Drawing upon the concept of "problem definition" from the public policy literature, this paper traces the origin and subsequent development of the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984. It argues that much of the "drift" of U.S. space policy in the years following the Apollo program was largely the result of there being no well-defined, generally accepted "space problem." Because it had been defined as a Cold War issue following the 1957 launch of Sputnik by the USSR, the American space program had undergone a rapid expansion during the early 1960s. By the middle of the decade, however, that particular definition no longer seemed persuasive to policymakers or the general public.
It was not until the early 1980s that a new problem definition--or, more precisely, three definitions--emerged. Officials in the new Reagan Administration possessed a very strong sense of purpose with regard to U.S. national space policy. As they saw it, the "problem(s)" in space were promoting a strong national defense, conducting scientific research, and encouraging rapid commercialization. It is the latter that will be the focus of this paper.
Unfortunately, as the "problem definition" literature suggests, such attempts to recast a major policy area frequently encounter resistance from existing organizations and institutions created according to the previous policy definition. Programs aimed at promoting space commercialization, particularly in the newly-emerged launch industry, were no exception. The paper examines this conflict and discusses those elements that ultimately led to its resolution.
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