CHAPTER 14
MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING OF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

Ames, Milton B. Jr., et al. "Report of the Ad Hoc Subpanel on Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology." September 14, 1966. Copy in National Aeronautics and Space Administration Reference Collection, NASA History Office, Washington, DC. This report, prepared at the behest of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board for submission to the Supporting Space Research and Technology Review Panel, discusses the previous studies made and assesses future space mission requirements and related launch rates on a prospective basis for both DOD and NASA through the 1980 time period.

Assured Access to Space During the 1990s. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1986. This lengthy publication contains text of the joint hearings on the subject before the subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and the subcommittee on Research and Development, held 23-25 July 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.

Baker, David. "The NASA Budget: Fiscal Years 1979-1980." Spaceflight. 21 (August-September 1979): 338-48. This article assesses the effect of the federal budget on the nation and how that relates to the space program. Baker pays special attention to the Shuttle program as the primary activity in NASA. He contends that many important objectives in space science and technology planned for the 1980s will be frustrated due to tight NASA budgets. He also suggests that more money is required to see the Shuttle program over its development hurdles and this will have an added impact on the rest of the NASA effort.

Bell, M.W. Jack. "Advanced Space Transportation Requirements and Options." Journal of the British Interplanetary Society. 37 (December 1984): 531-36. The author comments that the United State's space transportation system is maturing and should remain operational for the rest of the century. The use of expendable and semi-expendable elements, the massive sustaining manpower, and the required ground equipment and facilities have all contributed to a higher cost per flight than was expected. Bell advocates the construction of a new generation Shuttle that is fully reusable, lightweight, highly reliable, and equipped with long-life hardware. He believes these features can be incorporated into a single- stage-to-orbit system. This article characterizes several possible configurations for this Shuttle and illustrates some desired features. He comments, however, that Shuttle requirements are constantly evolving. The follow-on system should be defined clearly in terms of missions and applications within the limits of transportation costs. He argues, however, that a new Shuttle could not be built until a source of leadership and inspiration to initiate and lead this effort appears. While the technology is present, the will and the concomitant dollars are not.

Byrnside, N.C. "Space Shuttle Integrated Logistics: Fact or Fiction?" Unpublished thesis written for Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1979. This paper takes issue with the NASA assessment of the Shuttle's integrated logistics system, comparing it to the USAF program for supply and maintenance of weapons systems.

Carrillo, Manuel J. A Development of Logistics Management Models for the Space Transportation System. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1983. This study reviews procedures and sets priorities and policies for the support of Shuttle operations.

Covault, Craig. "Space Shuttle Funding Seen at Stake." Aviation Week & Space Technology. 22 September 1975, pp. 47-50. This article reports on the NASA budget problems associated with the Shuttle as it ran into delays and cost overruns in the mid-1970s.

Dawson, Harry S. Review of Space Shuttle Requirements, Operations, and Future Plans. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1984. This report deals with the past and prospects for the Shuttle during its early operational life. It is optimistic but still not sanguine that NASA would be able to make it cost effective. This report was prepared by the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications.

Disher, John H. "Space Transportation: Reflections and Projections." in Durant, Frederick C., III, ed. Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives on American Astronautics. San Diego, CA: American Astronautical Society, 1981. pp. 199- 224. This article is part of a larger publication focusing on various aspects of the space program. A presentation by the director of Advanced Programs for NASA's Office of Space Transportation Systems at the AAS, it contains no notes or other scholarly apparatus. It does survey the methods of spaceflight for piloted missions since Mercury and describes some of the features of the Shuttle.

General Accounting Office. Issues Concerning the Future Operation of the Space Transportation System. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1982. This study attempts to clarify many of the problems that had arisen in the Shuttle program, especially its slower than expected mission schedule, and assesses their impact for the Congress.

General Accounting Office. NASA Must Reconsider Operations Pricing Policy to Compensate for Cost Growth on the Space Transportation System. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1982. This report to Congress deals with the operational costs of the Shuttle and calls for a review and repricing of services provided to users of the system.

General Accounting Office. Space Shuttle: External Tank Procurement Does Not Comply with Competition in Contracting Act. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1988. This report examines whether NASA complied with the Competition in Contracting Act for the manufacturing and fabricating of external tanks for the assembly of solid rocket boosters. It finds several deficiencies in the NASA approach.

General Accounting Office. Space Shuttle Facility Program: More Definitive Cost Information Needed. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 9 May 1977. This study looks at the costs of ground support systems and criticizes NASA for not managing the support program as carefully as thought advisable. It argues that the commitment and current estimates of NASA are not sufficiently supported by documentation, and that the facilities of the agency needed for the program have not been accurately determined. It asked that Congress require NASA to provide more definitive information from which the progress of its major facility acquisition programs could be measured and assessed.

General Accounting Office. Space Transportation System: Past, Present, Future. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 27 May 1977. This lengthy 86-page study assesses the status of NASA's Space Shuttle development program, focusing on its proposed policy for charges to users and offering several options to Congress on the question of production of orbiters in fiscal year 1978. It details the advantages and disadvantages of starting the production of a third orbiter in FY 1978 and of delaying funding of the remaining two proposed orbiters.

General Accounting Office. Status and Issues Relating to the Space Transportation System. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 21 April 1976. This study assesses NASA's Shuttle development plan and concludes that it could result in increased costs, schedule delays, and performance degradation that were not originally envisioned. The development plan, revised as the program fell behind schedule and took funding cuts, embodied such factors as reduced testing, compressed schedules, and concurrent development and production. The study also asks, but does not truly answer, whether the Shuttle system fulfills the space transportation needs of the United States.

Grey, Jerry. "Case for a Fifth Shuttle and More Expendable Launch Vehicles." Astronautics and Aeronautics. 19 (March 1981): 22-26. This article assesses the argument in favor of a fifth orbiter to increase the Shuttle capability as well as the development of an expendable launch vehicle for use in handling many unmanned missions. The article is prophetic in that, while it was opposed to NASA policy at the time, at least in terms of expendable vehicles, it says that the United States should not allow the Shuttle to dictate its entrance into space. This was a position especially popular after the Challenger accident.

Hale, Carl W. "Pricing of NASA Space Shuttle Transportation System Cargo." Engineering Economist. 24 (Spring 1979): 167-97. This complex article discusses the system of charges and payment for the launch of satellites and the execution of experiments by the Shuttle once it became operational. In this program, commercial firms, research institutions, and governments paid NASA for the deployment of their assets in space.

Hechler, Ken. Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-1979 (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 1980). This book contains the best account to date of Congressional wrangling over the Shuttle and demonstrates the bipartisan nature of both Shuttle support and opposition.

Hosenball, S. Neil. "The Space Shuttle: Prologue or Postscript?" Journal of Space Law. 9 (Spring-Fall 1981): 69-75. This article treats the development of the Shuttle as a method for easy access to space, focusing on the problems and potential of space commercialization, the legal issues of orbiting civilians, and associated questions. As might be expected, it is heavy on policy and legal questions and short on technological discussions.

Mandell, Humboldt C., Jr. "Assessment of Space Shuttle Cost Estimating Methods." Ph.D. Diss., University of Colorado at Denver, 1983. This scholarly work reviews the methodology for arriving at costing of Shuttle components. It is a complex study, without a good story line to it, but it is integral to understanding the development of the Shuttle, especially in view of the cost-effective strategy of funding that NASA was forced to pursue in the program.

Mandell, Humboldt C., Jr. "Management and Budget Lessons: The Space Shuttle Program." NASA SP-6101 (02), Autumn 1989. pp. 44-48. A condensation of Mandell's Ph.D. dissertation, this article assesses the Shuttle management program and offers several recommendations. Among the most important is a concern that the program planning process is essential, requiring long and realistic planning and budget forecasting. Mandell also found that NASA needs to pay more attention to the budgeting process to ensure that sufficient funding is available during peak periods of a program, and must not accede to the demands to underestimate costs to sell the program to Congress. He concluded that NASA has a top-heavy management approach with too many large program offices at various levels of organization.

Menter, Martin. "STS--Legal Connotations." Akron Law Review. 13 (Spring 1981): 629-647. A really fine rundown on the legal aspects of the Shuttle: accident liability, international law, and space territorial integrity.

Mueller, George E. Address on the Space Shuttle before the British Interplanetary Society, University College, London, England. August 10, 1968. Copy in National Aeronautics and Space Administration Reference Collection, NASA History Office, Washington, DC. This presentation, made by NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, may well have been the first public presentation of the Shuttle concept to a scholarly community. It set up the rationale, technological choices, and planning activities taking place at NASA for the development of the Space Transportation System.

National Research Council. Assessment of Constraints on Space Shuttle Launch Rates. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1983. This is a detailed study of the ability of NASA to launch the Shuttle in the timely fashion promised to meet mission requirements. It surveys everything from the orbiter to the launch facilities to arrive at conclusions that point toward fewer launches per year than earlier anticipated. One of the important concerns of this report was the shutdown of the Shuttle production line and the hazards it had for the system's cost-effectiveness.

Office of Technology Assessment. Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1988. This study reviews the practices and potential for cutting the cost of shuttle missions.

Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives Special Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1989. A detailed assessment of the state of the human spaceflight program and the Shuttle effort. It lays out well many of the issues affecting space policy at the end of the 1980s, e.g. whether to continue with the Shuttle in essentially its present form with minor improvements, to make major modifications, to develop a new launch system, or to develop and fly more unmanned launch vehicles.

Pace, Scott. "US Space Transportation Policy: History and Issues for a New Administration." Space Policy. 4 (November 1988): 307-18. The newly elected Bush administration faced complex questions on the future role of the United States in space, and tough decisions on how to pay for it. Pace comments that decisions made now on space transportation will have an important affect on U.S. space leadership in the next decade. He describes the history and current state of space transportation planning, and considers key issues that will confront the Bush Presidency. In this process the Shuttle emerges as both the cause and the effect of policy formulation.

Perrow, Charles. Complex Organizations. (New York: Random House, 1979). A general study, this work investigates the management of sophisticated organizations such as NASA, and offers some general insights into the way in which the Shuttle program was handled.

Pross, Mark A. "The National Aerospace Plane." GAO Journal. Winter 1988-1989. pp. 54-59. This article describes the NASP program and its goal "to develop and then demonstrate in a manned experimental flight vehicle--the X-30--the technologies necessary for future operational hypersonic airplanes and/or single-stage- to-orbit space launch vehicles that could deliver payloads into orbit more quickly, reliably, and inexpensively than today's Space Shuttle."

Review of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Report for NASA Fiscal Year 1990 Authorization. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1990. This work publishes the hearings of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications held on 28 September 1989 concerning the NASA budget.

Rubenstein, S.Z. "Managing Projects-- An Industry View." in Issues in NASA Program and Project Management. Autumn 1989. pp. 13-23. This article reviews the fundamentals of program management ala management 101, but it offers some specific lessons for the Shuttle program. It emphasizes learning from past successes and from past mistakes. It advocates the use of technology to ensure good communication between workers at all levels and tries to find a way to insulate people responsible for programs from the problems of micro-management made possible by the rapid communications medium.

Scheffer, Jim. "Shuttle Setbacks Challenge Engineers' Ingenuity." Space World. May 1980, pp. 14-19. This article explains better than most the reasons behind the delays in the Shuttle's development.

Shaver, R.D.; Dreyfuss, D.J.; Gosch, W.D.; and Levenson, G.S. "The Space Shuttle as an Element in the National Space Program." The Rand Corporation, October 1970. Document in the NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, Washington, DC. This report concentrates on the economic justification and potential funding problems of the Space Shuttle. The authors expected that by 1990 the Shuttle would cost $75 billion to $140 billion while saving only $2.8 billion in space transportation costs. They predicted that satellite redesign to make optimum use of the Shuttle might result in further savings of $150 million to $200 million per year. The report emphasizes that, due to the complexity of U.S. space transportation needs, criteria other than cost should be used to evaluate the space transportation system as then conceived.

Shuttle Derivative Vehicles Study: Operations, Systems, and Facilities. Seattle, WA: Boeing Aerospace Corp., 1977. This study deals with an assessment of unmanned cargo launch vehicles using solid rocket boosters to determine (1) vehicle concept definition, operations, and facility requirements, (2) advanced technology areas which have potential payoff in reducing operating cost, and (3) an implementation plan for a low life cycle cost system.

Space Shuttle 1975: Status Report for the Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, February 1975. This publication reports on the status of the Shuttle program before the 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

Space Shuttle 1976: Status Report for the Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, October 1975. This publication also reports on the status of the Shuttle program before the 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

Space Shuttle 1977: Status Report for the Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1976. This publication reports on the status of the Shuttle program before the 94th Cong., 2d Sess.

Space Shuttle 1980: Status Report for the Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1980. This publication reports on the status of the Shuttle program before the 96th Cong., 2d Sess.

Space Shuttle and Galileo Mission. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1980. This contains the hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.

Space Shuttle Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 1978. This contains the hearings before the Committee of Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. on the Shuttle.

Space Shuttle Main Engine Development Program. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, 1978. This is the report of a hearing on the Shuttle's engine development difficulties before the 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

Space Shuttle Program: Cost, Performance, and Schedule Review. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1984. This is a transcript of the hearings held before the subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the 98th Cong., 2d Sess.

Space Shuttle Reprogramming. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 1978. Text of the hearings on the subject between the subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies for the 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

Space Shuttle-Skylab 1973: Status Report for the Committee on Science and Astronautics. Washington, DC: House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 1973. This publication relates hearings held on this subject by the 93d Cong., 1st Sess., and reached several conclusions about the viability of the program. It recommended that the project proceed.

Space Shuttle-Skylab: Manned Space Flight in the 1970's Status Report for the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight. Washington, DC: House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 1972. This publication contains text of hearings held on this subject by the 92d Cong., 2d Sess., and reached several conclusions about the viability of the program, recommending that the project proceed.

Space Shuttle, Space Tug, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project-1974. Washington, DC: House Committee on Science and Astronautics, February 1974. Report of hearings held on this subject by the 93d Cong., 2d. Sess., which reached several conclusions about the viability of the program. Recommends that the program continue, noting the adequate funding for FY75 was critical to its success.

Space Tug-1973--Impact and Management of Space Tug Development Program. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, September 1973. Based on hearings during the 93d Congress, 1st Session, this document deals with the proposed space tug as a part of the Shuttle program. Congress asked for (1) a determination and finding of the role of the space tug in the Shuttle program; (2) the fiscal impact of the space tug on the overall manned spaceflight program; (3) the operations impact of the space tug on the latest proposed NASA mission model; (4) the operations impact on the project cost-per- flight of the Shuttle; (5) the ascertainment of the DOD role in the development and use of the tug; and (6) NASA's and industry's progress in conceptual design of the space tug vehicle. In concert with the above goals, the subcommittee held hearings with NASA, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Martin Marietta, and Grumman. As contained in the body of the hearing, NASA presented an overview of the role of the space tug program with neither conclusions nor recommended approaches.

Stevenson, A.E. "The Space Shuttle and Congress--A National Commitment." AIAA Student Journal. 17 (Winter 1979-1980): 4-8. As the principal element of the reusable space transportation system, the Shuttle will remain the main objective of the U.S. space program for the next twenty years. This paper analyzes various factors affecting the development of the Shuttle program with particular reference to budgeting requirements and respective congressional actions. Among the development problems that required additional funding were failures in the main engine components, particularly turbopumps, during ground tests and delays in the installation of the reusable surface insulation.

Toner, Mike. "It's Pay Off or Perish for the Shuttle." Science Digest. May 1985, pp. 64-67, 87-88. This article is a critical assessment of the Shuttle program written not long before the loss of Challenger. It notes that the Shuttle has proven to be neither cheap nor reliable, both primary selling points, and adds that the American public has been hornswoggled. Toner adds that the "concept of cost recovery is one of the legacies of the budget-conscious age in which the Shuttle program was conceived. After spending $24 billion to go to the moon, Congress wanted the Shuttle to pay its own way." That is a tall and ultimately an unfair order. NASA, the author concludes, made a blunder by accepting the cost effectiveness line instead of making the Shuttle a national resource.