76. Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Report on Apollo 204 Accident, report
956, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 7; Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 90th Cong.,
1st sess., pt. 4, p. 319. "Some early tendency to shift blame for
the fire upon North American Aviation," Tom Alexander wrote in
Fortune, July 1969, p. 117, "was gradually supplanted by
NASA's admission that the fire was largely its own management's
failure. NASA had overlooked and thereby
in effect approved an inherent fault in design, namely the locking
up of men in a capsule full of inflammable materials in an
atmosphere of pure oxygen at sixteen pounds per square inch of
pressure. NASA, after all, had more experience in the design and
operation of space hardware than any other organization and was,
therefore, more to blame than North American if the hardware worked
badly." In 1972, however, North American Rockwell Corp., North
American Aviation, Inc., Rockwell Standard Corp., and Rockwell
Standard Co. settled out of court with the widows of the three
astronauts who charged the spacecraft builders with negligence. The
widows of White and Chaffee each received $150,000, the widow of
Grissom S300,000. Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1972.
77. Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident: Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st
sess., pt. 5, pp. 397, 428.
78. Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, Report on Apollo 204 Accident, report 956, 90th
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 11, 20.
79. "New Hatch Slashes Apollo Egress
Time," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15 May 1967, p. 26.
80. William J. Normyle, "NASA Details
Sweeping Apollo Revisions," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 15
May 1967, p. 24.
81. George E. Mueller, "Apollo
Actions in Preparation for the Next Manned Flight," Astronautics
and Aeronautics 5 (Aug. 1967): 28-33; "Records of Spacecraft
Testing, July 1968," in files of R. E. Reyes, Preflight Operations
82. Normyle, "NASA Details," p. 25;
Reyes interview, 30 Oct. 1973; Atkins interview. 5 Nov. 1973.
Actually the official reports to Debus during 1966 show no written
reports from the Safety Office. Atkins must have reported orally
at irregular intervals.
83. Mueller, "Apollo Actions," p. 33.
84. House Special Studies
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations.
Investigation of the Boeing-TJE Contract: Hearings, 90th Cong., 2nd
sess., pp. 3-9.
85. Ibid., pp. 10, 13-14, 24.
86. "Technical Integration and
Evaluation Contract," NASW 1650, Statement of Work, 15 June 1967.
87. Wagner interview; "Boeing-TlE
Goals and Accomplishments," copy in file of Waiter Wagner, KSC.