had accepted this value and Grumman had been asked to design systems to
conform [see May 21]);
- the service propulsion system should include a propellant control so
that unused propellants (resulting from mixture ratio shift) would not
exceed 0.5 percent of the initial propellant supply. (Studies showed
that the North American design already met this requirement.)
"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 8," p. 63; MSC, "ASPO
Weekly Management Report, July 2-9, 1964."
