Part 2 (H)
Recovery, Spacecraft Redefinition, and First Manned Apollo Flight
MSC called to the attention of North American Rockwell the number of
discrepancies found at KSC that could have been found at Downey before
hardware shipment. In an effort to reduce the discrepancies North
American was requested to obtain and use the KSC receiving inspection
criteria as a guide for shipping inspections. It was also suggested that
the possibility of sending a few key inspectors to KSC for periods of
three to six months to gain additional experience might be investigated.
Ltr., Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, MSC, to Dale D. Myers, North American
Rockwell, Jan. 2, 1968.
ASPO Manager George M. Low discussed with Rocco Petrone of KSC the
problem of high humidity levels within the spacecraft-lunar module
adapter. Petrone advised that several changes had been made to
alleviate the problem: air conditioning in the SLA and the instrument
unit would remain on during propellant loading; and the rate of air
flow into the SLA was increased. Also, technicians at the Cape had
designed a tygon tube to be installed to bring dry air into the LM
descent engine bell, should this added precaution prove necessary. With
these changes, Low felt confident that the humidity problem had been
Memo for the Record, Low, "SLA humidity," Jan. 8, 1968.
Bellcomm engineers presented to NASA a proposed plan for lunar
exploration during the period from the first lunar landing through the
mid-1970s. The proposed program - based upon what the company termed
"reasonable" assumptions concerning hardware capabilities,
scientific objectives, launch rates, and relationships to other
programs - was divided into four distinct phases:
N. W. Hinners et al., Bellcomm Technical Memo 68-1012-1,"A Lunar
Exploration Program," Jan. 5, 1968.
- an Apollo phase using existing vehicles,
- a lunar exploration phase employing an extended LM with increased
payload and longer staytime,
- a lunar orbital survey and exploration phase using remote sensors
and photographic equipment on a polar orbit flight, and
- a lunar surface rendezvous and exploration phase using an unmanned
LM to deposit the increased scientific equipment and expendables
necessary to extend Apollo's manned lunar capability to two-week
Apollo Special Task Team (ASTT) Director Eberhard F. M. Rees, Martin L.
Raines, and Ralph Taeuber of MSC, and J. McNamara, North American
Rockwell, visited Rocketdyne Division to review the status of the LM
ascent engine backup program. The presentation was made by Steve
The group was favorably impressed and felt that there was every
indication that the Rocketdyne injectors would meet the LM requirements.
ASTT recommended that MSC establish a board, chaired by the Chief of the
Propulsion and Power Division and including one MSFC propulsion
engineer, one MSFC manufacturing specialist, and other MSC personnel as
required to provide a recommendation to ASPO of the ascent engine for
Memo, Raines to Manager, ASPO, "Trip Report - Rocketdyne - January
5, 1968," Jan 8, 1968.
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller
directed MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth to establish a task team to
investigate why, in light of extreme precautions taken early in the
program, the problem of stress corrosion in the LM was being
encountered at such a late stage in Apollo. The problem, Mueller
stressed, had been discovered at a most critical point in the program -
the launch of the first LM was imminent and two subsequent vehicles
were already well along in factory checkout. Any resultant slips in the
LM program would seriously impact overall Apollo schedules. Gilruth
replied he believed that such a team was not required. He affirmed that
the reviews undertaken with the contractors in 1964 to guard against
just these problems had proved inadequate when judged against present
program demands. "The answer simply is that the job was not
handled properly on the last go-round."
Ltrs., Mueller to Gilruth, Jan. 8, 1968; Gilruth to Mueller, Jan. 18,
George E. Mueller, NASA OMSF, in a letter to MSC Director Robert R.
Gilruth, summarized a number of key Apollo program decisions required in
order to emphasize the urgency of priority action in preparations
necessary to certify the Apollo system design for manned flight. Mueller
listed five items:
Ltr., Mueller to Gilruth, Jan. 9, 1968.
- Assuming a successful flight of Apollo 5, the LM design must be
certified ready for manned flight on AS-503.
- A successful test firing of SM 102 at Cape Kennedy in January, in
addition to the success of Apollo 4, would permit certification of the
SM propulsion system for manned flight on AS-205.
- A successful launch vehicle test of AS-502 (Apollo 6) would require
that the Saturn V design be certified ready for manned flight by early
- A decision to certify the Block II CM design for manned flight
should be essentially complete by early May 1968.
- Launch Complex 34 design should be certified for manned flight no
later than early June 1968.
Apollo Data Coordination Chief Howard W. Tindall, Jr., summarized
mission planning for the first two hours on the lunar surface. That
period, he said, would be devoted to checking out spacecraft systems
and preparing for launch (in effect simulating the final two hours
before liftoff). This procedure embodied several important benefits. As
a pre-ascent simulation, it would afford an early indication of any
problems in the checkout routine. More importantly, the initial
checkout procedure would prepare the LM for takeoff at the end of the
CSM's first revolution should some emergency situation require such an
immediate flight abort.
Memo, Tindall to distr., "First 2 hours on the moon is a countdown
to launch - simulated or real thing," Jan. 11, 1968.
A Parachute Test Vehicle (PTV) test failed at El Centro, Calif. The PTV
was released from a B-52 aircraft at 15,240 meters and the drogue chute
programmer was actuated by a static line connected to the aircraft. One
drogue chute appeared to fail upon deployment, followed by failure of
the second drogue seven seconds later. Disreefing of these drogues
normally occurred at 8 seconds after deployment with disconnect at
deployment at plus 18 seconds. The main chute programmer deployed and
was effective for only 14 out of the expected 40 seconds' duration.
This action was followed by normal deployment of one main parachute,
which failed, followed by the second main parachute as programmed after
four-tenths of a second, which also failed. The main chute failure was
observed from the ground and the emergency parachute system deployment
was commanded but also failed because of high dynamic pressure,
allowing the PTV to impact and be destroyed. Investigation was under
way and MSC personnel were en route to El Centro and Northrop-Ventura
to determine the cause and to effect a solution.
TWX, George M. Low, MSC, to NASA Hq., Attn: Apollo Program Director,
Jan. 11, 1968.
CSM Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht wrote his counterpart at North
American Rockwell, Dale D. Myers, to express concern about NR's seeming
inability to implement configuration control of flight hardware and
ground support equipment. Some progress had been made recently,
Kleinknecht observed, but many steps still had to be taken to achieve
effective configuration management on the CSM. The MSC chief pointed
especially to North American's inability to ensure that final hardware
matched that set forth in engineering documents, a weakness inherent in
the separate functions of manufacturing: planning, fabrication,
assembly and rework. MSC recommended a check procedure of comparing
part numbers of installed equipment to the "as designed"
parts list. "In short," Kleinknecht concluded, "I think
that we should tolerate no further delay in establishing a simple 'as
built' versus 'as designed' checking function, beginning with and
including the first manned spacecraft."
North American began a more nearly complete engineering order
accountability system, which provided an acceptable method of verifying
the "as designed" to the "as built" configuration
of each spacecraft. This system was planned to be applicable by the
Flight Readiness Review on spacecraft 104 and on subsequent spacecraft
at earlier points.
Ltrs., Kleinknecht to Myers, Jan. 11, 1968; Myers to Kleinknecht, Feb.
The Senior Flammability Review Board met at MSC with Chairman Robert R.
Gilruth, George M. Low, Maxime A. Faget, Aleck C. Bond, Charles A.
Berry, Donald K. Slayton, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., Kenneth S.
Kleinknecht, all of MSC, and George Jeffs of North American Rockwell
participating. The meeting summary reported that a 60-percent-oxygen and
40-percent-nitrogen atmosphere was acceptable from a crew physiological
standpoint. The requirement for crew prebreathing before launch was not
dependent upon launching with the atmosphere. Operationally, the crew
could remove their helmets and gloves following orbital insertion and
verification of the integrity of the cabin and its environmental control
system; oxygen leakage would be allowed to enrich the crew compartment
On January 25, Berry, MSC Director of Medical Research and Operations,
mote Gilruth: "We do not concur in the stated finding of the Board
that a 60 per cent oxygen, 40 per cent nitrogen atmosphere is
acceptable from a crew physiological standpoint. While it is true that
a 60% oxygen, 40% nitrogen atmosphere at 5.6 psi [3.9 newtons per sq
cm] should result in a cabin atmosphere physiologically equivalent to
sea level conditions, this will not be the case in a spacecraft
launched with a 60% oxygen, 40% nitrogen atmosphere to which no oxygen
is added except by normal operation of the cabin regulator. Oxygen will
be metabolized by the crew at a much greater rate than nitrogen will be
leaking from the spacecraft. Assuming a case in which cabin relief
valve seats at 6 psi [4.1 newtons per sq cm] and the cabin regulator
does not begin adding oxygen until 4.8 psi [3.3 newtons per sq cm], the
cabin atmosphere would then consist of approximately 49% oxygen. This
is physiologically equivalent to a 12,000-foot [3,700-meter] altitude
in air. It would then take approximately 50 hours at the nominal cabin
leak rate for the cabin regulator to enrich the mixture to a sea level
"Senior Flammability Review Board Meeting," MSC, Jan. 13,
1968; memo, Berry to Gilruth, "Senior Flammability Review Board
Meeting, January 13, 1968," Jan. 25, 1968.
ASPO Manager George M. Low outlined for the NASA Apollo Program Director
MSC plans to static-fire the service propulsion system (SPS) as a
complete unit. Houston officials maintained that at least one firing of
such a complete system was necessary to prove the adequacy of all SPS
manufacturing, assembly, and testing. However, because of several
potential adverse effects that might accrue to testing the first such
available system (that for the 101 SM), MSC proposed to test-fire the
102 unit and interpret those results - including any possible damage to
the SM structure itself - before making a final decision on whether to
proceed with a ground firing of the actual flight hardware before
Memo, Low to NASA Hq., Attn: Samuel C. Phillips, "Requirements for
static firing of Apollo service propulsion subsystem," Jan. 13,
George E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, summarized for Administrator James E. Webb recent program
progress in Apollo. Preparations were under way toward the revised
January 22 launch date for Apollo 5. Delays had resulted primarily from
difficulties with hypergolic loading and contamination problems, but
propellant loading had been completed several days earlier. Target for
the countdown demonstration test was January 19. At Buffalo, N.Y., the
NASA stability team assisted Bell Aerospace Co. in tackling the LM
ascent engine instability problem. Post-test analysis of the
qualification engine had revealed gouging of the chamber wall near the
injector face. Bell engineers were assessing the amount of
requalification testing that would be required and continued their
testing on reworked engines, seeking to find the cause of previous
engine instabilities. Meanwhile, the backup injector program at
Rocketdyne Division was proceeding extremely well. Tests employing fuel
film cooling had produced increased engine performance within
acceptable chamber erosion limits. Altitude tests were scheduled to
follow within a few weeks.
Memo, Mueller to Administrator and Deputy Administrator, "Manned
Space Flight Report - January 15, 1968."
Eberhard Rees, Director of the Apollo Special Task Team at North
American Rockwell's Downey plant, wrote ASPO Manager George Low
outlining what he termed "serious quality and reliability
resources deficiencies" and proposed several steps to bolster
NASA's manpower in these areas. Specifically, Rees cited the immediate
need for additional manpower (primarily through General Electric) to
make vendor surveys, test failure assessments, and specification review
and analysis and establish minimum inspection points. In addition, Rees
said, many areas were almost totally lacking in coverage by the
government, such as monitoring qualification tests, receiving
inspections, pre-installation test, and many manufacturing operations.
He urged Low to reassess his requirements in Houston to determine how
many persons MSC might contribute (along with those from MSFC and GE)
to plug these vital areas.
Ltr., Rees to Low, Jan. 17, 1968.
Eberhard Rees, Apollo Special Task Team chief at North American
Rockwell, participated in a failure review at Northrop-Ventura of the
recent parachute test failure (see January 11) and in development of a
revised test plan. Others at the review included Dale Myers and Norman
Ryker from North American and W. Gasich and W. Steyer, General Manager
and Apollo Program Manager at Northrop-Ventura. Those at the review put
together a revised drop test program that resulted in only a two-week
schedule delay because of the failure. Repair of the parachute test
vehicle was under way. Meantime, tests would continue, employing bomb
and boilerplate devices. Also, Rees decided to establish a Flight
Readiness Review Board (headed by Joseph Kotanchik of MSC) to approve
each drop test, and Northrop officials had established an internal
review board to review test engineering and planning and were tightening
their inspection and quality control areas.
Memo, Rees to Manager, ASPO, "Trip Report to Northrop-Ventura on
January 17, 1968," Jan. 19, 1968; ltr., Kenneth S. Kleinknecht,
MSC, to Myers, Jan. 19, 1968.
A meeting was held at MSC to determine necessary action concerning
recent contamination of CM 103's potable water, oxygen, and water-glycol
lines. North American Rockwell proposed that all 103 aluminum lines in
the potable water and oxygen systems (approximately 72 segments) be
replaced; and proposed to follow a chemical flushing procedure for the
water-glycol lines to remove the aluminum oxide and copper
contamination. North American estimated that these actions would cause a
15-17 day serial impact. Removal and replacement of all lines would
result in an estimated impact of 45 days. A decision was made to concur
with the North American recommendation and on January 19 Kenneth S.
Kleinknecht, MSC, informed Dale D. Myers, North American, of the
concurrence and authorized him to proceed immediately. In addition,
Kleinknecht appointed a Special Task Team for Spacecraft 103
Contamination Control to ensure timely review of all contractor
activities associated with removal of the contamination from the
spacecraft environmental control system coolant system. Members of the
team were: Wilbur H. Gray, Chairman; A. M. Worden, W. R. Downs, Jack
Cohen, A. W. Joslyn, R. E. Smylie, R. P. Burt, and W. H. Taylor.
On February 20 Myers notified Kleinknecht of initiation of the potable
water line changes and setting up of a monitor water-glycol system that
would duplicate CSM 103 operations during the balance of checkout and
would be examined for corrosion damage just before Flight Readiness
Memo, Manager, CSM, ASPO, to Manager, ASPO, "Meeting held to
determine course of action regarding contamination of CM 103
plumbing," Jan. 19, 1968; ltr., Kleinknecht to Myers, Jan. 19,
1968; memo, Manager, CSM, ASPO, to distr., "Spacecraft Plumbing
Contamination Control Board," Jan. 19, 1968; ltr., Myers to
Kleinknecht, Feb. 20, 1968.
Rolf Lanzkron and Owen Morris, Chiefs of MSC's CSM and LM Project
Engineering Divisions, led a review of the 2TV-1 and LTA-8 (thermal
vacuum test article and lunar module test article) thermal vacuum test
programs at MSC. Chief concerns expressed during the review centered on
the heavy concentration of testing during the summer of 1968, the need
for simultaneous operation of test chambers A and B, and the lack of
adequately trained chamber operations support personnel for dual
testing. The review disclosed that maintenance of testing schedules for
LTA-8 was most unlikely, even with a seven-day-a-week work schedule.
(The central problem was the large number of open items that had to be
cleared before start of the tests.)
Note, C. C. Gay, Jr., to LeRoy Day, Jan. 19, 1968.
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips wrote ASPO Manager George M.
Low requesting that he establish and maintain a detailed comparison of
configuration differences between the CSM and LM. This comparison,
Phillips said, should include major interface differences, subsystems
and components, weight, performance, and crew safety. Phillips ordered
this comparison chiefly because the Apollo spacecraft was entering an
extremely important phase to certify the vehicles for manned flight.
Ltr., Phillips to Low, Jan. 19, 1968.
NASA launched Apollo 5 - the first, unmanned LM flight -
on a Saturn IB from KSC Launch Complex 37B at 5:48:08 p.m. EST. Mission
objectives included verifying operation of the LM structure itself and
its two primary propulsion systems, to evaluate LM staging, and to
evaluate orbital performances of the S-IVB stage and instrument unit.
Flight of the AS-204 launch vehicle went as planned, with nosecone
(replacing the CSM) jettisoned and LM separating. Flight of LM-1 also
went as planned up to the first descent propulsion engine firing.
Because velocity increase did not build up as quickly as predicted, the
LM guidance system shut the engine down after only four seconds of
operation. Mission control personnel in Houston and supporting groups
quickly analyzed the problem. They determined that the difficulty was
one of guidance software only (and not a fault in hardware design) and
pursued an alternate mission plan that ensured meeting the minimum
requirements necessary to achieve the primary objectives of the
mission. After mission completion at 2:45 a.m. EST January 23, LM
stages were left in orbit to reenter the atmosphere later and
disintegrate. Apollo program directors attributed success of the
mission to careful preplanning of alternate ways to accomplish flight
objectives in the face of unforeseen events.
Memo, Samuel C. Phillips to NASA Administrator, "Apollo 5 Mission
(SA-204 LM-1) Post Launch Report #l," Feb. 12, 1968 (MOR
Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., LM Program Director at Grumman, advised ASPO
Manager George M. Low of steps under way to attack the problem of
stress corrosion in the LM. (Low had expressed MSC's concern over this
potential danger on December 20, 1967.) While stating that he shared
Low's concern, Gavin believed that stress corrosion would not prove to
be of significance to the LM mission. However, his organization was
prepared to reevaluate the LM's design and fabrication to determine to
what extent the problem could be ameliorated. (Gavin denied that such
metal corrosion could be absolutely eliminated using present materials
as dictated by weight constraints on the LM design.) Gavin stated that
he had created a special team of experienced designers and stress
analysts to review engineering design of every LM part sensitive to
stress corrosion, to review processes employed in fabrication of the LM
structure, and to review the adequacy of the company's quality control
procedures to ensure corrosion-free parts and assemblies.
Ltr., Gavin to Low, Jan. 22, 1968.
Eberhard F. M. Rees, head of the Apollo Special Task Team at North
American Rockwell, met with Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, MSC, and Martin L.
Raines, Manager of the White Sands Test Facility, to review the team's
recent operations and the responses of North American and its numerous
subcontractors to the team's recommendations. Kleinknecht listed what he
thought were the chief problems facing the CSM program: the S-band
highgain antenna (which he said should be turned over entirely to the
task team for resolution); the parachute program; the environmental
control system; and contamination inside the spacecraft. He urged that
the team take the lead in developing solutions to these problems.
Memo for Record, Raines, "Review of Apollo Special Task Team
Operations," Jan. 26, 1968.
In a letter to officials of the three manned space flight Centers, NASA
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips called attention to the fact
that as the time for the first manned Apollo flight was approaching
constant concern for crew safety was becoming more pronounced. Phillips
pointed out that the Crew Safety Panel, Flight Mechanics Panel, Launch
Operations Panel, Hazardous Emergency Egress Working Group, and other
Intercenter Coordination Panels had each dealt with specific aspects of
Apollo crew safety. Individual Centers and contractors had exercised
their crew safety responsibilities through system design, quality
control, and test channels. Single-point failure analyses, dealing with
specific hardware areas, had been made.
He said that these efforts had resulted in current provisions for rapid
crew egress on the pad, for spacecraft abort during early phases of the
launch, and for contingency flight modes. Phillips added, ". . . to
insure that all of the many parts of the problem are properly integrated
we should at this time step back and take another look at the overall
crew safety picture from ingress to mission completion. The questions to
be addressed are:
. . . I would like to have this essential area worked under leadership
of MSC-focused at a high management level - with assistance as required
from MSFC and KSC. . . ." In a reply to Phillips, on February 28,
MSC's George Low indicated that John Hodge had agreed to undertake the
task and had already held discussions on the subject with George Hage
of Phillips' office.
- Have we systematically analyzed all likely failure modes or
anomalies which could jeopardize the crew from ingress to mission
- In each of these cases do we have proper and timely cues coupled
with a safe egress, abort, or contingency capability?
- Do we have a plan for the timely solution of the known crew safety
Ltrs., Phillips to MSC, MSFC, and KSC, "Apollo Crew Safety
Review," Jan. 25, 1968; Low to Phillips, Feb. 28, 1968.
The Special Task Team for CSM 103, appointed January 18, submitted a
progress report of activities during daily sessions held January 22
through 25. North American Rockwell and NASA had reached agreements on:
The events leading to the situation on CSM 103 were reviewed in
sufficient detail to make visible the errors in the discipline
governing the flushing carts. RASPO Manager Wilbur H. Gray stated that
it was the RASPO responsibility to ensure the upgrading and control of
all such equipment which interfaced with the spacecraft. The team would
convene again January 30 to review reports and continue with other
activities required to ensure adequacy of the CSM 103 plumbing
- Cleaning and flushing of water management and oxygen systems. Since
all aluminum lines except for three were replaced on CM 103 with new
lines the resolution for cleaning and flushing these systems was quickly
- Cleaning and flushing of water glycol system.
- Pressure integrity of the water glycol system would be confirmed
by a hydrostatic check to 248 newtons per square centimeter (360 pounds
per square inch). Leak integrity would be confirmed by subsequent checks
with helium at 41 newtons per sq cm (60 psi).
- A resolution was obtained on the chemistry of the various
cleaning and flushing fluids to be used on CM 103.
- Agreement was reached on verification of cleaning and flushing
all flow paths.
Memo, Gray to distr., "Summary of progress on the Special Task
Team for CSM 103 Contamination Control," Jan. 26, 1968.
A LM-2 flight and requirement meeting was held at MSC, attended by key
MSC and NASA Hq. officials. The group reached three conclusions:
It was also agreed that a decision should be made not to fly the LM-2
mission, with this decision reversible if further evaluation of data
from the LM-1 flight indicated any problems. This decision would be
reviewed at the February 6 Manned Space Flight Management Council
Meeting and on March 6 at the LM-3 Design Certification Review. The
final decision would not be made until March 6.
- The LM-1 performance on the January 22 Apollo 5 mission had been
excellent for all conditions of the flight, as executed, with the
exception of minor anomalies.
- The LM-2 flight objectives that were partially accomplished could
be better accomplished by further ground testing or on subsequent
manned missions. Further unmanned flight testing was not required for
- A LM-2 flight was not required to man-rate the ascent engine
Minutes of the LM-2 Flight Requirements Meeting, Jan. 26, 1968.
In response to a letter from ASPO Manager George M. Low in late
December 1967, seeking assurances that no potential stress corrosion
problems existed in the CSM, Dale D. Myers, CSM Program Manager at
North American Rockwell, reviewed the three instances where problems
had been encountered during the CSM project and iterated the extensive
efforts to ensure against such potential problems. Echoing much the
same words as his counterpart at Grumman, Myers stated that "it is
not possible to guarantee that no single instance of stress corrosion
will ever occur" and that circumstances "could create a
problem not anticipated." He concluded that his company's efforts
in this direction had been "entirely adequate and beyond the
requirements of the contract and good practice in this industry,"
and he seated his belief that additional efforts in this area would not
produce measurable results.
Ltr., Myers to Low, Jan. 26, 1968.
MSC CSM Manager Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, in a letter to North American
Rockwell's Dale D. Myers, protested lack of North American reponse to
written MSC direction concerning parachute test vehicles. Kleinknecht
pointed out that MSC had "considerably modified our usual
requirements in supporting the boilerplate 19 task being performed for
you by Western Ways, Inc. These efforts seem to be completely negated
by delayed go-ahead to Northrop Ventura for their portion of the task.
I understand that neither Western Ways nor Northrop Ventura was given a
go-ahead until January 19, 1968. The original written direction to NR
[North American] was on November 9, 1967, to provide another parachute
test vehicle (PTV) and give us an estimate of cost and schedule for
another boilerplate PTV." If the effort on the PTV had started at
that time, "we would now be able to use that vehicle rather than
the bomb-type vehicles after losing PTV No. 2. The cost and schedule
for boilerplate 19 was not submitted to MSC until later, on December
22, asking for a reply by January 2, 1968. Because of the holiday
period, this written reply was furnished on January 5, after an
investigation of the cost and schedule. The Engineering Change Proposal
[ECP] stated a completion date of May 5; however, after a request by my
people to see what could be done to improve this date, the improvement
moved the Northrop Ventura schedule from June 14 to May 24 [a Friday].
This date is three weeks later than the date cited in the ECP and is
completely unacceptable. . . ."
On February 29, Myers assured Kleinknecht that North American had
proceeded with the BP-19A task in advance of NASA full coverage. Initial
partial coverage was issued to North American on January 5, 1968. On
March 14, in a letter of commendation, Kleinknecht thanked Myers for the
attention given the BP-19A effort that made a March 15 completion by
Western Ways possible. On May 27, W. H. Gray, RASPO Manager, wrote
another letter of commendation thanking North American for completing
BP-19A in time for a drop test in May 1968.
Ltrs., Kleinknecht to Myers, Jan. 30, 1968; Myers to Kleinknecht, Feb.
29, 1968; Kleinknecht to Myers, Mar. 14, 1968; Gray to Drucker, May 27,