PART 1816
TYPES OF
CONTRACTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUBPART
1816.1 SELECTING CONTRACT TYPES
1816.104 Factors in
selecting contract types.
1816.104-70 Contract type for
performance-based acquisition (PBA).
SUBPART 1816.2 FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
1816.202 Firm-fixed-price
contracts.
1816.202-70 NASA contract
clause.
1816.203 Fixed-price
contracts with economic price adjustment.
1816.203-4 Contract clauses.
SUBPART 1816.3 COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS
1816.303-70 Cost-sharing
contracts.
1816.306 Cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts.
1816.307 Contract
clauses.
1816.307-70 NASA contract
clauses.
SUBPART 1816.4 INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
1816.402 Application of
pre-determined, formula-type incentives.
1816.402-2 Performance
incentives.
1816.402-270 NASA technical
performance incentives.
1816.404 Fixed-price
contracts with award fees.
1816.405 Cost-reimbursement
incentive contracts.
1816.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts.
1816.405-270 CPAF contracts.
1816.405-271 Base fee.
1816.405-272 Award fee evaluation
periods.
1816.405-273 Award fee evaluations.
1816.405-274 Award fee evaluation
factors.
1816.405-275 Award fee evaluation
scoring.
1816.405-276
Award fee payments and limitations.
1816.406 Contract
clauses.
1816.406-70 NASA contract
clauses.
SUBPART 1816.5 INDEFINITE-DELIVERY CONTRACTS
1816.504 Indefinite
quantity contracts.
1816.505 Ordering.
1816.505-70 Task Ordering.
1816.505-71 Task
and delivery order contract ordering period.
1816.505-72 Task
and delivery order contract performance periods.
1816.506-70 NASA contract
clause.
SUBPART 1816.6 TIME-AND-MATERIALS, LABOR-HOUR, AND LETTER CONTRACTS
1816.603 Letter
contracts.
1816.603-2 Application.
1816.603-370 Approvals.
PART 1816
Subpart 1816.1--Selecting
Contract Types
1816.104 Factors in
selecting contract types.
1816.104-70 Contract type
for performance-based acquisition (PBA).
(a) PBA is defined in FAR 2.101 and discussed in FAR
37.6.
Although FAR Part
37 addresses services contracts, PBA is not limited to these
contracts. PBA is the preferred way of
contracting for all supplies and services at NASA. Generally, when contract performance risk
under a PBA specification can be fairly shifted to the contractor to allow for
the operation of objective incentives, a contract type with objectively
measurable incentives (e.g., FFP, FPIF, or CPIF) is appropriate. However, when contractor performance (e.g.,
cost control, schedule, or quality/technical) is best evaluated subjectively
using quantitative measures, a CPAF contract may be used.
(b) A PBA is a completion form of contract
(something is accomplished). Term/level-of-effort, time-and-materials and labor
hour contracts should include, when feasible, features that are
performance-oriented. However, those
contracts may not be characterized as PBA.
Subpart 1816.2--Fixed-Price Contracts
1816.202 Firm-fixed-price
contracts.
1816.202-70 NASA contract
clause.
The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-78, Firm-Fixed-Price,
in firm-fixed-price solicitations and contracts. Insert the appropriate amount in the
resulting contract.
1816.203 Fixed-price
contracts with
economic price adjustment.
(a) In addition to the approval requirements in the prescriptions
at FAR 52.216-2 through 52.216-4, the
contracting officer shall coordinate with the installation's Deputy Chief
Financial Officer (Finance) before exceeding the ten-percent limit in paragraph
(c)(1) of the clauses at FAR 52.216-2 and 52.216-3 and paragraph (c)(4) of the
clause at 52.216-4.
(d)(2) Contracting officers shall contact the Office of
Procurement, Code HK, for specific guidance on preparing clauses using cost
indexes. Such clauses require advance
approval by the Assistant Administrator for Procurement. Requests for approval shall be submitted to
the Headquarters Office of Procurement (Code HS).
Subpart 1816.3--Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
1816.303-70 Cost-sharing contracts.
(a) Cost-sharing with
for-profit organizations.
(1) Cost sharing by for-profit organizations is mandatory in any contract for basic or applied research resulting from an unsolicited proposal, and may be accepted in any other contract when offered by the proposing organization. The requirement for cost-sharing may be waived when the contracting officer determines in writing that the contractor has no commercial, production, education, or service activities that would benefit from the results of the research, and the contractor has no means of recovering its shared costs on such projects.
(2) The contractor's cost-sharing may be any percentage of the
project cost. In determining the amount
of cost-sharing, the contracting officer shall consider the relative benefits
to the contractor and the Government.
Factors that should be considered include --
(i) the potential for the contractor to recover its
contribution from non-Federal sources;
(ii) the extent to which the particular area of
research requires special stimulus in the national interest; and
(iii) the extent to which the research effort or
result is likely to enhance the contractor's capability, expertise, or competitive
advantage.
(b) Cost-sharing with
not-for-profit organizations.
(1) Costs to perform research stemming from an unsolicited
proposal by universities and other educational or not-for-profit institutions
are usually fully reimbursed. When the
contracting officer determines that there is a potential for significant
benefit to the institution cost-sharing will be considered.
(2) The contracting officer will normally limit the
institution's share to no more than 10 percent of the project's cost.
(c) Implementation.
Cost-sharing shall be stated as a minimum percentage of the total
allowable costs of the project. The
contractor's contributed costs may not be charged to the Government under any
other contract or grant, including allocation to other contracts and grants as
part of an independent research and development program.
1816.306 Cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts.
(d) Completion and term
forms.
(4) Term form contracts should include, when
feasible, features that are performance-oriented. However, those contracts may not be
characterized as PBA.
(a)(1) In paragraph (h)(2)(ii)(B) of the Allowable Cost
and Payment clause at FAR 52.216-7, the period of years may be
increased to correspond with any statutory period of limitation applicable to
claims of third parties against the contractor; provided, that a corresponding
increase is made in the period for retention of records required in paragraph
(f) of the clause at FAR 52.215-2, Audit and
Records - Negotiation.
(b) In solicitations and contracts containing the clause at FAR 52.216-8,
Fixed Fee, the Schedule shall include appropriate terms, if any, for
provisional billing against fee.
(d) In solicitations and contracts containing the clause at FAR 52.216-10, Incentive
Fee, the Schedule shall include appropriate terms, if any, for provisional
billing against fee.
(g)(1) In paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of the Allowable Cost and
Payment--Facilities clause at FAR 52.216-13, the period of years may be increased
to correspond with any statutory period of limitation applicable to claims of
third parties against the contractor; provided, that a corresponding increase
is made in the period for retention of records required in paragraph (f) of the
clause at FAR 52.215-2, Audit and Records - Negotiation.
1816.307-70 NASA contract clauses.
(a) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-73, Estimated
Cost and Cost Sharing, in each contract in which costs are shared by the contractor
pursuant to 1816.303-70.
(b) The contracting officer shall insert the clause substantially
as stated at 1852.216-74, Estimated Cost and Fixed Fee, in cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts.
(c) The contracting officer may insert the clause at 1852.216-75, Payment of Fixed Fee, in
cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Modifications to the clause are authorized.
(d) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-81, Estimated Cost, in cost-no-fee
contracts that are not cost sharing or facilities contracts.
(e) The contracting officer may insert a clause substantially as
stated at 1852.216-87, Submission of Vouchers for Payment, in
cost-reimbursement solicitations and contracts.
(f) When either FAR clause 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment,
or FAR clause 52.216-13,
Allowable Cost and Payment---Facilities, is included in the contract, as
prescribed at FAR 16.307(a) and (g), the contracting officer should
include the clause at 1852.216-89, Assignment and Release Forms.
Subpart 1816.4--Incentive Contracts
1816.402 Application of
predetermined, formula-type incentives.
When considering the use of a quality, performance, or schedule
incentive, the following guidance applies:
(1) A positive incentive is
generally not appropriate unless —
(i) Performance above the
target (or minimum, if there are no negative incentives) level is of
significant value to the Government;
(ii) The value of the higher
level of performance is worth the additional cost/fee;
(iii) The attainment of the higher
level of performance is clearly within the control of the contractor; and
(iv) An upper limit is
identified, beyond which no further incentive is earned.
(2) A negative incentive is
generally not appropriate unless —
(i) A target level of
performance can be established, which the contractor can reasonably be expected
to reach with a diligent effort, but a lower level of performance is also
minimally acceptable;
(ii) The value of the negative
incentive is commensurate with the lower level of performance and any
additional administrative costs; and
(iii) Factors likely to prevent
attainment of the target level of performance are clearly within the control of
the contractor.
(3) When a negative incentive
is used, the contract must indicate a level below which performance is not
acceptable.
1816.402-2 Performance
incentives.
1816.402-270 NASA technical
performance incentives.
(a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402,
NASA has determined that a performance incentive shall be included in all
contracts based on performance-oriented documents (see FAR 11.101(a)), except
those awarded under the commercial item procedures of FAR Part 12,
where the primary deliverable(s) is (are) hardware with a total value
(including options) greater than $25 million.
Any exception to this requirement shall be approved in writing by the head of the contracting activity. Performance incentives may be included in
hardware contracts valued under $25 million acquired under procedures other
than Part 12 at the discretion of the procurement officer upon consideration of
the guidelines in 1816.402. Performance incentives, which are objective
and measure hardware performance after delivery and acceptance, are separate
from other incentives, such as cost or delivery incentives.
(b) When a performance incentive is used, it shall be structured
to be both positive and negative based on hardware performance after delivery
and acceptance, unless the contract type requires complete contractor liability
for product performance (e.g., fixed price).
In this latter case, a negative incentive is not required. In structuring the incentives, the contract
shall establish a standard level of performance based on the salient hardware
performance requirement. This standard
performance level is normally the contract's minimum performance
requirement. No incentive amount is
earned at this standard performance level.
Discrete units of measurement based on the same performance parameter
shall be identified for performance above and, when a negative incentive is
used, below the standard. Specific
incentive amounts shall be associated with each performance level from maximum
beneficial performance (maximum positive incentive) to, when a negative
incentive is included, minimal beneficial performance or total failure (maximum
negative incentive). The relationship
between any given incentive, either positive and negative, and its associated
unit of measurement should reflect the value to the Government of that level of
hardware performance. The contractor
should not be rewarded for above-standard performance levels that are of no
benefit to the Government.
(c) The final calculation of the performance incentive shall be
done when hardware performance, as defined in the contract, ceases or when the
maximum positive incentive is reached.
When hardware performance ceases below the standard established in the
contract and a negative incentive is included, the Government shall calculate
the amount due and the contractor shall pay the Government that amount. Once hardware performance exceeds the standard,
the contractor may request payment of the incentive amount associated with a
given level of performance, provided that such payments shall not be more
frequent than monthly. When hardware
performance ceases above the standard level of performance, or when the maximum
positive incentive is reached, the Government shall calculate the final
performance incentive earned and unpaid and promptly remit it to the
contractor.
(d) When the deliverable hardware lends itself to multiple,
meaningful measures of performance, multiple performance incentives may be
established. When the contract requires
the sequential delivery of several hardware items (e.g., multiple spacecraft),
separate performance incentive structures may be established to parallel the
sequential delivery and use of the deliverables.
(e) In determining the value of the maximum performance incentives
available, the contracting officer shall follow the following rules:
(1) For a CPFF contract, the sum of the maximum positive
performance incentive and fixed fee shall not exceed the limitations in FAR 15.404-4(c)(4)(i).
(2) For an award fee contract.
(i) The individual values of the maximum positive
performance incentive and the total potential award fee (including any base
fee) shall each be at least one-third of the total potential contract fee. The remaining one-third of the total
potential contract fee may be divided between award fee and the maximum
performance incentive at the discretion of the contracting officer.
(ii) The maximum negative performance incentive for
research and development hardware (e.g., the first and second units) shall be
equal in amount to the total earned award fee (including any base
fee). The maximum negative performance
incentives for production hardware (e.g., the third and all subsequent units of
any hardware items) shall be equal in amount to the total potential
award fee (including any base fee). Where
one contract contains both cases described above, any base fee shall be
allocated reasonably among the items.
(3) For cost reimbursement contracts other than award fee
contracts, the maximum negative performance incentives shall not exceed the
total earned fee under the contract.
1816.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.
Section 1816.405-2
applies to the use of FPAF contracts as if they were CPAF contracts. However, neither base fee (see 1816.405-271)
nor evaluation of cost control (see 1816.405-274)
apply to FPAF contracts.
1816.405 Cost-reimbursement
incentive contracts.
1816.405-2
Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts.
(a) Use of an award fee incentive shall be approved
in writing by the procurement officer.
The procurement officer's approval shall include a discussion of the
other types of contracts considered and shall indicate why an award fee
incentive is the appropriate choice, including evidence that any additional
administrative effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate performance are
justified by the expected benefits (see FAR 16.405-2(b)(1)(iii)). Award fee incentives should not be used on
contracts with a total estimated cost and fee less than $2 million per
year. The procurement officer may
authorize use of award fee for lower-valued acquisitions, but should do so only
in exceptional situations, such as contract requirements having direct health
or safety impacts, where the judgmental assessment of the quality of contractor
performance is critical.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, an award
fee incentive may be used in conjunction with other contract types for aspects
of performance that cannot be objectively assessed. In such cases, the cost incentive is based on
objective formulas inherent in the other contract types (e.g., FPI, CPIF), and
the award fee provision should not separately incentivize cost performance.
(c) Award fee incentives shall not be used with a cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) contract.
(a) A base fee shall not be used on CPAF contracts for which the periodic award fee evaluations are final (1816.405-273(a)). In these circumstances, contractor performance during any award fee period is independent of and has no effect on subsequent performance periods or the final results at contract completion. For other contracts, such as those for hardware or software development, the procurement officer may authorize the use of a base fee not to exceed 3 percent. Base fee shall not be used when an award fee incentive is used in conjunction with another contract type (e.g., CPIF/AF).
(b) When a base fee is authorized for use in a CPAF contract, it shall be paid only if the final award fee evaluation is "satisfactory" or better. (See 1816.405-273 and 1816.405-275) Pending final evaluation, base fee may be paid during the life of the contract at defined intervals on a provisional basis. If the final award fee evaluation is "poor/unsatisfactory", all provisional base fee payments shall be refunded to the Government.
1816.405-272 Award fee
evaluation periods.
(a) Award fee evaluation periods, including those for interim
evaluations, should be at least 6 months in length. When appropriate, the procurement officer may
authorize shorter evaluation periods after ensuring that the additional
administrative costs associated with the shorter periods are offset by benefits
accruing to the Government. Where
practicable, such as developmental contracts with defined performance
milestones (e.g., Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, initial
system test), establishing evaluation periods at conclusion of the milestones
rather than calendar dates, or in combination with calendar dates should be
considered. In no case shall an
evaluation period be longer than 12 months.
(b) A portion of the total available award fee contract shall be allocated to each of the
evaluation periods. This allocation may
result in an equal or unequal distribution of fee among the periods. The contracting officer should consider the
nature of each contract and the incentive effects of fee distribution in
determining the appropriate allocation structure.
1816.405-273 Award fee
evaluations.
(a) Service Contracts. On
contracts where the contract deliverable is the performance of a service over
any given time period, contractor performance is often definitively measurable
within each evaluation period. In these
cases, all evaluations are final, and the contractor keeps the fee earned in
any period regardless of the evaluations of subsequent periods. Unearned award fee in any given period in a
service contract is lost and shall not be carried forward, or "rolled-over,"
into subsequent periods.
(b) End Item Contracts. On contracts, such as those for end item
deliverables, where the true quality of contractor performance cannot be
measured until the end of the contract, only the last evaluation is final. At that point, the total contract award fee
pool is available, and the contractor's total performance is evaluated against
the award fee plan to determine total earned award fee. In addition to the final evaluation, interim
evaluations are done to monitor performance prior to contract completion, provide
feedback to the contractor on the Government's assessment of the quality of its
performance, and establish the basis
for making interim award fee payments (see 1816.405-276(a)). These interim evaluations and associated
interim award fee payments are superseded by the fee determination made in the
final evaluation at contract completion.
The Government will then pay the contractor, or the contractor will
refund to the Government, the difference between the final award fee
determination and the cumulative interim fee payments.
(c) Control of evaluations. Interim and final evaluations may be used to
provide past performance information during the source selection process in
future acquisitions and should be marked and controlled as “Source Selection
Information - See FAR 3.104”.
1816.405-274 Award fee
evaluation factors.
(a) Explicit evaluation factors shall be
established for each award fee period.
Factors should be tied to desired outcomes. If used, subfactors should be limited to the
minimum necessary to ensure a thorough evaluation and an effective incentive.
(b) Evaluation factors will be developed by the contracting
officer based upon the characteristics of an individual procurement. Normally, technical and schedule
considerations will be included in all CPAF contracts as evaluation factors. Cost control shall be included as an
evaluation factor in all CPAF contracts.
When explicit evaluation factor weightings are used, cost control shall
be no less than 25 percent of the total weighted evaluation factors. The predominant consideration of the cost
control evaluation should be a measurement of the contractor's performance
against the negotiated estimated cost of the contract. This estimated cost may include the value of
undefinitized change orders when appropriate.
(c)(1) The technical factor, if used, must include
consideration of risk management (including mission success, safety, security,
health, export control, and damage to the environment, as appropriate) unless
waived at a level above the contracting officer, with the concurrence of the
project manager. The rationale for any
waiver shall be documented in the contract file. When safety, export control, or security are
considered under the technical factor, the award fee plan shall allow the
following fee determinations, regardless of contractor performance in other
evaluation factors, when there is a major breach of safety or security.
(i) For evaluation of service
contracts under 1816.405-273(a),
an overall fee determination of zero for any evaluation period in which there
is a major breach of safety or security.
(ii)
For evaluation of end item contracts under 1816.405-273(b),
an overall fee determination of zero for any interim evaluation period in which
there is a major breach of safety or security.
To ensure that the final award fee evaluation at contract completion
reflects any major breach of safety or security, in an interim period, the
overall award fee pool shall be reduced by the amount of the fee available for
the period in which the major breach occurred if a zero fee determination was
made because of a major breach of safety or security.
(2)
A major breach of safety must be related directly to the work on the
contract. A major breach of safety is an
act or omission of the Contractor that consists of an accident, incident, or
exposure resulting in a fatality or mission failure; or in damage to equipment
or property equal to or greater than $1 million; or in any “willful” or
“repeat” violation cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) or by a state agency operating under an OSHA approved plan.
(3) A major breach of security may occur on or
off Government installations, but must be directly related to the work on the
contract. A major breach of security is
an act or omission by the contractor that results in compromise of classified
information, illegal technology transfer, workplace violence resulting in
criminal conviction, sabotage, compromise or denial of information technology
services, equipment or property damage from vandalism greater than $250,000, or
theft greater than $250,000.
(4) The Assistant Administrator for Procurement
(Code HS) shall be notified prior to the determination of a zero award fee
because of a major breach of safety or security.
(d) In rare circumstances, contract costs may
increase for reasons outside the contractor's control and for which the
contractor is not entitled to an equitable adjustment. One example is a weather-related launch delay
on a launch support contract. The Government
shall take such situations into consideration when evaluating contractor cost
control.
(e) Emphasis on cost control should be
balanced against other performance requirement objectives. The contractor should not be incentivized to
pursue cost control to the point that overall performance is significantly degraded. For example, incentivizing an underrun that
results in direct negative impacts on technical performance, safety, or other
critical contract objectives is both undesirable and counterproductive. Therefore, evaluation of cost control shall
conform to the following guidelines:
(1) Normally, the contractor should be given a score of 0 for
cost control when there is a significant overrun within its control. However, the contractor may receive higher
scores for cost control if the overrun is insignificant. Scores should decrease sharply as the size of
the overrun increases. In any evaluation
of contractor overrun performance, the Government shall consider the reasons
for the overrun and assess the extent and effectiveness of the contractor's
efforts to control or mitigate the overrun.
(2) The contractor should normally be rewarded for an underrun
within its control, up to the maximum score allocated for cost control,
provided the average numerical rating for all other award fee evaluation
factors is 81 or greater (see 1816.405-275). An underrun shall be rewarded as if the
contractor has met the estimated cost of the contract (see 1816.405-274(d)(3))
when the average numerical rating for all other factors is less than 81 but
greater than 60.
(3) The contractor should be rewarded for meeting the
estimated cost of the contract, but not to the maximum score allocated for cost
control, to the degree that the contractor has prudently managed costs while
meeting contract requirements. No award
shall be given in this circumstance unless the average numerical rating for all
other award fee evaluation factors is 61 or greater.
(f) When an AF arrangement is used in conjunction with
another contract type, the award fee’s cost control factor will only apply to a
subjective assessment of the contractor’s efforts to control costs and not the
actual cost outcome incentivized under the basic contract type (e.g. CPIF,
FPIF).
(g)(1) The contractor's performance against the subcontracting
plan incorporated in the contract shall be evaluated. Emphasis may be placed on the contractor's
accomplishment of its goals for subcontracting with small business, HUBZone
small business, women-owned small business,
veteran-owned small business, and service-disabled veteran-owned small
business concerns.
(2) The contractor's performance against the contract target
for participation as subcontractors by small disadvantaged business concerns in
the NAICS Major Groups designated by the Department of Commerce (see FAR 19.201(c))
shall also be evaluated if the clause at FAR 52.219-26, Small
Disadvantaged Business Participation - Incentive Subcontracting, is not
included in the contract (see FAR 19.1204(c)).
(3) The contractor's achievements in subcontracting high
technology efforts as well as the contractor's performance under the
Mentor-Protégé Program, if applicable, may also be evaluated.
(4) The evaluation weight given to the contractor's performance against the considerations in paragraphs (g)(1) through (g)(3) of this section should be significant (up to 15 percent of available award fee). The weight should motivate the contractor to focus management attention to subcontracting with small, HUBZone, women-owned, veteran-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns, and with small disadvantaged business concerns in designated NAICS Major Groups to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with efficient contract performance.
(h) When contract changes are
anticipated, the contractor’s responsiveness to requests for change proposals
should be evaluated. This evaluation
should include the contractor’s submission of timely, complete proposals and
cooperation in negotiating the change.
(i) Only the award
fee performance evaluation factors set forth in the performance evaluation plan
shall be used to determine award fee scores.
(j) The Government may unilaterally modify the applicable award
fee performance evaluation factors and performance evaluation areas prior to
the start of an evaluation period. The
contracting officer shall notify the contractor in writing of any such changes
30 days prior to the start of the relevant evaluation period.
1816.405-275 Award fee
evaluation scoring.
(a) A scoring system of 0-100 shall be used for all award fee
ratings. Award fee earned is determined
by applying the numerical score to the award fee pool. For example, a score of 85 yields an award
fee of 85 percent of the award fee pool.
No award fee shall be paid unless the total score is 61 or greater.
(b) The following standard adjectival ratings and the associated
numerical scores shall be used on all award fee contracts.
(1) Excellent (100-91):
Of exceptional merit; exemplary performance in a timely, efficient, and
economical manner; very minor (if any) deficiencies with no adverse effect on
overall performance.
(2) Very good (90-81):
Very effective performance, fully responsive to contract requirements;
contract requirements accomplished in a
timely, efficient, and economical manner for the most part; only minor
deficiencies.
(3) Good (80-71):
Effective performance; fully responsive to contract requirements;
reportable deficiencies, but with little identifiable effect on overall
performance.
(4) Satisfactory (70-61):
Meets or slightly exceeds minimum acceptable standards; adequate
results; reportable deficiencies with identifiable, but not substantial,
effects on overall performance.
(5) Poor/Unsatisfactory (less than 61): Does not meet minimum acceptable standards in
one or more areas; remedial action required in one or more areas; deficiencies
in one or more areas which adversely affect overall performance.
(c) As a benchmark for evaluation, in order to be rated "Excellent,"
the contractor must be under cost, on or ahead of schedule, and have provided
excellent technical performance.
(d) A scoring system appropriate for the circumstances of the
individual contract requirement should be developed. Weighted scoring is recommended. In this system, each evaluation factor (e.g.,
technical, schedule, cost control) is assigned a specific percentage weighting
with the cumulative weightings of all factors totaling 100. During the award fee evaluation, each factor
is scored from 0-100 according to the ratings defined in 1816.405-275(b). The numerical score for each factor is then
multiplied by the weighting for that factor to determine the weighted score. For example, if the technical factor has a
weighting of 60 percent and the numerical score for that factor is 80, the
weighted technical score is 48 (80 x 60 percent). The weighted scores for each evaluation
factor are then added to determine the total award fee score.
1816.405-276 Award fee
payments and limitations.
(a) Interim Award Fee
Payments. The
amount of an interim award fee payment (see 1816.405-273(b))
is limited to the lesser of the interim evaluation score or 80 percent of the
fee allocated to that interim period less any provisional payments
(see paragraph (b) of this subsection) made during the period.
(b) Provisional Award Fee
Payments. Provisional award fee
payments are payments made within evaluation periods prior to an interim or
final evaluation for that period.
Provisional payments may be included in the contract and should be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis. For a service contract, the total amount of award fee available in an
evaluation period that may be provisionally paid is the lesser of a percentage
stipulated in the contract (but not exceeding 80 percent) or the prior period's evaluation score. For an end item contract, the
total amount of provisional payments in a period is limited to a percentage not
to exceed 80 percent of the prior
interim period’s evaluation score.
(c) Fee Payment. The Fee Determination Official's rating for
both interim and final evaluations will be provided to the contractor within 45
calendar days of the end of the period being evaluated. Any fee, interim or final, due the contractor
will be paid no later than 60 calendar days after the end of the period being
evaluated.
1816.406-70 NASA contract
clauses.
(a) As authorized by FAR 16.406(e),
the contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-76, Award Fee
for Service Contracts, in solicitations and contracts when an award-fee
contract is contemplated and the contract deliverable is the performance of a
service.
(b) As authorized by FAR 16.406(e), the contracting officer shall
insert the clause at 1852.216-77,
Award Fee for End Item Contracts, in solicitations and contracts when an award
fee contract is contemplated and the contract deliverables are hardware or
other end items for which total contractor performance cannot be measured until
the end of the contract. When the clause is used in a fixed-price award-fee
contract, it shall be modified by deleting references to base fee in paragraphs
(a), and by deleting paragraph (c)(1),
the last sentence of (c)(4), and the first sentence of (c)(5).
(c) The contracting officer may insert a clause substantially as
stated at 1852.216-83,
Fixed Price Incentive, in fixed-price-incentive solicitations and contracts
utilizing firm or successive targets.
For items subject to incentive price revision, identify the target cost,
target profit, target price, and ceiling price for each item.
(d) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-84,
Estimated Cost and Incentive Fee, in cost-plus-incentive-fee solicitations and
contracts.
(e) The contracting officer may insert the clause at 1852.216-85,
Estimated Cost and Award Fee, in award-fee solicitations and contracts. When the contract includes performance
incentives, use Alternate I. When the clause is used in a fixed-price award fee
contract, it shall be modified to delete references to base fee and to reflect
the contract type.
(f) As provided at 1816.402-270,
the contracting officer shall insert a clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-88,
Performance Incentive, when the primary deliverable(s) is (are) hardware and
total estimated cost and fee is greater than $25 million. A clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-88
may be included in lower dollar value hardware contracts with the approval of
the procurement officer.
Subpart 1816.5--Indefinite-Delivery Contracts
1816.504 Indefinite quantity
contracts.
(a)(4)(ii) ID/IQ service contract values and task order values
shall be expressed only in dollars.
(a)(4)(v) See 1815.7003.
(a)(2) Task and delivery orders shall be issued by the contracting officer.
(b)(5) The Agency and
installation ombudsmen designated in accordance with 1815.7001
shall review complaints from contractors on task order contracts and delivery
order contracts.
(a) The contracting officer shall, to the maximum extent possible,
state task order requirements in terms of functions and the related performance
and quality standards such that the standards may be objectively measured.
(b) To the maximum extent possible, contracting officers shall
solicit contractor task plans to use as the basis for finalizing task order
requirements and enable evaluation and pricing of the contractor's proposed
work on a performance based approach as described in 1816.104-70(a).
(c) Task order contract type shall be individually determined,
based on the nature of each task order's requirements.
(1) Task orders may be grouped by contract type for
administrative convenience (e.g., all CPIF orders, all FFP orders, etc.) for
contractor progress and cost reporting.
(2) Under multiple awards, solicitations for individual task
plans shall request the same pricing structure from all offerors.
(d) Any undefinitized task order issued under paragraph (f) of the
clause at 1852.216-80,
Task Ordering Procedure, shall be treated and reported as an undefinitized
contract action in accordance with 1843.70.
1816.505-71
Task and delivery order contract ordering period.
(a) 10
U.S.C. 2304a establishes limitations on the ordering period of a task or
delivery order contract awarded by NASA.
The statute specifies that the ordering period may be for any period up
to five years. This period may be subsequently
extended for one or more successive periods pursuant to an option or contract
modification. In no case may the
ordering period exceed a total of ten years unless approved by the Deputy Chief
Acquisition Officer.
(b)
The deviation requirement at 1817.204(e)(iii) applies to a task or
delivery contract with an ordering period of more than five years.
(c)
Orders under GSA Federal Supply Schedule contracts must comply with the
limitations in paragraph (a) of this subsection if the orders provide for the
issuance of subsequent task or delivery orders.
(d) The limitations in paragraph (a) of this
subsection do not apply to --
(1)
Advisory and assistance service task order contracts (authorized by 10
U.S.C. 2304b). These contracts are
limited by statute to 5 years, with the authority to extend an additional 6
months (see FAR 16.505(c));
(2)
Definite quantity contracts; and
(3)
Multi-agency contracts awarded by agencies other than NASA, DoD, or the
Coast Guard.
1816.505-72 Task
and delivery order contract performance periods.
(a)
Performance of orders placed within the contract ordering period may extend for
up to one year past the end of the ordering period if the contracting officer
determines that performance of the order cannot reasonably be deferred to any
planned follow-on contract.
(b) Orders that require performance of more than
one year past the end of the ordering period must be approved by the Deputy
Chief Acquisition Officer prior to issuance.
Centers shall submit approval requests, with full rationale for the
necessity of placing the order, to Code HS at least two weeks before the
planned issuance of the order.
1816.506-70 NASA contract
clause.
Insert the clause at 1852.216-80,
Task Ordering Procedure, in solicitations and contracts when an
indefinite-delivery, task order contract is contemplated. The clause is applicable to both fixed-price
and cost-reimbursement type contracts.
If the contract does not require 533M reporting (see NPR
9501.2, NASA Contractor Financial Management Reporting System), use
the clause with its Alternate I.
(a) Centers must ensure that NASA liabilities and commitments are minimized under letter contracts. When a letter contract is justified and program requirements can be severed into smaller, discreet efforts, the work authorized by the letter contract must be limited to the minimum severable effort required to satisfy the urgent program requirements. The remaining requirements may not be initially included in the letter contract and must be acquired through a separate fully priced and definitized contract action.