Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
November 1964
1964
November 2
Bellcomm, Inc., presented its evaluation of the requirement for a q-ball
in the emergency detection system. [The device, enclosed in the nose
cone atop the launch escape tower, measured dynamic pressures and thus
monitored the vehicle's angle of attack, and was designed to warn the
crew of an impending breakup of the vehicle.] Bellcomm's findings
confirmed that the q-ball was absolutely essential and that the device
was ideally suited to its task.
Letter, P. R. Knaff, Bellcomm, to O. E. Maynard, MSC, November 6, 1964,
with enclosure: Memorandum for File, "The Contribution of the
Q-Ball to the Emergency Detection System," P. R. Knaff and M. M.
Purdy, November 2, 1964.
November 3
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) Federal
Laboratories' Astrionics Center received a $125,000 contract from
Collins Radio for the S-band acquisition receivers that position the
ground-based dish antennas toward the spacecraft.
Space Business Daily, November 3, 1964, p. 11.
November 3
NASA announced the appointment of Brig. Gen. David M. Jones as Deputy
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight (effective December 15).
Most recently, Jones had been Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems, in the Air
Force Systems Command. He would be "primarily concerned with major
development problems in the Gemini and Apollo Programs, the planning for
Advanced Missions and all Mission Operations." Further, Jones would
"work with other NASA program offices to insure optimum use of other
elements of NASA to accomplish program objectives."
NASA News Release 64-277, "NASA Names Gen. Jones Deputy Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight," November 3, 1964.
November 5
MSC authorized Grumman to proceed with procurement of a battery charger
for the LEM, to replenish the portable life support system's power
source. On the following day, Houston informed North American such a
device was no longer needed in the CSM.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, November 5,
1964; letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Div., "Contract Change Authorization No. 269," November 6,
1964.
November 5
The Apollo Space Suit Assembly received a new designation, the Apollo
Extravehicular Mobility Unit. The purpose of the change was to make it
more descriptive of its function in the Apollo mission.
Memorandum, Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to Distr., "Change in Designation
of the Apollo Space Suit Assembly (SSA)," November 5, 1964.
November 5-12
Engineers from Grumman and the MSC Instrumentation and Electronics
Systems Division (IESD) reviewed the coverage requirements for the LEM's
S-band radio and the incompatibility of those requirements with the
present location of the steerable antenna. Most observers felt that a
deployable boom was the only feasible solution. The two groups therefore
recommended that IESD verify with ASPO the S-band coverage requirements
and that Grumman analyze the design effects of such a boom. In the
meantime, Dalmo-Victor, the antenna vendor, should continue its design
effort on the basis of the current location.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 5-12, 1964."
November 5-12
During a mechanical loading test (simulating a 20-g reentry) the CM aft
heatshield failed at 120 percent of maximum load. Structures and
Mechanics Division engineers inspected the structure. They found that
the inner skin had buckled, the damage extending three quarters of the
way around the bolt circle that secured the heatshield to the
spacecraft's inner structure. Their findings would be used along with
data from the recent drop of boilerplate 28 to determine what redesign
was necessary.
Ibid.
November 5-12
MSC informed North American that a flashing light on the CSM, as an aid
for visual rendezvous, was not required. [A request for some such device
had been generated at the Block II mockup review.] Houston's position
was based on the current CSM/LEM configuration, which called for
rendezvous radar on both spacecraft and the ability of both vehicles to
effect the rendezvous using either its own radar or that in the target
vehicle.
Ibid.
November 5-12
Engineers from the MSC Crew Systems Division and from North American
discussed testing of the breadboard environmental control system. During
all flights - both manned and unmanned - North American must monitor the
cabin atmosphere by gas chromatography and mass spectrography. The
company should also compare the materials for the breadboard with those
for Mercury, Gemini, and other applicable space chambers.
Ibid.; memorandum, Frank H. Samonski, Jr., MSC, to R. C.
Stults, "Transmission and coordination of Request for Engineering
Change Proposal (RECP) to add a gas chromatograph in the North American
Aviation environmental control system (ECS) breadboard test
facility," November 18, 1964.
November 5-12
ASPO officials completed a preliminary evaluation of the design and
weight implications of an all-battery electrical power system (EPS) for
the LEM. Investigators reviewed those factors that resulted in the
decision (in March 1963) to employ fuel cells; also, they surveyed
recent technological improvements in silver-zinc batteries.
At about the same time, Grumman was analyzing the auxiliary battery
requirements of the spacecraft. The contractor found that, under the
worst possible conditions (i.e., lunar abort), the LEM would need about
1,700 watt-hours of auxiliary power. Accordingly, Grumman recommended
one 1,700 watt-hour or two 850 watt-hour batteries (23 and 29.5 kg [50
and 65 lbs], respectively) in the spacecraft's ascent stage.
MSC would use both Grumman's and ASPO's findings in determining the
final design of the LEM's EPS. MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report,
Nov. 5-12, 1964."
November 6
By this date, all major LEM subcontracts had been let.
"NASA Administrator's Apollo Program Review, LEM Program,"
November 6, 1964, item A-10.
November 6
NASA anticipated five significant milestones for the LEM during the
forthcoming year:
- A major review of the entire LEM program (with especial emphasis
upon the fiscal picture for 1965 and 1966)
- Start of production on LEM-1 (the first LEM flight article)
- Delivery of LEM Test Article (LTA)-2 (a dynamic test article) to
Huntsville
- Start of vibration and static testing on the complete LEM structure
- Sea level and altitude qualification testing in the continuing
development of the LEM's propulsion systems.
Ibid., item C.
November 9
NASA and AC Spark Plug amended the company's contract for guidance and
navigation equipment. The change embodied an incentive clause, based on
a cost-schedule-performance scheme, and placed the estimated cost of the
contract at $235,000,000.
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, October 18-November 30, 1964,"
p. 39.
November 10
MSC's Structures and Mechanics Division and ASPO reviewed the LTA-10
test program to resolve the stop-work imposed upon Grumman. The review
resulted in an agreement to have LTA-10 remain in the program with a
modified configuration. LTA-10 would be used by North American at Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for adapter/LEM modal and separation testing and would consist
only of descent stage structure. Subsystems for LTA-10 which were
eliminated were the ascent stage, landing gear, ascent propulsion and
descent propulsion.
Memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to LEM Contracting Officer,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Deletion of Stop Work Order on LTA-10,"
November 10, 1964.
November 10
Joseph G. Thibodaux, Jr., MSC Propulsion and Power Division, reported at
an Apollo Engineering and Development technical management meeting that
the first J-2 firing of the service propulsion system engine was
conducted at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). Two fuel cell endurance
tests of greater than 400 hours were completed at Pratt and Whitney. MSC
would receive a single cell for testing during the month.
MSC, "Minutes, Apollo E and D Technical Management Meeting No. 9,
November 10, 1964."
November 12-19
There appeared to be some confusion and/or disagreement concerning
whether one or two successful Saturn V reentry tests were required to
qualify the CM heatshield. A number of documents relating to
instrumentation planning for the 501 and 502 flight indicated that two
successful reentries would be required. The preliminary mission
requirements document indicated that only a single successful reentry
trajectory would be necessary. The decision would influence the
measurement range capability of some heatshield transducers and the
mission planning activity being conducted by the Apollo Trajectory
Support Office. The Structures and Mechanics Division had been
requested to provide Systems Engineering with its recommendation.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, November 12-19, 1964."
November 12-19
More careful examination of the boilerplate 28 aft heatshield indicated
that the shear failures were in the face sheet splices which were not in
the same locations as the core splices.
Ibid.
November 12-19
In its search for some method of reducing water impact pressures, North
American was considering adding a 15- to 30.5-cm (6- to 12-in)
"lump" to the CM's blunt face. The spacecraft manufacturer was
also investigating such consequent factors as additional wind tunnel
testing, the effect on heatshield design, and impact upon the overall
Apollo program.
Ibid.
November 12-19
MSC reviewed a number of alternatives to the current design of the space
suit helmet. Engineers selected a modified concept, one with the
smallest feasible dimensions and began fabricating a thin fiber glass
shell. The product would serve as the test article in a series of tests
of an immobile, bubble-type helmet. The whole of this effort would
support MSC's in-house program to find the best possible helmet
design.
Ibid.
November 12-19
MSC analyzed Grumman's report on their program to resize the LEM. On the
basis of this information, ASPO recommended that the propellant tanks be
resized for separation and lunar liftoff weights of 14,742 and 4,908 kg
(32,500 and 10,820 lbs), respectively. Studies should investigate the
feasibility of an optical rendezvous device and the substitution of
batteries for fuel cells. And finally, engineering managers from both
Grumman and MSC should examine a selected list of weight reduction
changes to determine whether they could immediately be implemented.
Ibid.; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S.
Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, LEM Weights Meeting," November
19, 1964; Bob Button, MSC, "Apollo Status," November 20,
1964.
November 12-19
Shorting had become a significant problem in the LEM fuel cells, and
exemplified the continuing difficulties that plagued the system's
development. MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, November 5-12,
1964."
November 13
Robert E. Smylie, of the MSC Crew Systems Division, cited Hamilton
Standard's reliability figures for the Apollo space suit assembly,
including the suit per se and the portable life support system
(PLSS):
| Item | Mission
Success | Crew Safety |
|---|
| Space suit | 0.9995 | 0.99991 |
| PLSS (Liquid cooled) | 0.9995 | 0.99999 |
| Complete assembly | 0.999 | 0.9999 |
Memorandum, Robert E. Smylie, MSC, to Crew Integration Branch, Attn: C.
Haines, "Space Suit Assembly Reliability Apportionment,"
November 13, 1964.
November 13
MSC defined the requirements for visual docking aids on both of the
Apollo spacecraft:
- At a range of 305 m (1,000 ft), the astronaut must be able to see
the passive spacecraft and determine its gross attitude.
- From 61 m (200 ft) away, he must be able to judge the target's
relative attitude and the alignment of his own vehicle.
- And from this latter distance - and still solely through visual
means the pilot must be able to calculate the distance between the two
spacecraft and the closing rate.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, November 13,
1964; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, November 12-19,
1964."
November 16
NASA test pilot Joseph A. Walker flew the LLRV for the second time. The
first attempted liftoff, into a 9.26-km (5-nm) breeze, was stopped
because of excessive drift to the rear. The vehicle was then turned to
head downwind and liftoff was accomplished. While airborne the LLRV
drifted with the wind and descent to touchdown was accomplished.
Touchdown and resulting rollout (at that time the vehicle was on
casters) took the LLRV over an iron-door-covered pit. One door blew off
but did not strike the vehicle.
Pilot Report, Joseph A. Walker, November 16, 1964.
November 16
Crew Systems Division (CSD) was proceeding with procurement of an
inflight metabolic simulator in response to a request by Systems
Engineering Division. The simulator would be used to support the LEM
mission for SA-206 and would be compatible for use in the CM.
Responsibility for the project had been assigned to the Manager of the
LEM Environmental Control System Office. It was projected that the
Statement of Work would be completed by January 15, 1965; the proposals
evaluated by April 1; the contract awarded by June 1, 1965; the
prototype delivered by April 1, 1966, with two qualified simulator
deliveries by July 1, 1966.
Letter, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Engineering Systems
Division, "Inflight metabolic simulator," November 16,
1964.
November 16-December 15
After investigating the maximum radiation levels that were anticipated
during Apollo earth orbit missions, North American confirmed the need
for some type of nuclear particle detection system (NPDS). Except for
periods of extremely high flux rates, the current design of the NPDS was
considered adequate. During the same reporting period, North American
awarded a contract to Philco to build the system.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID-62-300-32, January
1, 1965, p. 18.
November 17-18
The Emergency Detection System (EDS) Design Sub-Panel of the
Apollo-Saturn Electrical Systems Integration Panel held its first
meeting at North American's Systems and Information Division facility
at Downey, Calif. A. Dennett of MSC and W. G. Shields of MSFC
co-chaired the meeting.
Personnel from MSC, MSFC, KSC, OMSF, and North American attended the
meeting. Included in the discussions were a review of the EDS design for
both the launch vehicle and spacecraft along with related ground support
equipment; a review of the differences of design and checkout concepts;
and a review of EDS status lights in the spacecraft.
Proceedings, Emergency Detection System Design Sub-Panel of the
Apollo-Saturn Electrical Systems Integration Panel, sgd. A. Dennett and
W. G. Shields, December 2, 1964.
November 17-18
The Apollo Mission Planning Task Force met in Bethpage, New York, to
define prelaunch handling procedures at the launch complex during lunar
missions. At the meeting were representatives of those groups most
intimately concerned with pad operations ASPO and the MSC Flight
Operations Directorate, Grumman, North American, GE, and the Kennedy
launch center. The task force agreed on several fundamental items:
- The mobile arming tower (MAT) would be installed just once, and
would be moved back only for the final launch preparations (at T minus
seven hours).
- All operations that had to be performed with the MAT removed should
be accomplished before that structure was mated to the launch umbilical
tower.
- Checkout equipment would be removed for simulated flights and would
be reconnected only after data from the simulation had been evaluated.
- Total pad time was set at 12 days.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 26-December 3,
1964."
November 18
Ling-Temco-Vought received a contract from MSC, valued at $365,000, for
unmanned testing of Gemini and Apollo space suits in the firm's space
environment simulator.
Space Business Daily, November 18, 1964, p. 84.
November 19
MSC's Assistant Director for Flight Crew Operations, Donald K. Slayton,
told the Apollo Program Manager that the current display and keyboard
(DSKY) for the Block II CSM and for the LEM were not compatible with
existing display panel design of both vehicles from the standpoint of
lighting, nomenclature presentation, and caution warning philosophy. In
his memorandum, Slayton pointed out mandatory operational requirements
of the DSKY to ensure compatibility and consistency with the existing
spacecraft display panel design.
With reference to lighting, he said all numerics should be green,
nomenclature and status lights white, and caution lights should be
aviation yellow. All panel lighting should be dimmable throughout the
entire range of brightness, including off.
In regard to nomenclature, Slayton pointed out that abbreviations on the
DSKY should conform to the North American Interface Control Document
(ICD). The referenced ICD was being reviewed by Grumman and North
American and was scheduled to be signed December 1, 1964.
Referring to the caution and warning system, he pointed out that all
caution lights on the DSKY should be gated into the primary navigation
and guidance system (PNGS) caution light on the main instrument panel of
both vehicles and into the PNGS caution light on the lower equipment bay
panel of the CM.
Slayton requested that preliminary designs of the DSKY panel be
submitted to the Subsystem Managers for Controls and Displays for review
and approval.
Memorandum, Donald K. Slayton, MSC, to Apollo Program Manager,
"Incompatibility of DSKY with LEM and CM Controls and
Displays," November 19, 1964.
November 19
MSC was giving serious thought to using radioisotope generators to power
the Apollo lunar surface experiments packages. If some method could be
found to control waste heat, such a device would be the lightest source
of power available. Accordingly, the Center asked Grumman to study the
feasibility of incorporating it into the LEM's scientific payload. The
company should analyze thermal and radiological problems, as well as
methods of stowage, together with the possibility of using the generator
for power and heat during the flight. To minimize the problem of
integration, Grumman was allowed much flexibility in designing the unit.
Basically, however, it would measure about 0.07 cu m (2.5 cu ft) and
would weigh between 13 and 18 kg (30 and 40 lbs). Its energy source
(plutonium 238) would produce about 50 watts of electricity (29 volts,
direct current).
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Radioisotope power supply for lunar
scientific experiments," November 19, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Weekly
Management Report, November 19-26, 1964."
November 19-26
The MSC-Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Guidance and Control
Implementation Sub-Panel set forth several procedural rules for
translunar injection (TLI):
- Once the S-IVB ignition sequence was started, the spacecraft would
not be able to halt the maneuver. (This would occur about 427 sec before
the stage's J-2 engine achieved 90 percent of its thrust capability.)
- Because the spacecraft would receive no signal from the instrument
unit (IU), the exact time of sequence initiation must be relayed from
the ground.
- The vehicle's roll attitude would be reset prior to injection.
- And when the spacecraft had control of the vehicle, the IU would not
initiate the ignition sequence.
Memorandum, Secretaries, Guidance and Control Implementation Sub-Panel,
MSFC and MSC, to Distr., "Action Items and Agreements from the
Guidance and Control Implementation Sub-Panel Meeting" (November
17, 1964), November 19, 1964; with enclosures; MSC, "ASPO Weekly
Management Report, November 19-26, 1964."
November 19-26
To solve the persisting problem of the integrity of the CM's aft
heatshield during water impacts, MSC engineers were investigating
several approaches: increasing the thickness of the face sheet (but with
no change to the core itself); and replacing the stainless-steel
honeycomb with a type of gridwork shell. Technicians felt that, of these
two possibilities, the first seemed more efficient structurally.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November l9-26, 1964."
November 19-26
North American and Grumman agreed on the alignment of the two spacecraft
during docking maneuvers: the LEM's overhead window would be aligned
with right-hand docking window of the CM.
Ibid.
November 19-26
MSC determined that the lights on the fingertips of the space suits were
adequate to supplement the CM's interior lighting. Thus North American's
efforts to develop a portable light in the spacecraft were canceled. The
exact requirements for those fingertip lights now had to be defined. The
astronauts preferred red bulbs, which would necessitate a redesign of
the existing Gemini system. [See October 29-November 5.]
Ibid.; letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Attn: J. C. Cozad,
"Contract NAS 9-150, Crewman portable light," November 4,
1964.
November 19-26
The MSC Crew Systems Division reviewed the extravehicular mobility unit
micrometeoroid protection garment. It was estimated a total weight of 13
to 18 kg (30 to 40 lbs) would be required for the two micrometeoroid
protection garments which had a crew safety reliability goal of 0.9999
for the meteoroid hazard. Ground rules for their design were being
defined.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 19-26, 1964";
memorandum, Robert E. Smylie, MSC, to Paige B. Burbank,
"Investigation of meteoroid protection for Apollo space suit,"
December 9, 1964.
November 19-26
MSC conducted studies to determine problems in donning and doffing the
Apollo external thermal garment (ETG) and portable life support system
(PLSS) by a subject in a full-pressure suit. The subject donned and
doffed the ETG and PLSS unassisted with the suit in a vented condition
and with assistance while the suit was pressurized to 25.5 kilonewtons
per sq m (3.7 psig). Tests showed the necessity of redesigning the ETG
in the neck and chest area to prevent a gathering of excess material
which restricted downward visibility.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 19-26, 1964";
memorandum, Francis J. Devos, MSC, to Chief, Crew Systems Div.,
"Trip Report - Contract NAS 9-2820," November 19, 1964.
November 19-26
Officials from North American and MSC Crew Systems Division defined the
container design and stowage of survival kits in the Block II CM. The
equipment would be packed in fabric rucksacks and would be installed in
the spacecraft's stowage compartment. [This method eliminated a
removable hard container used in the Block I vehicle and would save
weight.]
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 19-26, 1964";
letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS
9-150, Block II mockup - request for change disposition," December
1, 1964.
November 19-26
To ensure that the redesigned landing gear on the resized LEM would be
consistent with earlier criteria, MSC sent to Grumman revisions to those
design criteria:
- Maximum rate of descent - 3.05 m (10 ft) per sec
- Maximum horizontal velocity - 1.22 m (4 ft) per sec
- Maximum attitude rates (any axis) - 3 degrees per sec
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 19-26, 1964."
November 19-26
In flights that simulated the moon's gravity, MSC technicians evaluated
the astronaut's ability to remove scientific packages from the descent
stage of the LEM. They affirmed the relative ease with which large
containers (about 0.226 cu m [8 cu ft] and weighing 81.65 kg [180 lbs])
could be extracted and carried about.
Ibid.
November 19-26
The current thrust buildup time for the LEM ascent engine was 0.3
second. To avoid redesigning the engine valve-which was already the
pacing item in the ascent engine's development - MSC directed Grumman
simply to change the specification value from 0.2 to 0.3 second.
At the same time, engineers at the Center began studying ways to
increase the engine's thrust. Because of the LEM's weight gains, the
engine must either be uprated or it would have to burn longer.
Preliminary studies showed that, by using a phase "B" chamber
(designed for a chamber pressure of 689.5 kilonewtons per sq m (100
psia)), thus producing chamber pressure of about 792.9 kilonewtons (115
psia), the thrust could be increased from 1,587 to 1,814 kg (3,500 to
4,000 lbs). Moreover, this could be accomplished with the present
pressurization and propellant feed systems.
Ibid.; TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S.
Mullaney, November 27, 1964.
November 19-26
MSC and Grumman representatives reviewed individual subsystem test
logics for the LEM and agreed on test logic and associated hardware
requirements for the entire subsystem development. Agreement was also
reached on the vehicle ground test program which Grumman proposed to
implement with their respective subcontractors during December. Cost and
effort associated with the revised program would be jointly reviewed by
MSC and Grumman during January and February 1965.
Memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to LEM Subsystem Managers,
"Subsystem Test Logic and Hardware Review at GAEC," November
18, 1964; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November l9-26,
1964"; memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to Chief, Program Control
Div., "Staff Meeting Actions," November 20, 1964, with
enclosures.
November 19-26
MSC asked Grumman to design and fabricate a prototype for a lunar sample
return container. This effort would explore handling procedures and
compatibility with both spacecraft. Concurrently, the Center's Advanced
Spacecraft Technology Division was studying structural and packaging
requirements for such a container.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 19-26, 1964."
November 23
NASA concluded contract negotiations with AC Spark Plug for Apollo
guidance and navigation equipment.
Ibid.
November 23
Apollo Command Module, Block II.
North American received NASA's formal go-ahead on manufacture of the
Block II spacecraft.
Ibid.
November 23
The CSM Configuration Control Panel, at its first meeting, approved
several engineering changes. Perhaps the most significant was the
substitution of an elapsed time display for the clock on the main
display console.
Ibid.
November 23
A "pre-FRR" laid some preliminaries for the formal Flight
Readiness Review (ERR) of boilerplate 23 (held at WSMR on December 4,
1964). Because the boost protective cover had not been designed to
sustain the dynamic pressures that would follow deployment of the
canards and vehicle "turn-around," North American was asked to
analyze the possibility of its failing.
Several other problems were aired - fluttering of the canards and the
likelihood of damage to the parachute compartment during jettisoning of
the launch escape tower and the boost cover. Joseph N. Kotanchik, chief
of the Structures and Mechanics Division, confidently reported to ASPO
that "these items will also be resolved prior to the ERR."
MSC, "Minutes, Mission A-002 (BP 23/LJ II 12-51-1), Preliminary
Flight Readiness Review, November 23, 1964"; MSC, "ASPO Weekly
Management Report, November 26-December 3, 1964."
November 23
Grumman and MSC representatives met at Bethpage, New York, to establish
requirements for a new hardware delivery schedule for the LEM ground
development test program. This program would involve changes in the
workload at the subcontractors, WSMR, AEDC, and Grumman. New delivery
schedules for flight engines were also finalized at the meeting.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 26-December 3,
1964."
November 23-25
MSC and Grumman reviewed the ground test program for the LEM guidance
and navigation subsystem (including radar). All major milestones for
hardware qualification would be met by the revised test logic, and both
LEM and CSM radar were expected to be delivered on time. The major
problem area was permissible deviations from fully qualified parts for
pre-production equipment. Since this was apparently true for all LEM
electronics equipment, it was recommended that an overall plan be
approved by ASPO.
Ibid.
November 25
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips that it was his desire to review the progress of the two
subcontractors (Space Technology Laboratory and Rocketdyne) prior to the
final evaluation and selection of a subcontractor for the LEM descent
engine.
Shea had asked MSC's Maxime A. Faget to be chairman of a committee to
accomplish the review, and would also ask the following individuals to
serve: C. H. Lambert, W. F. Rector III, and J. G. Thibodaux, all of MSC;
L. F. Belew, MSFC; M. Dandridge and J. A. Gavin, Grumman; I. A. Johnsen,
Lewis Research Center; C. H. King, OMSF; Maj. W. R. Moe, Edwards Rocket
Research Laboratory; and A. O. Tischler, NASA Office of Advanced
Research and Technology.
The Committee should
- establish review criteria during a planning meeting at MSC during
the week of November 30, 1964;
- visit the two subcontractors' facilities during the week of December
7, 1964, for review of technical status, manufacturing resources, and
test facilities; and
- prepare a written report and brief appropriate NASA personnel on
their findings by December 18, 1964.
"Both GAEC and NASA will be parties to the final selection and it
is not my intent to usurp GAEC's responsibility in this matter; but I do
feel we should have the intelligence at our disposal to appreciate all
ramifications of GAEC's final selection," Shea said.
Letter, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, November
25, 1964.
November 26-December 3
The Configuration Control Panel approved a deployment angle of 45
degrees for the adapter panels on Block I flights. North American
anticipated no schedule impact. MSC and North American were jointly
evaluating the acceptability of this angle for Block II missions as
well. A most important consideration was the necessity to communicate
via the CM's high-gain antenna during the transposition and docking
phase of the flight.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 26-December 3,
1964."
November 26-December 3
MSC's Flight Operations Directorate accepted KSC's proposal for
emergency nitrogen deluge into the SM and spacecraft LEM adapter (SLA)
in case of a hydrogen leak on the pad. The proposal was based upon no
changes to the spacecraft and insertion to the SM SLA area in about
three minutes. However, errors in volume estimation and inlet conditions
in the spacecraft required reevaluation of the proposal to assure that
insertion could be accomplished in a reasonable length of time without
changes in the spacecraft.
Ibid.
November 26-December 3
Because of heat from the service propulsion engine (especially during
insertion into lunar orbit), a serious thermal problem existed for
equipment in the rear of the SM. Reviewing the rendezvous radar's
installation, the Guidance and Control Division felt that a heatshield
might be needed to protect the equipment. Similar problems might also be
encountered with the steerable antenna.
Ibid.
November 26-December 3
MSC informed North American that the Center would furnish a VHF
transmitter to serve as a telemetry dump for all manned Block I flights.
This would permit wide flexibility in testing the CSM S-band's
compatibility with the Manned Space Flight Network prior to Block II
missions.
Ibid.
November 26-December 3
Crew Systems Division (CSD) engineers evaluated the radiator for the
environmental control system in Block I CSM's. The division was certain
that, because of that item's inadequacy, Block I missions would have to
be shortened.
During the same period, however, the Systems Engineering Division (SED)
reported "progress" in solving the radiator problem. SED
stated that some "disagreement" existed on the radiator's
capability. North American predicted a five-day capability; CSD placed
the mission's limit at about two days. SED ordered further testing on
the equipment to reconcile this difference.
Ibid.
November 26-December 3
Crew Systems Division gave space suit manufacturers the responsibility
of providing personal communications equipment in their products.
Ibid.
November 26-December 3
Bell Aerosystems Company tested a high-performance injector for the LEM
ascent engine. The new design was similar to the current one, except
that the mixture ratio of the barrier flow along the chamber wall had
been changed from 0.85 to 1.05. Bell reported a performance increase of
0.8 percent (about 2.5 sec of specific impulse). Subsequent testing,
however, produced excessive erosion in the ablative wall of the thrust
chamber caused by the higher temperature. The MSC Propulsion and Power
Division (PPD) felt this method of increasing the ascent engine's
performance might not be practicable.
At the same time, PPD reported that Bell had canceled its effort to find
a lighter ablative material (part of the weight reduction program). A
number of tests had been conducted on such materials; none was
successful.
Ibid.; "ASPO Weekly Management Report" [December
10, 1964-January 7, 1965]; TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R.
S. Mullaney, November 27, 1964.
November 26-December 3
Grumman selected the Leach Corporation to supply data storage
electronics assemblies for the LEM. Conclusion of contract negotiations
was anticipated about February 1, 1965. The resident Apollo office at
Grumman gave its approval to the selection, with only two conditions:
- because of its toxic characteristics, beryllium must not be used in
the assemblies; and
- Leach should demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed time-voice
multiplexing scheme.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 26-December 3,
1964."
November 27
General Precision's Link Group received a $7 million contract from NASA,
through a subcontract with Grumman, for two LEM simulators, one at
Houston and the other at Cape Kennedy. Along with comparable equipment
for the CSM (also being developed by Link), the machines would serve as
trainers for Apollo astronauts. The devices would duplicate the interior
of the spacecraft; and visual displays would realistically simulate
every phase of the mission.
Space Business Daily, November 27, 1964, p. 124.
November 30
North American tested the canard thrusters for the launch escape system,
using both single and dual cartridges. These tests were to determine
whether the pressure of residual gases was sufficient to maintain the
canards in a fully deployed position. Investigators found that residual
pressures remained fairly constant; further, the firing of a single
cartridge produced ample pressure to keep the canards deployed.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID-64-300-32, pp. 1,3, 31;
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, November 26-December 3,
1964."
November 30
Acceptance testing was completed at Downey, California, on three
principal systems trainers for the CSM (the environmental control,
stabilization and control, and electrical power systems). The trainers
were then shipped to Houston and installed at the site, arriving there
December 8. They were constructed under the basic Apollo Spacecraft
contract at a cost of $953,024.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID-62-300-31, p. 24;
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, December 3-10, 1964"; MSC News
Release 64-191, December 8, 1964.
During the Month
Six flights of the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV) were made
during the month, bringing the total number to seven. The project pilot,
Joseph Walker, made all flights and demonstrated a rapid increase in the
ease and skill with which he handled the craft as the flights
progressed.
Altitudes to between 18 and 21 m (60 and 70 ft) and flight duration up
to three minutes were attained. With the jet engine remaining vertical,
attitude angles in excess of 20 degrees were demonstrated in both pitch
and roll. Lift rockets were used on the last four flights. Six knots (6
n mi per hr) had been tentatively set as the maximum permissible wind
velocity for flying.
Letter, Office of Director, Flight Research Center, to NASA
Headquarters, "Lunar Landing Research Vehicle progress report No.
17 for period ending November 30, 1964," sgd. De E. Beeler for Paul
F. Bikle, December 8, 1964.
