Realignment of McDonnell's work began first. Spokesmen from McDonnell and its subcontractors met in Houston at MSC on 24-26 August and again on 6-8 September. They agreed to limit the scope of development for some spacecraft systems and ground equipment.59 But MSC Director Gilruth told Walter Burke, McDonnell's spacecraft chief, not to do anything right away. When Gilruth talked to Burke on 8 September, the financial situation was still fluid enough to warn against too-hasty action. By the end of the month, however, prospects for any quick easing of the money crisis were fading. Burke flew to Houston to see Gilruth and Chamberlin on 28 September. Gilruth told Burke to carry out the earlier agreement on the revised scope of the program. Burke set his staff to work that same day on the necessary paperwork, wiring the subcontractors formal notice of their altered responsibilities and drawing up the required purchase order changes.60
Reprogramming at McDonnell in St. Louis was mainly a matter of making some adjustments. The company cut back its own and its subcontractors' quality assurance and reliability programs, reduced the number of published reports, decreased the number of spare parts to be maintained, trimmed the amount of engineering data and support required of subcontractors, and limited its support at Cape Canaveral. The net result of these changes was to slice $26 million from the $464 million that McDonnell thought its part of the project would cost, bringing the total down to $438.2 million.61
The largest savings in spacecraft development were to come through lessened testing by subcontractors. Teams from GPO spent much of October on two-day trips to major spacecraft subcontractors.* At each plant, they reviewed in detail the effect of various forms of  systems failures, plans for qualification and reliability testing, and test facilities required. In general, they agreed that reliability testing could be sharply curtailed at the expense of slightly increased qualification testing. Qualification tests ensured that something worked; they usually preceded reliability tests, which made sure that something worked consistently. Assured reliability could thus be gained from augmented qualification tests.62 Concerned by the way the program had grown, GPO also asked McDonnell for prompt notice of any future action that might affect contract costs or schedules.63
Spacecraft reprogramming was largely complete by mid-October, but the project office saw some further trimming possible in McDonnell's test program. After a review of its plans for structural tests of the spacecraft, the contractor concluded that one of the four programmed static articles might be dispensed with, and GPO agreed.64 The project office also suggested that Project Orbit might be canceled, a view McDonnell opposed. The dispute was eventually resolved with Orbit restricted to testing the spacecraft's heat balance and renamed "spacecraft thermal qualification test."65
Another casualty of Gemini's financial straits was a lately revived lunar landing scheme. This time the impetus had come from NASA Headquarters in the person of Joseph F. Shea, newly appointed Deputy Director for Systems in the Office of Manned S ace Flight. Shea wanted McDonnell to study using a Gemini spacecraft as a lunar logistics and rescue vehicle, a possibility also under study during that summer by the Space Technology Laboratories.66 The eight-week McDonnell effort explored the concept of a two-man command module, evaluated using a Gemini spacecraft to land two men on the lunar surface, and looked at the design changes needed for such a mission.67 Meanwhile, GPO computed the cost of buying extra spacecraft.68 McDonnell submitted its findings to NASA Headquarters in November 1962.69 Whatever chance the scheme may have had, however, vanished in the wake of Gemini's money problems, and the idea once again came to nothing.70
With the spacecraft taken care of by mid-October, the project office turned to launch vehicle programming. Limited funds compelled GPO to restrict 1963 costs to $59.28 million, some $10 million below its earlier plan and $18 million less than the $77.5 million SSD now claimed to need.71 Chamberlin wired Richard Dineen, SSD's chief of Launch Vehicle Development, on 19 October to apprise him of the new funding limits. GPO believed that Gemini's major goals might still be met despite shortage of funds. The key was a sharp cutback in testing, especially where it involved repeated engine firing.72 To Dineen, these changes seemed drastic, and he asked Chamberlin for a fuller explanation.73 Chamberlin insisted that there was no hope of more than $59.28 million for 1963, which meant the planned test program  had to be reduced and, in part, canceled. He asked Dineen for an early meeting to decide how to put these changes into effect.74 SSD still objected.75 Chamberlin persisted, wiring Dineen on 16 November that a meeting to review the launch vehicle test program was urgent and "should take precedence over other SSD/Aerospace/Martin/Aerojet Gemini commitments."76 The meeting finally convened on 27 November.
The proposed changes were indeed drastic. The revised engine program called for only 34 test firings, less than a fifth of the number originally planned. This would yield all the data needed at a saving of several million dollars, if effort were focused on thorough development and qualification to make sure each part worked and would keep on working.77 Sound engineering, in other words, made reliability a natural product of development and qualification. SSD and its contractors could scarcely quarrel with this view, but they tended to see reliability in more statistical term - a part was reliable if it failed no more than some very small percentage of the times it was tested. The issue was not merely philosophical. Proving reliability statistically meant more tests, more equipment, and more money.
What was true for engines was also true for other parts of the launch vehicle. Martin's reliability program was budgeted for $2.7 million, but the GPO approach, by concentrating dollars on qualification rather than on reliability testing, could cut that figure in half.78 Further study convinced Chamberlin that most of the planned prelaunch firings of the complete launch vehicle could also be safely discarded, and they were.79
NASA's budget crisis in the fall of 1962 never posed any real danger to Project Gemini itself. Work on spacecraft and launch vehicle was simply adjusted to meet an unexpected funding squeeze. Whether the Gemini that emerged from reprogramming would be the same project that had been planned, however, was another question. Tight money threatened to deprive Gemini of its chief objective, the development of orbital rendezvous techniques. For several months the role of Atlas-Agena in the program was in jeopardy, as NASA Headquarters debated dropping it, cutting it back, or keeping it with whatever slippage restricted funding entailed. The choice was not made any easier by the complex management structure of the target vehicle program. Two organizations, Marshall and SSD, stood between GPO and Lockheed, Agena's builder.
Word of tight budgets and a need to cut costs had reached Marshall's Agena Project Office by early October 1962 but was slower getting to SSD.80 The first firm notice that the Atlas-Agena program was to endure something more than a routine economy drive came on 23 October, when Chamberlin wired Friedrich Duerr, Agena systems manager at Marshall, "to reshape and reschedule the Atlas-Agena to conform to budget limitations.  MSFC is further directed to establish accounting procedures and funds expended monitoring procedures to assure that Agena development is prosecuted within the established fund limitations."
GPO had just completed a detailed study of changes that might be made in the Agena program to keep costs within budget limits. It concluded that $16.7 million could be sliced from the 1963 Atlas-Agena budget, dropping it from $27 million to $10.3 million.Chamberlin presented Duerr with the $10.3 million figure as a funding limit for fiscal year 1963, as part of an overall goal to reduce the cost of development by a third. For Agena, like Titan II, the savings were to be found mainly in less engine test firing and more built-in reliability. But Agena faced sterner sanction - no more money and all work stopped until reprogramming was complete.81
Duerr passed the word to the Air Force,82 although, as he informed Chamberlin, GPO's view of the savings that might be achieved was "optimistic" and the changes could only mean a long delay in the development program.83 Reprogramming began with a meeting in Houston on 25 October to discuss plans and schedules. What reliability meant emerged as the central issue, just as it did for Titan II. A second meeting, to agree on a specific plan, was set for 2 November.84
Before that meeting convened, however, the real need for Agena in the Gemini program was called into question. In mid-1962, NASA had decided in favor of the lunar orbit rendezvous scheme for the Apollo lunar landing. That tentative decision was confirmed on 24 October by the findings of a manned lunar landing comparison study.85 At a meeting of the Manned Space Flight Management Council six days later, Holmes raised the issue of Gemini objectives in light of this decision. Shea reviewed Gemini's aims and claimed "that all of these objectives appear to be possible of achievement without use of the Agena in the program." MSC Director Gilruth disagreed, and an inconclusive debate over the fate of Agena followed. Although he knew that time was running out, Holmes asked Gilruth to study the matter further.86
Meanwhile, the second reprogramming session convened at the Lockheed plant in Sunnyvale, California. The monthly spending rate under the Gemini-Agena contract had reached $2 million during October. The limit for November, however, was fixed at $650,000, and Lockheed was instructed to stay within it. Lockheed spokesmen protested, claiming that Bell Aerosystems, the engine subcontractor, could not produce engines for an October 1964 launch if funds were so restricted. Chamberlin told them they had no choice - they must find ways to stay within the fixed limits. Lockheed had a week to provide a rough cost estimate for the revised program to SSD, which would turn its findings over to Marshall's Agena Project Office, which, in turn,  would pass its findings up the line to GPO. A final meeting to coordinate the changes was scheduled for 20 November.87
Duerr reminded Chamberlin that limited funding was bound to cost time, perhaps as much as 14 months, in Agena development. Extra money - $12.7 million instead of $10.3 million for the current fiscal year would hold the loss to a less painful five and a half months.88 But even at that, it would still be "a maximum risk program. That is to say that the target vehicle program has been minimized and no allowance is made for contingencies that may arise which would adversely affect costs and schedules."89 Chamberlin knew as well as anyone that time was being traded for money, but his hands were tied. A financial operating plan for 1963 had yet to be approved. Whether Agena could even be kept in the Gemini program - and not the precise level of funding - was the crucial question.
At a meeting of MSC's senior staff on 9 November, Chamberlin strongly objected to Shea's claims at the Management Council meeting on 30 October. Shea, and others in NASA Headquarters, believed that rendezvous goals might be met by using a "piggyback" rendezvous package, carried aloft in the adapter section of the spacecraft and then ejected in orbit to serve as a stable but non-maneuverable target. Chamberlin dismissed the piggyback technique as inherently limited in contrast to the stabilized and maneuverable Agena. He also believed that the package would be far heavier than its proponents claimed. André Meyer, chief of GPO administration, figured its weight at 180 kilograms, twice the Headquarters estimate. If that were true, it could mean the end of paraglider. Meyer thought the package would cost as much as Agena, although without the problems and expenses of separate launches.90
MSC had been thinking along similar, but much more modest, lines. A study issued on 28 March 1962 had concluded that a piggyback rendezvous target could provide useful data. A month later, McDonnell had suggested testing the spacecraft rendezvous radar and maneuvering systems on an early Gemini flight with what it called a "Rendezvous Evaluation Pod (REP)." This was a small battery-powered module with a radar transponder, radar beacon, and flashing light, the whole package weighing about 30 kilograms and designed to give the pilots a chance to practice terminal rendezvous maneuvers with their spacecraft. In June, MSC had told McDonnell to go ahead with design and development. The REP would be carried on the second and third Gemini flights. Planning was largely complete by the end of 1962, with Westinghouse, the rendezvous radar subcontractor, responsible for components and McDonnell for the package and its ejection.91 This, however, amounted to little more than an experiment, intended to prepare for, not supplant, the Agena rendezvous missions.
 On 16 November, Wesley Hjornevik, chief of MSC administration, reported to the senior staff that a financial operating plan for fiscal year 1963 had finally been approved. Agena funding, however, had been withheld.92 Target vehicle reprogramming went ahead, with the final meeting on 20 November in Houston. Lockheed's new program was accepted. The major changes made reliability demonstration part of development and qualification testing, cut engine development testing to the bone, and trimmed production lead times to keep down 1963 expenses. This last meant chiefly that Lockheed was to work at a reduced level through the rest of calendar year 1962, then return to full effort on 2 January 1963. The program would be four months late, but its total cost could be as low as $44.1 million, $32.7 million less than estimated before reprogramming began.93
Gilruth outlined the revised Atlas-Agena plans to the Management Council on 27 November, with a sharp reminder that "it is very critical that a decision as to the inclusion of the Atlas-Agena in the program is reached soon if the Agena target schedule is to be maintained." Holmes promised a ruling by 10 December.94 Not only had the fate of Agena become a matter of public speculation, but lack of funds threatened to stop the target vehicle even before anything was decided.95
The decision came early but turned out to be only a stopgap: $900,000 for another month. This brought the total for fiscal year1963 to $4.9 million; the balance of the planned $10.3 million for Atlas-Agena remained in abeyance.96 Shea, who had proposed dropping Agena from Gemini, told a reporter that NASA was thinking about several alternatives to simplify the rendezvous concept, with a decision due shortly. He gave Agena only a 50-50 chance of staying in the program.97 Agena's fate was in the hands of a NASA-wide committee, which Shea himself headed. A thorough investigation, bolstered by the well-informed and forceful case presented by James Rose, the GPO member, decided the committee in favor of Agena. A wire from Washington on 21 December authorized MSC to spend the full $10.3 million needed for the reprogrammed Agena in fiscal year 1963.98
MSC also took over management of the Gemini Agena program. NASA decided to transfer all its Agena programs from Marshall so that that Center could focus on the Saturn launch vehicle for Apollo. Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, assumed control of all NASA Agena programs except Gemini, which went to MSC.99 MSC, now dealing directly with SSD,100 took formal charge of the Gemini Atlas-Agena program on 14 January 1963, with active advice from the Marshall office for the next month and a half.101 Lockheed and SSD also adjusted their management relationships. The Gemini manager at Lockheed, Herbert Ballard, moved up a notch; he now reported directly to the head of Lockheed's Medium Space Vehicles Programs. SSD followed suit by upping the rank of its program manager from  captain to major; and Major Charles A. Wurster took over the reins.102
Since the only function for Atlas in Project Gemini was launching the target, its fate waited on Agena's. But Atlas, too, suffered in NASA's fall budget crisis. On 25 July 1962, NASA Associate Administrator Seamans had agreed to support Air Force development of a standard Atlas launch vehicle, SLV3.103 By the time the Department of Defense had drafted a formal Memorandum of Agreement and forwarded it to NASA on 21 August, NASA's funding outlook had so deteriorated that it could no longer contribute to the program. Seamans restated NASA's interest in SLV-3 development but declined to commit the roughly $10 million that was to have been its share of the cost.104
Reprogramming raised the possibility of using surplus Atlas boosters from the Mercury program in Gemini. Chamberlin asked SSD for an opinion. A report to the Atlas-Agena reprogramming meeting of 20 November was favorable. Chamberlin then asked the Atlas contractor, General Dynamics/Astronautics, for a formal proposal.105 The results made conversion look promising economically. Three converted Mercury boosters could be had for a net cost of $3.364 million, as opposed to $5.4 million for three new standard Atlases.106 But by the time those figures were submitted on 13 February 1963, Gemini's budget crisis was over, and NASA was back in the standard Atlas development program. In December, Seamans had formally committed NASA to pay its $10 million share.107
* The teams included Richard R. Carley, Robert Cohen, Duncan R. Collins, Paul L. Chavroz, William H. Douglas, John R. Hoffman, Clifford M. Jackson, Lemuel S. Menear, Jean Petersen, and William F. Smith. Companies visited were Minneapolis-Honeywell, St. Petersburg, Florida (inertial measuring unit); Minneapolis-Honeywell, Minneapolis (attitude control and maneuver electronics); ElectroMechanical Research, Inc. (data transmission systems); IBM, Owego, New York (computer); Westinghouse, Baltimore, Maryland (rendezvous radar); Motorola, Scottsdale, Arizona (digital command system); Collins Radio Company, Cedar Rapids, Iowa (voice communications); Advanced Technology Laboratories, Mountain View, California (horizon sensor); and General Electric, West Lynn, Massachusetts (fuel cells).
59 TWX, William A. Parker to NASA Hq. Procurement and Supply Div., for Herbert L. Brewer, MSC-PG-4-827, 17 Sept. 1962; letter, Gray to Burke, "Instructions to Project Gemini suppliers; Contract NAS 9-170," NAS/170-770, 2 Oct. 1962; letter, Oldeg to MSC, Attn: Glenn F. Bailey, "Contract NAS 9- 170, Gemini, Program Direction Subsequent to NASA/MAC Meeting in Houston on 28 September 1962," 306-16-1282, 8 Oct. 1962; letter, Gardner to MSC, Attn: Atkinson, "Contract NAS 9-170, Gemini, Reduction on Major Vendor Estimated Costs," 306-16-1296, 23 Oct. 1962, with enclosure, "Analysis of Adjustments in Major Vendor Estimated Costs."
60 Letter, Burke to Gray, "Contract NAS 9-170 Program Direction," 306-09-93, 5 Oct 1962; Oldeg letter, 306-16-1282, 8 Oct. 1962.
61 Oldeg letter, 306-16-1282, 8 Oct. 1962; Gardner letter, 306-16-1296, 23 Oct. 1962.
62 TWX, Chamberlin to Burke, "Contract NAS 9-170, Gemini Vendor Program Reviews," GPO-50242, 3 Oct. 1962; TWX, John Y. Brown to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, 306-161346, 19 Oct. 1962; Purser, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, October 19, 1962," p. 4.
63 Letter, Gray to Burke, "Notification of Implementation of NASA/MAC Decisions Affecting Suppliers, Contract NAS 9-170," NAS/170-809, 15 Oct. 1962; letter, John Brown to Gray, "Contract NAS 9-170 - Implementation of NASA/MAC Decisions Affecting Supplies [sic]," 306-16-1422, 2 Nov. 1962, with enclosure.
64 TWX, John Brown to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, "Cancellation of Static No. 1 Vehicle," 306-16-1490, 27 Nov. 1962; TWX, Chamberlin to Burke, "Gemini Reliability and Test Plan Review, December 5-7, 1962," GPO-50418, 14 Dec. 1962; TWX, Chamberlin to Burke, "Cancellation of Static No. 1 Vehicle," GPO-50436, 19 Dec. 1962.
65 Letter, John Brown to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, "Proposed Re-Allocation of Gemini Project Orbit Spacecraft," 306-16-1397, 6 Nov.1962; letter, Burke to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, "Policy with Respect to Project Orbit - Gemini," 306-09-188, 3 Jan. 1963; NX, Chamberlin to Burke, "Spacecraft Thermal Qualification Test," GPO-50460, 3 Jan. 1963.
66 Seventh Semiannual Report to Congress, January 1 through June 30, 1962, NASA (Washington, 1963), p. 133; Zavasky, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting[s], July 27, 1962," p. 5, and "August 3, 1962," pp. 1, 4.
67 TWX, Douglas R. Lord to Chamberlin, 3 Aug. 1962.
68 Memo, James B. Jackson, Jr., to Project Gemini files, "Telecon between Col. D. D. McKee and G. F. MacDougall on 8-3-62," 23 Aug. 1962; memo, Jackson and Galloway B. Foster, Jr., to Project Gemini files, "Additional data concerning ltr. GPO-00324 dated September 14, 1962," 19 Sept. 1962.
69 Memo, Calvin C. Guild to Barton C. Hacker, "Gemini History," PD12/M 799-69, 17 June 1969.
70 Memo, James E. Webb to Abraham Hyatt, no subj., 1 Nov. 1962; memo, Bothmer to dist., 2 Nov. 1962, with enclosure, "Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Management Council, Tuesday, October 30, 1962," p. 5.
71 Letter, Dineen to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, "Coordination of Development Plan for Gemini Launch Vehicle System," 24 Oct. 1962, with enclosure, "Development Plan for Gemini Launch Vehicle System," engineering service program PS 920E (rev. of plan dated 23 March 1962), esp. Chart 7; Crane, "Titan II Gemini Launch Vehicle Status Report," 5 Jan. 1963; TWX, Chamberlin to SSD for Dineen, GPO-50302, 19 Oct. 1962.
72 TWX, Chamberlin to SSD for Dineen, GPO-50304, 22 Oct.1962, which revises GPO-50302.
73 TWX, Dineen to MSC, SSVLP-23-10-6, 23 Oct. 1962.
74 TWX, Chamberlin to SSD for Dineen, GPO-50306, 29 Oct. 1962; "Reliability Test Plan," Martin ER-12258, 15 June 1962.
75 "Impact of FY 1963 Funding Reduction on Cost and Schedule," SSD presentation 7 Nov. 1962, to Chamberlin, MacDougall, and Hammack; Purser, recorder, "Minutes of Project Gemini Management Panel Meeting . . . , November 13, 1962," p. 3.
76 TWX, Chamberlin to SSD for Dineen, GPO-50361, 16 Nov. 1962.
77 Zavasky, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, November 29, 1962," p. 2; "Abstract of Meeting on Launch Vehicle Reprogramming, November 27, 1962," 3 Dec.1962. On the reliability dispute, see also Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966), pp. 179-80.
78 "Abstract of Meeting on Launch Vehicle Reprogramming, November 27, 1962"; TWX, Chamberlin to SSD, Attn: Dineen, GPO-50446, 20 Dec. 1962.
79 "Abstract of Meeting on Launch Vehicle Reprogramming, November 27, 1962"; "Review of Requirements for a Restrained Firing Program," Martin LV-114, 24 Sept. 1962; Chamberlin TWX, GPO- 50446, 20 Dec. 1962.
80 Letter, John G. Albert to Marshall, Attn: Duerr, "Gemini Propulsion," 11 Oct. 1962; letter, Duerr to Albert, "Gemini Target Vehicle Program," 17 Oct. 1962.
81 TWX, Chamberlin to Duerr, "Atlas/Agena Program," GPO-50294, 23 Oct. 1962; memo, Floyd A. Turner to Chamberlin, "Atlas-Agena Program," 19 Oct. 1962, with enclosure.
82 TWX, Duerr to Cdr., AF Systems Command, M-L&M-AP 10-17, 23 Oct. 1962; TWX, Duerr to Albert, M-L&M-AP 10-18, 23 Oct. 1962.
83 Letter, Duerr to Chamberlin, "Budget Limitations for Gemini Target Vehicle," 24 Oct. 1962.
84 "Abstract of Meeting on Reprogramming Atlas/Agena, October 25, 1962," 31 Oct. 1962; "Medium Space Vehicles Monthly Progress Report, October 1962," LMSC-447 186-28, 20 Nov. 1962, p. 8.
85 Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: News Conference on Apollo Plans at NASA Headquarters on July 11, 1962 (Washington, 1962); "Manned Lunar Landing Mode Comparison," OMSF, 24 Oct. 1962.
86 Bothmer, "Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Management Council," p. 6.
87 "Abstract of Meeting on Reprogramming Atlas/Agena, November 2, 1962," 9 Nov. 1962; "Thirteenth Report on MSFC Activities Covering November 1 thru November 16, 1962, to Manned Spacecraft Center," 28 Dec. 1962.
88 TWX. Duerr to Chamberlin, M-L&M-AP-11-9, 6 Nov. 1962.
89 TWX, Duerr to Chamberlin, "Funding Requirements for Gemini," M-L&M-AS 11-59, 14 Nov. 1962.
90 Zavasky, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting[s], November 9, 1962," pp. 4-5, and "November 16, 1962," pp. 3-4.
91 Memo, Charles W. Mathews to Asst. Dir., Research and Development, "Preliminary study of possible rendezvous maneuvers which could be accomplished with a Gemini Spacecraft without the Atlas-Agena vehicle," 28 March 1962, with enclosures; "Abstract of. . . Coordination Meeting (Electrical), May 1, 1962,"2 May 1962; Peggy Dugge and Marvin R. Czarnik, "Practice Rendezvous Mission," McDonnell Guidance and Control Mechanics Design Note No. I, 7 July 1962; memo, Carl R. Huss to Chief, Flight Operations Div., "Comments and Notes from Gemini Mission Planning and Guidance Meeting Held January 4, 1963 and January 16, 1963," 28 Jan. 1963; Quarterly Status Report No. 4, for period ending 28 February 1963, pp. 22-23.
92 Zavasky, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, November 16, 1962," p. 2.
93 "Abstract of Meeting on Reprogramming Atlas/Agena, November 20, 1962," 27 Nov. 1962; "Monthly Progress Report, November 1962," LMAC-447186-29, 20 Dec. 1962, p. 3; Quarterly Status Report No. 3, p. 32; TWX, Chamberlin to Marshall, Attn: Duerr, "Atlas Agena Program," GPO-50376, 23 Nov. 1962.
94 Memo, Bothmer to dist., 1 Dec. 1962, with enclosure, "Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Management Council, Tuesday, November 27, 1961," p. 2.
95 John W. Finney, "2-Man Earth Orbit Delayed until 1964," The New York Times, 28 Nov. 1962; William Hines, "Revised Gemini Space Flight Plans Could Save Both Time and Money," The Sunday Star, Washington, 2 Dec. 1962; Edward H. Kolcum, "NASA May Cut Agena from Gemini Plan," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 Nov. 1962; Zavasky, "Minutes of Senior Staff Meeting, November 29, 1962," p. 6; TWX, SSD to Marshall, SSVR 28-11-254, 28 Nov. 1962; TWX, Marshall to Chamberlin, M-L&M-AS 11-66, 28 Nov. 1962; TWX, Chamberlin to Low, "Gemini Atlas/Agena FY 63 Funding," GPO-50392, 29 Nov. 1962.
96 TWX, Low to MSC, "M-A S 1300.007," M-C P 9200.059, 6 Dec. 1962; Crane, "Gemini Atlas-Agena Program Status Report," 5 Jan. 1963, pp. 2-3; NASA Project Approval Document, Research and Development, 6 Dec. 1962, approved by Seamans.
97 Edward H. Kolcum, "Administration to Ask $6 Billion for NASA," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Dec. 1962, p. 28.
98 TWX, Low to MSC, "M-A 1300.009," M-C P 9200.064, 21 Dec. 1962; Crane, "Gemini Atlas-Agena Program Status Report," p. 3; letter, Chamberlin to Grimwood, 25 March 1974.
99 TWX, Seamans to Marshall and Lewis, Attn: Dirs., 14 Dec. 1962.
100 Letter, Low to MSC, Attn: Robert R. Gilruth, "NASA Atlas/Agena Vehicles," M-M S 1343-540, 28 Dec. 1962; letter, Low to Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, "NASA Atlas/Agena Vehicles," M-C S 1343-515, 28 Dec.1962; letter, Low to Marshall, Attn: von Braun, "NASA Atlas/Agena Vehicles," M-M S 1343-541, 28 Dec. 1962; letter, Low to Kurt H. Debus, M-C S 1343-520, 9 Jan. 1963; TWX, Chamberlin to NASA Hq., Attn: Low, "NASA-Air Force Agreement on Gemini Atlas-Agena Development," GPO-50470, 9 Jan. 1963.
101 Letters, Chamberlin to Albert and Elmer P. Wheaton, GPO-00538 and -00540, 18 Jan. 1963; letter, Chamberlin to Marshall, Attn: Hans H. Hueter, "Gemini Target Vehicle Program," GPO-00531, 18 Jan. 1963; letter, Chamberlin to Lockheed, Attn: Donald E. Forney, GPO-00539, 18 Jan. 1963; memo, Crane for record, "Status Review - Coordination Conference - Atlas-Agena Program," 19 Feb. 1963; letter, Duerr to Chamberlin, 1 March 1963; "Agena Monthly Progress Report for December 1962," Marshall Light and Medium Vehicles Office, p. 1; Ninth Semiannual Report to Congress, January 1 - June 30, 1963, NASA (Washington, 1964), p. 76.
102 J[oseph] F. Wambolt and S[ally] F. Anderson, coordinators, "Gemini Program Launch Systems Final Report: Gemini/Titan Launch Vehicle; Gemini/Agena Target Vehicle; Atlas SLV-3," Aerospace TOR-1001(2126-80)-3, January 1967.
103 Letter, Seamans to John H. Rubel, 25 July 1962.
104 Letter, Seamans to Harold Brown, 5 Sept. 1962, with enclosure, "Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration: DOD/NASA Standard ATLAS Space Booster Agreement"; memo, D. L. Forsythe to Dep. Dir., Office of Space Sciences, "USAF/GDA Review for Improving Atlas Vehicles and Launch Operations for NASA Missions," 5 Sept. 1962.
105 "Abstract of Meeting on Atlas-Agena, October 18, 1962," 23 Oct. 1962; TWX, Chamberlin to Duerr and Albert, "Surplus Atlas Boosters from Project Mercury," GPO-50301, 19 Oct. 1962; "Abstract of Meeting on Atlas/Agena Reprogramming, November 20, 1962"; TWX, SSD to MSC for Kenneth S. Kleinknecht, "Refurbishing Current Mercury-Atlas Boosters for Use in the Gemini Program," SSVM-30-11-10, 1 Dec. 1962; Crane, "Gemini Atlas-Agena Program Status Report," p. 2.
106 "Abstract of Meeting on Target Vehicle Booster Conversion Study, February 13, 1963," 1 March 1963.
107 Letter, Seamans to Harold Brown, 10 Dec. 1962, with enclosure, memo of agreement, "DOD/NASA Standard ATLAS Space Booster Agreement," 10 Dec. 1962, signed by Seamans and Brown; TWX, McKee to MSC, Attn: Chamberlin, "Gemini Arget [sic-Target] Booster Selection," 7 March 1963; memo, Mathews for Gemini Procurement, Attn: Stephen D. Armstrong, "Statement of Work for Atlas Standard Launch Vehicles, NASA-DOD Purchase Request T-15482-G to AFSSD," GPO- 03039-A, 7 Aug. 1963, with enclosure, "Statement of Work for Atlas Standard Launch Vehicles to Be Used in Project Gemini," GP-33, 6 Aug. 1963.