SP-4213 THE HUMAN FACTOR: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980

 

12

NASA life sciences from the Shuttle into the future

 

[193] In the 1970s, NASA's life scientists acquired an opportunity to develop a life sciences program that was not constrained by the practical requirements of specific manned missions. They were free to devise an integrated approach to biological and medical research, to design meaningful inflight investigations, to emphasize fundamental research in biomedicine, and to replace the pragmatic incremental approach to human research with the traditional mode of biomedical investigation. Biomedical aspects of Skylab and long-range planning for Space Shuttle operations reflected this shift in the role and responsibilities of the life sciences program.

Yet the life sciences program was not without problems. While the end of the Apollo program released life scientists from the pragmatism of the manned program of the 1960s, it also deprived them of certainty (i.e., clearly defined, readily identified mission objectives) and an important justification for life sciences activities. Moreover, the shift cast an old dilemma into a new mold: how to achieve a balanced life sciences program that would satisfy the demands of both the manned spaceflight program and the space sciences program. The history of the life sciences in the 1970s shows the efforts of life scientists to take advantage of new opportunities while resolving this dilemma and while maintaining and justifying their activities in the absence of a major national manned objective in space.

 

BIOMEDICAL ASPECTS OF SKYLAB

The Skylab program, which consisted of three manned missions flown between May 25,1973 and February 1974, was both an ending and a beginning. In operational terms, the Skylab missions were logical extensions of [194] the manned programs of the 1960s and the concluding phase of the manned missions that had begun with the first suborbital flight of Project Mercury. At the same time, Skylab represented the first U.S. step toward c space station The mission durations were chosen to extend the incremental approach to the qualification of man for spaceflight, and most of the biomedical investigations and experiments were designed in response to physiological and behavioral situations identified in the earlier flight programs.

Yet Skylab was also a major departure. The Skylab missions were the first in the American space program in which scientific investigations had the same level of priority as operational tasks and in which the astronauts had a fundamental responsibility to function as scientific investigators. Further, the Skylab program was not limited by specific short-range mission objectives; its objective was to evaluate man's capability for enduring flights up to 84 days in length, to understand some of the mechanisms underlying physiological adaptation to weightlessness, and to identify countermeasures that would permit man to perform effectively in flights of longer duration. The clinical studies and biomedical experiments of the Skylab flights were designed along classical lines of biomedical research and involved correlated studies of major body systems to determine the dynamics of physiological and behavioral responses to spaceflight.1 Skylab, then, was the first American effort to make fundamental research in biology and medicine an integral part of manned spaceflight operations and to give operational reality to the integrated life sciences program.

The complete history of Skylab, including its biomedical aspects, has been detailed in other studies and will receive only summary treatment here.2 The following survey of its biomedical investigations and findings will show the range of biomedical activities within the Skylab program and the expansion in scope of the biomedical aspects of manned spaceflight from the beginnings in Project Mercury. The Skylab program was significant in two ways. First, the missions qualified man for flights up to 84 days long and provided medically acceptable evidence of man's qualification for flights of longer duration. Second, the biomedical experiments and clinical investigations yielded important information on human physiological adaptation to weightlessness and affirmed the value of fundamental and coordinated biomedical investigations to long-range manned operations.

The Skylab biomedical program encompassed six areas: general clinical evaluations, neurophysiology, musculoskeletal functions, body fluid biochemistry and hematology, cardiovascular function, and nutrition and metabolic function. Experiments within these areas reflected clinical and research concerns derived from earlier manned missions: crew health stabilization and the prevention of inflight illnesses; vestibular function....

 


[
195]

Astronaut Joseph P. Kerwin, crew member of the first manned Skylab mission, examines the Human Vestibular Function, while astronaut Paul J. Weitz reads a checklist.

Astronaut Joseph P. Kerwin, crew member of the first manned Skylab mission, examines the Human Vestibular Function, while astronaut Paul J. Weitz reads a checklist. The experiment will help establish the validity of measurements of specific behavioral/physiological responses influenced by vestibular activity under one-g and zero-g conditions.

 

[196] ....and motion sickness, bone demineralization and muscle atrophy; red cell mass and blood volume losses; cardiovascular adaptations to weightlessness and orthostatic hypotension; and the metabolic costs of workloads in null gravity These investigations consisted of a broad range of pre- and postflight clinical studies and 13 biomedical experiments to study a variety of physiological functions and test the reliability of new bioinstruments.

 

CREW HEALTH STABILIZATION

The Skylab program for reducing the probability of inflight illness followed the basic procedures established in the latter stages of the Apollo program (see Table 4). A 21-day preflight isolation period was imposed, during which the number of primary contacts was strictly limited and the health of those contacts closely monitored. The 21-day period was selected because it covered the incubation period for the majority of infectious disease organisms.3

In Skylab a seven-day postflight isolation was added to protect returning crewmen, who might have increased susceptibility to infectious diseases due to the extended duration of the flights. This added period of isolation would also reduce the possibility of postflight infection interfering with the scientific evaluation of medical data and would prevent transfer of infections between flight crews.4

The program for prevention of inflight illnesses was closely linked to a series of microbiological investigations to detect the presence of potentiality pathogenic microorganisms on the crewmen and in the spacecraft and to gain an understanding of the response of these organisms to the spaceflight environment. The procedure entailed collecting samples of....

 

Table 4. Skylab Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program.

Primary Contacts

Class A and Class B

Illness reporting (voluntary)

up and down pointing arrows

Crew

Medical Surveillance Office

Primary Work Areas

(Crew Surgeon)

Program coordination

left and right pointing arrows

Active surveillance

Living quarters

left and right pointing arrows

Training

Security

Mobile trailers (JSC)

Records and data

Preventive measures

Crew quarters (KSC)

Medical status reports

Surgical masks

Food

up and down pointing arrows

Biorespirators

Travel

Clinic

Air filters

Medical examinations

PC qualification-disqualification

Badge control

SOURCE: Johnston and Dietlein, Biomedical Results from Skylab.

 


[
197]

Ames's Dr. Patricia Cowings straps laboratory assistant Leah Schafer into vertical acceleration device used to induce motion sickness in human volunteers.

Ames's Dr. Patricia Cowings straps laboratory assistant Leah Schafer into vertical acceleration device used to induce motion sickness in human volunteers. Dr. Cowings trains subjects to use biofeedback to prevent motion sickness.

 

[198] ....microbial flora from 12 separate sites on the bodies of the crewmen before and after each mission and 16 days before the termination of each mission (see Table 5). Analysis of these data demonstrated gross contamination of the Skylab environment, but failed to show that any of the inflight diseases during the Skylab missions was caused by this contamination or that the contamination posed a significant hazard for long-duration spaceflight.5

Overall, the Skylab health stabilization program appeared to significantly reduce the incidence of inflight infections. While upper respiratory infections and gastroenteritis were relatively common during the Apollo missions, they did not occur during the Skylab missions. Table 6 compares the occurrence of infectious diseases before the health stabilization program with that after the introduction of the program.

 

Table 5. Crew Sample Collection Sites 1

Sample designation

Area sampled

.

Neck

13 cm2 below hairline at base of neck

Ears 2

Right and left external auditory canals with two revolutions of each swab in each ear canal.

Axillae

6.5 cm2 below hair area on each side

Hands

6.5 cm2 on right and left palms

Navel

The internal area of the umbilicus, and a surrounding 13 cm2 area with at least two revolutions made with each swab

Groin

5cm strip from rear to front on right and left inguinal area between legs

Toes 2

Area between the two smallest toes of each foot

Nares 2

Both nostrils

Throat swab 2

Surfaces of tonsils and posterior pharyngeal vlaut swabbed with each of two dry calcium alginate swabs

Gargle

60 cm2 phosphate buffer used as gargle and washed through oral cavity three times

Urine

60 cm2 midstream sample

Feces

Two samples of 100 mg each taken from center of the feca specimen

Table 6. Effect of the Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program on the Occurrence of Illness in Prime Crewmen.

Health stabilization program absent

.

Health stabilization program operational

.

.

Mission

Illness type 1

Number of crewmen involved

Time period 2

Mission

Illness type 1

Number of crewmen involved

Time period 2

.

.

Apollo 7

URI

3

M

Apollo 14

.

.

.

Apollo 8

VG

3

P, M

Apollo 15

.

.

.

Apollo 9

URI

3

P

Apollo 16

.

.

.

Apollo 10

URI

2

P

Apollo 17

SI

1

P

Apollo 11

.

.

.

Skylab 2

.

.

.

Apollo 12

SI

2

M

Skylab 3

SI

2

M

Apollo 13

R

1

P

Skylab 4

SI

2

M

1 Illness type: URI = Upper Respiratory Infection; VG = Viral Gastroenteritis; SI = Skin Infection; R = Rubella exposrue.
2 Time period: M = During mission; P = Premission

 

 

[199] NEUROPHYSIOLOGY

Investigations in neurophysiology had two objectives: to test methods for predicting and controlling motion sickness and to identify the nature and cause of the vestibular changes that contribute to motion sickness. The investigations consisted of a three-part vestibular function experiment and a postflight evaluation of balance.6 The findings from these studies were basically inconclusive. Tests of susceptibility to motion sickness successfully predicted motion sickness events in only 22 percent of the cases and led to the conclusion that susceptibility on the ground is not an accurate indicator of inflight susceptibility. Rather, prevention of motion sickness involves adaptation and use of appropriate medications. Likewise, while these studies indicated that' otolith function is profoundly influenced by null gravity," the etiological factors connecting otolith function to motion sickness could not be identified. The general conclusion was that the "central memory network" is programmed to respond to a 1-G environment and requires "repatterning" through training to prevent distortion of "sensory inputs" in the null G environment.7

 

MUSCULOSKELETAL FUNCTIONS

As noted earlier, bone demineralization and muscle atrophy were anomalies observed in the Gemini and Apollo flights and were of significant concern to physicians. In Skylab, several investigations were conducted to measure the extent of musculoskeletal changes, to determine whether they represented a self-limiting adaptive response, and to test the reliability of instruments for measuring them. In one experiment, the dietary intake of the crew members was carefully monitored and compared with analyses of urine samples taken each 24 hours. A significant increase was observed in calcium and creatinine in the urine, both indicative of bone demineralization, and in nitrogen and phosphorus in the urine, indicative of muscle degeneration. These changes continued to increase throughout each of the three manned missions, suggesting that a self-limiting adaptive response was not occurring. As these changes occurred in spite of inflight exercise regimens, the findings indicated that musculoskeletal function could be an area of significant concern in longer duration flights.8 Other studies confirmed changes in bone density and muscle mass, but indicated that exercise programs could reduce atrophy in muscle strength.9 Overall, these investigations showed that weightlessness was the principal factor in bone and muscle atrophy in spaceflight and that there was a need for intensive investigations to understand these phenomena and identify effective countermeasures.10

 

BODY FLUID BlOCHEMISTRY

[200] Early theories and practical experiences in the manned flights of the 1970s suggested that weightlessness causes, through a complex biomedical reaction, a loss in body fluid. In simplest terms, weightlessness causes a reduction in total circulating blood volume, which reduces hormones controlling excretion and leads to elimination of body fluids. It was theorized that this change was a response to the space environment. To test this idea, determine the scope of this change, and identify the mechanisms involved, Skylab investigators conducted experiments to measure changes in blood volume, body fluid output, and the biochemistry of body fluids.11 Their findings confirmed that changes occur in blood and body fluid volume and body fluid chemistry in direct response to weightlessness, that these changes appear to be self-limiting and successful adaptations to the spaceflight environment, and that the specific dynamics are uncertain.12

 

HEMATOLOGY

Data gathered during the 4-, 8-, and 14-day Gemini flights indicated a significant loss in red cell mass However, physicians could not determine whether this was a self-limiting adaptive response or a condition that would become worse as the duration of flights was extended. They also could not identify the precise cause of this change, though they suspected that it was a toxic reaction to prolonged exposure to highly oxygenated atmospheres. In the Skylab missions, medical scientists sought to measure the duration of the change and determine whether it was an adaptive response or a reaction to oxygen toxicity.13

The findings confirmed that the decrease in red cell mass "is a constant occurrence in space flight," but that the phenomenon is self-limiting. The effect did not increase steadily as mission duration increased. However, a 30-day delay occurred before the change began to reverse itself. The success of the 83-day mission suggested that this rather lengthy recovery, though a matter of clinical concern, would not pose a hazard in longer duration missions. Efforts to identify the cause of this change were unsuccessful, though the relevant experiment indicated that it was not a response to oxygen toxicity. Rather, some unidentified factor was believed to cause a suppression in bone marrow activity and a consequent decrease in red cell mass.14

 

CARDIOVASCULAR STUDIES

The Mercury and Gemini flights revealed a significant decrease in postflight orthostatic tolerance and suggested that the body makes [201] cardiovascular adaptations to weightlessness that interfere with cardiovascular function on return to a 1-G environment. Skylab investigations were conducted to determine the extent and time course of changes in orthostatic tolerance in flight, to determine whether data collected in flight could be used to predict postflight orthostatic intolerance, and to determine whether changes in orthostatic tolerance can be minimized by inflight exercise.15 The findings confirmed that the cardiovascular system changes to adapt to weightlessness, that this adaptation stabilizes in four to six weeks, that the change does not impair inflight physiological function or performance, and that it does not affect exercise tolerance in flight. Further, the change appeared to be a result of undetermined factors that reduce circulating blood volume, although this was not confirmed. Postflight studies showed that orthostatic tolerance decreased only after return to the Earth and was directly related to inflight exercise. This finding pointed to the need for an effective inflight exercise program.16

 

BIOMEDICAL PLANNING FOR THE SPACE SHUTTLE ERA

The biomedical results of Skylab justified the objectives of the integrated life sciences program and generated optimism that the program would continue to grow and develop within the context of a space program based on use of a Space Shuttle. NASA initiated the development program for the Space Shuttle after two years of study and President Nixon's call for a reusable space transportation system that would offer "less costly and less complicated ways of transporting payloads into space."17 Although the Shuttle would be the prime focus of the manned spaceflight program through the early 1980s, it was to be the first component of an eventual multistage space transportation system, which would include the Shuttle, a space tug, and a space station. The Shuttle would transport passengers and payloads from the Earth to low Earth orbit; the space tug would ferry them from low orbit to higher orbits or to the space station; and the space station would function as a staging area for interplanetary flights and as a site for extended spaceflight operations and scientific investigations. In the interim between initial operations and completion of the system, the Shuttle, the tug, a space lab, and various automated satellites would serve as the modalities for both operations and inflight investigations.18 However, at the close of the Skylab program, NASA had full approval and funding only for the development of the basic Space Shuttle and its initial operational tests. NASA had authorization to proceed with planning for the development of the other components, but the time frame for full funding, final design development, and actual operation was uncertain.

[202] In spite of the uncertainties, life scientists were confident that the Shuttle and subsequent developments would be boons to the space life sciences. They were most excited about the prospect of carrying out life sciences experiments in space in laboratories under conditions approximating those on the ground.19 Previously, life scientists had been forced to use bioinstruments of questionable reliability in remote monitoring of biological processes and to design their experiment packages with engineering constraints, thus compromising scientific objectives With a reusable system, experimental payloads could be designed as closed units which could be returned to the Earth for analysis if required, weight and space would no longer be major constraints, and life sciences experiments would not have to be designed as one shot operations but could be carried on over a series of flights.

Life scientists also saw in the Shuttle an opportunity to use trained scientists as inflight investigators and obtain data on the physiological effects of spaceflight from a diversity of passengers. Previously, data were drawn from flight crews who were well suited and carefully selected for space missions. At the same time, a large body of data was obtained from a very small sample of human beings. With the Shuttle flights, scientists could study passengers who were more representative of the general population and obtain data from a broad sample.20 Many life scientists were especially interested in the opportunity to study the effects of spaceflight on women and wished to know the degree to which sex is a factor, if at all, in adaptation to weightlessness and if special countermeasures are necessary to protect women astronauts from the effects of extended duration spaceflight.21

A third advantage that life scientists saw in Shuttle operations was the opportunity to study physiological changes during the first three to five days of spaceflight, the critical period during which physiological adaptations begin. In Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab, this was not possible because of the short duration of the missions or the need for the astronauts to devote themselves exclusively to operational tasks during the first days. After the initial Shuttle qualification flights, operational tasks would not monopolize the time of the flight crews, and some of the Shuttle passengers would have no involvement in operational tasks. Consequently, data could be obtained on this critical period of adaptation.22

Finally, life scientists were buoyed by the prospect of a permanent orbiting space station. This would provide opportunities to conduct controlled studies over very long periods to evaluate human responses, to conduct long-range, uninterrupted biomedical experiments, and to conduct biological investigations at all biological levels. Equally important, [203] they viewed the space station as an opportunity to move toward biological investigations of the planets.23

Anticipating that the space transportation system world become fully operational by 1985, life scientists in NASA and the National Academy of Sciences devised long-range plans for biomedical research for the Shuttle era from about 1982 to 1991. These plans followed traditional life sciences categories and divided the Shuttle life sciences programs into space biology, biomedicine, planetary biology, and man-machine relationships These four subprograms were to (1) further investigations into the origin of life and the search for extraterrestrial life, (2) continue research on mechanisms of adaptation to spaceflight and identify criteria for developing countermeasures, (3) continue the refinement of advanced technology for life support, protective systems, and work aids, and (4) implement techniques for studying in animals and lower organisms physiologic al changes observed during manned flights that cannot be easily or safely studied through experiments with man.24

However, life scientists understood the realities of the space program and recognized that implementation of this long-range research program could be delayed until well beyond 1985. Consequently, they also focused on designing life sciences payloads for the early Shuttle flights. The life sciences investigations would be conducted in low orbit with the Shuttle itself and automated subsatellites. Life scientists anticipated that this arrangement would prevail through the early 1990s. Accordingly, they established somewhat modest short-range goals, emphasizing weightlessness as the variable of fundamental concern to both space biologists and space physicians. Their two short-range goals were to study "basic biological and physical mechanisms . . . and . . . changes over time in biological systems," and to gain information for developing "countermeasures and support systems to extend man's capability to live and work in space." Life scientists planned to meet these objectives in three ways. First, they planned to develop an automated life sciences research module that would contain an array of biological specimens and would remain in space for extended periods. This module would be ferried into low orbit by the Shuttle, and subsequent Shuttle flights would retrieve and return packages from the module. Basically, the module would be used to study the long-term effects of weightlessness, radiation, and altered circadian rhythms. Other biomedical experiments would be conducted in a laboratory designed for incorporation in the Shuttle and through experiment payloads flown according to a predetermined schedule. The operation of the laboratory and the monitoring of the payloads would be the responsibility of trained scientists carried as passengers on the Shuttle.25

 

[204] LIFE SCIENCES MANAGEMENT IN THE SHUTTLE ERA

Designing a long-range research program was one matter; implementing it in the face of political and administrative constraints was quite another Responsibility for effecting the transition from a life sciences program oriented almost exclusively to support for manned spaceflight operations to one stressing fundamental research in biology and medicine fell to Dr. David L. Winter. Winter, a physician, medical scientist, and specialist in neurophysiology, was deputy director of the life science directorate at Ames from 1971 to 1974. He was appointed to the life sciences division at NASA Headquarters by Administrator Fletcher following recommendations that NASA place the division under the direction of a research-oriented, rather than flight-oriented, medical scientist.26

Winter came into a situation where, at the time of his appointment, the life sciences director reported to the administrator for manned spaceflight. Thus, he was responsible for developing a life sciences program that would support fundamental research in biology and medicine while functioning within a program office that had a strong traditional orientation toward applied research, biotechnology, and medical operations and that was staffed by personnel who favored that orientation.27 After devoting a year to devising a life sciences program directed at balancing the differing requirements of manned operations and space science, Winter and his office were transferred to the space sciences program office. The administrators of that office were primarily physical scientists who had no tradition of involvement in the manned program, and who were as devoted to basic research and theoretical science as the manned spaceflight administrators had been to manned spaceflight applications. Moreover, several key administrators in the space sciences office had a low opinion of the life sciences program. They believed that it had failed to achieve the same level of scientific excellence as the physical science and astronomy programs.28 Winter was in the unenviable position of having to shift from an office where he strove to justify a balanced and integrated life sciences program to administrators who had little interest in basic science, to an office where he had to justify such a balanced program to administrators who had little interest in applied research, biotechnology, and medical operations.

Winter, at the time of his appointment, understood that he was to design a life sciences program that would define the standards for passengers on the Shuttle, determine human requirements and man-machine requirements for Shuttle era operations, and devise biological and medical experiments that would form the life sciences payloads for Shuttle operations.29 However, the space science administrators had somewhat different objectives. When he announced the reorganization of [205] September 1975, Fletcher specified that the space science office would have responsibility for defining the scientific parameters for the Shuttle era (see Chapter 11). The key space science administrators, Noel Hinners and John Naugle, interpreted this as meaning that the space science office would focus exclusively on science and would not be constrained by the requirements of the manned space program. Accordingly, they directed Winter to design a life sciences program that would be acceptable to research scientists and that would attract as much respect and support from academic life scientists as the physical science and astronomy programs had. They specifically did not want a life sciences program that was justified primarily by its applications to manned spaceflight.30

As a scientist with no strong identification with the manned space program, Winter shared the desire for a program that would make scientific contributions and would be respected by life scientists outside NASA. However, although he shared the overall goal of the space scientists, his conception of the responsibilities of science was different from theirs. As a medical scientist, Winter was heir to a different scientific tradition than that inherited by Hinners and Naugle. Medical science has never been totally divorced from human applications; its theories are formulated with the expectation that they will have eventual application in clinical situations. Physical scientists have a tradition of science for science's sake, a belief that scientific theories can be formulated without regard to practical applications. To a large extent, biological scientists (as opposed to medical scientists) share the latter tradition. Winter's medical orientation, combined with his understanding that he was responsible for establishing a balanced life sciences program, caused him to work toward the formulation of a life sciences program that, though scientific in orientation, gave major attention to the role of life sciences in support of manned spaceflight.31 Hinners and Naugle viewed this as a repudiation of their directives to Winter.32

In addition, bureaucratic inertia complicated Winter's attempts to develop an appropriately balanced program. Although the life sciences division had been transferred to a new program office, the loyalties of many of the key administrators and staff remained fixed in the manned spaceflight program. The staff that followed Winter in September 1975 included Dr. Stanley Deutsch, a psychologist and human factors specialist, Dr. Sherman Vinograd, a physician, medical scientist, and specialist in space physiology and clinical space medicine, Dr. Rufus Hessberg, a physician and retired Air Force flight surgeon, Dan Popma, a bioengineer and life systems specialist, and Dr. Richard Young, a biologist. All but Hessberg had been with NASA since the early 1960s; Hessberg had joined NASA in 1966 after a career in aerospace medical programs in the Air Force Only Young had a background in basic research and the biological [206] sciences and strong connections with academic life scientists. Thus, the 'new" life sciences program within the space science office was to be defined and implemented by personnel whose careers were linked to the manned space program of the 1960s and who justified the agency's work in terms of its applications to manned spaceflight. A similar situation prevailed at the NASA centers The Johnson Space Center life science division, which would have primary responsibility for life sciences support of the Shuttle at project level, was appropriately, overwhelmingly oriented toward manned spaceflight applications. The director of the life sciences office, Richard S. Johnston, was a chemist with a background in the development, testing, and evaluation of environmental control systems. His staff consisted primarily of physicians, veterinarians, and bioengineers, most of whom had been with the space program since the early days and few of whom had any strong interest in fundamental life sciences research and development that were not linked to manned spacefIight. 33

If Winter had a failing, it lay in his unwillingness to replace these people with others oriented toward the more fundamental aspects of life sciences research. He valued the experience they brought to the program, respected their credentials-and their loyalty to the agency-and shared their assumption that life sciences research should have an ultimate application to manned spaceflight.34 Moreover, Winter would have encountered problems had he tried to remove them. Besides being protected by Civil Service regulations, their removal could be expected to cause widespread unrest and undermine morale.

Within this context, Winter proceeded to develop a life sciences program that was closely linked to the future of manned spaceflight. Following guidelines set down in various studies of the life sciences aspects of the Shuttle era, Winter directed a program that had a number of notable accomplishments. Under his direction, the life sciences office supported the first studies of the physiological requirements for space passengers who were not test pilots, including the first American effort to determine whether women differed from men in their response to the conditions of spaceflight and whether they had special requirements beyond the obvious (e g., special adapters for waste disposal). Other accomplishments included the development of flight suits to meet the diversity of requirements in the future space program, development of experiment protocols to extend study of physiological and behavioral data derived from Skylab and to evaluate changes occurring during the first three to five days of spaceflight, and design of experiment packages to study mechanisms of long-duration biological changes as manifested in lower organisms. Perhaps, to some degree, the most important accomplishment of Winter's administration was diplomatic rather than scientific: he played [207] a major role in establishing and maintaining U.S -Soviet interactions in the life sciences, which led to the sharing of vital life sciences data between the two nations.35

In spite of these accomplishments, the space science administrators did not believe Winter was taking the life sciences program in the direction they desired. They concluded that he was not developing a truly scientific program and was continuing to justify the life sciences in terms of manned spaceflight applications. 36 To some extent, this view was supported by the findings of a study of NASA's life sciences program undertaken by the Life Sciences Advisory Committee in 1978 (though overall, the report was generally favorable).37 Winter's superiors were also disturbed that he had not made a greater effort to replace old-line administrators and believed that he was an ineffective administrator.38 Given these differences, a conflict gradually developed between Winter and space science administrator Hinners, and Winter resigned under pressure in 1979.

 

THE LIFE SCIENCES AND THE FUTURE

In 1981 the future of NASA's life sciences program was unclear, primarily because the future of the American space program was uncertain. Throughout the 1970s NASA's life scientists rested their hopes in the Space Shuttle and the transportation system that would follow It was no longer certain that the Shuttle would lead to a reactivated manned space program in the near future or generate support for crash efforts to place a space station in orbit or conduct manned interplanetary flights.

Devising a life sciences program that would be ready to respond to whatever contingencies emerged was the objective of the new NASA life sciences director, Dr. Gerald Soffen. The appointment of Gerald Soffen as David Winter's replacement may have signified a commitment by NASA management to free the life sciences completely from the constraints of the manned space program. Soffen was the first life sciences administrator in NASA's history who did not have a background in medicine. He has a doctorate in biophysics and undergraduate and graduate training in biology. One of the first scientists professionally committed to exobiology, Soffen has been involved in exobiology with NASA since the early 1960s and was project scientist for Viking.39

Soffen admired Winter and respected his efforts and accomplishments; nonetheless, he was committed to eliminating the problems that led to Winter's departure. Soffen's first effort was to encourage old-line life scientists to retire and to identify younger life scientists who would be able to make imaginative contributions to "new" life sciences planning. He was committed to developing a life sciences program oriented toward [208] the basic biological sciences as impacted by the environment of space, and to making the most of whatever opportunities emerge as the future space program evolves rather than toward solving specific biomedical problems of specific types of manned missions. In this light, he believed that Winter's major error lay in his efforts to design a science-oriented life sciences program within a philosophical framework of manned spaceflight carried over from the 1960s. That philosophy was one in which the focus was on the problems that lay in the way of manned flight and the search for solutions to those problems. With that emphasis, Soffen believed, NASA's life scientists never took full advantage of the opportunities for research that were available.

In line with his own philosophy, Soffen did not intend to devise a long-range life sciences program, but rather to lay the groundwork on which a continuously evolving program can be built. He believed that the heart of the program should be the formation of a team of imaginative scientists able to identify specific, attainable scientific goals, and find ways to take advantage of whatever spaceflight systems are available for achieving those goals. He hoped that such a team would be able to pursue answers to meaningful scientific questions and, in so doing, lay the groundwork for life scientists who follow. One of the more intriguing questions which NASA has the capability for answering, Soffen believed, is how biology fits into and interacts with larger systems. He saw this as the type of question that can be answered through research in space, has implications for both global ecology and spacecraft ecology, and links problems of the terrestrial environment with those of the spacecraft environment.40

 

CONCLUSION

NASA's approach to the "human factor"-or life sciences research-resulted to a large degree from the engineering requirements of placing man in space, for limited periods of time, to demonstrate U.S. technological capabilities. The content of a coherent life sciences program within the agency would depend on the differing attitudes of scientists and engineers toward qualifying and supporting humans in space, scientific study of the effects of the space environment on biological matter, and a search for extraterrestrial life.

One fundamental issue was whether the manned space program should be directed by scientists or by engineers who would pursue its development as they had the development of a research airplane (incremental exploration and expansion of capabilities with human operators). Resolution of this issue would govern the agency's strategy for qualifying man for spaceflight and would decide whether it should seek increased funding for "space biology" as distinct from human factors research. The argument [209] proceeded to the accompaniment of recurrent complaints that the manned space program was draining excessive resources from space science.

NASA's development of a life sciences program suffered not only from philosophical differences but also from inconsistent direction and management. NASA life sciences research was no less subject to the fiscal and political fluctuations that affected the space program than any other part of NASA. NASA's own study of the human factor" finally fell victim to a human factor: personalities and competing aspirations combined with managerial failure to specify objectives, to delegate authority along with responsibility, and to insist on timely implementation of its objectives to undermine the development of a strong and effective program. Notwithstanding the triumphs of NASA's Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle programs, the agency still had to demonstrate its ability to fully integrate life sciences into the U.S. venture into space.

The close of NASA's first quarter-century proved critical for the nation's space program. As the successful space transportation system achieved nearly operational status with ever more frequent flights, the agency won in January 1984 President Ronald Reagan's endorsement of a new initiative to develop a permanently manned Earth-orbiting space station, and to have such a station operational by the centennial year of Christopher Columbus's voyage, 1992.

A successful space station program will provide the United States and its international partners space-based facilities enabling routine, continuous use of space for science, applications, technology development, commercial exploitation of the unique space environment, and space operations. None of this can be achieved, however, unless NASA develops and exploits the synergism of the man-machine combination in space. Moreover, one or more of the space station's proposed habitation, logistic, service, and laboratory modules will be dedicated to research and technology development pertinent to the life sciences. This will provide the life sciences community with its first opportunity for continuous, detailed study of man, and other biological matter, in the space environment.

Of longer term significance to the life sciences is the fact that the presence in Earth orbit of a space station will enable the agency to consider more extensive lunar exploration and possibly lunar colonization. The possibility of extended stays in space, whether on the space station or for lunar and planetary visits, will have profound impacts on life sciences research. Not only will the effects of zero gravity be of concern, but the synergistic effects of a combination of space environmental factors will pose special problems: How will different levels of gravity, when combined with different radiation exposures, different atmospheric constituents [210], and different day-night and seasonal cycles, affect humans and other biological matter? What will new generations look like, and what will be the nature of their mental and intellectual growth? How will we sustain and house humans and provide them with the tools to function effectively in these distant, hostile environments? These are difficult questions that must be resolved by life scientists and engineers in the coming decades, supported by effective and coherent strategies of program management with a full appreciation of the increasingly complex research and development challenges of future decades.


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