Part 1 (A)
Preparation for Flight, the Accident, and Investigation
January 21, 1966, through March 1966
NASA converted one of its major contracts from a cost-plus-fixed-fee to
a cost-plus-incentive-fee agreement. The contract was with North
American Aviation's Space and Information Systems Division, Downey,
Calif., for development of the Apollo spacecraft command and service
modules (CSM) and spacecraft-lunar excursion module adapter (SLA).
NASA News Release 66-15, "Apollo Spacecraft Major Contract Is
Converted," Jan. 21, 1966.
NASA negotiated a contract with Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) for a program of radar and radiometric measurements on the
surface of the moon. The program, which would be active until March 31,
1967, would have Paul B. Sebring of MIT's Lincoln Laboratory as
principal investigator. Results would be used to select areas for
intensive study to support investigations related to manned landing
Arthur T. Strickland of NASA's Lunar and Planetary Programs Office
would be the technical monitor. Andrew Patteson of the MSC Lunar
Surface Technology Branch was requested as alternate technical
Ltr., Oran W. Nicks, NASA Hq., to Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, "
Alternate Technical Monitor for MIT Contract NSR 22-009-l06," Jan.
The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Checkout and Test Division was
informed by the Flight Crew Operations Director that in reference to a
request for "our desires for altitude chamber runs on Apollo
spacecraft, we definitely feel three runs are mandatory on CSMs 012 and
014. For planning purposes I think we should assume this is a
steady-state requirement although it should be a subject for review as
we accumulate experience." Runs on backup crews had been deleted
in several instances if they had already flown and the mission was
essentially the same. The value of chamber runs in terms of crew
confidence was great and it was assumed that no one would care to make
a manned run without a previous unmanned run.
Memo, Donald K. Slayton, MSC, to Chief, Checkout and Test Div., MSC,
"Altitude Chamber runs on manned spacecraft," Jan. 28,
NASA Hq. requested the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office at Manned
Spacecraft Center to evaluate the impact, including the effect on
ground support equipment and mission control, of a dual AS-207/208
flight as early as AS-207 was currently scheduled. ASPO was to assume
that launch vehicle 207 would carry the Block II CSM, launch vehicle
208 would carry the lunar excursion module (LEM), and the two launches
would be nearly simultaneous. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) were asked to make similar studies for their
systems. Response was requested by February 7, 1966.
TWX, Samuel C. Phillips, NASA OMSF, to Joseph F. Shea, MSC, Jan. 28,
MSC's Robert R. Gilruth, Maxime A. Faget, and William E. Stoney visited
Langley Research Center to discuss the Orbiter program status and plans
for distributing photos obtained from Orbiter with Floyd Thompson,
Charles Donlan, and other Langley personnel members connected with the
Orbiter program. Important aspects of the program were presented, with
particular emphasis on the camera system and the kind and quality of
photography to be obtained. In the discussion of data handling it was
apparent there were no conflicts of purpose or planned activity between
LaRC and MSC. It was determined that strong MSC representation at
Langley during the photo screening period would be advantageous to MSC
and of great benefit in MSC's subsequent lunar landing site
Memo for Record, Faget, "Discussion between MSC and Langley
Research Center regarding reduction of Orbiter data," March 1,
MSC Assistant Director for Flight Crew Operations Donald K. Slayton
said he did not think that current testing or proposed evaluation would
do anything to resolve the basic debate between optics versus radar as
a primary LEM rendezvous aid. Slayton said, "The question is not
which system can be manufactured, packaged, and qualified as flight
hardware at the earliest date; it is which design is most operationally
suited to accomplishing the lunar mission. The 'Olympics' contribute
nothing to solving this problem." He proposed that an MSC
management design review of both systems at the earliest reasonable
date was the only way to reach a conclusion, adding, "This
requires only existing paperwork and knowledge - no hardware."
Memo, Slayton to Chief, Guidance and Control Div., MSC, "LORS-RR
'Olympics,'" Feb. 1, 1966.
MSC awarded $70,000 contract to Rodana Research Corp. to develop
emergency medical kits that would "satisfy all inflight and
training requirements for the Apollo Command Module and the Lunar
Excursion Module." Under terms of contract, two training units
would be delivered for each flight, in addition to one mockup and six
prototype models. The small kits would contain loaded injectors,
tablets, capsules, ointments, inhalers, adhesives, and compressed
MSC News Release 66-8, Feb. 2, 1966.
In response to a January 28 TWX from NASA Hq., MSC personnel made
recommendations after evaluating the impact of a dual AS-207/208 flight
on ground support and mission control. On February 2, John P. Mayer,
Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis Division, told the Assistant
Director for Flight Operations that the sole area of concern would be
in providing the necessary Real Time Computer Complex readiness in a
time frame consistent with the AS-207 launch schedule. Mayer also
recommended that a decision be made in the very near future to commit
AS-207 and AS-208 to a dual mission and that, if possible, IBM
personnel knowledgeable in the Gemini dual vehicle system be diverted
to the proposed mission if major modifications were not required for
the Gemini XI and Gemini XII missions.
On February 4, John D. Hodge, Chief of the Flight Control Division,
listed for the Technical Assistant for Apollo some problem areas that
could arise in the operational aspects of the proposed mission with
AS-207 carrying a manned CSM and AS-208 carrying only a LEM. Hodge
recommended that the two launches not be attempted simultaneously,
saying that some time between the launches should be determined, which
would eliminate most of the problems anticipated.
Howard W. Tindall, Jr., Assistant Chief, Mission Planning and Analysis
Division, in a memo documented some design criteria and philosophy on
which the AS-207/208 rendezvous mission plan was being developed by the
Rendezvous Analysis Branch. Tindall pointed out that, from the Gemini
program experience, the plan was felt to be relatively firm. Tindall
named some of the basic features recommended by the study:
MSC Memos, Mayer to Assistant Director for Flight Operations,
"Dual Apollo Missions," Feb. 2, 1966; Hodge to Technical
Assistant for Apollo, "Simultaneous Launch for AS-207 and
AS-208," Feb. 4, 1967: Tindall to distribution, "Apollo
AS-207/208 rendezvous mission planning," Feb. 24, 1966.
- The CSM should be launched before the LEM.
- The first CSM orbit should be 482 km and the LEM orbit should be
203 km high, both circular. The inclination should be about 29 degrees.
- There should be two "on-time" launch opportunities each
day of about three minutes each, during which a LEM launch would
provide ideal in-plane and phasing conditions.
- It was anticipated that the basic rendezvous could be completed
within four-and-a-half hours after LEM liftoff.
- It was estimated that about 1,317 km per hr of spacecraft in-orbit
propulsion would be required to carry out the rendezvous, with about
seven service propulsion system maneuvers including terminal phase
Alfred Cohen, head of the ground support equipment (GSE) office of the
Resident Apollo Spacecraft Office (RASPO) at Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp., objected to the unrealistic production schedule set
up by Grumman Manufacturing for LEM GSE. Cohen pointed out that Grumman
had been notified many times that NASA did not believe that GSE could be
produced in the short time spans formulated by Grumman. Cohen added that
Grumman had been informed that this disbelief was based on actual
experience with North American Aviation and McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
Tracking of the manufacture of such items showed that Grumman was unable
to produce in accordance with schedules. Cohen cited that Grumman had
planned to complete 99 GSE items in December 1965 and had completed 27;
in January it had scheduled 146 items for completion and had completed
43. Cohen requested that the RASPO Manager confront Grumman management
with the facts and suggest that they
Memo, Cohen to Manager, RASPO, "Manufacturing of GSE, Unrealistic
Planning," Feb. 4. 1966.
- establish realistic schedules for fabricating GSE based on past
- step up efforts in expediting purchase of parts and adding manpower
that would be required.
The first test of the cryogenic gas storage system was successfully
conducted from 12:30p.m. February 6 through 8:50 p.m. February 8 at the
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), N. Mex. Primary objectives were to
demonstrate the compatibility between the ground support equipment and
cryogenic subsystem with respect to mechanical, thermodynamic, and
electrical interfaces during checkout, servicing, monitoring, and
ground control. All objectives were attained.
TWX, MSC WSTF to MSC, "Preliminary Report, First Cryogenic System
Test at WSTF," Feb. 9, 1966.
The CSM weight program was reviewed by James L. Bullard of MSC and D.
Morgan of North American Aviation at a meeting in Houston. The CM 011
projected weight was at its upper limit as designed by the
earth-landing-system restraint, about 68 kilograms above the maximum
weight used for mission planning. Data to revise the 011 specification
to show a CM weight of 5,352 kilograms were being prepared.
CMs 012 and 014 would present definite weight problems. At the time the
CM weight vs earth-landing system factors of safety relationships were
investigated in the study of the possibility of shaving ablator
material from the heatshield, a maximum weight of 5,296 kilograms was
established for the manned spacecraft. Bullard had discussed the
possibility of a higher CM weight with James M. Peacock of the Systems
Engineering Division and the earth-landing-system subsystem manager but
had received no definite reply. Bullard said it was imperative that a
firm weight be established, above which the weight could not grow,
before any weight reductions could be seriously considered. It appeared
that 90 to 136 kilograms would have to be eliminated from the
spacecraft, and that the reduction would have to be accomplished
primarily by removing items.
Memo, Bullard to Chief, Systems Engineering Div., "CSM weight
status," Feb. 7, 1966.
NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications Homer
E. Newell advised MSC that he had selected space science investigations
to be carried to the moon on Apollo missions, emplaced on the lunar
surface by Apollo astronauts, and left behind to collect and transmit
data to the earth on lunar environmental characteristics following those
missions. Newell assigned the experiments to specific missions and
indicated their priority. Any changes in the assignments would require
Newell's approval. The experiments, institutions responsible, and
principal investigators and coinvestigators were:
By separate actions, Newell asked the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight to approve the assignment of these experiments to
the Apollo Program and the Director of the Apollo Program was asked to
assign the experiments, part of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment
Package, to the missions indicated. MSC was authorized to use not in
excess of $5.109 million to develop the experiments through flight
qualified prototype, including provision for all necessary software for
operational and support purposes, as well as data analysis.
- Passive Lunar Seismic Experiment, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Frank Press; Columbia University, George Sutton.
- Lunar Tri-axis Magnetometer, Ames Research Center, C. P. Sonett;
MSC, Jerry Modisette.
- Medium-Energy Solar Wind, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), C. W.
Snyder; JPL, M. M. Neugebauer.
- Suprathermal Ion Detection, Rice University, J. W. Freeman, Jr.;
MSC, F. C. Michel.
- Lunar Heat Flow Management, Columbia University, M. Langseth; Yale
University, S. Clark.
- Low-Energy Solar Wind, Rice University, B. J. O'Brien.
- Active Lunar Seismic Experiment, Stanford University, R. L. Kovach;
U.S. Geological Survey, J. S. Watkins.
Ltr., Newell to MSC, Attn: Manager, Experiments Program Office,
"Authorization to Procure Space Science and Applications
Investigations for Apollo Lunar Missions," Feb. 14, 1966.
NASA announced conversion of its contract with Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp. for development of the LEM to a cost-plus-incentive
agreement. Under the terms of the new four-year contract Grumman was to
deliver 15 flight articles, 10 test articles, and 2 mission simulators.
The change added 4 flight articles to the program. The contract
provided incentive for outstanding performance, cost control, and
timely delivery as well as potential profit reductions if performance,
cost, and schedule requirements were not met.
TWX, NASA Hq. to MSC, MSFC, Western Operations Office, KSC, Attn:
Public Information Officers, NASA Converts Apollo Contract to
Cost-Plus-Incentive," Feb. 15, 1966.
The LEM Configuration Control Panel approved Grumman's request for
government-furnished-equipment (North American Aviation-manufactured)
optical alignment sights (OAS) for installation in the LEM. A total of
21 OAS units would be required (including 2 spares). Detailed interface
requirements between the OAS and LEM would be negotiated between North
American and Grumman and delivery dates would be specified during
Memo, Project Officer, LEM, MSC, to Project Officer, CSM, MSC, "PCCP
SID-150-551 Optical Alignment Sights for Use in LEM," Feb. 25,
Apollo-Saturn 201 was launched from Cape Kennedy, with liftoff of an
Apollo Block I spacecraft (CSM 009) on a Saturn IB launch vehicle at
11:12:01 EST. Launched from Launch Complex 34, the unmanned suborbital
mission was the first flight test of the Saturn IB and an Apollo
spacecraft. Total launch weight was 22,000 kilograms.
Spacecraft communications blackout lasted 1 minute 22 seconds. Reentry
was initiated with a space-fixed velocity of 29,000 kilometers per hour.
CM structure and heatshields performed adequately. The CM was recovered
from the Atlantic about 72 kilometers uprange from the planned landing
point. (Mission objectives are listed in Appendix 5.)
Missions Operations Div., MSC, "Postlaunch Report for Mission
AS-201 (Apollo S/C )," May 6, 1966.
Recent discussion between Axel Mattson of LaRC and Donald K. Slayton of
MSC concerning the possibility of astronauts' using the Lunar Landing
Research Facility (LLRF) at Langley led to agreement that astronauts
should fly the LLRF for a week before flying the MSC lunar landing
training vehicle. An evaluation of the proposal at MSC resulted in a
letter from Director Robert R. Gilruth to LaRC Director Floyd L.
Thompson indicating the desirability of using the LLRF and also the
desirability of some equipment modifications that would improve the
vehicle with a minimum effort. These included such items as LEM flight
instruments, hand controllers, panel modifications, and software
changes. Also discussed was the training benefit that could be realized
if the facility were updated to use a vehicle like the LEM so the pilots
could become familiar with problems of a standup restraint system,
pressure suit and helmet interface with the cockpit structure and window
during landing operations, and sensing and reacting to the dynamic cues
of motion while standing up.
Ltr., Gilruth to Thompson, March 1, 1966.
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips, in response to a January 28 TWX from Phillips, that MSC had
evaluated the capability to support a dual launch of AS-207 208 provided
an immediate go-ahead could be given to the contractors. Shea said the
evaluation had covered mission planning, ground support equipment (GSE),
flight hardware, and operations support. Modifications and additional
GSE would be required to update Launch Complex 34 at Cape Kennedy to
support a Block II CSM. The total cost of supporting the AS-207/208 dual
launch was estimated at $10.2 million for the GSE and additional boiler
plate CSM configuration, but Shea added that these costs could be
absorbed within the FY 1966 budget. Shea recommended that the dual
mission be incorporated into the program.
TWX, Shea to Phillips, "Saturn IB Dual Launch," March 1,
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, in a memo to the Director,
Office of Advanced Research and Technology, NASA Hq., pointed out that
in July 1965 the Apollo program encountered stress corrosion of titanium
tanks from nitrogen tetroxide propellant, and that through his auspices
Langley Research Center initiated a crash effort that had been a key
factor in solving the problem. Phillips said that Langley's effort had
been vigorous, thorough, and of the highest professional calibre. An
excellent team relationship had been maintained with MSC, MSFC, KSC,
vehicle contractors, and tank subcontractors and LaRC personnel had
given dedicated and outstanding support. He cited that
Memo, Phillips to Director, Research Div., NASA OART,
"Compatibility of Titanium Propellant Tanks with Nitrogen
Tetroxide," March 7, 1966.
- within nine days from go-ahead a test facility was constructed,
equipped, and in operation;
- within one hour after the request from MSC, coupon tests were under
way in support of the Gemini VII flight;
- glass bead peening was demonstrated as a solution and many tanks
were peened on a crash schedule for flight and test use; and
- coupon tests in direct support of AS-201 were instrumental in
providing confidence for proceeding with that flight.
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips notified the three manned
space flight Centers that they were requested to plan for a dual
AS-207/208 mission, assuming that launch would occur one month later
than the 207 launch now scheduled. TWX, Phillips to MSC, MSFC, and KSC,
"Saturn IB Dual Launch," March 8, 1966.
The first integrated test of the service propulsion system, electrical
power system, and cryogenic gas storage system was successfully
conducted at the White Sands Test Facility.
TWX, Samuel C. Phillips to Joseph F. Shea, "Block I CSM Delivery
Dates," March 14, 1966. 101," March 10, 1966.
NASA Hq. told MSC that delivery changes should be reflected in manned
space flight schedules as controlled milestone changes and referred
specifically to CSM 008 - April 1966; CSM 011 - April 15, 1966; and CSM
007 - March 31, 1966. Headquarters noted that the "NAA [North
American Aviation Inc.] contract delivery date remains 28 February
1966" for each and that "every effort should be made to
deliver these articles as early as possible, since completion of each
is constraining a launch or other major activity."
TWX, Samuel C. Phillips to Joseph F. Shea, "Block I CSM Delivery
Dates," March 14, 1966.
The Atlas-Agena target vehicle for the Gemini VIII mission
was successfully launched from KSC Launch Complex 14 at 10 a.m. EST
March 16. The Gemini VIII spacecraft was launched from
Launch Complex 19 at 11:41 a.m., with command pilot Neil A. Armstrong
and pilot David R. Scott aboard. The spacecraft and its target vehicle
rendezvoused and docked, with docking confirmed 6 hours 33 minutes
after the spacecraft was launched. About 27 minutes later the
spacecraft-Agena combination encountered unexpected roll and yaw
motion. The crew reduced the rates sufficiently to undock from the
target and began troubleshooting to determine the cause of the problem.
The problem arose again and when the yaw and roll rates became too high
the crew activated and used both rings of the reentry control system to
reduce the spacecraft rates to zero. This action required that the
mission be ended, and splashdown was scheduled for the western Pacific
during the seventh revolution. The spacecraft landed at 10:23 p.m. EST
March 16 and Armstrong and Scott were picked up by the U.S.S.
Mason at 1:37 a.m. EST March 17. Although the flight was
cut short by the incident, one of the primary objectives - rendezvous
and docking (the first rendezvous of two spacecraft in orbital flight)
- was accomplished.
Memo, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight to
Administrator, "Gemini Vlll Mission, Post Launch Report No.
1," March 23, 1966 (Mission Operation Report M-913-66-09).
NASA Administrator James E. Webb and Deputy Administrator Robert C.
Seamans, Jr., selected Bendix Systems Division, Bendix Corp., from among
three contractors for design, manufacture, test, and operational support
of four deliverable packages of the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments
Package (ALSEP), with first delivery scheduled for July 1967. The
estimated cost of the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract negotiated with
Bendix before the presentation by the Source Evaluation Board to Webb
and Seamans was $17.3 million.
Memo, NASA Deputy Associate Administrator to Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight, "Selection of Contractor for Phase D
(Phase II) for Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package," March
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips informed MSC Director Robert
R. Gilruth of specific NASA Hq. management assignments that had been
implemented in connection with the ALSEP program. He told Gilruth he had
asked Len Reiffel to serve as the primary focus of Headquarters on ALSEP
and that he would be assisted by three members of the Lunar and
Planetary Program Office of the Office of Space Science and
Applications: W. T. O'Bryant, E. Davin, and R. Green.
Ltr., Phillips to Gilruth, March 16, 1966.
MSC analysis of Grumman ground support equipment (GSE) showed that a
serious problem in manufacturing and delivery of GSE would have a
significant program impact if not corrected immediately. Information
submitted to NASA indicated a completion rate of 35 percent of that
planned. Grumman was requested to initiate action to identify causes of
the problem and take immediate remedial action. A formal recovery plan
was to be submitted to NASA, considering the following guidelines:
Grumman was required to initiate the recovery plan as soon as possible
but not later than 30 days from receipt of the instructions, and
progress reports were to be submitted to NASA biweekly, starting two
weeks from receipt of the TWX.
TWX, James L. Neal, MSC, to Grumman, Attn: J. C. Snedecker, "LEM
GSE," March 16, 1966.
- the plan would take into account the interrelations of the LEM
vehicle, site activation, vehicle checkout, and GSE end-item
- a priority system should be established by which
"critical" equipment would be identified, with all other
equipment identified in either "preferred" or "not
essential" categories ("critical" was defined as that
mission-essential or mission-support equipment without which the
successful completion of the vehicle test or launch would be
- manufacturing schedules should be revised to emphasize completion
of all critical category equipment, including such means as two- or
three-shift operation or additional subcontracting, or both.
John D. Hodge, Chief of MSC's Flight Control Division, proposed that
time-critical aborts in the event of a service propulsion system failure
after translunar injection (TLI; i.e., insertion on a trajectory toward
the moon) be investigated. Time-critical abort was defined as an abort
occurring within 12 hours after TLI and requiring reentry in less than
two days after the abort.
He suggested that if an SPS failed the service module be jettisoned for
a time-critical abort and both LEM propulsion systems be used for earth
return, reducing the total time to return by approximately 60 hours. As
an example, if the time of abort was 10 hours after translunar
injection, he said, this method would require about 36 hours; if the SM
were retained the return time would require about 96 hours.
He added that the LEM/CM-only configuration should be studied for any
constraints that would preclude initiating this kind of time-critical
abort. Some of the factors to be considered should be:
Memo, Hodge to Technical Assistant for Apollo, MSC, "Time critical
translunar coast aborts for SPS failure case," March 17, 1966.
- maximum time the LEM environmental control system could support two
or three men on an earth return;
- maximum time the CM electrical system could support minimum power-up
- time constraints on completely powering down the CM and using the
LEM systems for support;
- effects on planned landing areas from an open loop reentry mode;
- stability of the LEM/CM configuration during the descent and ascent
- total time to return using the descent propulsion system only or
both the LEM's descent propulsion system and ascent propulsion system;
- communications with Manned Space Flight Network required to support
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips discussed cost problems of
the contract with General Motors' AC Electronics Division, in a memo to
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller.
One of the problems was late design releases from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology to AC Electronics, resulting in an increase of
$2.7 million. Phillips also pointed out that computer problems at
Raytheon Corp. had increased the program cost by $6.7 million, added
that many of these problems had their origins in the MIT design, and
listed seven of the most significant technical problems. Phillips stated
that MSC in conjunction with AC Electronics had taken several positive
Memo, Phillips to Mueller, "Cost problems on AC Electronics
Contract NAS 9-497 for G&N Systems," March 28, 1966.
- to establish a factory test method review board to review all
procedures encompassing fabrication of the computer in the manufacturing
- to schedule 100-percent audit of all hardware in fabrication; and
- to increase the AC Electronics resident technical staff at the
MSC requested use of Langley Research Center's Lunar Orbit and Landing
Approach (LOLA) Simulator in connection with two technical contracts in
progress with Geonautics, Inc., Washington, D.C. One was for pilotage
techniques for use in the descent and ascent phases of the LEM profile,
while the other specified construction of a binocular viewing device
for simplified pilotage monitoring. Langley concurred with the request
and suggested that MSC personnel work with Manuel J. Queijo in setting
up the program, in making working arrangements between the parties
concerned, and in defining the trajectories of interest.
Ltrs., Director, MSC, to Director, LaRC, March 29, 1966, "Use of
Lunar Orbit and Landing Approach Simulator (LOLA)"; Director,
LaRC, to Paul E. Purser, April 29, 1966, "Proposed pilotage study
using interim LOLA simulator."
NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., said he had been
reflecting on network coverage for Apollo, as a result of the
Gemini VIII experience. He recognized that Apollo had more
weight-carrying ability and stowage space than Gemini and that as a
consequence live TV from the spacecraft might be a good possibility.
This coverage could allow for extensive TV during travel to and from
the moon as well as during lunar landing, disembarkation, and lunar
exploration. The TV equipment would not be solely for news purposes but
he felt "all manner of demands will be placed upon us for
continuous live coverage." He requested a review at an early date
Memo, Seamans to George Mueller, OMSF, and Julian Scheer, NASA Hq.,
"Potential TV Coverage on Apollo," March 30, 1966.
- the technical capability of planned equipment,
- preliminary plans for network coverage, and
- possible modification of Apollo equipment to provide greater
capability for scientific, technical, operational, and information
coverage of the missions by camera and television techniques.
A Space Science Office was established as an interim-organizational
element of MSC's Engineering and Development Directorate, pending
development of a permanent organization. The Office would report to the
E&D Manager, Experiments, and would be responsible for providing
support technology for manned space flight in environmental elements
such as space radiation, micrometeoroid flux, lunar surface conditions
and planetary atmospheres. It would also participate in making
measurements and conducting experiments with and from manned
spacecraft. Robert O. Piland was named Acting Manager of the Office.
Memo, Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to distr., "Establishment of a Space
Science Office within E&D," March 31, 1966.
A cutaway view of the large space environment chamber in the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory at Manned Spacecraft Center shows how Apollo spacecraft components were tested at the extreme temperatures they would meet in space.
During the Month
NASA OMSF prepared a position paper on NASA's estimated total cost of
the manned lunar landing program. Administrator James E. Webb furnished
the paper for the record of the FY 1967 Senate authorization hearings
and the same statement was given to the House Committee. The paper was
approved by Webb and George E. Mueller and placed the run-out costs for
the program at $22.718 billion.
MSF Staff Paper, "Statement on Cost of Manned Lunar Landing
Program," March 1966.