For NASA personnel interested in fostering cooperative projects with the Soviet Union, the political climate of 1959-1962 was frustrating. These were the years of Soviet Premier Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's foreign policy that on the one hand sought detente with the West while on the other exploited "every major trouble spot, every embarrassment" to damage Western influence and prestige. To quote one assessment:
There appeared to be two Khrushchevs: one, a "coexistentialist" eager for enhanced intercourse between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; dropping hints (to be sure so obscure as to remain at the time undecipherable) about the necessity for a virtual alliance of the two powers; the other, a militant Communist and bully ready to cash in on each and every weakness and hesitation of the West, threatening nuclear obliteration if his opponent would not submit.
Khrushchev did not want a crisis that would lead inexorably to nuclear disaster, but he was a skillful poker player who successfully bluffed the leaders of the country that had originated the game, until the confrontation over missiles in Cuba.30
Nineteen fifty-nine was a year of political maneuvering. Vice President Richard Nixon and Premier Khrushchev held their "kitchen debate" at an American exhibition in Moscow's Sokolniki Park,31 and Khrushchev later made his ostentatious, but largely ceremonial, visit to the U.S. It was also the year of the first Soviet lunar probes. Luna I, launched in January, was the first spacecraft to penetrate interplanetary space; Luna II, launched during the Premier's visit to the U.S., was the first spacecraft to hit the moon. Then in October, Luna III swung around the moon and photographed its back side. But the debates and visits did nothing to solve international problems; successful moon probes certainly did not enhance the chances for cooperation between the two nations - especially when contrasted with the high number of U.S. launch failures in 1959.
In the next year, however, Soviet and American heads of state had to deal with realities of international politics that could not be brushed aside. Khrushchev had wanted a summit meeting for several years; now such a meeting seemed less than desirable. Following his visit to the United States, Khrushchev had visited Peking. From the Soviet standpoint, discussions with the Chinese were unsatisfactory, causing the ideological split between the two nations to widen and heading the Chinese on an increasingly independent course. This problem, together with the hardening positions of the American, British, and French on the question of two Germanys, made a summit meeting with the Americans undesirable. Just as the potentially embarrassing get- together approached, American pilot Francis Gary Powers  became an unintentional celebrity when his Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was downed deep in Soviet territory.
The U-2 incident had three immediate consequences. First, it solved Khrushchev's dilemma. He could now avoid the summit meeting without accepting the responsibility for wrecking it. Second, the United States suffered a serious international embarrassment when President Eisenhower took personal responsibility for the U-2 flight.32 Third, the credibility of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was questioned because it had served as a cover for this clandestine, intelligence-gathering overflight.
On 5 May 1960, on orders from the White House, NASA stated that one of its U-2 research planes used "to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude" had been missing since 1 May. Then six days later, Eisenhower admitted publicly that the flight actually had been part of a military reconnaissance program conducted with his permission. While the administration had to cope with the impact of the U-2 mission at the abortive Paris summit conference and later during Khrushchev's visit to the United Nations in September, NASA had to fight the notion that there was more to the civilian program than was being admitted in public.
An immediate issue was Soviet participation in the Tiros weather satellite program. "It's part of our national policy that space research is for peaceful purposes," Arnold Frutkin told a Wall Street Journal reporter. "We want to have an open program. And the best way to prove this to other countries is to have them participate in our experiments."33 NASA had long planned to solicit the cooperation of other nations, including the U.S.S.R., in studying cloud photographs taken by the Tiros satellite. Soviet participation would have gone a long way to allay fears that Tiros was looking at more than the weather patterns, but the Soviets saw - or purported to see - the satellite as another U-2. A year later NASA Administrator James E. Webb labeled as "political opportunism" their attacks on the Tiros program and their refusal to participate.34
Even without the U-2 incident, 1960 was not a propitious time to talk about cooperative ventures in space. The American public was watching a very close political contest between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon; a key campaign topic was the state of the nation's defenses against nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. During the campaign, the trade journal Missiles and Rockets invited the candidates to respond to a series of statements on space and defense. The first proposition asked if they would "recognize as national policy that we are in a strategic space race with Russia." Kennedy's response was published first:
We are in a strategic space race with the Russians, and we have been losing. The first man-made satellite to orbit the earth was named Sputnik. The first living creature in space was Laika. The first rocket to the moon carried a Red  flag. The first photograph of the far side of the moon was made with a Soviet camera. If a man orbits earth his year his name will be Ivan. These are unpleasant facts that the Republican candidate would prefer us to forget. Control of space will be divided in the next decade. If the Soviets control space they can control earth, as in past centuries the nation that controlled the seas dominated the continents. This does not mean that the United States desires more rights in space than any other nation. But we cannot run second in this vital race. To insure peace and freedom, we must be first.35
Nixon responded later in a manner that was uncharacteristic of the Eisenhower administration, which had played down the idea of a space race. Candidate Nixon argued:
If the Eisenhower Administration had not long ago recognized that we were in a strategic race with Russia, our space record would not be as creditable as it is today. Twenty-six satellites and 2 space probes have been launched successfully by the United States. Six satellites and 2 space probes have been launched successfully by the Soviet Union. Today 13 United States satellites are in orbit; only 1 Russian satellite remains in orbit. Eight United States satellites in orbit are still transmitting; the sole Russian satellite in orbit is not transmitting. The United States has recovered 2 satellite payloads from orbit while the U.S.S.R. claims to have recovered one. Despite the greater weight of U.S.S.R. space vehicles, the United States has gathered far more scientific information from space. In instrumentation, communications, electronics, reliability, and guidance, United States space vehicles have made gigantic strides. In short, the United States is not losing the space race or any other race with the Soviet Union. Today we are ahead of the U.S.S.R. From a standing start in 1953, we have forged ahead to overcome an 8-year Russian lead. And we will continue to maintain a clear cut lead in the race for space.36
While the candidates debated, NASA and the Eisenhower administration attempted to keep a line open with the Soviets on space cooperation. Frutkin had talked informally with Academician Anatoliy Arkadyevich Blagonravov about the possibility of using Echo I, the balloon-like passive communications satellite, for communications experiments between the United States and the Soviet Union. Echo I had been launched on 12 August 1960, three days before the International Astronautical Congress convened in Stockholm, and the delegates had heard a message recorded by President Eisenhower, transmitted part of the way by the satellite.37 On 22 September, the President in an address to the United Nations suggested a  four-point proposal for the peaceful exploration of space, using as his precedent the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which had prompted scientific research and barred military activity from that continent.38 However, the future of Eisenhower's hope for an agreement on the peaceful uses of outer space would depend upon the efforts of the new President and the individuals within NASA.
Kennedy's election in November 1960 portended a number of changes for defense and space programs. Subsequently, Kennedy asked his Vice President-elect to serve as his senior adviser on space policy and as chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. Lyndon B. Johnson's first task was to recommend a new Administrator for NASA, Glennan having resigned effective the last day of the Eisenhower administration. As Johnson began the search, Kennedy announced on 11 January 1961 the appointment of Jerome B. Wiesner of MIT to be his assistant for science and technology. The same month appeared the "Wiesner Report," prepared by a committee of science advisers who had worked with the Kennedy campaign.
Expanding upon campaign themes, this document criticized the space program under the Eisenhower administration. But while belaboring some aspects, especially the manned space-flight project, the report foresaw "exciting possibilities for international cooperation" in space exploration and communications. Such projects would prosper if "carried out in an atmosphere of cooperation as projects of all mankind instead of in the present atmosphere of national competition."39 Kennedy pursued the same theme in his inaugural address.
Kennedy's speech was notable because of its hopeful and skillful rhetoric, expressing the desire for new beginnings in foreign policy, including a reduction in the level of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. To that end, he appealed to the Soviets: "Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths and encourage the arts and commerce. . . ." And Kennedy continued to espouse the cooperative theme in his State of the Union address on 30 January 1961. The President invited all nations, including the U.S.S.R., "to join with us in developing a weather prediction program, in a new communications satellite program and in preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes which may someday unlock the deepest secrets of the universe." He repeated the hopes of his science advisers that the arms race could be kept from spreading into space. "Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War." This was to be a recurring theme in Kennedy's public comments.40
At the time of these pronouncements, and to this day, debate has  existed over the depth of the new President's initial understanding of the space issue relative to the realities of international power politics.41 Missiles and space had been a warm issue during the campaign; Kennedy had insisted that the previous administration had allowed national defense to slip in relation to Soviet strength. After Kennedy assumed the Presidency, the "missile gap" proved to have been a myth; but the problem remained to fit the national space program into the power equation by which American military and political leaders would evaluate the "strength" of their nation versus that of the Soviet Union.
Ten days after his inauguration, Kennedy followed the recommendation of his Vice President and nominated James E. Webb to be Administrator of the space agency. At first hesitant to accept the position, which he felt would have been more satisfactorily filled by a scientist or engineer, Webb had agreed once he understood that Kennedy was seeking a policy maker who could manage scientists and engineers. Upon accepting the assignment, Webb announced that Hugh Dryden, the other presidential appointee in NASA, would continue as Deputy Administrator. With directions from the President to make a comprehensive review of NASA programs, Webb went before the Senate for hearings on his confirmation. He was confirmed on 9 February and sworn in on the 14th.42
As the first months of 1961 slipped away, Kennedy and Webb became convinced that second place in space exploration would carry the negative impression that the United States was second rate in military strength as well. This conclusion once again pointed to the dilemma of competition versus cooperation in space exploitation. On the one hand, Kennedy genuinely wanted to cooperate in this arena with the Soviets; on the other hand, military and technical superiority had to remain with the United States. Events during the spring of 1961 swiftly determined his choice between these conflicting goals.
The successful one-orbit flight of Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin on 12 April 1961 was a significant element in the subsequent American deliberations. While this event was anticipated by the Kennedy administration, the Soviet feat was still another blow to the American image at home and abroad. The Soviet Union constantly stressed three themes in exploiting the first manned space flight:
Such a challenge could not go unanswered. Theodore Sorenson later commented, overdramatically perhaps, that "As the Soviet Union capitalized  on its historic feat in all corners of the globe, Kennedy congratulated Khrushchev and Gagarin and set to work."44
Even as John Kennedy was rolling up his sleeves and consulting his advisers, other events were unfolding that would complicate the political scene. None too secretly, a band of approximately 1,500 Cuban refugees was preparing to launch an invasion of Fidel Castro's Cuba. The exact impact of this military and political fiasco on the subsequent decision to go to the moon has been repeatedly argued by many of those associated with the Kennedy administration. John Logsdon concludes in his study of the events:
The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs reinforced Kennedy's determination, already strong, to approve a program aimed at placing the United States ahead of the Soviet Union in the competition for firsts in space. It was one of the many pressures that converged on the president at the time, and thus its exact influence cannot be isolated. As president, Kennedy could treat few issues in isolation anyway , and there seems to be little doubt that the Bay of Pigs was in the front of his mind as he called Lyndon Johnson to his office on April 19 and asked him to find a "space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win."45
By the end of April 1961, Kennedy had decided that the dramatic program would be a manned lunar landing. The suborbital flight of Alan B. Shepard in his Freedom 7 spacecraft on 5 May was a much needed positive accomplishment, which brought favorable public response. On 8 May, Vice President Johnson presented to the President a memorandum prepared by NASA Administrator Webb and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara - "Recommendations for our National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals." The Webb-McNamara memorandum suggested that manned space flight could be an effective means of enhancing national prestige:
Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have just done, lend national prestige even though the scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically unjustified. . . . The non-military, non-commercial, non- scientific but "civilian" projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war.46
John Kennedy agreed.
On 25 May in a speech on "Urgent National Needs," the President reminded the Congress that "these are extraordinary times. We face an extraordinary challenge." After addressing himself to a number of other important issues, Kennedy turned to the subject of space. This new frontier was just another aspect of the "battle that is going on around the world between freedom and tyranny. . . ." Therefore, "Now it is time to take longer strides - time for a great new American enterprise - time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may  hold the key to our future on earth." One of those "longer strides" Kennedy proposed was the landing of an American on the moon. The President believed "that the Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth." This goal was that bold type of challenge that had peculiar appeal to the young President. "No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish."47
Thus, space competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was reaffirmed by Kennedy's speech. What did this mean to NASA, and particularly what did it mean for NASA's mandate to cooperate? During 1961, the NASA position on the prospects of Soviet-American space cooperation was one of basic skepticism. Administrator Webb was committed by the Webb- McNamara memorandum of 8 May to support a program of American technological pre- eminence in space. Any program of cooperation would have to occur within a framework that would not jeopardize America's chances of establishing that position.
In June 1961, in response to questioning, NASA submitted a series of formal statements to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. "In general, how cooperative have the Soviets been in sharing the results of their space experiments?" NASA responded that the difference between the attitude of the U.S. and that of the U.S.S.R. was one of degree. The Soviets were judged to have been quite active in international meetings.
In a 25 May 1961 address to joint session of the U.S. Congress, President John F. Kennedy establishes the goal "of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth" before the decade is out.
 They had presented papers and discussed problems of mutual interest with their international colleagues, but it was the NASA opinion that they had not operated with an openness comparable to that of scientists from other nations.48 Throughout 1961, NASA spokesmen told Congress and the American public that while NASA still sought space cooperation with the U.S.S.R., the attitude and actions of the Soviets left little hope for success.
Public remarks by Soviet officials in 1961 on space cooperation were equally ambivalent. On 13 February, Kennedy congratulated Khrushchev on the launch of a space probe to Venus.49 In his reply two days later,
Khrushchev thanked Kennedy for his "high appraisal to this outstanding achievement of peaceful science." The Soviet leader, in referring to Kennedy's inaugural and State of the Union invitations to the Soviets, said that "such an approach . . . impresses us and we welcome these utterances of yours." But the Soviet Premier still saw disarmament as the key to the problem: "We consider that favorable conditions for the most speedy solution of these noble tasks facing humanity would be created through the settlement of the problem of disarmament."50
With Gagarin's Vostok I April flight, the tone of the Soviet statements on cooperation in space changed. Clearly the Soviets enjoyed their sense of technological superiority, but still they did not totally abandon the thought of cooperation with the U.S. Academician Sedov,* in his public congratulations to Alan Shepard for suborbital flight, was careful to point out that the Gagarin flight was of greater significance. He also restated the Soviet position on the relationship of international cooperation in space flight to the question of disarmament:
Soviet scientists and scientists of other countries, who are occupied with scientific research in space, are participating in mutual discussions on the results achieved, and we can speak on the beginning of fruitful cooperation. Nonetheless, the problem of international scientific cooperation on space flights in general is still not resolved. It is evident that such cooperation will be successful only upon the favorable development of international relations and the realistic solution of the problem of disarmament.51
Later at the Washington meetings of the International Astronautical Federation during October, Sedov was asked if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be able to collaborate in launching large payloads. Sedov replied, "I think it will be possible in the future, not only between the Russians and Americans but with other countries as well."  Deputy Administrator Dryden observed at the time that "Sedov and I have discussed this possibility many times. If the decision were ours alone, there would be no problem."52 Coming at a time when East-West tensions had worsened, optimistic statements about cooperation in space hardly seemed realistic. The two-day confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the June 1961 Vienna summit was from Kennedy's perspective a disaster. But in one of the rare moments of amicability, Kennedy suggested that the two nations pool their space efforts and "go to the moon together." Khrushchev's immediate response was "all right," but upon reflection the mercurial Soviet leader decided that such a venture would not be practical. The boosters used for manned space flight had military implications. That triggered considerations of disarmament, and that brought the discussions back to the Cold War. There the proposed joint trip to the moon died.53
The unsuccessful Vienna summit was followed by the crisis over the Berlin Wall. With that physical barrier between East and West Berlin erected on 13 August 1961, Khrushchev once again raised the question of the divided status of Germany. For the second time in three years, Khrushchev threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the East German Government, thus forcing the Americans to deal with a separate communist state. On 25 July, Kennedy told the nation in a somber television address that the United States would go to war should that become necessary to defend a free Berlin. Khrushchev reacted strongly to what he perceived to be an ultimatum from the President of the United States, and while the two sides negotiated the Berlin issue, the Soviet Union dramatically broke the three-year old moratorium on atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Beginning on 1 September 1961, the tests continued for two months. They were culminated with a 58-megaton explosion, the most powerful hydrogen device to have been tested at that time by either nation.54 While events such as these would seem to pose insurmountable barriers to cooperation in space, Russian and American scientists managed to keep the discussions alive.
Threats to world peace posed by the succession of summer and autumn crises, while not unnoticed, seemed far distant from the pleasant atmosphere of the lodge at Smugglers Notch, Vermont. For four days, 5-8 September 1961, scientists from ten countries, including the U.S.S.R., gathered for the Seventh International Conference on Science and World Affairs.**  Included in a broad spectrum of proposals relating to greater cooperation among the world's scientists were suggestions for a program of space cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Four areas in which the scientists felt that cooperation was possible were (1) a worldwide system of weather satellites and forecasting; (2) an international program of communications satellites; (3) an international exchange of data relating to space biology; and (4) a joint program for the scientific exploration of the moon and the planets.55 Despite the international debate engendered by the Soviet resumption of nuclear arms tests, there was an atmosphere of good will at Smugglers Notch.56 The fragility of such scientist-to-scientist efforts was clearly demonstrated two months later.
In November 1961, NASA and the U.S. Department of Commerce sponsored an International Satellite Workshop in Washington. American representatives explained their plans for the further exploitation of weather satellites and encouraged other nations to participate in the gathering and use of satellite data. The Americans expected delegates from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia, since visas had been sought by representatives of those countries. On the second day of the workshop, it became apparent that the Soviets would not attend. To most contemporary observers the lesson was clear: cooperation in space matters was a political consideration that could be understood only in the broader context of East-West relations.57 Nineteen sixty-one, the fifth year of the space age and NASA's third, had not been a good year for space cooperation. Indeed, as one commentator has reflected: "For all the style and excitement of the new team, and all the great promise, 1961 was a terrible year for the Kennedy Administration."58 International tensions would not lessen during 1962, but the opportunity for cooperation in space would seem more real. Two men would work hard to give that opportunity a chance to mature - Hugh Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
* Sedov was Chairman of the Commission for the Promotion of Interplanetary Flights, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, as well as President of the International Astronautical Federation.
** Americans present
included E. Rabinowitch, Professor of Biophysics, University of
Illinois; H. Brown, California Institute of Technology; P. Doty,
Harvard University; and I. I. Rabi, Professor of Physics, Columbia
University. The Soviets included A. A. Blagonravov; A. V. Topchiev,
Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences; I. Y. Tamm, physicist;
and N. N. Bogolubov, physicist. British representatives included
Professor P. M. S. Blackett, physicist, London University; Sir John
Cockcroft, nuclear physicist, Cambridge University; and the Rt. Hon.
Philip Noel-Baker. Henry Kissinger, Harvard, and George Kistiakowsky,
former science adviser to President Eisenhower, attended the sessions
30. Ulam, The Rivals, p. 249.
31. Bela Kornitzer, The Real Nixon: An Intimate Biography (New York, 1960), pp. 297-310, gives material concerning the kitchen debate.
32. Strobe Talbot, tr. and ed., Khruschev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston and Toronto, 1974), pp. 443-455.
33. NASA Hq News Release, "Memo to the Press," 5 May 1960; and David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, "The U-2 Affair: Memo to Press Hastily Drawn," Washington Star, 8 June 1962.
34. Louis Kraar, "Space Partnerships," Wall Street Journal, 26 Sept. 1960. Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 23 July 1961, stated that Tiros III and Midas III were comparable to the U-2: "A spy is a spy, no matter what height it flies."
35. John F. Kennedy, "If the Soviets Control Space . . . They Can Control Earth," Missiles and Rockets, 10 Oct. 1960, pp. 12-13; and in the same issue, Clarke Newlon, "Kennedy's Stand on Defense and Space," p. 50.
36. Richard M. Nixon, "Nixon: Military Has Mission to Defend Space," Missiles and Rockets, 31 Oct. 1960, pp. 10-11; in the same issue, "Candidates Views Compared," p. 12; and in the same issue, Clarke Newton, "Nixon Drops Party Line on Space," p. 50.
37. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, pp. 89-91.
38. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961 (Washington, 1961), pp. 714-715.
39. Ad Hoc Committee on Space, Jerome B. Wiesner, Chairman, "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," 12 Jan. 1961; Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander, This New Ocean, pp. 304-306; W. H. Lawrence, "Kennedy Warned of Space Setback," New York Times, 12 Jan. 1961; "Excerpts from Task Force's Report to Kennedy on U.S. Position in Space Race," New York Times, 12 Jan. 1961; and James Baar, "Space Shake-up Coming," Missiles and Rockets, 16 Jan. 1961, pp. 11-12.
40. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, 1962), pp. 1-2, 26-27, and 93-94.
41. The differing views can be seen by comparing Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 524, with Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, p. 9 3.
42. Interview, Hugh L. Dryden-Jay Holmes, 26 Mar. 1964.
43. Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, pp. 111-112.
44. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 524.
45. Logsdon, Decision to Go to the Moon, pp. 111-112.
46. Ibid., p. 126.
47. Public Papers of John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 405-406.
48. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1962, Hearings on H.R. 6874, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 155.
49. TWX, Kennedy to Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, 13 Feb. 1961, as printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Documents on International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-1962, 1963, p. 190.
50. TWX, Khrushchev to Kennedy, 15 Feb. 1961, ibid.
51. Sedov, "Sovetskii Soyuz-pioner v osvoenii kosmosa" [The Soviet Union-pioneer in space], Pravda, 9 May 1961.
52. William Beller, "AIAC Stressing Peace," Missiles and Rockets, 9 Oct. 1961, p. 14.
53. Dept. of State, Memo of conversation, "Vienna Meeting between the President and Chairman Khrushchev," 3 June 1961 [John F. Kennedy Library]; Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, New York, 1966), p. 178.
54. Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 189-196; and Ulm, The Rivals, pp. 322-323.
55. Harrison E. Salisbury, "World Scientists Map Coordinations," New York Times, 8 Sept. 1961; and Salisbury, "Space Proposals for World Near," New York Times, 9 Sept. 1961.
56. For the tenor of the time, see Harry Schwartz, "Khrushchev Presses Hard to Force Settlement on His Terms," New York Times, 11 Sept. 1961; John W. Finney, "U.S. Tests to Preserve Lead over Soviets," New York Times, 11 Sept.1961; and Richard Lowenthal, "Negotiating with Russia - What's the Use," New York Times Magazine, 11 Sept. 1961, pp. 21 and 116-117.
57. John W. Finney, "Soviet Block Boycotts U.S. Weather Satellite Symposium," New York Times, 15 Nov. 1961.
58. David Halberstam,
The Best and the
Brightest (Greenwich, Conn., 1973), p.