Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
April 1965
1965
April 1
Grumman presented to MSC its recommendations for an all-battery
electrical power system for the LEM:
- Two batteries in the ascent stage
- Four batteries in the descent stage
- A new power distribution system
- Active cooling for the descent batteries and electrical control
assemblies
Following a review of cost and resources proposals, MSC approved
Grumman's configuration, and on April 15 gave the LEM manufacturer a
go-ahead.
MSC requested that Grumman evaluate the possibility of furnishing power
for the pre-separation checkout of the LEM wholly from that module's
power supply. This procedure would obviate the CSM's supplying that
power during the initial 60 min of the checkout. This would simplify
the electrical connections between the two spacecraft and eliminate the
possible requirement for an additional battery charger in the CSM. The
Center advised North American, however, that such a charger might still
be needed on Block II CSMs.
GAEC, "Implementation of LEM All-Battery Configuration,"
April 1, 1965; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S.
Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, Implementation of All-Battery LEM
Configuration," April 15, 1965.
April 1
The first stage of the Saturn IB booster (the S-IB-1) underwent its
first static firing at Huntsville, Alabama. The stage's eight uprated
H-1 engines produced about 71,168-kilonewtons (1.6 million lbs) thrust.
On April 23, Marshall and Rocketdyne announced that the uprated H-1 had
passed qualification testing and was ready for flight.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 162; Space
Business Daily, April 7, 1965, p. 209.
April 1
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips told ASPO Manager Joseph F.
Shea that Bellcomm, Inc., was conducting a systems engineering study of
lunar landing dynamics to determine "functional compatibility of
the navigation, guidance, control, crew, and landing gear systems
involved in Apollo lunar landing." Phillips asked that he be
advised of any specific assignments in these areas which would prove
useful in support of the ASPO operation.
Shea replied, "We are currently evaluating the LEM lunar landing
system with the Apollo contractors and the NASA Centers. We believe
that the landing problem is being covered adequately by ourselves and
these contractors." Shea added that a meeting would be held at
Grumman April 21 and 22 to determine if there were any deficiencies in
the program, and that he would be pleased to have Bellcomm attend the
meeting and later make comments and recommendations.
Letter, Phillips to Shea, April 1, 1965; letter, Shea to Phillips,
April 6, 1965.
April 1-7
H. I. Thompson Company's first combustion chamber with a tape-wrapped
throat successfully withstood a series of four test firings. If further
testing confirmed its performance, reported the resident Apollo office
at Bethpage, N.Y., the design would be used in the LEM's ascent engine.
(It would replace the current compression-molded throat, which suffered
from excessive cracking.)
MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, April 4-10, 1965," p. 2.
April 1-8
The thrust mount for the LEM ascent engine cracked during vibration
testing. The mount would be strengthened.
During the same period, Bell tested the first one-piece ablative chamber
for the ascent engine (designed to replace the molded-throat design,
which developed cracks during testing . In firings that totaled over
eight minutes, Bell engineers found that the unit suffered only
negligible throat erosion and decay of chamber pressure.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 1-8, 1965."
April 1-8
The cryoformed steel bottle for the portable life support system,
manufactured by Arde-Portland, Inc., passed its first burst and cycling
tests, which Crew Systems Division called a "major milestone"
in its development.
Ibid.
April 1-8
MSC and Grumman reviewed the requirement for a backup mode of entering
and leaving the LEM while on the moon. The new rectangular hatch was
deemed "inherently highly reliable," and the only failure
that was even "remotely possible" was one of the hatch
mechanism. The proposal to use the top (or transfer) hatch was
impractical, because it would cost 13.6 kg (30 lb) and would impose an
undue hazard on both the crew and the spacecraft's thermal shield.
Ibid.
April 1-8
North American reviewed nondestructive techniques for testing honeycomb
structures. The principal method involved ultrasonic testing, but this
approach was highly dependent upon equipment and procedure. At best,
ultrasonic testing could do no more than indicate faulty bond areas, and
these could be confirmed only through destructive tests. A number of
promising nondestructive methods were being investigated, but thus far
none was satisfactory. The danger in this situation was that, if design
allowables had to be lowered to meet the results of strength
distribution tests, the weight advantage of honeycomb construction might
be lost.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 1-8, 1965"; memorandum,
D. D. Few, RASPO-Downey, to R. H. Ridnour, "Recent Bonding
Problems at NAA," May 12, 1965, with enclosures.
April 2
North American presented final results of their modification to the
electrical power system for spacecraft 011 to solve the power and
energy problem. This consisted of the addition of three batteries which
would be mounted on the center platform and used to supply
instrumentation and mission control programmer loads during flight.
These batteries would be paralleled with the entry and landing
batteries at impact to provide power for postlanding recovery loads.
MSC concurred with this approach.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Instrumentation and
Electronic Systems Division, "S/C 011 circuit protection,"
April 8, 1965; TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information
Systems Div., Attn: J. C. Cozad, April 13, 1965.
April 2
Following a presentation by North American on the status of the adapter,
MSC spelled out specific and detailed design changes required.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Div., Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Spacecraft LEM
Adapter (SLA) change status," April 2, 1965, with enclosure,
"Technical Description of Proposed SLA Changes."
April 5-11
Rocketdyne completed qualification tests on two CM reaction control
engines. These were successful. One of the nozzle extensions failed to
seat, however, and was rejected. Its failure was being analyzed.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity
Report (Period 5 April 1965 through 11 April 1965)," p. 3.
April 5-16
To evaluate the Block 11 CSM's manual thrust vector control, five
pilots, among them two astronauts, flew the Apollo simulator at
Honeywell. These mock flights demonstrated that the manual control was
sufficiently accurate for transearth injection. Also, researchers
determined that the optical alignment sight provided the crewmen with
attitude references adequate for midcourse maneuvers.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, June 1,
1965, p. 6.
April 6
Quality verification vibration tests were completed on the command
module of spacecraft 006.
Ibid., p. 1; memorandum, W. D. Graves, MSC, to Distr.,
"Quality Vibration Verification Testing (QVVT) Facility
Validation," April 27, 1965.
April 7
A LEM/CSM interface meeting uncovered a number of design problems and
referred them to the Systems Engineering Division (SED) for evaluation:
the requirement for ground verification of panel deployment prior to LEM
withdrawal; the requirement for panel deployment in earth orbit during
the SA-206 flight; the absence of a backup to the command sequencer for
jettisoning the CSM (Flight Projects Division [FPD] urged such a backup
signal); and Grumman's opposition to a communications link with the LEM
during withdrawal of the spacecraft (FPD felt that such a link was
needed through verification of reaction control system ignition). SED's
recommendations on these issues were anticipated by April 22.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 8-15, 1965";
memorandum, R. W. Lanzkron, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "LEM-1 CSM Interface Meeting," April 19, 1965;
memorandum, Lanzkron to Chief, Systems Engineering Division,
"LEM-1 CSM Interface Meeting," April 15, 1965.
April 8
Goddard Space Flight Center awarded a $4.6 million contract to RCA for
a deep space tracking and data acquisition system. The equipment, to be
installed on Cooper's Island, Bermuda, would support a variety of NASA
space missions, including Apollo flights.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 174-l75;
Space Business Daily, April 12, 1965, p. 231.
April 8-15
The MSC Crew Performance Section evaluated the ability of two
pressure-suited astronauts to put on and take off their external
thermal garments and portable life support systems (PLSS). The subjects
had considerable difficulty positioning the PLSS; also, though these
modified thermal garments were much easier to don and doff, the
subjects still experienced some trouble inserting the second arm.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 8-15, 1965."
April 8-15
Bell Aerosystems tested a pressure transducer for the LEM's ascent
propulsion system (the first time such a device was ever used with
hypergolic fuels). The transducer proved extremely accurate at sensing
pressure differences between the propellant lines.
Ibid.; "Monthly Progress Report No. 27,"
LPR-10-43, p. 13.
April 9
George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight,
announced the transfer of control over manned space flights from Cape
Kennedy, Fla., to Houston, Texas. MSC's Mission Control Center would
direct the flights from end of liftoff through recovery.
NASA News Release 65-119, "Mission Control Center at Houston to
Handle GT-4, Subsequent Manned Flights," April 9, 1965.
April 9
Crew Systems Division (CSD) decided on a single garment for both thermal
and micrometeoroid protection for Apollo astronauts. CSD's Richard S.
Johnston summarized factors underlying this decision:
- The integrated garment would be easier to don and thus would
simplify preparations for leaving the LEM; it would fit better and
afford greater visibility, mobility, and access to suit controls.
- The dual-purpose garment would weigh about 2.3 kg (5 lbs) less than
would two separate protective covers. And because it would consume less
storage space, the ascent stage of the spacecraft could be lightened by
about three pounds. Involved here, also, was the abort weight of the
LEM. It was assumed that the most adverse conditions would be
encountered during an "immediate abort," before the crew could
depressurize the cabin or jettison now-superfluous equipment (such as
the thermal/meteoroid garment).
- Conversely, separate protective garments - and the
"staging" procedure they entailed - would require
modifications to the spacecraft and would shorten the astronauts' stay
outside the LEM. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, separate
garments would limit rescue possibilities and would lessen crew
safety.
Johnston emphasized that, if for any reason the integration scheme
proved impracticable, the division could still return to the concept of
separate thermal and micrometeoroid garments.
Memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) thermal and
meteoroid protection," April 9, 1965.
April 9
Systems Engineering Division (SED) reviewed the Flight Operations
Directorate's recommendation for an up-data system in the LEM during
manned missions. (Currently the LEM's guidance computer received data
either from the computer in the CSM or from MSC.) SED concluded that,
because the equipment was not essential for mission success, an up-data
system did not warrant the cost and weight penalties ($750,000 and 4.54
kg [10 lbs]) that it would entail.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Manager, ASPO, "LEM up-data
system," April 9, 1965.
April 12
The Apollo Program Director, Samuel C. Phillips, informed the Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, George E. Mueller, that action
was underway by Grumman to terminate all Pratt & Whitney LEM fuel
cell activity by June 30, 1965. Pratt & Whitney would complete
testing of LEM fuel cell hardware already produced and one complete LEM
fuel cell module plus spare parts would be sent to MSC for in- house
testing.
North American's Space and Information Systems Division would continue
development at Pratt & Whitney on the CSM fuel cell for 18 months
at a cost not to exceed $2.5 million, to ensure meeting the 400-hour
lifetime requirement of the CSM system.
MSC would contract directly with Pratt & Whitney for CSM cell
development followed by complete CSM module testing for a 1,000-hour
CSM module at a cost of approximately $2.5 million. Grumman was
scheduled to propose to ASPO their battery contractor selection on
April 29, 1965.
Memorandum, Phillips to Mueller, "Plans for LEM Fuel Cell
Termination and Related Effort," sgd. John H. Disher, April 12,
1965.
April 12
MSC awarded MIT a new $15,529,000 contract to design guidance and
navigation equipment for Apollo spacecraft.
MSC, "Quarterly Activity Report for Office of the Associate
Administrator, Manned Space Flight, for Period Ending April 30,
1965," p. 25.
April 13
Marshall Space Flight Center finalized a $2,697,546 addition to an
existing contract with Douglas Aircraft Company to provide for
environmental testing of a full-scale S-IVB forward stage simulator, a
full-scale test instrument unit, and an Apollo thermal simulator.
Testing would be conducted in Douglas' 11.89-m- (39-ft-) diameter space
simulator at Huntington Beach, California, and would simulate a typical
Saturn V flight from launch to earth orbit and injection into lunar
path.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 182; Space
Business Daily, April 27, 1965, p. 317.
April 14
Construction workers emplaced the final beam in the structural skeleton
of the Vertical Assembly Building at Merritt Island (KSC), Florida.
Scheduled for completion in 1966, the cavernous structure (160 m [525
ft] tall and comprising 10,968,476 cu m [129 million cu ft]) would
provide a controlled environment for assembling Saturn V launch vehicles
and mating them to Apollo spacecraft.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 184.
April 15
The first firing of the LEM ascent engine test rig (HA-3) was
successfully conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. A
second firing on April 23 lasted 14.45 sec instead of 10 sec as planned.
A third firing, lasting 30 sec, completed the test series. A helium
pressurization system would be installed before additional testing could
begin.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, pp. 1, 13; GAEC,
"Monthly Progress Report No. 28," LPR- 10-44, June 10, 1965,
p. 1.
April 15
ASPO informed North American that a meeting would be held at its Downey,
California, plant April 20-23 to negotiate and have signed off all Block
I and Block II suit interface control documents (ICDs) and the
government furnished equipment ICDs. Hamilton Standard, Grumman, and
David Clark were being instructed to have representation present to
achieve the signed ICDs. North American was instructed to have the ICDs
in final form to be signed or negotiated.
TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Attn: J. C. Cozad, April 15, 1965.
Mid month
Officials from North American and the three NASA centers most concerned
(MSFC, KSC, and MSC) discussed the environmental umbilical arrangement
for the CM. The current configuration hampered rapid crew egress and
therefore did not meet emergency requirements. This group put forth
several alternative designs, including lengthening the umbilical hood
and relocating the door or hatch.
Internal Letter, E. P. Smith, NAA, to Distr., "Trip Report - MSFC
- Command Module Environmental Umbilical Interface," April 15,
1965.
April 15-22
Grumman reviewed the engineering simulation program. The total cost was
anticipated at $9 million.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 15-22, 1965."
April 15-22
At North American, ultrasonic inspection of the forward portion of
airframe 007 disclosed only minor imperfections in the bonding, called
"a dramatic demonstration of the improvement in the bonding
process." (See April 1-8.)
Ibid.
April 15-22
MSC and Grumman reviewed the program for the LEM's reaction control
system. The only issue outstanding was Grumman's in-house effort: MSC
felt that that effort was "overestimated" and that the
manufacturer alone should not handle support from subcontractors.
Ibid.; memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to Assistant
Manager, ASPO, Attn: H. L. Reynolds, "LEM RCS Status," April
22, 1965.
April 15-22
North American began full-scale developmental testing on the CM's
uprighting system.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 15-22, 1965";
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report;' SID 62-300- 37, p. 3.
April 16
MSFC conducted the first clustered firing of the Saturn V's first stage
(the S-IC). The booster's five F-1 engines burned for about 6½
seconds and produced 33,360 kilonewtons (7.5 million lbs) thrust.
George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight,
emphasized the significance of this test, calling it "one of the
key milestones in the whole lunar landing program."
Eight days later, at its static facility in Santa Susana, California,
North American first fired the S-II, intermediate stage of the Saturn
V. The event was chronicled as the "second major Saturn V
milestone" during April.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 188, 198;
Space Business Daily, April 20, 1965, p. 276;
Ibid., April 28, 1965, p. 322.
April 16
Owen E. Maynard, Chief of MSC's Systems Engineering Division, announced
that the ordering of objectives into first, second, and third order had
been discontinued and replaced with two classifications: primary and
secondary objectives. Primary objectives were defined as those which
were mandatory. Malfunctions of spacecraft or launch vehicle systems,
ground equipment, or instrumentation which would result in failure to
achieve these objectives would be cause to hold or cancel the mission
until the malfunction had been eliminated. Secondary objectives were
those considered desirable but not mandatory. Malfunctions resulting in
failure to achieve these objectives would be cause to hold or cancel the
mission as indicated in Mission Rules.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Distr., "Changes to objective
classification," April 16, 1965.
April 16-May 15
Two CSM fuel cells failed qualification testing, the first failing after
101.75 hrs of the vacuum endurance test. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft
determined that the failure was caused by a cleaning fluid which
contaminated and plugged the oxygen lines and contaminated the oxygen
gas at the electrodes. The fuel cell would be rebuilt for qualification
testing and test preparation procedures were to be revised.
An internal short circuit occurred in the second fuel cell 16 hrs before
the end of the 400-hour qualification test. In spite of the failure the
fuel cell met the current Block I mission specification and did not need
to be redesigned.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 10.
April 16-May 15
North American completed qualification testing on the fuel tanks for the
SM's reaction control system.
Ibid., p. 11; NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test
Program Weekly Activity Report (12 April 1965 through 18 April
1965)," p. 3.
April 16-May 15
On the basis of current systems reliabilities and the design reference
mission, North American estimated at one in a hundred the possibility
that returning Apollo crewmen would land on solid ground rather than on
water. The contractor used this estimate in formulating test programs
for boilerplate 28 and spacecraft 002A and 007.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 12.
April 16-May 15
North American halted testing on the hydrogen tanks for the CSM,
produced by Beech, because of weld failures. Testing on a redesigned
tank assembly began on May 8.
Ibid., p. 9; "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program
Weekly Activity Report (12 April through 18 April 1965)," p. 5.
April 19-26
North American, Hamilton Standard, Grumman, David Clark, and MSC
representatives, meeting in Downey, California, resolved all interfaces
between the space suit and the two blocks of spacecraft. As a result of
these agreements, MSC directed North American and Grumman to make some
minor changes (suggested by the Crew Systems Division) in the
communications cables; to remove the portable life support systems from
the CM; and to add a thermal-meteoroid garment - rather than one
providing merely thermal protection - to the CM.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965";
memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) thermal and
meteoroid protection," April 9, 1965; memorandum, Johnston to
Asst. Chief, Program Control Division, Attn: G. J. Stoops,
"Implementation of RECP's pertaining to Extravehicular Mobility
Unit (EMU) thermal and meteoroid protection," April 21, 1965.
April 20
NASA and Boeing negotiated a contract modification. For an additional
$3,135,977, Boeing would furnish instrumentation equipment and
engineering support for Marshall Space Flight Center's program for
dynamic testing of the Saturn V.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 191; Space
Business Daily, April 22, 1965, p. 291.
April 20
At the initial design engineering inspection (DEI) of Spacecraft 009,
held at Downey, California, MSC and North American officials reviewed
the compatibility of the vehicle with SA-201 mission requirements. The
DEI Review Board approved 11 hardware changes and assigned 26 others for
further study.
Memorandum, Daniel A. Nebrig, MSC, to Distr., "Minutes of Houston
Board Review for AFRM 009 DEI - Phase I," April 20, 1965;
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 3.
April 20
The ASPO CSM Project Officer, C. L. Taylor, said that immediate action
must be taken to reduce the FY 1965 expenditures on the CSM program by
$5 million. Toward that end, he directed attention to a cost reduction
program, "Project Squeeze," and said that a joint North American/NASA
Project Squeeze had been in operation several months and had resulted in
significant program reductions. However, the majority of items
recommended for investigation were North American-oriented.
Taylor requested items for consideration be submitted no later than
April 27, 1965, and pointed out some specifics which might be
considered:
- qualification programs, hardware quantities, tests, etc.,
- component testing,
- analytical effort,
- design to excess,
- documentation, and
- changes.
Memorandum, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to Distr., "Project Squeeze,"
April 20, 1965.
April 20
MSC requested Grumman to make provisions for storage of two additional
portable life support system (PLSS) batteries. This was an increase of
two batteries over the previous requirement; requirement now was for two
batteries in the PLSS and additional storage for six.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 20,
1965.
April 20
MSC's Systems Engineering Division requested that Grumman be advised to
terminate the RCA systems engineering subcontract as soon as possible.
It had been determined that this contract was no longer useful. Based on
data presented by Grumman during a program review, an immediate and
complete termination would save about $45,000.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Contract Engineering
Branch, "LEM Program Review Contract NAS 9-1100, RCA Systems
Engineering Sub-Contract," April 20, 1965.
April 21-22
Grumman and MSC engineers discussed the effect of landing impacts on the
structure of the LEM. Based on analyses of critical loading conditions,
Grumman reported that the present configuration was inadequate. Several
possible solutions were being studied jointly by Grumman and the
Structures and Mechanics Division (SMD):
- Strengthening the spacecraft's structure (which would increase the
weight of the ascent and descent stages by 19 and 32 kg [42 and 70 lbs],
respectively)
- Modifying the gear
- Reducing factors of safety and landing dynamics, including vertical
velocity at touchdown
A decision was expected from SMD by June 1.
Also Grumman representatives summarized the company's study on the
design of the footpads. They recommended that, rather than adopting a
stroking-type design, the current rigid footpad should be modified. The
modification, they said, would improve performance as much as would the
stroking design, without entailing the latter's increased weight and
complexity and lowered reliability. SMD was evaluating Grumman's
recommendations.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 22
MSC completed the program review on the electrical power system for the
LEM and approved the cost through completion of the program (about
$23.2 million).
Ibid.
April 22
The MSC Systems Engineering Division published revisions to Apollo
Mission 204A objectives and mission requirements. The principal
difference between the revised version and the Initial Mission Directive
for Mission 204 was the expansion of the secondary propulsion system
performance objective, the radiation survey meter objective, which was
deleted, and the don/doff of the Block I pressure garment and thermal
blanket objectives which had also been deleted.
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Apollo Trajectory Support Office,
"Revisions to Apollo Mission 204A objectives and mission
requirements," sgd. C. H. Perrine, April 22, 1965.
April 22
The LEM Project Officer notified Grumman that the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) had established sub-panels to work
on specific technical areas, beyond the full PSAC briefings. One of the
sub-panels was concerned with the environmental control subsystem,
including space suits. This group desired representation from Hamilton
Standard to discuss with regard to the LEM-ECS its interpretation of
the reliability design requirements, its implementation through
development and test phases, its demonstration of reliability, and its
frank assessment of confidence in these measures. Briefing material
should be available to the sub-panel by May 17, 1965, with a primary
discussion meeting to be held at Hamilton Standard on May 24.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22,
1965; TWX, W. L. Conn, MSC, to Hamilton Standard, Attn: E. V. Marshall,
April 22, 1965.
April 22
Grumman was requested to ship ground support equipment and associated
equipment to field test sites as soon as it was available.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22,
1965.
April 22
Grumman was requested to attend a meeting at MSC and to present their
reasons as to why the LEM reaction control system (RCS) propellant tanks
could not be of common technology with the CSM RCS propellant tanks.
Grumman was to also say why an additional development program was
required for the LEM tanks.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 22,
1965.
April 22-23
North American conducted the final zero-g trials (part of developmental
testing on the CM's waste management system) and reported good results
for both urine and feces apparatus.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 4.
April 22-29
After reviewing the status of the LEM landing simulation program, the
Guidance and Control Division reported that "significant
data" from the Bell training vehicle were more than a year
away.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 22-29
Allison Division of General Motors Corporation completed an analysis of
failures in the LEM descent stage's propellant tanks. Investigators
placed the blame on brittle forgings. MSC's Propulsion and Power
Division reported that "efforts are continuing to insure [that]
future forgings will be satisfactory."
Ibid.
April 22-29
Crews Systems Division reported that work on the suit visors was
progressing well, and that operational mockups had been sent to North
American for the upcoming critical design review. The visor could be
attached and detached by a pressurized crewman; also, it afforded
thermal protection and allowed a complete range of light attenuation.
Ibid.
April 22-29
North American updated the electrical power profile for spacecraft 011:
| | Requirement (watt-hours) |
|---|
| Prelaunch | 159 |
| Ascent | 4457 |
| Entry | 1032 |
| Postlanding | 2288 |
During the flight, the entry and landing batteries would supplement the
spacecraft's fuel cells; three auxiliary batteries would power the
mission control programmer and the instrumentation. At touchdown, all
batteries would supply energy for postlanding requirements.
Ibid.
April 23
MSC and Grumman conducted the design engineering inspection on LEM test
article 10. Structures and Mechanics Division called it
"significant" that there were no requests for design changes.
The vehicle was ready for shipment to Tulsa, Oklahoma, for static
testing by North American, but, at the latter's request, delivery was
delayed until May 28.
Ibid.; letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Minutes of the LTA-10 Development
Engineering Inspection," April 29, 1965, with enclosure:
"Minutes of LTA-10 Development Engineering Inspection, April 23,
1965."
April 26
North American received CM 009 forward and crew compartment heatshields
from Avco Corporation. These heatshields were the first CM heatshields
received by the contractor with complete ablative application.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-37, p. 1.
April 26
Operating on a round-the-clock schedule, researchers at Langley
Research Center began simulations of high-altitude aborts and
CSM-active dockings. (See July 7-9.)
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29, 1965."
April 26-May 2
Using boilerplate 14, North American simulated the mission for
spacecraft 009. The test was conducted in two phases, with the vehicle
on external and then internal power. All data showed satisfactory
performance.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity
Report (Period 26 April 1965 through 2 May 1965),"
April 27
ASPO announced that a LEM Test Program Requirement Review would be held
at Grumman during the first week in June. The purpose of the review
would be to reach agreement with Grumman on an overall Test Program Plan
and to consider planned allocation of hardware, test schedules, and test
logic in relationship to flight missions.
The review would result in publication of a certification document which
would define and catalog the program of testing, analysis, and
rationalization which would form the basis for certification of flight
spacecraft as capable of meeting requirements of flight missions. It
would cover all formal qualification testing above the part level being
done at subcontractors or vendors, component testing at Grumman, higher
level of assembly testing conducted anywhere in support of a portion of
test logic, and individual system test requirements to be conducted on
integrated test vehicles such as LEM test article 1.
The format for the review would consist of individual subsystem test
program reviews by the respective MSC and Grumman Subsystem Managers.
MSC Subsystem Managers would be supported by RASPO, ASPO, and GE
personnel where appropriate. After their initial meeting, the MSC and
Grumman managers would summarize their findings to a MSC Grumman review
board, emphasizing deficiencies in the program (to include inadequate
tests, hardware availability problems, and schedules which were
inconsistent with flight support requirements).
Memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Distribution, "LEM Test
Program Requirements Review," April 27, 1965.
April 27
North American summarized its position on the design of the CM for earth
impact in a letter to MSC. A number of meetings had taken place since
the NASA North American Technical Management Meeting February 25, 1964,
at which the decision was made to reorient Apollo impact to water as the
primary landing site.
The letter reviewed the history of boilerplate 28 drop tests and a
series of MSC North American meetings during the last two months of 1964
and the first two of 1965. On February 12, at a meeting at Downey,
California, North American had recommended:
- Design for 0.99999 criteria.
- Retain the 27.5 degrees hang angle to eliminate the requirement for
redesign of upper crew compartment side wall. The dual hang angle
configuration should be eliminated for spacecraft 017 and subsequently
through Block II.
- Allow plastic deformation of the aft heatshield.
- Continue investigation of possible upper deck and tunnel problems.
- Fly spacecraft 009 with a probability of success at water impact of
0.999, and continue boilerplate 28 testing to give assurance of meeting
this criterion.
In a follow-up meeting on March 2, NASA gave concurrence to these
recommendations in the form of signed meeting minutes.
At the time of the April 27 letter, North American was implementing the
design changes defined in the Apollo CM design changes for water impact.
The changes were based on North American's best understanding of
agreements between it and MSC regarding criteria, loads, definition of
the ultimate land envelope, structural analysis, and the requirement
that no-leakage integrity within the ultimate load level be demonstrated
by test.
Letter, J. G. Cozad, North American, to NASA MSC, Attn: J. B.
Alldredge, "Contract NAS 9-150, R&D for Project Apollo
Spacecraft Design of Apollo Command Module for Earth Impact,"
April 27, 1965.
April 27
LEM Project Officer W. F. Rector III, in a letter to Grumman,
established the minimum acceptable NASA requirements for accomplishing
the inspection, acceptance, and delivery operations at Bethpage, N.Y.,
on flight and major ground test vehicles.
Following manufacture, and prior to NASA acceptance, the spacecraft
must undergo a thorough checkout by the contractor with MSC
participating as an active member of a checkout team. Through
experience in Projects Mercury and the CSM portion of Apollo, a team
concept of operations had evolved for the aforementioned activities.
The concept had proved highly successful in providing a balance of MSC
and contractor personnel which assured that the evaluation of problems
received proper attention and resulted in solutions acceptable to both
NASA and the contractors. In addition, this "cross
pollination" of skills provided a more complete evaluation of the
spacecraft performance and systems anomalies.
Prior to starting acceptance testing, all systems should have completed
a pre-installation acceptance check, been installed in the spacecraft,
and the configuration verified. Acceptance checkout would begin
following complete installation of all subsystems and hook-up to the
Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE). After ACE was installed, individual
subsystems tests were to be performed. The hook-up of ACE to the
spacecraft would constitute the point at which the checkout team would
assume responsibility for the vehicle. At that time a documentation
system must provide a means for authorizing and permanently recording
all work and testing to be performed on the spacecraft.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, NASA Requirements for Inspection, Acceptance
and Delivery Operations at Bethpage," April 27, 1965.
April 27-30
Part II of the Critical Design Review of the crew compartment and
docking system for the Block II CM was held at Downey, California, using
mockups 28 and 27 A. (Part I had been held on March 23-24.)
- Systems Engineering Division reported 49 design changes were
requested in the crew compartment, 45 of which were acted upon. The two
most serious problems were:
- stowage of the portable life support systems;
- and the crewmen's knees striking the main display console at
impact.
- Structures and Mechanics Division reported a number of minor changes
to the docking system, primarily to simplify crew transfer and operation
of the hatch mechanisms.
- Crew Systems Division (CSD) engineers evaluated the compatibility of
the space suit and MSC's new in- house helmet with the Block II
spacecraft. CSD reported that the suits were sufficiently mobile and
afforded adequate visibility; problems with the shoulders, experienced
in early versions of the suit, had been solved; and while the three
crewmen still quite literally rubbed elbows, this problem also had been
alleviated and no longer hampered the crew's performance.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 29-May 6, 1965."
April 28
NASA Administrator James E. Webb, Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden,
and Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., decided that the
announcement of any Apollo crew should be delayed as long as feasible
without jeopardizing training schedules. They reasoned that as long as
the entire astronaut group was undergoing generalized Apollo training,
and until individual mission planning was complete, there should be no
need to make even tentative crew selections.
Memorandum, Seamans to Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
George E. Mueller, "Apollo Crew Selection," April 28,
1965.
April 28
Joseph F. Shea, ASPO Manager, approved Crew Systems Division's
recommendation to retain the "shirtsleeve" environment for
the CM. The design was simpler and promised greater overall mission
reliability; also, it would be more comfortable for the crewmen.
Wearing part of the space suit would compound problems with humidity
and condensation inside the cabin. Accordingly, the crew would be clad
only in their constant-wear garments or would be fully suited. (MSC and
North American had explored the feasibility of putting a water
separator in the cabin heat exchanger for airframe 012. It was hoped
that, through partially suited operations, the crew could gain
confidence in the spacecraft's pressurization system. North American
advised, however, that considerable cost and schedule impacts could be
expected. Moreover, such a device would be only partly successful
-condensation would still be a major problem, Shea therefore vetoed the
water separator and the idea of partially suited operations during the
first manned Apollo flight.)
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Distr., "Wear of space suits
in C/M," April 28, 1965.
April 28-May 3
Under NASA contract, proton irradiation of primates tests were
conducted on the Oak Ridge cyclotron by a team from Brooks AFB and Crew
Systems Division. During this period, 136 monkeys and 900 mice were
irradiated.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, May 6-13, 1965."
April 29-May 6
Portable life support systems (PLSS) stowed against the aft bulkhead in
the CM would prevent the crew couch from stroking fully. This condition
would be aggravated if, at impact, the bulkhead was forced inward. North
American spokesmen maintained that, in a water landing, the bulkhead
would give only slightly and that the couch struts would not compress to
their limits. They argued, therefore, that this condition would be of
concern only in a land landing. On the contrary, said MSC. Center
officials were adamant that any interference was absolutely
unacceptable: it would lessen the attenuation capability of the couch
(thereby jeopardizing crew safety); possibly, the bulkhead might even be
ruptured (with obviously disastrous results). Because of this problem -
and because the capability for extravehicular transfer from the CM to
the LEM was required - MSC invited representatives from the three
contractors involved to meet in Houston to deal with the question of
PLSS stowage. (See May 12.)
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 29-May 6, 1965";
memorandum, Charles R. Haines, MSC, to Owen E. Maynard,
"PLSS," May 25, 1965.
April 29-May 6
Grumman recommended redundant pyrotechnic or solenoid valves in the
propellant system of the LEM's ascent stage. Thus the firm could meet
NASA's ground rule that no single failure would cause the mission to be
aborted.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 29-May 6, 1965."
April 29-May 6
The Flight Projects Division (FPD) proposed a change in the checkout
procedure at Merritt Island (KSC). The idea, drawn from Gemini, would
eliminate checkout at the environmental control system (ECS) facility.
Basically, FPD's plan was to transport the mated CSM directly from the
Operations and Checkout Building to the altitude chamber, where the ECS
would be tested. Officials at North American approved the new procedure,
and FPD requested the Checkout and Test Division to study its
feasibility.
Ibid.
April 30
Grumman advised MSC that it had selected the Eagle-Picher Company as
vendor for batteries in both stages of the LEM. At the same time,
because a proposal by Yardney Electric Company promised a sizable
weight saving, this latter firm would produce
"pre-production" models for the ascent stage.
Ibid.
April 30
North American announced an Apollo Engineering Reorganization, designed
to improve operational efficiency and to be consistent with existing
requirements of the Apollo program. The reorganization would: (1)
increase the number of managers, but reduce the individual manager's
scope and eliminate one level of management, making for clearer
assignments and better communications; (2) incorporate certain checkout
and ground support equipment systems engineering functions into Systems
Engineering, strengthening the integration capabilities and simplifying
operational procedures; and (3) basic functions of analytical
engineering within Apollo Engineering were being transferred to the
Research and Engineering Division, increasing the effective use of
technical and management personnel.
NAA, Organization Announcement, Dale D. Myers, Apollo Program Manager,
and H. G. Osbon, Chief Engineer, Apollo Engineering, to Apollo
Engineering Supervision, "Apollo Engineering Reorganization,"
April 30, 1965.
April 30
A tentative agreement was reached between Grumman and MSC propulsion
personnel concerning the Propulsion System Development Facility's test
scheduling at White Sands operations in regard to stand occupancy times
relating to the ascent and descent development rigs. The tentative
schedule showed that the ascent LEM Test Article (LTA)-5 vehicle would
not start testing until April 1967. The PA-1 rig prototype ascent
propulsion rig) would therefore be required to prove the final design
and support early LEMs.
The PA-1 rig was designed and was being fabricated to accommodate small
propellant tanks, and there were no plans to update it with larger ones.
Therefore, advantages of flexibility, running tests of longer sustained
durations, and with the final tank outlet configurations would not be
realized. Grumman was requested to take immediate action to have the rig
accommodate the larger tanks and install the smaller tanks by use of
adapters or other methods.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, April 30,
1965.
April 30
As a result of the decision for an all-battery LEM, MSC advised Grumman
that power for the entire pre- separation checkout of the spacecraft
would be drawn from that module's batteries (instead of only during the
30 minutes prior to separation). This change simplified the electrical
mating between the two spacecraft and obviated an additional battery
charger in the CSM. From docking until the start of the checkout,
however, the CSM would still furnish power to the LEM.
TWX, James L. Neal, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney. April 30, 1965.
During the Month
Grumman reported two major problems with the LEM's descent engine:
- Space Technology Laboratories (STL) asked that the thrust chamber be
lengthened by 13.9 cm (5.5 in). Weight penalty would be 11.3 kg (25
lbs).
- STL concluded that, if used with Grumman's heatshield, the current
nozzle extension would melt.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, pp. 3, 13.
