In 1999, as in the previous year, a strong, ongoing demand for satellites, launch vehicles, and ground equipment driven by the expansion of the telecommunications industry continued to keep the infrastructure segment of the space industry quite healthy.

The commercial telecommunications industry's continued need for geostationary satellites provides the launch market with a steady revenue base. In 1999, the development of LEO satellite constellations, which require a large number of small satellites in orbit, has begun to dramatically expand the market. While two satellite mobile-phone projects, Iridium LLC and ICO Global Communications Ltd., had to file for Chapter 11 U.S. bankruptcy protection late in 1999 (restructuring efforts have begun), other projects, like Globalstar and Orbcomm, have been more successful, with Globalstar getting ready to initiate a carefully phased "rollout" of its mobile satellite phone service in parts of the world covered by its first nine operational gateways.

While the year 1999 could be considered the year of the "dish" for communication satellites due to the boom in direct-broadcast-systems (DBS) subscribers, with direct-to-home services, according to published estimates, now accounting for one-quarter of industry revenues, for remote sensing satellites it stood out for breaking the 1-meter resolution barrier in the imaging market. The first attempt of achieving this breakthrough failed when the "Ikonos-1" satellite, a Lockheed Martin LM 900, was lost on 4/27 due to failed separation of the Athena-2's payload shroud. The second launch of the solid-propellant vehicle, on 9/24, was successful, however, and "Ikonos-2" became the first non-military satellite to provide high-resolution images with detail at the 1-m (3.3 ft) level to the commercial market. Compared to the 5m-resolution provided by the Indian IRS-1C/1D satellites, which allows map making at a 1:24,000 scale at best, Ikonos mappers can get scales up 1:2,400.

Problems encountered by commercial industries, not necessarily surprisingly, were late spacecraft deliveries, satellite export controls, political instability, launch failures, and increased competition. On the positive side, the first demonstration flight of Boeing's Sea Launch rocket was successful on 3/27 with the launch of a 4700-kg (10,300 lbs.) simulated Galaxy XI spacecraft into geosynchronous transfer orbit, followed by the success of the first commercial flight on 10/10 which launched the DirecTV-1R satellite for U.S.-wide digital television services. Sea Launch Co. was formed in April 1995 by Boeing Commercial Space Co., RSC-Energia of Russia, Kvaerner Maritime a.s of Norway, and KBYuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash of the Ukraine, in response to growing market demand for a more affordable, reliable, and convenient commercial satellite launching service. The Sea Launch system consists of a floating mission control center and rocket-assembly factory ("Commander"), a self-propelled launch platform ("Odyssey"), and a Russian Zenit-3SL rocket.

Of the 33 total launch attempts by the United States in 1999 (vs. 36 in 1998), 25 were on commercial expendable launchers (NASA/Shuttle: 3; military/Titan 2 & 4: 5). Total number of U.S. commercial payloads was 70, with 41 launched on U.S. carriers and 29 on foreign launchers (China: 2; Russia: 25, Europe: 2). Only two of the 25 commercial launch attempts of expendable U.S. space carriers failed. Specifically, Boeing launched 10 Delta-2 vehicles, followed by Lockheed Martin with five Atlas 2A and three Pegasus XL of Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC). However, Boeing's second launch of its new powerful Delta 3 with nine strap-on boosters, carrying the Orion 3 comsat, failed on 5/5 by placing the satellite in the wrong orbit, making it - after the loss of Ikonos-1 - the second of the two failures in 1999.

Questions or comments? Send a message to Jesco von Puttkamer

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