As Soviet and American reporters analyzed the exchange between their political leaders, NASA officials prepared for discussions with the Soviets.20 With State Department help, the NASA Office of International Programs drafted three informal position papers expanding the major points of Kennedy's 7 March letter.21 Dryden and Frutkin then traveled to New York City to meet with Academician Blagonravov on 27 March for their first exploratory talks; the exchanges were informal and preliminary.* Both parties had agreed in advance that formal negotiations would begin later. The Kennedy-Khrushchev letters were discussed, but to Dryden "It became obvious as the talks proceeded that Academician Blagonravov had left Moscow [either] before the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, or so soon thereafter that he had not discussed the several proposals in any detail with other scientists, and that he had received few instructions from Moscow."22 Blagonravov promised to study the NASA position papers and respond with formal position statements at a subsequent meeting.
Dryden believed that these first conversations were "generally free of cold-war propaganda. On one or two occasions there were remarks that cooperation could be on a much larger scale if the disarmament negotiations were successful, but the main interest seemed to be . . . finding possible...
A. A. Blagonravov and H. L. Dryden have an informal chat in the lobby of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations before beginning their talks on space cooperation, March 1962 (New York Times photo).
...beginning steps for cooperation." At one juncture, Blagonravov raised the issue of American nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and subsequently at a meeting in the Soviet mission in New York City, he briefly mentioned spy satellites. Dryden replied politely but firmly that his authority was limited to technical matters; political and legal issues were outside his authority.23 Frutkin later reported that "Blagonravov accepted this position philosophically, not raising such issues again."24
As Frutkin saw it, the Soviets seemed hesitant to discuss the possibilities of cooperative efforts in space medicine, even though this topic had been proposed by Khrushchev, and Blagonravov quickly dismissed the American proposal to conduct experiments with high-altitude balloons. He said that his country disliked balloons, an obvious reference to American programs to disseminate propaganda leaflets from balloons over Eastern Europe.25 On the question that had been raised by Khrushchev's letter concerning outer-space pollution, Blagonravov "expressed concern" regarding the negative impact of one nation's experiments on the scientific work of another. Specifically, he was referring to Project West Ford, a target for Soviet criticism.** Frutkin also perceived that the Soviets were not eager to become immediately involved in joint space flight. "Blagonravov stated that  current programs were too far along to permit coordination at this date. The coordination of future programs . . . seemed possible."26
The guarded sense of optimism felt by Dryden and Frutkin was expressed only in private.27 In a brief joint statement from Blagonravov and Dryden on 30 March, the press was told that the representatives of the two nations "have now concluded their preliminary discussions." They also announced that they intended to meet again during either the COSPAR sessions scheduled for 30 April-10 May in Washington or the meeting of the Scientific-Technical and Juridical Subcommittee of the U.N. Outer Space Committee. Additional scientists from both nations would join in these technical discussions. This was not hard news, but the statement indicated that both parties realized their work had just begun.28
Soviet public reaction to the proposed cooperation was favorable. On 12 April 1962 at the government-sponsored Cosmonautics Day celebrations, both Gagarin and Titov were quoted in the Soviet press as favoring cooperation between the two countries, especially if it led to a reduction in armaments.*** 29 Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, declared that he favored Soviet-American space cooperation as a route toward the solution of many scientific concerns.30 This basic theme was repeated in an interview with Khrushchev by Gardner Cowles, editor of Look magazine. Khrushchev saw a joint expedition to the moon as technically and scientifically possible; only the political problem of the military character of space rockets stood in the way.31
Reaction in the U.S. to space cooperation with the Soviets was mixed. Glenn's flight had reassured many Americans who had been worried about the nation's position in the space race. Most public figures were still committed to establishing American pre-eminence in space. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the ranking Republican member of the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, felt that the United States had little to gain from cooperation, especially since the nation was committed to "superiority over Russia on really important space development."32 However, Representative George P. Miller, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, approached the possibility of cooperation in a more positive fashion. In welcoming the Khrushchev overture to cooperate, Congressman Miller said, "This is something we must do. We must accept their offer in good faith unless, and until, proven otherwise. The world expects this of us."33  The wider public reaction seemed to mildly favor cooperation so long as it did not have a negative impact on the American goal in space - the Kennedy-inspired goal to reach the moon during this decade.34
Vice President Lyndon Johnson, on 10 May 1962, summed up the feelings of many American politicians in a speech dedicating the NASA Space Exhibit at the Seattle World's Fair. Cooperation in space could be the route to greater understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. Joint scientific efforts might make other political areas easier to discuss, but the burden of cooperative programs was a mutual one. The Vice President, "with a spirit of cautious optimism," was able to tell his audience "that the Soviet Union appears to realize that - in outer space, at least - there may be something to be gained by cooperating with the rest of humanity."35
Meanwhile, Dryden was preparing for the next round of discussions with the Soviets, to be held at the end of May in Geneva.36 Dryden was concerned about the political considerations behind the Kennedy administration desire to discuss collaboration; thus, he sought to determine the President's position. Unfortunately, Dryden never had the opportunity to discuss the matter directly with Kennedy or his top White House advisers. His closest contact to the President was George C. McGhee at the State Department.
Dryden, a scientist turned administrator called upon to be an international negotiator, sat down with McGhee on 18 May and asked him how the President wanted the negotiations conducted. Were these discussions intended to arrive at true cooperation, or were they only propaganda? Was it a sincere effort to get negotiations going or merely something for public display? As Dryden told McGhee, the nature of the goal "would make some difference in the approach." McGhee assured Dryden that "the President had in mind real cooperation, that he was as anxious to go just as far as the Soviets would go." With the nature of his mission somewhat more clear, Dryden made ready for his trip to Europe.37
Dryden and Blagonravov met in Geneva on 27 May 1962. Both men had traveled to the Swiss city for the first meeting of the Technical Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. While there was no direct connection between the bilateral Soviet-American talks and the U.N. meeting, the negotiators found such an occasion convenient to pursue their private discussions. The two men, despite their obvious political constraints, worked well together. In 12 days, they succeeded in hammering out agreement on three points.**** 38
 As reported by Frutkin, "this first agreement embraced three projects, following the US proposals on meteorology and geomagnetism very closely and reflecting Blagonravov's new interest in the Echo experiment in satellite communications." The two principal negotiators were satisfied with their progress. Dryden commented to reporters that approval of the agreements by the American and Soviet governments would mark an "important step" in space cooperation. At the joint news conference on 8 June, Blagonravov added that they would have been wasting their time if they had not "believed the work to be of major significance."39 The two men departed to their respective capitals to secure the necessary government approvals for their proposals.
The Dryden-Blagonravov agreement provided for a two-month study period, during which either party could suggest changes to the proposals. As it developed, neither country sought amendments, and Soviet Academy President Keldysh and NASA Administrator Webb exchanged letters on 18 and 30 October 1962 that formalized the agreements.40 Much political and technical work lay ahead - work that was hindered by the grave situation created by the discovery of Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Cuba. # 41
When the joint announcement of the bilateral space agreement was made to the U.N. on 5 December 1962, the somber and tense days of October lingered in the minds of many American and Soviet political figures. Indeed, the joint announcement had been postponed until December because of a Presidential order during the Cuban crisis decreeing "that there be no further action on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. outer space bilateral until the Cuban situation has been settled."42 An atmosphere of restraint accompanied the official announcements when they were made. Administrator Webb indicated simply:
This is an important step toward cooperation among nations of the world to increase man's knowledge and use of his special environment. The careful preparation for such a joint cooperative effort made by Academician A. A. Blagonravov and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden is a sound basis on which to proceed. The United States will make every effort to facilitate this undertaking.43
The official Soviet news agency, Tass, stated briefly: "There is no doubt that this agreement will make a great contribution to the conquest of the universe  and to the further advance of international cooperation between scientists."44
The next step in implementing the agreements called for creating joint working groups. To facilitate the establishment of those technical parties, Dryden and Blagonravov met in Rome on 11-20 March 1963 and again in Geneva during the following May. The result of these two meetings was a document - the "First Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962."45 The details for the weather satellite launching and the data exchange project were concluded with relative ease. But the agreement on the communications satellite experiments with Echo II was more difficult to arrange because of technical complexities. Proposals for a coordinated launch of geophysical satellites to study the earth's magnetic field were finalized at the May meeting.## 46
The process for conducting the negotiations followed an unofficial protocol, which established a precedent for subsequent discussions. In Rome, the first two days were essentially ceremonial. Following the formalities held first at the American Embassy and then at the Soviet Embassy, the working sessions began. Generally, the pattern of the meetings called for the discussion of draft documents, during which the two negotiating teams compared points and argued matters of substance and wording until an agreed document was assembled in both English and Russian.47
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, Dryden reflected on the possible motivations that underlay the Soviet decision to subscribe to these cooperative agreements. It was Dryden's personal belief that "this group of scientists who are interested in collaboration have been given a hand to see what they can come up with." Both groups of negotiators had decided that they "could not agree on anything which did not show a benefit to both countries." Looking at the nature of the joint discussions, Dryden felt that there was a "possibility that the political elements in Russia may at some point shut this off." Dryden was assuming, as did other American scientists, that Blagonravov and his associates in the Soviet Academy represented "what you might call a liberal group in Russia," which sought to begin "limited cooperation within the  political climate of their own country and of the times."48 Frutkin, however, challenged the notion expressed by Dryden and others that "technical cooperation does not involve a party political line."49
The concept that scientists have a unique position in the scheme of things, as a result of the international character of their work, has a long history. Equally strong is "the notion that the scientist can play a special role and effective role in establishing and cementing improved relations among nations. . . ."50 In the post-World War II era, there has been a strong feeling of internationalism within the community of science and technology, especially in the U.S. where a number of scientists urged their fellows to lead the way toward greater scientific cooperation among nations. But among scientists, as among all peoples, there are both internationalists and nationalists. Frutkin contends:
The evidence appears to be overwhelming that scientists confronted with the exigencies of national need have reacted much as other patriotic citizens, professional and nonprofessional. In part, this follows from an interaction between science and government which produces a rough alignment even in democratic countries. International ties, real or fancied, have not weighed in the balance in any significant way. . . . When we say that science is international we mean that it is international where scientific matters of essentially professional character are concerned, and not really where political matters are concerned.51
Thus, Dryden was correct in his report that both teams of negotiators could only agree to those activities that were of mutual benefit, but he may have been too generous in his analysis when he said that politics did not influence technical cooperation. Simply, in some areas of negotiations, politics were less obtrusive than in other areas. Indeed, the passage of time would show that there were political considerations behind all the technical agreements.
American public response to the 16 August 1963 announcement of the Soviet-American bilateral space agreement was conditioned by the successful conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty and speculation over rumors of a joint manned space flight. On 25 July 1963, representatives of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom initialed a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and space and under water; relaxation of nuclear tension made the space agreement between the Americans and Soviets seem all the more promising. A New York Times article on the Dryden-Blagonravov "Memorandum of Understanding" termed the idea of cooperative manned space flights "a logical outgrowth of the present agreement."52 Rumors circulated that there might possibly be a joint lunar mission in the planning, speculation developed partly as a result of the visit  of British astronomer Sir Bernard Lovell. In the latter half of 1963, according to Frutkin, there ensued in the story of U.S.- U.S.S.R. space relationships "by all odds the strangest chapter. . . ."
* The American delegation also included D. F. Hornig, J. W. Townsend, Jr., P. S. Thacher, R. W. Porter, and L. Bowdin. The other Soviet participants were Y. A. Barinov, G. S. Stashevsky, R. M. Timberbaev, and V. A. Zaitzev.
** Project West Ford, a USAF program conceived at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, involved launching into earth orbit 350 million copper threads (17.78 millimeters long and 0.254 millimeters in diameter), which would serve as reflector antennas for short wavelength communications (8,000 megahertz). The experiment promised to make global radio coverage invulnerable to jamming. Project West Ford, approved on 4 Oct. 1961 by the White House, met with mixed international scientific reactions, being criticized by many scientists as a possible threat to the study of radio astronomy or as an alteration to the environment of space, but the project was praised by NATO politicians as a significant deterrent defense system. On 10 May 1963, a second attempt to orbit the disputed payload was successful; the dipoles ejected and formed a compact cloud, circling the earth every 166 minutes in a near-polar orbit at a height of 3.704 kilometers. Science on 16 Dec. reported that nearly all of Project West Ford's dipoles had reentered the atmosphere.
*** Cosmonautics Day, 12 Apr., was created by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet not only to celebrate the anniversary of Gagarin's first space flight but also to remind the Soviet public and the world of the accomplishments and goals of the Soviet space program. It has become annually customary for Pravda and Izvestiya to feature articles at this time written by the cosmonauts on different aspects of space flight. Gagarin, until his death in an aircraft crash in Mar. 1968, and Titov were frequent authors of items promoting international peace and cooperation.
**** Frutkin in International Cooperation in Space gives a detailed account of the negotiations and some of the difficulties encountered by Dryden and Blagonravov.
# Kennedy publicly announced on 22 Oct 1962 the presence in Cuba of Soviet missiles capable of striking a large part of the U.S. A naval blockade was imposed to intercept further shipments, and the President bluntly demanded that the Soviets withdraw their missiles. By early November, aerial reconnaissance showed that the Cuban bases were being dismantled and the missiles crated for return to the U.S.S.R.
## For details of the discussions, see Frutkin's International Cooperation in Space, pp. 97- 105. The co-chairmen of each of the three Working Groups were as follows: Working Group 1 (weather) - M. Tepper, Director, Program of Weather Satellite Applications, NASA, and V. A. Bugayev, Director, Central Institute of Weather Forecasting, U.S.S.R.; Working Group 2 (communications) - L. Jaffee, Director, Communications Systems, NASA, and I. V. Klokov, Deputy Minister of Communications, U.S.S.R.; and Working Group 3 (geomagnetic study) - L. Cahill, Director of Physics, Office of Space Sciences, NASA, and Yu. D. Kalinin, Deputy Director of the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism, U.S.S.R.
20. See "Poslanie N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidenty SShA Dzh. Kennedi" [Message of N. S. Khrushchev to President of the USA John Kennedy], Pravda, 22 Mar. 1962; and "Kosmicheskie isspedovaniya-na sluzhbu delu mira, poslanie N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidenty SShA Dzh. Kennedi" [Space investigation - into the affairs of the world, message of N. S. Khrushchev to President of the USA John Kennedy], Izvestiya, 22 Mar. 1962. The American newspapers treated the exchange of letters at some length. Milton Besser, "Soviet Says It Would Help Set up Satellite Communications System," Washington Post, 21 Mar. 1962; Thomas J. Hamilton, "Soviet Promises Space Data to U.N.," New York Times, 21 Mar. 1962; "Khrushchev Accepts Bid for Cooperation in Space," New York Times, 22 Mar. 1962; "Russia Agrees to Plan for Joint Space Ventures," Wall Street Journal, 22 Mar.1962; Carroll Kilpatrick, "U.S. and Soviet Move Toward Joint Space Use," Washington Post, 22 Mar. 1962; and "Joint Space Efforts," editorial, Washington Post, 24 Mar. 1962.
21. Dryden, "Preliminary Summary Report: U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Talks, New York, N.Y., March 27, 28, 30, 1962," 30 Mar. 1962; Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 95; and TWX, Adlai E. Stevenson to Secretary of State, 21 Mar. 1962. Stevenson reported the Soviets felt that the press treatment of the talks must be limited. The Soviets had "urged that if [the] talks are to be fruitful, they cannot be conducted in a goldfish bowl."
22. Dryden, "Preliminary Summary Report, U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Talks," p. 1. The NASA position papers were attached to the Dryden report: "Tentative Basis for Further Discussions of Meteorological Satellite Cooperation," "Tentative Basis for Further Discussions of Cooperation in Data Acquisition," and "Tentative Basis for Further Discussions of Mapping the Earths Magnetic Field."
24. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 95.
25. To follow the dialogue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the subject of "weather" and "propaganda" balloons, see in the Department of State Bulletin the following: correspondence and DoD press release, 8 Jan. 1956, p. 293; "Transcript of Secretary Duties News Conference," 20 Feb. 1956, pp. 280-282; "Correspondence with U.S.S.R. Concerning Weather Balloons," 20 Feb. 1956, pp. 293-295; "U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons," 12 Mar. 1956, pp. 426- 428; text of 5 Sept. 1958 U.S. note, 29 Sept. 1958p. 504; and "U.S. Replies to Soviet Note on Balloons" (10 Nov. 1958), pp. 739-740. Also, see "Balloons over the Red World," America; National Catholic Weekly Review, 18 Feb. 1956, p. 547; "The Russians, Too," Newsweek, 12 Mar. 1956, pp. 33-34; "Freedom Balloons Aimed" Science Newsletter, 25 Aug. 1951, p. 124; and "Iron Curtain Balloons," Flying, Dec. 1955, p. 79.
26. Frutkin, "Topical Summary of Bilateral Discussion with the Soviet Union, March 27-30, 1962," 1 May 1962, as cited in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (Coral Gables, Fla., 1974), p. 94; [Frutkin], "Status of US/USSR Bilateral Space Talks," 21 Apr. 1962; [Robert F. Packard, memo for record, "Meeting with Under Secretary McGhee Concerning US-USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities," 24 Apr. 1962; and NASA, Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963: Chronology on Science, Technology, and Policy, NASA SP-4004 (Washington, 1964), p. 219. On 29 May 1963, a U.N. subcommittee on space addressed the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with the following message: the "urgency and importance of the problem of preventing potentially harmful interference with peaceful uses of outer space" cannot be overemphasized. This warning, referring to the USAF-sponsored Project West Ford communications experiment, had been initiated by the Soviet delegate Anatoliy A. Blagonravov. He denounced the experiment as a danger to other space studies, including flights by manned satellites. This charge was denied by Homer E. Newell, Jr., a U.S. representative.
27. Dryden to T. Keith Glennan, 26 Apr. 1962, as cited in Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, p. 94; and Dryden to James A. Van Allen, 20 Apr. 1962.
28. Howard Simons, "U.S.-Russia Open Talks on Co-operation in Space," Washington Post, 28 Mar. 1962; Lawrence O'Kane, "U.S. and Soviet Start Space Talks," New York Times, 28 Mar. 1962; and "New Parley Slated on Space Research," New York Times, 31 Mar. 1962. Dryden commented privately on the drafting of this statement. The Americans "proposed to list the three specific projects on which agreement seemed possible but the Soviet delegation wished either to include all projects mentioned in the letters plus the reconnaissance satellite item or none. . . ." Nevertheless, Dryden considered the Soviet attitude businesslike and a "good sign," since "Blagonravov stated that he favored the negotiation of agreements for those projects on which we can agree as agreement is reached rather than attempting to cover all projects in a single negotiation. Such a procedure appears to dispose of the reconnaissance satellite pledge as a precondition for agreements and is favorable to a fruitful outcome of the negotiations." Dryden, "Preliminary Summary Report, U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation Talks."
29. "Chelovechestvo raskroet tainy kosmosa" [Mankind gets back secrets from space], Pravda, 10 Apr. 1962; and "Blizkie prostopi vselennoy, intervy c Yu. Gagarinim i G. Titovim" [Near Space is Universal, an Interview with Yu. Gagarin and G. Titov], Izvestiya, 12 Apr. 1962.
30. "Rech tovarishcha M. V. Keldysha" [Speech by comrade M. V. Keldysh], Pravda, 13 Apr. 1962.
31. "Khrushchev Drops Summit Pressure," New York Times, 25 Apr. 1962.
32. Interview, Margaret Chase Smith over radio, 1 Apr. 1962, as cited in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Astronautical and Aeronautieal Events of 1962, Report, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 12 June 1963, p. 46.
33. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics, George P. Miller, "Press Release," 23 Feb. 1962.
34. William E. Minshall of Ohio reprinted the results of a poll of his constituents. Of some 20,000 respondents, 47 percent were opposed and 13.4 percent had no opinion, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 108 (18 Apr. 1962), p. A3035.
35. Committee on Science and Astronautics, Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, p. 74.
36. Dryden to Glennan, 28 Apr.1963, indicates that Dryden did not expect the meetings to resume in Washington but in Geneva in May.
37. Interview, Dryden-Frutkin, Sohier, and Emme, 26 Mar. 1964, p. 23.
38. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 96. The full text of the "Bilateral Space Agreement between the US and the USSR," together with letters of transmittal and news releases, are presented in Department of State Bulletin, 24 Dec. 1962, pp. 962-965. The agreement took shape much as Dean Rusk had predicted, Rusk to Kennedy, memo, 15 May 1962:
. . . the Soviets prefer to develop such arrangements on a step-by-step basis, not on the basis of an overall formal agreement between the two governments. Further, the Soviets are apparently interested in working primarily within multilateral programs (i.e., those of the World Meteorological Organization and the International Telecommunications Union), but on the basis of prior US-USSR agreement. It appears unlikely that significant joint effort in outer space activities will develop in the near term, but there is a prospect that the Soviets will agree to some modest cooperation in the form of coordinated satellite launch schedules, compatible instrumentation and some additional exchange of technical information.
39. "U.S.-Russian Pact on Weather Probes Drafted in Geneva," New York Times, 9 June 1962; "Joint Communique on US-USSR Talks," 8 June 1962; and Packard to E. C. Welsh, H. L. Dryden, J. B. Wiesner, W. P. Bundy, F. W. Reichelderfer, and H. Scoville, memo, "Meeting with Under Secretary McGhee Concerning U.S.USSR Cooperation in Outer Space Activities," 12 June 1962, with attachments, "Dryden-Blagonravov Memorandum," 8 June 1962, and "Joint Communique." The Americans participating in the Geneva talks who had not been in New York City were Furnas, Wexler, Heppner, and Valdes. The Soviet delegation consisted of Blagonravov, Barinov, Stashevsky, Klokov, Kalinin, and Bugaev.
40. James E. Webb to Keldysh, 30 Oct. 1962; "Bilateral Space Agreement between the US and the USSR," Department of State Bulletin, 24 Dec. 1962, pp. 964-965; and John W. Finney, "U.S. Prods Soviet on Space Accord," New York Times, 20 Sept. 1962.
41. Considering the political climate, Dryden had little difficulty in setting up the next meeting with Blagonravov, Dryden to Blagonravov, 11 Dec. 1963; and McGeorge Bundy to George C. McGhee, memo, "Bilateral Cooperation with the USSR in Outer Space Activities," 10 Dec. 1963. In Blagonravov to Dryden, 7 Jan. 1963, the Soviet representative asked that the meeting be scheduled for March rather than January as proposed by Dryden. In Dryden to Blagonravov, 21 Jan. 1963, Dryden agreed to the postponement but requested that a larger number of technical experts be present so the talks could be "more substantial and expeditious." See also Dryden to Donald F. Hornig, 21 Jan. 1963.
42. Richard J. H. Barnes, Acting Director, International Programs, to Webb and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., memo, "US-USSR Bilaterals," 1 Nov. 1962. Barnes commented on Webbs letter to Keldysh of 30 Oct.:
State understands that the Webb reply to Keldysh was sent by international registered mail Tuesday evening, October 30 and that Dr. Dryden was undertaking last night to notify Congressmen Miller and Fulton, and Senators Smith, Cannon, and Kerr, of the exchange of correspondence and the White House embargo on publicity. Both actions had been authorized by Undersecretary McGhee, and State had urged that the Congressional Committee members be informed yesterday because of the news stories and yesterdays editorial in the Washington Post.
See also "Light in Space?" editorial, Washington Post, 31 Oct. 1962; and John W. Finney, "Space Pact Nearer for U.S. and Russia," New York Times, 30 Oct. 1962.
43. NASA News Release 62-257, "US-USSR Join in Outer Space Program," 5 Dec. 1962.
44. Tass International Service, 8 Dec. 1962.
45. "First Memorandum of Understanding to Implement the Bilateral Space Agreement of June 8, 1962, between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the US," together with news releases and correspondence, is reproduced in Department of State Bulletin, 9 Sept. 1963, pp. 404-410.
46. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, pp. 97-105; [Joint U.S.-USSR news release], "Progress Made in US-USSR Space Talks," 20 Mar. 1963; and "U.S.-Soviet Agree to Program for Weather Probes in Space," New York Times, 21 Mar. 1963.
47. NASA News Release, HQ [unnumbered], "News Media Briefing: Joint US-USSR Talkson Cooperative Space Research Projects Held in Rome, Italy," 25 Mar. 1963, pp. 8-9.
48. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964: Hearings on S. 1245, Pt. 1., 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pp. 33-34; and John W. Finney, "Conflicts Peril Accord on Space," New York Times, 28 Apr. 1963.
49. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964, p. 35.
50. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, p. 12.
51. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
52. "Kommunike o
podnisanii drugimi gosudarstvami dogovora o zapreshchenii ispitanii
yadernoga oruzhiya v atmosfere, v kosmicheckom prostranstve i pod
vodoy" [Communique about other countries signing the agreement on
forbidding the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and under
water], Pravda, 17 Aug. 1963; "V imya progressa, sovetsko-amerikanskoe
sotrudnichestvo v mirnom osvoenii kosmosa" [In the name of progress,
Soviet-American collaboration in the peaceful use of space],
Izvestiya, 17 Aug. 1963; and Robert C. Toth, "U.S. and Russia
Agree to Share Satellite Data." New
York Times, 17 Aug. 1963.