Part 1 (B)
Preparation for Flight, the Accident, and Investigation
April through June 1966
MSC sent proposed organizational changes to NASA Hq. for approval by the
Administrator. The two basic changes to be made were:
Both proposals, it was pointed out to Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight George E. Mueller, had been discussed with him and other
key members of the Headquarters staff. The proposed Space Medicine
Directorate would combine the functions of the Chief of Center Medical
Programs and the Center Medical Office, along with biomedical research
functions currently performed in the Crew Systems Division of the E&D
Directorate. The Offices of Chief of Center Medical Programs and Center
Medical Office would be abolished by the change.
- establishment of a Space Medicine Directorate and
- establishment of a Space Science Division within the Engineering and
Development (E&D) Directorate.
The Space Science Division had been discussed with NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Science and Applications Homer E. Newell and
would consolidate into a single organization several of the space
science activities of MSC, including those under the Assistant Chief for
Space Environment in Advanced Spacecraft Technology Division as well as
the planned Lunar Sample Receiving Laboratory. The four basic functions
of the Division, reflecting the increased scientific program emphasis,
In addition a name change was proposed for heads of the five major
operating elements of MSC, from "Assistant Director for" to
"Director of"; e.g., from Assistant Director for Flight
Operations to Director of Flight Operations. This change was suggested
to eliminate frequent and continuing misunderstandings in dealing with
persons outside the organization who assumed that the "Assistant
Director for Flight Operations," etc., was the number two man in
that organization, rather than the number one.
- interpretation of environmental data for spacecraft design and
- obtaining lunar samples, and
- astronaut training.
Ltr., MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth to Mueller, "Changes in MSC
Basic Organization," April 4, 1966.
In response to an April 1 query from George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF,
asking, "Could GE or Boeing help on GAEC [Grumman Aircraft
Engineering Corp.] GSE?" Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips replied that on several occasions in the recent past he had
made known to both Center and industry representatives that a highly
capable, quick-response ground support equipment (GSE) organization had
been built by and through General Electric, which the Centers and other
companies should take advantage of whenever it could help with
schedules or costs. He also recalled that "in one of our last two
meetings with Grumman" he had reminded them of this capability and
had suggested they consider it.
Notes, Mueller to Phillips, April 1, 1966; Phillips to Mueller, April
In response to the March 30 memo from NASA Deputy Administrator Robert
C. Seamans, Jr., regarding potential uses of TV on Apollo, Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller replied that
". . . we have been making a progressive review of the Apollo
electronic systems. Performance and application of the Apollo TV system
are being looked at as part of the review." He added that he
expected to be in position by mid-May to discuss plans with Seamans in
Memo, Mueller to Seamans, "Potential TV Coverage on Apollo,"
April 7, 1966.
Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., received a letter from
John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
expressing pleasure that the agreement between the Department of
Defense and NASA on extraterrestrial mapping, charting, and geodesy
support had been consummated. He was returning a copy of the agreement
for the NASA files.
Ltr., Foster to Seamans, April 8, 1966.
A Bellcomm, Inc., memo to Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips
presented the status of the Apollo Block I spacesuit assembly. A
modified Gemini suit manufactured by the David Clark Manufacturing Co.,
the overall assembly consisted of a constant-wear garment and a pressure
garment assembly. Crew members would also be provided with coveralls to
wear in a pressurized cabin as desired. The primary functional
requirement of the Block I suit was to provide environmental protection
in a depressurized CSM cabin. Therefore, it did not incorporate a
thermal and micrometeoroid-protection garment or the helmet visor
assembly, which were required for extravehicular operation. The memo
listed seven major modifications required to adapt the Gemini suit to
make it acceptable for use as an Apollo Block I item.
Memo, Bellcomm, Inc., to distr., "Status of Block I Space Suit
Assembly (SSA) Development - Case 330," sgd. T. A. Bottomley, Jr.,
April 12, 1966, with Bellcomm routing slip to Phillips from J. Z.
Menard, April 13, 1966.
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth told Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight George E. Mueller he felt it was necessary either to
proceed with the Apollo Experiment Pallet program or to cancel the
program, reaching a decision not later than April 22. Gilruth pointed
out that four contracts had been initiated in December 1965 for Phase C
of the program, that the contracts were completed on April 6, that
full-scale mockups had been delivered, and that documentation with cost
proposals were due April 22. The four contractors were McDonnell
Aircraft, Martin-Denver, Northrop, and Lockheed Aircraft-Sunnyvale.
Gilruth said it was apparent that all contractors had done an
exceptionally good job during the Phase C effort. Low cost had been
emphasized in every phase of the program, with contractors responding
with a very economical device and at the same time a straightforward
design that offered every chance of early availability and successful
Of equal significance, he said, "the Pallet offers the opportunity
to minimize the interface with both North American and the Apollo
program. It provides a single interface to Apollo and NAA, allowing the
multiple-experiment interfaces to be handled by a contractor whose
specific interest is in experiments. If experiments are to be carried
in the Service Module, the Pallet both by concept and experience offers
the most economical approach." Gilruth said the following plan had
Gilruth strongly recommended that the pallet program be implemented as
planned. On April 22, Mueller gave his approval to proceed as planned.
(See August 22.)
- April 22 - receive documentation and cost proposals.
- April 22-May 22 - evaluate four proposals and negotiate four
acceptable contracts in the same manner as for ALSEP.
- May 23-24 - Source Evaluation Board Review.
- May 25-June 1 - Center and Headquarters Review.
- June 1 - date of cost incurrence for selected contractor.
Ltrs., Gilruth to Mueller, April 15, 1966; Mueller to Gilruth, April
Spacecraft 007 and 011 were delivered to NASA by North American
Aviation. Spacecraft 007 was delivered to Houston to be used for water
impact and flotation tests in the Gulf of Mexico and in an environmental
tank at Ellington AFB. It contained all recovery systems required during
actual flight and the total configuration was that of a flight CM.
The CM of spacecraft 011 was similar to those in which astronauts would
ride in later flights and the SM contained support systems including
environmental control and fuel cell systems and the main service
propulsion system. Spacecraft 011 was scheduled to be launched during
the third quarter of 1966.
TWX, NAA Space and Information Systems Div. to MSC, April 18, 1966.
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea and members of his organization were
invited to attend the formal presentation by the Aeronutronic Division
of Philco Corp. on a "Study of Lunar Worm Planetary Roving Vehicle
Concept," at LaRC on May 3. The exploratory study to determine the
feasibility of a bellows-concept mobile vehicle included a mobility and
traction analysis for several kinds of bellows motion and several soil
surfaces; analysis of both metallic and nonmetallic construction to
provide the bellows structure; brief design studies of the concept as
applied to a small unmanned vehicle, a supply vehicle, a small lunar
shelter, a large lunar shelter; and an overall evaluation of the
suitability of the concept for carrying out various missions as
compared with other vehicles.
Ltr., Floyd L. Thompson, LaRC, to Shea, "Final Briefing, Contract
NAS-1-5709, 'Study of Lunar Worm Planetary Roving Vehicle Concept,' by
the Aeronutronic Division of the Philco Corp.," April 18, 1966.
MSC announced the establishment of a Flight Experiment Board. The Board
would select and recommend to the Director space flight experiments
proposed from within the Center and judged by the Board to be in the
best interest of the Center and the NASA space flight program.
MSC-originated flight experiments were expected normally to be
designated as one of two general classifications: Type I - Medical,
Space Science, Flight Operations or Engineering that would yield new
knowledge or improve the state of the art; Type II - Operational, which
would be required in direct support of major manned flight programs
such as Apollo.
Members appointed to the Board were George M. Low, chairman; Warren
Gillespie, Jr., executive secretary; Maxime A. Faget; Robert O. Piland;
Charles A. Berry; Christopher C. Kraft, Jr.; Donald K. Slayton; Kenneth
S. Kleinknecht; and Joseph N. Kotanchik. The Board would meet bimonthly
on the first Friday of every even month, with called meetings at the
direction of the chairman when necessary to expedite experiments.
MSC Announcement 66-47, MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board, April
NASA Office of Manned Space Flight policy for Design certification
Reviews (DCRs) was defined for application to manned Apollo missions by
a NASA directive. The concept stressed was that design evaluation by
NASA management should begin with design reviews and inspections of
subsystems and culminate in a DCR before selected flights. Documentation
presented at DCRs were to reflect this sequence of progressive
assessment of subsystems.
Ltr., Samuel C. Phillips to R. A. Petrone, KSC; J. F. Shea, MSC; and E.
F. O'Connor, MSFC: "Program Directive No. 7 - Apollo Design
Certification Review," April 22, 1966.
J. K. Holcomb, Director of Apollo Flight Operations, NASA OMSF,
reported to Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips that the NASA
flight scoring system was considered satisfactory in its present form.
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller
had taken exception to including a statement of primary and secondary
objectives in the AS-202 Mission Rules Guidelines. The scoring system,
established by the Office of Program Reports, labeled each flight a
success or a failure in a report to the Administrator and Deputy
Administrator and was used in briefing Congress and the press. Flights
were categorized only as "successful" or
"unsuccessful." Criteria for judging success of a mission
were based on the statement of primary objectives in the Mission
Operations Report. If one primary objective was missed the flight was
classified as "unsuccessful."
Memo, Holcomb to Phillips, "NASA Scoring System," April 28,
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth wrote George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF, that
plans were being completed for MSC in-house, full-scale parachute tests
at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), N. Mex. The tests would be part of
the effort to develop a gliding parachute system suitable for land
landing with manned spacecraft. Tests were expected to begin in July
1966, with about six tests a year for two or three years. Gilruth
pointed out that although full-scale tests were planned for WSMR it
would not be possible to find suitable terrain at that site, at Edwards
Air Force Base, Calif., or at El Centro, Calif., to determine
operational and system requirements for land landing in unplanned
areas. Unplanned-area landing tests were cited as not a major part of
the program but a necessary part. He pointed out that the U.S. Army
Reservation at Fort Hood, Tex., was the only area which had the
required variety of landing obstacle sizes and concentrations suitable
for the unplanned-area tests. Scale-model tests had been made and would
be continued at Fort Hood without interference to training, and MSC had
completed a local agreement that would permit occasional use of the
reservation but required no fiscal reimbursement or administrative
responsibility by MSC. This action was in response to a letter from
Mueller July 8, 1965, directing that MSC give careful consideration to
transfer of parachute test activities to WSMR.
Ltr., Gilruth to Mueller, "Parachute landing test areas for MSC
land landing development tests," May 3, 1966.
NASA Hq. requested the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office to reassess
the spacecraft control weights and delta-V budget and prepare
recommendations for the first lunar landing mission weight and
performance budgets. The ASPO spacecraft Weight Report for April
indicated that the Block II CSM, when loaded for an 8.3-day mission,
would exceed its control weights by more than 180 kilograms and the
projected value would exceed the control weight by more than 630
kilograms. At the same time the LEM was reported at 495 kilograms under
its control weight. Credit for LEM weight reduction had been attributed
to Grumman's Super Weight Improvement Program.
Memo, Apollo Program Director to Manager, ASPO, "Lunar Landing
Mission Weights and Performance," May 5, 1966.
Engine testing at the Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) had
been the subject of discussions during recent months with
representatives from MSC, Apollo Program Quality and Test groups, AEDC,
Air Force Systems Command and ARO, Inc., participating. While AEDC had
not been able to implement formal NASA requirements, the situation had
improved and MSC was receiving acceptable data.
In a letter to ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea, Apollo Program Director
Samuel C. Phillips said, ". . . I do not think further pressure is
in order. However, in a separate letter to Lee Gossick, I have asked
that he give his personal attention to the strict adherence to test
procedures, up-to-date certification of instrumentation, and care and
cleanliness in handling of test hardware."
Ltr., Phillips to Shea, May 5, 1966.
The Grumman-directed Apollo Mission Planning Task Force reported on
studies of abort sequences for translunar coast situations and the LEM
capability to support an abort if the SM had to be jettisoned. The LEM
could be powered down in drifting flight except for five one-hour
periods, and a three-man crew could be supported for 57 hours 30
minutes. It was assumed that all crewmen would be unsuited in the LEM or
tunnel area and that the LEM cabin air, circulated by cabin fans, would
provide adequate environment.
Grumman LEM Engineering Memo to distribution, "LEM Consumable
Capability for Abort to Earth from Translunar Coast," May 9,
MSC Deputy Director George M. Low recommended to Maxime A. Faget, MSC,
that, in light of Air Force and Aerospace Corp. studies on space rescue,
MSC plans for a general study on space rescue be discontinued and a
formal request be made to OMSF to cancel the request for proposals,
which had not yet been released. As an alternative, Low suggested that
MSC should cooperate with the Air Force to maximize gains from the USAF
task on space rescue requirements.
Memo, Low to Faget, "Space rescue," May 11, 1966.
A memo to KSC, MSC, and MSFC from the NASA Office of Manned Space
Flight reported that the NASA Project Designation Committee had
concurred in changes in Saturn/Apollo nomenclature recommended by
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., George E. Mueller, and Julian Scheer:
The memo instructed that the new nomenclature be used in all future
news releases and announcements.
- lunar excursion module to be called lunar module.
- Saturn IB to become the "uprated Saturn I."
Memo, NASA Hq. to Center Public Affairs Officers, May 12, 1966.
George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, forwarded views and recommendations of the Interagency
Committee on Back Contamination to MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth for
information and necessary action. The Committee had met at MSC to
discuss the status of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL) on April
The committee agreed in general philosophy and preliminary specific
detail with the overall design plan, schedule, size containment
provisions, and functional areas of the LRL; it approved the plan to
secure Baylor Medical School or an equally qualified institution to head
a development for the bioanalysis protocol; it expressed its concern
with the possibility of uncontrolled outventing of CM atmosphere
following splashdown; and it recommended that MSC investigate alternate
means of treatment and isolation of Apollo space crews and associated
physicians and technicians. MSC replied on June 8 that the analytical
work in the engineering and biologic areas of the recommendations had
been started and that the date for review and evaluation of the studies
would be June 27.
Ltrs., Mueller to Gilruth, May 19, 1966; Gilruth to Mueller, June 8,
1966; "Interagency Committee on Back Contamination Views and
E. E. Christensen, NASA OMSF Director of Mission Operations, in a
letter to Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, said he was certain the
problem of potential mission abort was receiving considerable attention
within the Flight Operations Directorate. The resulting early
development of related mission rules should provide other mission
activities with adequate planning information for design, engineering,
procedural, and training decisions. Christensen requested that
development of medical mission rules be given emphasis in planning, to
minimize the necessity for late modification of spacecraft telemetry
systems, on-board instrumentation, ground-based data-processing
schemes, and training schedules.
Ltr., Christensen to Kraft, May 19, 1966.
As a result of a fire in the environmental control system (ECS) unit at
AiResearch Co., a concerted effort was under way to identify nonmetallic
materials as well as other potential fire problems. MSC told North
American Aviation it appeared that at least some modifications would be
required in Block I spacecraft and that modifications could be
considered only as temporary expedients to correct conditions that could
be more readily resolved in the original design. MSC requested that
North American eliminate or restrict as far as possible combustible
materials in the following categories in the Block II spacecraft:
Additionally, North American Aviation was requested to review,
evaluate, and institute design measures to eliminate other potential
fire hazards, such as hydrogen leakage from batteries, overheated
lamps, and large areas of exposed fabric or foam.
- materials contained in sufficient quantities to contribute
materially to a fire once started,
- materials present in lengths which could propagate a flame front
over 46 centimeters,
- materials used with the electrical system, and
- materials that could be ignited by a spark source.
TWX, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to North American Aviation, Attn: J. C. Cozad,
May 19, 1966.
AS-500-F, the first full-scale Apollo Saturn V launch vehicle and
spacecraft combination, was rolled out from Kennedy Space Center's
Vehicle Assembly Building to the launch pad, for use in verifying
launch facilities, training crews, and developing test procedures. The
111-meter, 227,000-kilogram vehicle was moved by a diesel-powered
steel-link-tread crawler-transporter exactly five years after President
John F. Kennedy asked the United States to commit itself to a manned
lunar landing within the decade.
Marshall Space Flight Center News Release 66-114; MSFC, Marshall
Star, June 1, 1966.
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea informed Rocco A. Petrone, KSC, that
structural problems in the CSM fuel and oxidizer tanks required
standpipe modifications and that they were mandatory for Block I and
Block II spacecraft. Retrofit was to be effective on CSM 011 at KSC and
other vehicles at North American's plant in Downey, Calif.
TWX, Shea to Petrone, May 27, 1966.
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips asked NASA Procurement
Director George J. Vecchietti to help ensure there would be no gap in
the Philco Corp. Aeronutronic Division's development of penetrometers to
assess the lunar surface. Originally the penetrometers were to be
deployed from a lunar survey probe, but the Apollo Program Office had
concluded that they should be further developed on an urgent basis for
possible deployment from the LEM just before the first lunar landing.
Phillips sought to prevent development gaps that could critically delay
the landing program.
Memo, Phillips to Vecchietti, "Lunar Penetrometer
Development," June 1, 1966.
Surveyor I, launched May 30 from Cape Kennedy on an
Atlas-Centaur, softlanded on the moon in the Ocean of Storms and began
transmitting the first of more than 10,000 clear, detailed television
pictures to Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Deep Space Facility, Goldstone,
Calif. The landing sequence began 3,200 kilometers above the moon with
the spacecraft traveling at a speed of 9,700 kilometers per hour. The
spacecraft was successfully slowed to 5.6 kilometers per hour by the
time it reached 4-meter altitude and then free-fell to the surface at
13 kilometers per hour. The landing was so precise that the three
footpads touched the surface within 19 milliseconds of each other, and
it confirmed that the lunar surface could support the LM. It was the
first U.S. attempt to softland on the moon.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1966 (NASA SP-4007, 1967),
MSC top management had agreed with Headquarters on early Center
participation in discussions of scientific experiments for manned
flights, Deputy Director George M. Low informed MSC Experiments Program
Manager Robert O. Piland. NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science
and Applications Homer E. Newell had asked, during a recent OSSA Senior
Council meeting at MSC, that the Center and astronauts comment on
technical and operational feasibility of experiments before OSSA
divisions and subcommittees acted on proposals. Low and Director Robert
R. Gilruth had agreed. Because of manpower requirements MSC refused a
request to be represented on all the subcommittees, but MSC would send
representatives to all meetings devoted primarily to manned flight
experiments and would contribute to other meetings by phone.
Memo, Low to Piland, "Feasibility review of manned space science
experiments," June 2, 1966.
Headquarters informed MSC that MSFC had been assigned development
responsibility for the S027 X-ray Astronomy experiment for integration
with the Saturn S-IVB/instrument unit. Should development be found not
feasible, a modified version of the equipment was planned. MSC was
requested to study:
Study results were requested no later than July 1, 1966, including cost,
schedule, and technical data.
- the practicality of modifying the equipment to perform the
scientific objectives and
- the feasibility of integrating the modified experiment hardware in a
Block II SM on an early Apollo Applications flight.
Ltr., John H. Disher, NASA Hq., to George M. Low, MSC, June 2, 1966.
In response to a query on needs for or objections to an Apollo
spacecraft TV system, MSC Assistant Director for Flight Crew Operations
Donald K. Slayton informed the Flight Control Division that FCOD had no
operational requirements for a TV capability in either the Block I or
the Block II CSM or LM. He added that his Directorate would object to
interference caused by checkout, crew training, and inflight time
Memo, Slayton to Chief, Flight Control Div., MSC, "Apollo
Spacecraft Television System," June 6, 1966.
A series of actions on the LM rendezvous sensor was summarized in a memo
to the MSC Apollo Procurement Branch. A competition between LM
rendezvous radar and the optical tracker had been initiated in January
1966 after discussion by ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea, NASA Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller, and MSC
Guidance and Control Division Chief Robert C. Duncan. On May 13, RCA and
Hughes Aircraft Go. made presentations on the rendezvous radar optical
tracker. The NASA board that heard the presentations met for two days to
evaluate the two programs and presented the following conclusions:
The board's evaluation, an analytical presentation by Donald Cheatham,
a weight-and-power comparison by R. W. Williams, and a cost
presentation by the two contractors were given MSC management May 19.
Management recommended that RCA's radar be continued as the main effort
and that a backup optical tracker program be continued by Hughes on a
greatly reduced level. The recommendations were made to Apollo Program
Director Samuel C. Phillips and NASA Associate Administrator George E.
Mueller at KSC on May 25. Phillips and Mueller concurred but stipulated
that the optical tracker program was to be completed on a fixed-price
basis and that MSC would qualify the optical tracker using the
facilities of the MSC laboratories. Mueller expressed concern about
developmental difficulties and possible production problems in the
radar program. RCA representatives visited MSC May 27 and reviewed all
developmental difficulties and their potential effect on production.
- both sensors could meet the difficult environmental requirements of
the lunar mission with near specification performance,
- the tracker had several possible specification deviations,
- optical production training represented a difficult schedule problem
at Hughes, and
- either sensor could be produced in time to meet LM and program
Memo, Robert C. Duncan, MSC, to Henry P. Yschek, MSC, "LEM
Rendezvous Sensor Evaluation," June 7, 1966.
MSC informed the NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
that it had established a Lunar Receiving Laboratory Program Office with
Joseph V. Piland as Program Manager. The office included the functions
of program control, procurement, requirements, engineering, and
Ltr., MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth to George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF,
June 9, 1966.
The MSC Flight Experiments Selection Board reviewed and endorsed three
proposals for analysis of lunar samples and forwarded them to NASA Hq.
for consideration. Titles of the proposals and principal investigators
Ltrs., MSC Director to NASA Hq., Attn: Homer E. Newell, "Proposals
for analysis of lunar samples," June 16, 1966.
- Cataloging and Preliminary Examination of Lunar Samples - E. A.
- Study of Alpha Particle Activity of Returned Lunar Samples - K.A.
- Analysis of Lunar Sample Effluent Gases for Organic Components - G.
G. Meisells, University of Houston, and D. A. Flory, MSC.
Joseph N. Kotanchik, MSC, told H. E. McCoy of KSC that his April 4
letter discussing problems and solutions in packing parachutes at KSC
by Northrop-Ventura Co. had been studied. To effect economies in the
program and move forward delivery of a complete spacecraft to KSC, the
upper-deck buildup would be done at North American Aviation's plant in
Downey, Calif., and therefore parachutes would be packed at
Northrop-Ventura beginning with spacecraft 017. Kotanchik requested KSC
to support the parachute packing at Northrup-Ventura by assigning two
experienced inspectors for the period required (estimated at two to
four weeks for each spacecraft).
Ltr., Kotanchik to McCoy, "Apollo Spacecraft parachute
packing," June 16, 1966.
A memorandum for the file, prepared by J. S. Dudek of Bellcomm, Inc.,
proposed a two-burn deboost technique that required establishing an
initial lunar parking orbit and, after a coast phase, performing an
added plane change to attain the final lunar parking orbit. The
two-burn deboost technique would make a much larger lunar area
accessible than that provided by the existing Apollo mission profile,
which used a single burn to place the CSM and LM directly in a circular
lunar parking orbit over the landing site and would permit
accessibility to only a bow-tie shaped area approximately centered
about the lunar equator. On August 1, the memo was forwarded to Apollo
Program Director Samuel C. Phillips, stating that the trajectory
modification would increase the accessible lunar area about threefold.
The note to Phillips from R. L. Wagner stated that discussions had been
held with MSC and it appeared that the flight programs as planned at
the time could handle the modified mission.
Memo for file, Bellcomm, Inc, "A Generalized Two Burn Deboost
Technique which Increases Apollo Lunar Accessibility - Case 310,"
June 23, 1966; note, Wagner to Phillips, "Working Note," Aug.
Grumman LM thermodynamics studies showed the LM thermal shield would
have to be modified because fire-in-the-hole pressures and temperatures
had increased. Portions of the LM descent stage would be redesigned, but
modification of the descent stage blast deflector was unlikely.
Apollo Spacecraft Program Quarterly Report No. 16, for Period Ending
June 30, 1966.
Crew procedures in the LM during lunar stay were reported completed and
documented for presentation to NASA Hq. personnel.
Apollo Spacecraft Program Quarterly Status Report No. 16, for Period
Ending June 30, 1966.