| 3.1 Communications Market | 3.2 Space Manufacturing | 3.3 Remote Sensing | 3.4 Government Missions | 3.5 Transportation Missions |
| 3.6 Entertainment | 3.7 New Missions | 3.8 Space Utilities | 3.9 Extraterrestrial Resources | 3.10 Advertising |
The following sections describe the following transportation market segments: Space Rescue, Fast Package Delivery, Space Servicing/Transfer, Hazardous Waste Disposal, Space Tourism Transportation, and Ultra High Speed Civil Transport.
Assuming the large traffic predictions for the transportation markets are realized, the required fleet size will be substantially larger than for other CSTS market groups. If the fast package delivery concept is realized, this market will set the fleet size for all the CSTS missions; likewise, the hazardous waste disposal market represents the largest market as measured by its mass-to-orbit requirements. Given the low net revenue per flight, it is imperative that the unit cost of the vehicles be as low as possible, assuming commercial amortization rates. This requirement should feed back into the design process instead of attempting to minimize the production costs after development.
Most of the CSTS markets will have as a requirement vastly improved service. In the transportation area, high flight rates dictate flight schedules (availability) must be maintained to a high degree of confidence. This can be achieved through very high reliability systems, fault tolerance, and spares/extra flight vehicles.
It appears that, in many ways, the requirements for transportation markets may be the most difficult to satisfy. One strategy is to exclude these markets from inclusion in a total aggregate until a second-generation commercial space transportation system is likely. Another view is that by addressing the stringent requirements for the transportation segments, other commercial markets will be able to use the same vehicles or technology without bearing the development costs and risks.
Transportation markets provide leveraged growth for many other market areas. Beyond the jobs associated with developing, manufacturing, and operating the system, other terrestrial analogs would suggest there are several times as many jobs associated with the transportation markets.
Timely rescue of humans and/or valuable space assets has heretofore not been possible. In the unforgiving environment of space, minor system failures or natural disasters (such as micrometeor strikes), can result in loss of life or the degradation of expensive assets.
In order to mitigate these potentially disastrous results, conceptually an industry would be created to rapidly and flexibly respond to crisis situations. Figure 3.5.2.1-1 lists some of the terrestrial services that are analogous.
Many terrestrial rescue services are not for profit, operating from municipal, tax-based revenues. The cost of rescue services is based on a cultural perception of the value of such services, rather than an economic analysis. Similarly, the assured crew return vehicle (ACRV), a planned rescue capability for NASA's space station, is not economically justified by any reasonable value assessed to the life of astronauts.
Other rescue services are based on economics. Terrestrially, even paying a high premium for a specialty company to extinguish and cap a burning oil well is justified by the revenue-earning oil that is preserved. In space, there have been several high-profile satellite repair missions. As there was not the element of time urgency associated with the term rescue, these examples will be discussed in Section 3.5.4, Space Servicing/Transfer. It is possible in the future that a situation such as was described in the previous vision statement would result in the requirement for rapid response. The failure to act in a timely manner could result in tremendous costs for some space ventures when one considers loss of revenue, customers migrating to functioning alternatives, and replacement costs.
The market then, is for a service that could rapidly respond to any number of possible emergencies in space and perform a successful rescue (meaning extract, stabilize, rapidly repair, or retrieve) at an acceptable cost.
In the past, space rescue was all but technologically impossible. Pre-positioned rescue assets such as the ACRV have been studied for manned missions. Ground-based rescue concepts are attractive when one considers the advantages of checking the hardware immediately before use and making any modifications to accommodate unique rescue situations. Rapid response of launch vehicles was possible (witness the ICBMs in their silos) but not with a nonstandard payload and certainly not to any random orbital destination.
When all this basic information is known, one would have to probabilistically assess likely failure rates and modes. This does not require a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for all possible spacecraft. It would be important to acknowledge that some spacecraft are more likely to need rescue and some are more likely to be able to be rescued.
The value of rescue must also be considered. Insurance actuarials could be used to understand the monetary compensation that could be expected: if the price of the space rescue mission is lower than the amount paid out by insurance, law suits, and so forth, someone will pay for the service.
As much of the information required to do this market evaluation awaits the completion of this phase of the CSTS, no results can be presented yet.
The system will have adaptive guidance and large reserves of propellant to permit flexible, off-optimum rendezvous. Control and physical attachment with the rescued object will need to be largely autonomous with telepresence as a backup. Finally the rescue vehicle must be able to reenter and land with a large, minimally restrained payload (rescued items) with a wide range of possible centers of gravity.
If available in an unclassified format, the U.S. Navy submarine rescue experience could provide an excellent data source for interfacing in hostile environments.
In general, a successful space rescue concept would have to be very versatile in its ability to interface with any number of spacecraft.
After Global Express and TechnoWorld are called, a replacement board is whisked to evening express flight out of L.A. (San Francisco is still constructing its own express port). The cost in shipping charges paid to Global Express is $9,842. At 10:52 p.m., PST, the delivery rocket to the space port in Singapore, landing 48 minutes later at 3:40 p.m. local time. By 5:15, the board is delivered to the factory, enabling resumption of operations by Wednesday morning . . . .
The concept of fast package delivery via a form of commercial space transportation is a logical extrapolation in the history of commerce. Rapid transport of physical goods is desirable for several reasons. Getting the product to market first can be the difference between success and failure. Competitive markets are driven to offer enhanced service (which includes responsive delivery and/or repairs) when the difference between the price or product quality of competing products is indistinguishable. For some industries, the higher costs associated with a more rapid transport of products is still preferable to the even higher cost of warehousing extensive inventories. Some products are too perishable to be viable unless the time in transit is very low.
The fast package delivery mission does not go to a stable orbit, and one may validly ask why this market area is included in a study of commercial space transportation. As will be discussed in later subsections, the system solution will embody almost all of the attributes that an orbital system would have. The total energy required can be up to ~85% of an orbital mission, apogees can approach 800 nmi, and reentry profiles are as severe as a return from orbit. Operationally, the requirements for a fast package delivery vehicle include rapid turnaround, a high degree of reusability, low unit costs, and high reliability-all the same as (or better than) orbital missions. Furthermore, the market is near-term, which means some operations could conceivably begin today, at nearly today's costs, with the availability of a system. Finally, as the vehicles for fast package delivery tend to be smaller and technically less demanding than for other CST markets, fast package delivery offers the potential to serve as a bridging mission: investors, operators, and governments will learn and gain confidence in routine space transportation. Lower development risks and cost, lower valued payloads (liability), and evolutionary technology implementation will enable the hardware manufacturer some latitude to learn how to make a commercial space vehicle.}
Therefore, the study approach for this market began with an examination of current and predicted facets of air freight, and in particular, the fast package services that use aircraft transportation. The thesis is that by understanding the lessons learned and business models of this service/transportation industry, a reasonable and traceable extrapolation to a new fast package delivery market could be made.
In the express delivery services market, even more optimistic predictions are claimed. The United States market, where the concept first was implemented, is the largest, worth approximately $16 billion and will continue to grow at some modest rate. In Europe and eastern Asia, companies are still learning to exploit the advantages of overnight and/or same day delivery services in their businesses. One could expect significant growth in these markets. True transoceanic fast package delivery appears mainly in limited markets and is mostly based upon charter-type operations. As the global economy becomes more and more interdependent, regular fast package delivery services will become a necessity, not a luxury (in the same way U.S. businesses have come to depend on Federal Express, DHL, Emery Worldwide, etc.).
There are some foreseeable factors that may limit the demand for fast package delivery. A significant percentage of current fast package users transport original documentation or currency to execute business transactions. With time, electronic signatures and money transfers are increasingly viewed as legal and acceptable, reducing the demand for physical transport of packages. Another factor relates to the capabilities of air transport: for small items, the trend in airplane design has created a glut of "free" cargo capacity in the belly holds that will attract some products that find that their time criticality is not worth the higher price of fast package delivery services.
Figure 3.5.3.3-1 depicts the forces and constraints at work in the development of a fast package delivery service. There are two product classes that would use a fast package delivery system: (1) commodities/services for which customers are willing to pay a premium for speed of delivery and (2) commodities/services in created markets that were previously impossible due to the perishable nature of the product. The first category is typified by the difference between fees charged for overnight letters vis-a-vis conventional postal rates. An analogous example in air freight for the second class of product would be the inception of transoceanic flights of fresh cut flowers.
Data gleaned from current air freight practices may prove instructive on predicting why customers would use fast delivery services. Figure 3.5.3.3-2 lists the top five United States imports and exports commodity groups via air transport in 1992. The items are not intuitively obvious! Note, too, that the intrinsic value of the items being shipped represent a wide range- from 1 to 10,000 $/lb. Each of these industry groups has made a trade between the higher cost of air shipment and the costs of warehousing, "buying more time" for production, customer responsiveness, and service, and beating the competition to market. Similarly, our inability to precisely define the users of fast package delivery does not imply users will not exist.
Another potentially lucrative area of time-value delivery would be in the form of specialty machines or electronic parts and assemblies. As in the fictitious example given in the introduction to this market segment, the value of such items should be calculated to include more than the basic price of the item. The cost of downtime and inconvenience to many enterprises is potentially huge. A premium fast package delivery service would be part of just-in-time manufacturing principles, critical repair service, and supply-line disruption recovery. It is likely that a "package" of this type will represent the payload that will size the transportation system. Note that the cost of the delivery service must meet or beat the sum costs of transporting, storing, and depreciating comparable commodities.
The commodities and markets that would be created by a fast package delivery service may include items such as human organs for transplantation, fresh food delicacies, or biologic specimens for research.
Providing human organs for transplantation is a good example of a service enabled by a fast package delivery. As seen in Figure 3.5.3.3-3, the demand for transplant organs is growing at a fast pace, as medical technology improves techniques to minimize rejection. Opinions in interviews with the medical community were diverse as to the appropriateness of an expanded transplant network. Some believe that artificial or cloned organs will obviate the need for the current donor/recipient matching systems. Currently, potential recipients typically relocate to an urban area that has a facility specializing in a certain type of operation and wait agonizing months until a donor is matched (assuming one is found at all, before death occurs). When a donor is found, the salvageable organs are carefully removed and packaged and whisked to the recipients' facility (typically by a chartered Learjet). Transplant availability is limited by the lifetime of the organ outside of the body (as little as 4 hours in the case of a heart). Faster transit time would significantly expand the range of potential donors. Some ethicists have expressed concern over the possibility of "harvesting" third world organs; there will be many aspects of this fast package delivery market that will have to be resolved before implementation. The fact is that if properly done, an expanded pool of donors would save many lives.
Market user surveys have been useful in identifying the issues and thresholds of a number of commodities. Quantitative data, however, are virtually impossible to gather: the initial operating capability of such a system in well beyond the long-range planning horizon of most prospective users. Additionally, it would appear that traffic estimates are highly elastic to transportation cost-at a sufficiently low cost, the mature relationship between air freight and other transportation modes would disruptively shift, making credible prediction difficult.
Another approach is to back into an estimate of economic validity. The cargo industry generally considers that products can bear about 3% to 6% of their value, in the aggregate, for transportation. Although there are examples of individual commodities varying from this range, this rule of thumb has a fairly good correlation to any number of transportation systems (including air freight). If one assumes that an operational fast package delivery system will meet with customer acceptance by falling in a similar range, one could assess the parametric value of typical products versus the anticipated range of CST system transportation costs. Figure 3.5.3.3-4 illustrates the range of likely product values as transportation cost is varied. At the right of the graph are some notional products and what their "value" is (remember, as in the introduction example, value includes a time component). From this exercise, it would appear that there are products for which fast package delivery is economically sound.
International air transport is legally possible because issues such as liability have been resolved in treaties. The fast package delivery concept involves more launch and landing sites and more overflight of population centers than any other commercial space mission. Space transportation does not, as of yet, enjoy the same degree of understanding or precedent as atmospheric flight activities. The treaty "Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects" (in force October 9, 1973) would seem to need some amendment. Basically liability is assessed to the country where the launch physically occurred. As written, this could be a strong disincentive to some nations to engage in fast package commerce.
Other issues would include interface with regional, national, and local air traffic control networks to ensure safety of atmospheric flight operations. Regulations concerning noise abatement, curfews, and environmental impact are real concerns for a system that must fly often and in proximity to population centers. Range safety, as currently defined, will be too cumbersome to implement at so many launch sites, and will probably be eliminated in favor of strict certification requirements.
Discussion of the pros and cons of each option, and the implications for a transportation system follow.
Limiting service to major destinations would enable startup of operations with the least number of vehicles and would simplify maintenance logistics. Figure 3.5.3.3-5 depicts the current top air freight traffic city pairs in terms of mass. One could presume that fast package delivery would best be suited to these markets, where the collection/distribution systems are in place and demand is high. Selecting the top "n" markets would then determine the vehicle/fleet requirements. It should be noted that these city pairs do not necessarily correspond to the largest population or industrial base. In some cases, a particular industry has found that air freight is important to its operations and uses the service heavily. For example, Columbus, Ohio, has a private airfield that supports the arrival of 747s loaded with imported clothing for The Limited.
Designing a system to land in many locations, while staging in only a few could dramatically enhance utility of the system. Returning the vehicle to a launching site (assuming reusability) is potentially a major cost, and reduces the availability of the system.
Scheduled service in many city pairs will create a large and stable demand for fast package delivery. If the experience of the express mail market has any relevance to commercial space fast package delivery, the key lesson is this: there is a number, a critical mass, of networked nodes (cities) that cause the number of users to explode. The theory is the subject of doctoral dissertations, but the practical experience is worth examining. Federal Express began with a limited route structure flying small business jets, and lost money. When larger capacity airplanes and a nationwide network was established, an era of tremendous profitability was sustained. On the down side, there is a large upfront investment required to establish this capability (note that express mail service companies had the fortuitous timing to expand when a glut of used, convertible aircraft were available; no such used launch vehicle market exists).
The answer may lie, as it does with express mail/air freight, in a hybrid mix of operations. Currently charter operations account for about 10% of the revenues of the express delivery industry. If service really is of paramount importance to the users, the expense of the extra vehicles may be justified.
Estimating the size of the fast package delivery market, and the operating cost requirements ($/lb) was attempted via several methods. For a new market, none of these methods is rigorous to provide a precise estimate, but it was hoped some patterns would emerge.
In the first method, an extrapolation of Federal Express international operations was made. Federal Express was chosen because it is an industry leader and some financial data were available. Approximately one-quarter of its revenue is attributable to international operations. Applying this ratio to the ~$16 billion express market would indicate the current international express market is worth ~$4 billion annually. One could parametrically vary the percentage of that market that may be captured by a fast package delivery service as well as the rate of growth in international package services. Figure 3.5.3.3-6 portrays the range of annual mass estimates that result.
It is instructive to look at some 1991 data for mail, priority mail, and express mail (Fig. 3.5.3.3-7). One could extrapolate to a fast package delivery market from these data (recognizing that mail data are not all-inclusive and other services such as charter operations are unrepresented). For example, if five million items were transported at $100 each, the market would be $500 million annually.
There are two classes of transportation systems that can achieve the fast package mission. The first, as represented in the previous example, is a boost/glide system. The system performs an initial accelerating burn that lofts the vehicle/payload in an elliptical, suborbital trajectory. The propulsion system (rockets) operates for only a small fraction of the flight time. As the vehicle reenters the atmosphere, it is aligned in such a way to cause it to skip along the highest fringes of the atmosphere. This technique maximizes the range for a minimum amount of propulsive energy and limits the aerodynamic and thermodynamic loads on the reentering vehicle.
Other transportation system requirements would probably include a minimization of vibration and environmental extremes given the diversity and unknown fragility of the packages.
Reliability is a key requirement for a fast package service operator. What the operator defines as reliability is not the same as what the transportation hardware industry thinks of as reliability. The typical user of current express services only approaches such companies when all their other, slower, less expensive options have been explored. CST fast package delivery users could be expected to fit the same profile. Businesses do not usually plan to get into situations where premium express delivery is the difference between success and failure. When their services are employed, the express companies are expected to deliver as advertised. Failure to do so virtually guarantees there will be no repeat customers. What the fast package delivery operator defines as reliable will be the ability to deliver a given package at its intended destination and time with a very high degree of confidence.
If, as is the experience of current express package services, fast package delivery customers implicitly demand this form of reliable delivery 99.999% of the time, there are some major implications to a commercial space transportation venture. The space transportation developers may immediately translate this into a required vehicle reliability of 0.99999, a major development challenge. Realizing that subsonic aircraft have high "reliabilities," but only "dispatch reliabilities" of 0.93-0.99, should provide a clue to an alternative solution. Air freight companies maintain high schedule confidence by using extra aircraft, extensive spares (~5-10% of fleet cost), and standardized payload interfaces (rapid changeout to alternative vehicle). If the cost of developing a commercial space transportation vehicle to ultrahigh reliabilities is prohibitive, one could instead cost extra airframes and/or spares. A small fleet of vehicles for fast package delivery will be less efficient in major assets, such as rocket engines, would likely have to be pre-positioned at every destination to minimize downtime. Either way, the service demanded by fast package operators represents a significant input to the costs of a future system.
It is possible to use the fast package system to orbit small payloads, however. Conceptually, a fast package vehicle flight would be chartered on occasion to boost small satellites. {The cost of the flight should be much lower than for developing and operating a dedicated, small satellite launcher. In addition, the dependability, flexible scheduling, and operating infrastructure of such system should be attractive to customers.} Near apogee, the payload bay would open and a small payload/kickstage assembly would be ejected. The size of the payload will be limited by the Delta-V of the fast package vehicle and the performance of the kickstage. In Figure 3.5.3.5-2, the orbital altitude of a payload is plotted for the initial velocity capability of a fast package system for various kickstage Delta-Vs.
The boost/glide trajectories offer another use for the fast package delivery transportation system. After the initial boost phase, the vehicle is lofted to very high altitudes in a O-G parabola before skipping back in the atmosphere. Again, it is conceptually feasible that occasional flights could be chartered for microgravity research, manufacturing, engineering equipment development, or astronomy. Many microgravity processes, such as crystal formation, could be performed during the 0-G period of the flight, with near-immediate access to the payload upon landing. The New York to Paris route, for example, offers some 15.5 minutes of microgravity; a New York to Sydney route provides over 40 minutes of microgravity. Comparable to NASA's KC-135 research aircraft, such a system could provide multiple flights to microgravity researchers or even light commercial manufacturing at sizes well in excess of traditional-sounding rockets.
There will be no time for payload checkout or inspection. Users must conform to some basic safety regulations, such as flammability. Packages will arrive or be picked up by the delivery operator, encased by the user to withstand the expected transportation environment. After sorting, packages will be placed in standard payload containers (such as sacks or airline type LD containers) with no interfaces external to the package. Conformity to standard containers is important as the package may have to be transferred one or more times to other forms of transit to get to its final destination. Reloading packages into other containers adds time and cost to a delivery.
In addition to the transit time associated with the primary vehicle, the transport of cargo typically includes a significant time for collection (also called stem time) and distribution of individual items. In fact, the airborne portion of intercontinental shipping is only a small fraction of the total door-to-door transit time. The real benefit of a fast package system may be to exploit the time zone differences that currently influence east-west transport. As illustrated in following figures, a comparison of total timelines for several forms of "rapid" package/freight services shows the advantage of a fast package delivery system.
For a westbound example, Figure 3.5.3.5-3 compares Frankfurt to New York traffic (currently the world's busiest international air cargo city pair). From all over Europe, air cargo is gathered, typically in the afternoon, to be export-processed in the early evening. Dedicated freighters have an advantage over cargo destined to fly in the belly holds of passenger flights: the freighter can leave in the night, whereas there are few passenger flights that are scheduled to leave so late in the evening. This is more than just a consideration of the inconvenience to the traveling public. As passenger airplanes function at a high operating cost to revenue ratio compared to freight (more crew, amenities, etc.), the airframe is optimally utilized through positioning of the airframe to maximize load factor and time in the air. For westbound European departures this translates into morning departures. Note that flying a passenger airplane faster than mach 0.9 does not significantly impact delivery time. A fast package delivery system would more closely resemble a freighter.
As mentioned previously, there are some trends in subsonic air transport design that do have bearing on the market elasticity discussion for a fast package delivery service. The market for transported goods between two destinations (which are primarily produced and consumed by people) tends to be proportional to the size of the populations of those two destinations. While this may seem trivial, if one thinks of the number of people (flights) who travel between those population centers, one realizes that the onboard cargo capacity that a plane has in its belly hold is extremely synergistic with the needs of cargo services. Note that the new, twin-aisle aircraft (which require wider bodies for a given number of seats) that will replace existing fleets have higher cargo capacity. Passenger ticket pricing does not relate to cargo; this freight revenue is essentially all profit for the operator. The message from this discussion is this: the increase in availability in air cargo volume will drive freight prices down. This will certainly have a positive effect on the size of the air cargo market, but a widening of the price differential between air freight and fast package delivery may cause some customers to opt for a slower, less expensive system.
Second, the number of vehicles in the fleet varies significantly with assumptions regarding the number and location of routes serviced and the turnaround times on the ground. Even if one assumes only a small handful of destinations, these variables lead to a wide range of possible fleet sizes. Again, price per flight can only be determined when one knows the size of the nonrecurring debt that has to be amortized.
Within the time and resource constraints of this study, it was determined that a credible model was impractical to create. Such a model would need to be detailed enough to account for "real world" constraints such as curfews, interface with air traffic control, relationship to local transport infrastructure, and spares placement strategy. It was decided, then, at the time of this writing, to defer any cost analysis and consequently to defer inclusion of fast package delivery in the aggregate CSTS economic model.
Potential users would be available as soon as a system became available; the concept is a natural extension of world economic expansion and could be easily incorporated into the global trade infrastructure.
The idea of on-orbit repair is not a new one. Several space shuttle missions have been dedicated to satellite repair, including the spectacularly successful Hubble Space Telescope repair. While these missions may not have been economically justified if performed in a truly commercial environment, nevertheless, there are a number of postulated commercial spacecraft that would pay to repair rather than replace the asset, especially as regards large platforms.
In the absence of specific spacecraft data, one cannot model with certainty the type or frequency of servicing and/or transfer missions. The function of space repair and transfer, however, can be predicted to be required in a thriving commercial space environment. Therefore, to include this mission without specifics, we agreed on a small multiplier on the total aggregate of spacecraft to quantify the number of missions for space servicing and transfer. (This is similar to the approach taken in Sec. 3.5.2, Space Rescue.)
On the positive side, there are valid reasons to consider space servicing and transfer that are insensitive to launch costs. Underwriters would rather pay for a lower cost repair mission than replace the entire spacecraft. Designing a spacecraft with the ability to be repaired on orbit would translate directly into lower insurance premiums, resulting ultimately in a lower price for customers. Similarly, the high replacement cost of a new spacecraft could be deferred with the availability of servicing/transfer, improving the operators' cash flow. Replacing orbital assets before the expected lifetime of the spacecraft can also result in a significant downtime that could be very detrimental to business. Lost revenues and customer migration to alternative services must be factored into the cost/benefit of a repair mission. Last, as experience is gained in autonomous and robotic servicing operations, such as those missions conducted on the space shuttle, the technology and interface standards associated with on-orbit servicing, repair, and transfer will have matured to a point at which a servicing venture is technically feasible.
It should be realized that there are also significant forces at work against the demand for on-orbit services. Obsolescence is a key driver in much of the world's high technology infrastructure. Markets and needs change constantly; looking back a couple of decades ago, for example, U.S. live black-and-white television satellites were state of the art; today even small countries own far more sophisticated assets. Combined with improved reliability in many subsystems, the usefulness of future spacecraft will be limited to the time between new generations of consumer-driven technology. There may be no real reason to plan for servicing a spacecraft due to be phased out within a few months or years. Other factors include the diverse locations and types of spacecraft, which would require a very versatile (probably expensive) servicing system. A trend towards on-orbit spares, driven in part by the need to minimize downtime when a satellite fails, is economically attractive to the operator, especially if launches can be comanifested to reduce costs. Finally, there could be an issue relating to transfer of national or company-sensitive data to a servicing company that would prevent some users from availing themselves of these services.
When all this basic information is known, one would have to probabilistically assess likely failure rates and modes. This does not require a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for all possible spacecraft. It would be important to acknowledge that some spacecraft are more likely to need service and some are more likely to be able to be serviced. In addition, the very availability of space repair and transfer services is likely to influence the design and deployment strategy of new commercial spacecraft, creating a larger market for such services.
The value of repair/transfer/reboost must also be considered. As in terrestrial ventures, companies are continually trading off replacement and repair. Insurance actuarials could be used to understand the monetary compensation that could be expected: if the price of the space servicing mission is lower than the amount paid out by insurance, lawsuits, and so forth, someone will pay for the service.
Another probable aspect of the servicing business would be a sideline in salvage operations. For a fee, owners of a "dead" spacecraft would sell that asset to the servicing company. That company could then return and refurbish or cannibalize space-qualified hardware for resale. Insurance companies may also be interested in contributing to removal of excess space debris reducing collision hazards and lowering claims.
As much information required to do this market evaluation awaits the completion of this phase of the CSTS, no results can be presented yet.
In order for successful servicing to occur, the space servicing company must know as much as possible about the object to be serviced as early as possible. Online databases could provide instantaneous access to critical information. If the space hardware is developed to accepted standards, the toolkit of the service provider would be more likely to be useful in the mission.
Every 9 to 10 days a reusable space tug leaves for the Moon and three days later a load of waste canisters is soft landed into a crater on the Moon's far side. Once on the surface, they are picked up by a remotely controlled tractor and placed in a position to radiate to free space, essentially forever. This system was put in place and operated continuously using the disposal surcharge assessed to nuclear power generation facilities. In addition, the steady traffic to LEO and the Moon has created a commercial transportation capability that has opened other profitable ventures . . . .
The problems associated with hazardous waste are an ugly reminder of the downside of mankind's technological progress. Industrial processes and weapons production often result in wastes too toxic to simply put in a landfill. At a gross level, there are three categories of hazardous waste: chemical, biological, and nuclear. Both chemical and biological waste can generally be cracked through some form of incineration: chemical bonds break down with the addition of a sufficient amount of heat. There are still some compounds and heavy metals that will require extra processing steps. Radioactive waste is harder to process: humans can be harmed even without physical contact and accelerating the natural slow decay can only be accomplished by bombarding the materials with neutrons of just the right energy levels.
For the purposes of the CSTS analysis, hazardous waste disposal in space is limited to a discussion of nuclear waste disposal. The decision to do this was based on the following factors:
Resolving the nuclear waste disposal problem is critical to the future of nuclear power, but political, legal, and technical delays have put off the opening date for a permanent, government-operated high-level waste depository until at least 2010. Yucca Mountain in the state of Nevada is proposed as a temporary site for nuclear waste storage and is expected to become a permanent repository after 50 years. A second repository will also be necessary (probably on the East Coast), and the DOE plans to spend $43 billion for the two permanent waste repositories. Besides the high cost, public opinion is against having nuclear waste permanently stored underground because safety is difficult to guarantee for tens of thousands of years. Locals especially fear degradation of safe storage from seismic activity or contamination by running water. This issue has become a lightning rod for environmental concerns, and permanent ground storage of nuclear waste might already be a lost cause in the United States. Bear in mind also that the United States owns only 40% of the world's estimated nuclear wastes. Other nations (primarily Russia, Ukraine, and France) possess huge amounts of waste. The world's citizens are increasingly aware that nuclear waste is a global problem and will demand safe disposal by all nations with nuclear capability.
How extensive is the nuclear waste problem? Predictions state there will be 41,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste in the U.S. from nuclear power plants by the year 2000 and another 10,000 tons from government nuclear weapons programs. Spent reactor fuel will be accumulating at the rate of 1,000 tons per year in this country by the year 2000 and storage pools at the power plants are already full (ref. 2). On the other hand, electrical consumers in this country have paid a one-tenth of a cent fee on every nuclear-generated kilowatt hour since 1982 for eventual waste disposal, and the payments and interest currently total nearly $5 billion. What is needed is an environmentally acceptable permanent solution at an affordable price.
The world, especially the Third World, requires abundant, environmentally acceptable, low-cost power to raise the standard of living and avoid widespread starvation. Modern nuclear power plants can provide this low cost power, but dissemination of the knowledge and hardware necessary to build these plants has been thwarted by the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear proliferation is a political issue with a possible technical solution. If used nuclear fuel rods can only be removed (and permanently disposed of) by an international body like the United Nations, then surreptitious processing to obtain plutonium would be nearly impossible. The threat of global warming through emissions from burning fossil fuels, the dropping standard of living in the third world, and the decreasing cost of enriched uranium dictate that nuclear power must be seriously considered for developing nations; and safe, effective disposal of used nuclear fuel rods could make this practical.
Disposing of the waste outside the Earth's biosphere would be the ideal permanent disposal of nuclear generated wastes and byproducts. Various ideas for space disposal have been considered: Earth orbit, Earth-Moon libration points, 1.1 or 0.85 AU, Venus impact, Jupiter entry, solar impact, and solar system escape. Figure 3.5.5.2-1 lists a summary of pros and cons of the various space waste disposal concepts.
With a lunar repository as a baseline, several different scenarios for hazardous waste disposal were examined. All upper stages and lunar landers are based on a study done by Boeing in 1991 (ref. 3), which was considered representative (but by no means the only solution). From the estimates of the mass of spent nuclear fuel to be disposed of by 2000, the number of trips necessary for its disposal on the Moon was determined, assuming some or no ground-processing of the waste before launch is allowed. Once the number of trips is determined, a cost estimate, not including Earth to LEO launch, is made for each case. The cost of each is compared to the budget for the disposal of nuclear waste; the remainder determined the threshold transportation cost for feasibility.
By the year 2030, nuclear power is expected to grow to 190-250 gigawatts, adding over $1 billion per year to the waste fund. Currently the first permanent repository is expected to cost $28 billion and the second to cost $17 billion. Therefore, the operating budget for this study is taken to be $43 billion, although more money may be available if space disposal is perceived to be more palatable to the public than currently proposed methods.
In fact, the issue of public acceptance is arguably the most important driver in the development of a commercial space disposal venture. Any economic benefit of space disposal is moot if regulation and protest prevent operations. The effort that will be required in convincing people of the safety of this concept cannot be overstated.
Buried sites like Yucca Mountain offer long-term storage at moderate cost, but it is very difficult to prove no leakage over geological times because our database is not sufficient. This point is used by environmentalists to raise local opposition to proposed permanent depositories. As a result, the agreement defining the Yucca Mountain site states that after 50 years of operation the overall performance will be reviewed and a majority vote of Congress can close the facility and have all the waste removed. The agreement also states the second disposal site will be on the U.S. East Coast. That will be a very difficult sell.
An alternative to space disposal is transmutation of the long half-life radioactives to short-lived radioactives that decay away in 20 to 30 years While physically possible, this may be technically and economically unfeasible. This approach is discussed in depth in Section 3.5.5.6.
Hence, our assessment is that the market for permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste is huge, easily enough to justify major investments in infrastructure, and that space disposal provides a very valid alternative to ground disposal.
That moratorium is supposed to have been withdrawn, but if not, it will have to be rescinded before launch operations can begin. As will be discussed later, nuclear waste is best "aged" for about 10 years prior to processing to reduce the thermal loads from radioactive decay. Ground depositories such as Yucca Mountain would serve as excellent sites to temporarily store spent fuel prior to processing and launch.
CSTS members held discussions with DOE, with informal exchanges conducted with members of Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), a number of West Coast utilities, and Greenpeace.
However, they are going to be radioactive and thermally active. How radioactive and how much heat is radiated was determined by quantifying various sample waste products. This data show the thermal radiation of concentrated nuclear waste 2 years after removal from the reactor to be about 180 kw/ton. After 10 years heat production has dropped by roughly an order of magnitude, and it decays very slowly after that. Hence, we recommend the spent fuel rods be aged for 10 years at a temporary repository prior to processing and packaging in the GPHS canisters. The canisters are designed to withstand the thermal flux from 238PuO2, which is 0.4 kwth/gm, or twice the worst flux expected from the concentrated spent fuel waste. On the other hand, the spent fuel waste radiates a large fraction of its energy as gamma particles unlike 238PuO2, which is an alpha emitter. This further reduces the thermal load on the canisters but causes problems with ground handling and sharing a payload bay with live animals. The extent of the problem with gamma radiation will depend on the age and specific mix of nuclear waste and has not been fully quantified at this time.
The first LEO-to-lunar transportation scenario involves a space-based reusable spacecraft. In this scenario, nuclear waste is brought to LEO as secondary- or low-priority payload on a LEO launch vehicle. The waste is accumulated at a LEO node and transferred to the lunar transfer vehicle (LTV). The LTV takes its cargo to the Moon, expending its translunar injection tanks and lunar descent tanks. The LTV returns to the LEO node where it picks up its cargo and full tanks for its next mission. A mission timeline and Delta-Vs are given in figure 3.5.5.5-1. The mission time from LEO to LEO is 187 hours, or almost 8 days. Adding 1 day at LEO for refueling and loading gives a total mission time of 9 days.
The propulsion module returns to the LEO node where it picks up its cargo and full tanks for its next mission. The mission time from LEO to LEO is 170 hours or about 7 days. Adding 1 day at LEO for refueling and loading gives a total mission time of 8 days. This level of reliability is arguably still for in the future, even if a commercial system embodied redundancy, health monitoring, engine-out, and so forth, in its design.
It is more likely that the payload can be encapsulated in a way that ensures that zero waste is released, even in worst case launch vehicle failure. There is a precedent for this in the launching of thermoisotope generators on interplanetary probes. In fact, for this baseline analysis, our concept for shielding is to use the already-space-qualified general purpose heat source (GPHS) containers. Each GPHS container holds 32.8 lbm of 238Pu fuel and 27.1 lbm of shielding, giving a 0.83 shield-to-fuel ratio. The container has a 3D graphite aeroshell designed to withstand reentry and an impact of 165 ft/s.
In order to size the transport system to the Moon, the following assumptions are made:
To accomplish, this we propose to move the spent fuel rods to the launch site and then (1) cut open the spent fuel rods, separate the fuel from the cladding, compress the cladding and bury it in low-level waste repositories, (2) chemically separate the uranium oxides from the spent fuel and recycle them as reactor fuel, and (3) put the remaining material into GPHS canisters designed for space launch and launch them promptly to a transfer station in LEO. By not separating isotopes, we believe we can keep the ground processing cheap (less than $100/lb), relatively free from public/political controversy, and environmentally safe.
Figure 3.5.5.5-5 presents preliminary cost estimates for ground processing from a DOE Environmental Impact Statement on Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste, October 1980.
The fuel loading assumed was 88,563 kg of Uranium @ 2.535 enrichment. The basis point was 1.5 years after removal. After 1.5 years in cooling pool, the rods have 83.09 metric tons of actinides, 5.4 tons of fission products, and 30.3 tons of activation products. Removal of the cladding and unreacted uranium oxide reduces this to 2.74 tons of material to be loaded into GPHS containers and launched.
With a typical GPHS ratio of container mass to fuel of 0.83, we estimate a total mass for this example of 5.01 metric tons. If we assume the Sequoyah Unit 2 produced 1100 MWe of power at a 65% online factor, this would equate to 12.53X109 kW/h of electricity over the 2 years. At the $0.001-kW/h millage, if we were to operate with just the money set aside, we must dispose of 5.01 tons of loaded containers for $12.53 million, or $2500/kg delivered to the Moon. Note that the current DOE disposal plan will require the equivalent of three times this cost. This example is thought to be representative of spent nuclear reactor fuel, but many more cases are necessary to quantify possible separation scenarios and disposal of the many types of nuclear waste.
According to the cost assessments shown below space disposal has a lower life cycle cost than ground disposal and could be available in the same timeframe with moderate investments in new hardware (other than a new launch system). Hence, there is a legitimate opportunity to negotiate an anchor tenant agreement with either the electric utility companies or the DOE to permanently dispose of the U.S. and overseas nuclear waste. Right now space disposal is the moderate technical risk option but there is a higher risk major competitor, as discussed below.
The major competitor for removing nuclear waste from the biosphere (other than ground storage, which does not remove the waste, but only stores it) is nuclear transmutation.
The Grumman Corporation and Los Alamos National Energy Lab are looking at the feasibility of accelerated transmutation of waste using a high-energy particle beam system. Conceptually, such a system would be capable of transforming the atomic nuclei of the waste into other radioactive elements with a shorter half-life.
The device to be used in the accelerator transmutation of waste (ATW) is a product of past Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) research into directed-energy weapons and would use a derivative of the neutral particle-beam-based Continuous Waste Deuterium Demonstration (CWDD) program. The concept involves scaling up a charged particle accelerator beam until it produces a very dense and energetic beam of protons.
These protons are then directed onto a lead or tungsten target. The protons interact with the target and produce highly energetic neutrons. Beyond the target a heavy-water or graphite "blanket" slows down the neutrons into an energy range such that they can interact with the nuclei of radioactive materials loaded into a target zone, and changes them into less-radioactive or inert materials. Meanwhile a continuous slipstream processor collects and separates the processed materials from the unprocessed materials in a continuous flow separation system.
Using this system, the ATW process is projected to result in very low-level, short-lived waste products, and short-lived species byproducts. The goal of this program is to get everything of significant activity to a 30-year half-life.
The status of the program is currently at conceptual stage.
The ATW program currently is looking for at $30 to 50 million in government funding from the DOE for a conceptual study of an accelerator to produce a neutron beam that would be used to irradiate samples of nuclear waste. After this conceptual study, then a demonstration and test program is expected before this can be committed to for reprocessing of nuclear fuel or waste.
There is an industry working group of Grumman, Westinghouse Electric, TRW Space & Defense, Lockheed Missiles & Space, Rockwell, Thomson, General Atomics, Litton Electron Devices, BDM Engineering Services, and Babcock & Wilcox, which is working to understand this technology. It was hoped that this project would receive TRP (Technology Reinvestment Program) funding for defense conversion work, but at this time no funding has been received. This information was provided by Grumman senior program engineer Timothy Myers and Anthony Favale, Grumman's deputy director of energy systems.
CSTS Comment - There are technical, political, and financial issues to be resolved with this system. The technical issues involved in this concept involve the beam system and the slipstream processor.
The charged particle beam will have to achieve orders of magnitude of greater beam flux than current systems and orders of magnitude greater beam duration of operating time. (The current beam is a pulsed beam, and for effective transmutation the beam must be continuous.) The slipstream processor itself will be a technical challenge.
The processor must work continuously separating out the transmuted materials from the nontransmuted products. This will involve continuous flow chemistry and separation, working with highly radioactive and rather nasty chemical substances, while the beam is running. And the separation system may have to separate between substances with different isotopes, but almost identical chemistry.
The political barrier is that there is currently an executive order prohibiting reprocessing of nuclear waste. This executive order was put into force primarily to recognize issues with waste reprocessing and the separation of controlled substances such as plutonium from existing nuclear waste stocks, including spent nuclear fuel.
To demonstrate the slipstream processor needed to demonstrate the continuous flow reprocessing, this executive order will have to be changed. (It should be noted that the space disposal of nuclear waste will also have this problem, although the levels and complexity of the reprocessing are much simpler in the space disposal option.)
The final barrier for this system is cost. The final cost of developing a transmutation system for nuclear waste is unknown, but estimates for the cost of adding such a system to handle the disposal of commercial nuclear electric power wastes project the addition of costs to the generation costs of nuclear power, increasing the average price of electricity from 3% to 10% This represents a recurring cost from $5 billion per year to $17.5 billion per year. This compares to a cost of $1.2 billion per year for space disposal at $600/lb.
The time scale for this project potentially places it in the same time period as a new launch system. The current expectation is that an ATW system would require a conceptual study, then a demonstration system (including the nuclear chemistry demonstration, the continuous flow/separation system, and the beam power and duration scaleup), and then commitment to an operational system.
From the market contract, the time to proceed to the first unit of an operational system ranges from 8 to 15 years, depending upon funding and the results of each stage of the program. The time scale to the operation of a small-scale fully operational demonstration system may be as little as 8 years, with the longer time period assuming 2 years for the conceptual study, 8 years in development of the demonstration system, and another 5 years to put the first operational unit into operation.
If no ground processing is done then the entire 51,000 metric tons of waste must be loaded into GPHS containers and the total cost estimates including launch to LEO are $210 billion for the round trip to the surface system and $149 billion for the reusable TLI stage with expendable lander. This assumes a launch cost of $100/lb to LEO, which is the lower limit used in the CSTS discussions. Obviously, hauling the entire undifferentiated nuclear waste package to the Moon is not economically feasible.
If the nuclear waste is treated with the simple mechanical and chemical separation described above, and only 3% of the remaining material containing the most hazardous portion of the fuel rods is shipped to space, then the total cost of disposal falls to $35.8 billion for the round-trip system and $27.8 billion for the expendable lander system. This is at a launch cost of $500/lb ($1100/kg), so if the fuel can be partially processed at the launch site, space disposal presents an economically attractive alternative.
This market can be captured with launch costs as high as $500/lb to $600/lb and will average approximately 2,000,000 lb per year over 30 years of operation. The following recommendations are made for follow-on studies:
Space tourism to low Earth orbit (LEO) can become an economically viable industry if the proper conditions exist. The tourism market is primed and ready for the introduction of space travel as a means of recreation. The Cruise Line International Association of New York City reported that over three million Americans took oceangoing cruises in 1989 and that the average cost expended by each traveler was in excess of $7,000. The journalist William Buckley organizes a trip once a year to fly around the world with a few stopping-off points for the passengers. The cost for this trip -$60,000 to $80,000 per person.
From information taken from Space Tourism, The Unbelievable Market by G. Harry Stine, regular service would be provided with one space plane flight to LEO and return every day.
This requires a fleet of at least four vehicles. Service could be provided from existing airports or from newly constructed launch/recovery pads. The only new ground servicing facilities required would be a fuel storage facility and a fueling facility. A turnaround time of 24 hours with no more than 200 maintenance labor hours would be expected. The reliability would have to be at least comparable to existing air transportation systems. The ultimate goal would be to provide a system that could operate on a per-flight budget of around $2 million. If a space plane could carry 110 passengers, the required price would be $18,181. This represents less than 25% of the William Buckley around-the-world tours. With these statistics, it is not hard to conceive of the tourist market being able support space travel.
A space transportation system must have the same economic and operational factors as other successful transportation systems. The system must be available to customers on short demand; costs and pricing structures must allow a reasonable profit margin; the system must be capable of operating without a standing army of support personnel; and, operating facilities must offer multiuser capabilities so that they can be more cost effective.
Indeed, the sum financial total of man's activities in space to date pale by comparison to the potential space tourism market. As many of these studies have pointed out, the key to financial success (assuming governments are uninterested in a long-term subsidy) lies in significant reduction of the cost of operating the transportation elements.
While there are many useful analogies to other segments of the tourism industry (e.g., cruise ship operations) that have been used to suggest traffic models and available income, a significant idiosyncrasy of space tourism is the relatively high cost of the transportation hardware. The ability to amortize the development and manufacture of new vehicles with even a substantial portion of the annual revenues may not be possible.
The objective of the analysis presented in this report is to formulate economic requirements for any new space transportation system and to answer the fundamental question concerning the feasibility of developing the space tourism market: Can the vehicle be developed and a fleet built and operated for the magnitude of money that can be reasonably expected to be generated from passenger revenue?
The drawbacks of this method include the limited sample size and a questionable correlation between survey results and actual ticket purchases. Questions must be phrased to address the specific information that investors would need to know before proceeding with a tourism venture. To date, our understanding of the breadth and depth of this information is too limited to credibly create a useful survey. We have contacted the U.S. Travel Data Center, in Washington, D.C., which has agreed to perform a nationwide space tourism survey. Sponsored by the travel industry, it is experienced in developing and phrasing the proper questions to correlate responses with actual sales.
Another approach to determining the space tourism market is to explore analogous terrestrial travel ventures. Oceangoing cruise lines operate ships worth hundreds of millions of dollars and offer a glimpse of the financial decisions involved when developing, financing, and profitably operating expensive assets. Exploring the growing market for exotic travel and/or ecotourism services sheds some light on the high-end tourist. We have contacted both cruise line companies and "adventure" travel groups. While we found some interest in both groups, quantitative data were very limited. (A summary of contacts is found in app. E.1-1.)
The third method to determining elasticity is to model the space tourism market parametrically by varying the economic factors that are likely to determine demand. An objective tool for examining the development of a space tourism vehicle was created for this purpose. For the purposes of this analysis, multiple uses for the transportation system (as well as the accompanying sources of development funding) were excluded.
Prior efforts to characterize the economics of space tourism were based on a top-down approach, depicted in Figure 3.5.6.2-1. Typically, a concept for tourism is proposed first: either a vehicle design, an orbiting hotel concept, or a marketing approach, such as the "adventure travel" extrapolation from exotic terrestrial travel to spaceflight. A cost analysis of the concept is performed next, leading to a form of market analysis to determine the ticket price that results in a profit for the operator. Finally, one can speculate on whether people will buy a ticket at that price. While this approach is fundamentally sound, it is easy to create an optimistic view of the space tourism market by assumptions or ground rules that are based on sketchy projections and cost estimating.
An alternative approach to defining the space tourism market, a "bottoms-up" technique, was developed. Also shown in Figure 3.5.6.2-1, the first step here was to define the pool of monies available by modeling the world's population in terms of annual income. From this, the percentage of people with the financial means to travel and the interest in traveling to space is defined, resulting in an estimate of the annual cash flow available for the space tourism operator/developer, as well as an idea of what the fleet size and vehicle passenger capacity would have to be. Then one can conceptualize concepts to fit the size and turnaround guidelines suggested from the previous steps. The costs of the concepts are estimated, and an assessment is made of whether or not the vehicle can be developed, built, and operated at a profit.
Over time the makeup of the tourism market will change. Initially, joyrides could justify a venture (in fact, the Society Expedition survey results show a healthy demand for joyrides); in later years, a destination will be required to sustain a space tourism industry.
One of the fastest growing areas in recent years in the tourism business is high-end, exotic tours. By combining exotic destinations with a learning experience, travelers find significant value added to their leisure time. This trend fits well with space tourism.
To establish the economic feasibility of this market, the CSTS team performed two "bottoms up" analyses to define the global market based upon annual income. (See app. E.1.2 for details.) Within that reduced market we further decreased the size by introducing age considerations and a "likelihood factor" to reflect the percentage that will make the trip.
Our starting point is the development of a worldwide income distribution by aggregating the populations of countries with per capita incomes similar to that of the United States. For the remaining, less wealthy, world population, 5% was assumed to have upper income levels similar to the United States. These statistics were obtained from the World Almanac with populations adjusted to the year 2020. From this information, the number of households worldwide with income levels comparable to U.S. standards is four to five times greater than just U.S. statistics alone.
Specifically, the U.S. income distribution statistics was multiplied by a factor of 4.62 to arrive at the worldwide households with equivalent income levels. The number of worldwide households with incomes above a specified level is shown in Figure 3.5.6.3-1 below. World wealth is growing at an uninflated rate of roughly 2% a year compounded. Thus, by the 2020, these population statistics could grow by another 67% (but not applied in this paper). The distinction between households and people is that for each household in the United Stated in 1991 there was an average of 2.63 people.
Income distributions have been collected by households from the three sources shown in Figure 3.5.6.3-1, below: (1) 1990 census data, (2) the 1989 Adjusted Gross Income Tax Statistics, and (3) the 1992 Statistical Abstract of the United States. The income statistics used in this study were for households with adults aged 25 to 55. Below this age band, it is assumed that there is insufficient household income, and above the age band, physiological restrictions will prevail.3.5.1.1 Results Summary
The transportation market segments are truly driven by the availability of low cost, reliable systems. In the case of the transportation market segments, there is essentially no significant profit to be made until the transportation costs are reduced to a few hundred dollars per pound. Huge transportation revenues are envisioned, as the volume of traffic should increase more than proportionally to the price as compared to the higher cost markets.3.5.1.2 Associated Market Segments
The market segments grouped within this category have little association with other non "Transportation" markets due primarily to our definition of what is included in this category. Space tourism transportation is however, related to the entertainment and space business park concepts. Considerable effort was spent ensuring consistency in the treatment of these market segments. 3.5.2 Space Rescue
3.5.2.1 Introduction/Statement of Problem
Vision statement: Bad news from the unmanned industrial materials processing platform Matsat IV- a failed solar array connection. In 3 days the batteries will be exhausted and the furnaces will shut down. The samples and the furnace will be ruined! A space rescue vehicle is called up and launched. Using the onboard intelligent algorithms, stereo vision, versatile toolkit, and multiple dexterous "arms", a repair is effected with minimal telepresence support from the ground. The experiments and the facility continue on their mission . . .
Fire Department Rescue Teams Emergency Medical Technicians Hazardous Material Spill Teams Forest Fire Smoke Jumpers Oil Well Fire Specialists Coast Guard Search and Rescue (SAR) U.S. Navy Submarine Rescue Team Commercial Aircraft Airplane-on-Ground Teams
3.5.2.2 Study Approach
Since there is no such capability (or company) existing today, it is not possible to directly interview any users. Assuming that it will be a part of a large, thriving commercial space scenario, we agreed to postpone further market analysis of this market segment, representing it as a small multiplier applied to the sum total mission model. This approach is insufficient to quantify the economics of the space rescuer's business or transportation system and is left for future study to refine.3.5.2.3 Market Description
3.5.2.3.1 Description Market Evaluation
Rescue of personnel and assets has economic and societal value if the cost of the rescue is less than or equal to the cost of inaction. For purposes of this report, the term "rescue" is taken to imply that time is an important, distinguishing feature of this market segment. 3.5.2.3.2 Market Evaluation
To credibly evaluate the market for space rescue services, one needs to examine the aggregate traffic model for what will be in space at any given time. Furthermore, one needs to know what the orbital parameters are for all potential "customers" and some basics about how a rescue could be performed physically on a given spacecraft.3.5.2.3.3 Market Assessment
No business assessment for a space rescue enterprise was conducted within the time and resources of this study.
3.5.2.3.4 Market Infrastructure
A space rescue venture, like many terrestrial analogs, involves specialized equipment and operations. The degree of overlap with other commercial space infrastructure will be minimal. The costs of this unique infrastructure represents a negative factor on realizing space rescue.3.5.2.4 Prospective Users
As space rescue is a new market with no existing customers and was not a focus area, we did not have time to discuss this concept with others outside of the alliance. Within the alliance, discussions were held with personnel who have worked on the ACRV program. Future studies may explore discussions with commercial, premium priced terrestrial rescue services, government rescue agencies, and insurance community representatives.3.5.2.5 CSTS Needs and Attributes
3.5.2.5.1 Transportation System Characteristics
In general, without specifically knowing the spacecraft to be rescued, one can only discuss transportation system characteristics in general terms. If pre-positioned, space-based rescue assets are required, there is some latitude as to the scheduling of launches. For a ground-based rescue concept, the transportation system is "called up" quickly; that is, all elements from the decision to rescue to launch of a rescue package will be effected within hours. 3.5.2.5.2 Transportation System Capabilities
When a full accounting is made of the possible spacecraft to be rescued, the required capability of the transportation system will become apparent. The most difficult transportation capability to fulfill will be to remain dormant for an indefinite period and then reliably launch to a variable destination. Alternatively, the system could require a planned payload to be demated and a rescue payload to be mated and launched within a short time period.3.5.2.5.3 Ground Handling
Minimal ground handling is required to ensure that a rescue mission could be called up and flown as quickly as possible.3.5.2.5.4 User/Space Transportation Interfaces
In order for a successful rescue to occur, the rescuer must know as much as possible about the object to be rescued as early as possible. Online databases could provide instantaneous access to critical information. If the space hardware is developed to accepted standards, the toolkit of the rescuer would be more likely to be useful in the rescue.3.5.2.5.5 Improvements Over Current
Most of the transportation characteristics described in the previous sections require improvements over current systems. Rapid transition from dormancy to operational status will be a challenge unlikely to be required of other CSTS missions.3.5.2.6 Business Opportunities
Analysis of business opportunity was limited at this point. After summing the other CSTS missions, a 1% "tax" was applied to the manifest as a gross estimate of the likely level of rescue activity. For example, if there were 259 active orbiting spacecraft in the year 2013, there would be 2 rescue missions that year.3.5.2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Space rescue constitutes a probable element of a healthy commercial space scenario. In the absence of specific spacecraft data, it is difficult to credibly assess even a preliminary business opportunity. Similarly, there are insufficient data at this time to determine how space rescue should be effected (ground and/or pre-positioned space assets options). A small multiplier, or tax, on the overall CSTS model was considered prudent.3.5.3 Fast Package Delivery
3.5.3.1 Introduction/Statement of Problem
Vision statement: . . . Tuesday, 9:32 am, on the outskirts of Singapore . . . . The sequence control computer has just burned up, bringing the Lumpur Enterprises, Limited, assembly line to a grinding halt. The replacement board is made at TechnoWorld Industries in Palo Alto, California, where it is 5:32 p.m. locally. If a night flight heading west could be found, the board would still not get to Singapore until, at best, Thursday morning - 2 days of expensive downtime at about $135,000 a day! Instead, the plant manager remembers reading about the new Global Express service called UltraDelivery™. 3.5.3.2 Study Approach
Although the fast package delivery concept represents a "new" market, it was instructive to work with air freight companies, particularly those offering premium services, such as overnight delivery. Furthermore, it is likely that some of these existing carriers would offer fast package delivery as one of several specialized services. This business vision would exploit the experience and shared infrastructure efficiencies of these companies vis-a-vis some new company trying to start up offering only premium, low-volume (as compared to air freight) transportation.3.5.3.3 Market Description
3.5.3.3.1 Description Market Evaluation
Rapid transport of products over long distances, currently in the form of air freight and express mail, continues to expand. Despite the current global economic slump, this transportation sector is healthy. Various sources predict that the global air freight and express market will grow at something like 7% per annum through at least 2010.
3.5.3.3.2 Market Evaluation
The question that is invariably asked about the fast package delivery concept is: What are the things that would use such a service? (Anecdotally, and notably, interviewed personnel within the express package industry did not seem as skeptical or concerned as those in aerospace manufacturing with the makeup of the payload and the likelihood of a market materializing. . . .)
Commodity lbm Commodity lbm I/O units for computers 330,000,000 Aircraft Parts 38,000,000 Sound recording equipment 300,000,000 I/O units for computers
28,000,000 Footwear 206,000,000 Photo film 28,000,000 Photocopying apparatus 112,000,000 Specialized industrial machinery
24,000,000 Shirts, men's and boy's 110,000,000 Tractor parts
22,000,000
In the category of commodities that would find tangible benefit of rapid delivery, one could speculate that original documentation, currency, precious metals, and jewels may utilize such a service. These items have to have a very high value per unit weight; assuming shipping prices reflect the size and/or mass of the package, the fee would be tolerably low for such items.
Organ 1989 1990 1991 (awaiting transplant) Heart 1,700 2,085 2,045 Heart-lung 68 50 586 Kidney 8,706 9,560 18,464 Liver 2,164 2,656 1,466 Lung 119 265 450 Pancreas 419 549 170 Total 13,176 15,165 23,181
One can explore the likelihood of finding products that would be justified in accepting the high cost of a commercial space transportation system by several techniques.
Other aspects of a long distance (primarily international) transport of goods would be those of customs, taxes, labor disruptions, and landing fees. These are very real facets of international trade and must be accounted for in a market assessment. For example, it is easy to visualize how a local customs inspector could hold up a shipment (having gone to lunch, misplacing a form, or even perhaps, exercising a work slowdown as a labor contract is in dispute) and rapidly erode any time advantage fast package delivery may have over a competing mode of transport. Proper planning and flexible response are keys to overcoming these obstacles.3.5.3.3.3 Market Assessment
The number and city pairs serviced and the frequency/availability of flights requires careful consideration. Assuming the initial operators to be a commercial venture (governments may encourage or promote activity, but route decisions are not regulated), the selection of initial operations will determine how quickly the fast package delivery industry will mature. The following are several paths a fast package delivery business could take:
Charter operations would seem better suited to the nature of many fast package commodities; the arguments for reducing flight times are equally valid in the need to reduce the stem time prior to a scheduled flight. Vehicle life will be increased due to the infrequent use of the hardware elements. On the down side, predicting utilization in a new system is difficult, and the uncertainty in the estimates may scare off investors. The higher the cost of the hardware, the less desirable it becomes to establish an extensive network of destinations.
Parameter First Class Priority Mail Express Mail
Per piece attributable cost $0.30 $3.33 $11.52
Per piece attributable cost $0.18 $1.91 $8.72
Per piece revenue less attributable cost $0.12 $1.42 $2.81
Per pound revenue $7.84 $1.74 $6.23
Per pound attributable cost $4.64 $1.00 $4.72
Per pound revenue less attributable cost $3.21 $0.74 $1.52
Pieces ~90,000M ~530M ~58M
Average weight/piece 0.0375 lb 1.919 lb 1.85 lb
Average density 14.4 lb/ft3 11.3 lb/ft3 7.0 lb/ft3
Total weight 3,398Mlb 1,017Mlb 107Mlb
Total volume 236Mft3 90Mft3 15Mft3
Given the discussions held with express delivery industry representatives, charging users hundreds of dollars per pound is quite consistent with a specialty service philosophy. Even thousands of dollars per pound would still be acceptable to some users. Another order of magnitude was viewed as "iffy." Figure 3.5.3.3-8 depicts a rough order of magnitude model of what the price elasticity/demand may look like. Note that this corresponds to 1991 data and should be escalated at 7%, compounded annually depending on the anticipated date of introduction of service.
3.5.3.3.4 Market Infrastructure
It is expected that a fast package delivery system will begin as an adjunct to the existing express mail/air freight infrastructure. Package collection, sorting, loading/unloading, and distribution will probably not require extensive new infrastructure elements.3.5.3.4 Prospective Users
Direct contact was established with several prospective users of a fast package delivery service. The responses received were all viewed as positive to enthusiastic. Representatives of Emery Worldwide, Federal Express, and the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group/Cargo Research organizations were interviewed and provided much of the information in this report. The concept of fast package delivery has in fact been discussed before: the CEO of Federal Express, Fred Smith, had even previously spoken on using the Orient Express for such a purpose (ref. 1). 3.5.3.5 CSTS Needs and Attributes
3.5.3.5.1 Transportation System Characteristics
The fast package delivery system is a hybrid between cargo aircraft and rocket transportation in that there are multiple takeoff and landing sites, but large amounts of energy are required to reach the destination. Typical payload sizes would not be anticipated to be very large. At this point, an educated guess would indicate a capacity of 3,000 lbm is sufficient. The performance capability, measured in terms of Delta-V, is determined by the maximum range route one would anticipate flying. In the absence of a complete analysis of likely city pairs for service, it can be shown that the longest range of interest is about 10,000 nmi, with most major routes somewhat below this range. Figure 3.5.3.5-1 depicts a typical boost/glide trajectory between New York and Sydney-about the maximum range one would anticipate.
The second type of concept flies within the atmosphere using a continuously thrusting, air-breathing propulsion system, like an airplane. The National Aerospace Plane program was similar in concept. While the vehicle would be smaller (and theoretically less expensive) to move a given payload, the technology risk is substantial and has yet to be proven.3.5.3.5.2 Transportation System Capabilities
The payload size of the fast package delivery transportation system is small compared to that required for other market segments, and the propellant tanks would not be sized to achieve orbital velocities. As was seen in Figure 3.5.3.5-1, the longest fast package delivery routes (around 10,000 nmi) require the system to have a Delta-V capability of around 24,000 feet per second (fps). Orbital capability requires about 30,000 fps and would necessitate the tankage (and the vehicle) be that much proportionally larger.
Two example points are shown in the figure. The kickstage is assumed to be a conventional, solid-propellant expendable vehicle. For this example, the fast package payload capability is 3,000 lbm. Point "A" corresponds to a case where the fast package vehicle has a capability of ~24,800 fps (the same as a New York to Sydney route), with a kickstage sized to provide an additional 2,000 fps. Such a system could put a 1,850-lbm satellite in a 200 nmi circular orbit. In the Point "B" example, a 22,000 fps fast package system, combined with a kickstage of 6,000 fps capability could place a 911-lbm payload in a 483-nmi circular orbit.3.5.3.5.3 Ground Handling
It is reasonable to assume that the vehicle takeoff and landing facilities are collocated. This spaceport will look more like an airport than Kennedy Space Center; in fact, depending on the design solution, an airport is an excellent choice for a facility, as it represents a large, secure area that is near commerce centers. Access to the spaceport via other transportation modes is essential, particularly air and road transport.3.5.3.5.4 User/Space Transportation Interfaces
The customer will interface with the operator of the fast package delivery service. That operator will be responsible for educating the customers as to the constraints (size, safety, pickup times) for shipment. The operator, having jointly agreed to the physical interfaces with the transportation vehicle developer, will know the limits of the hardware.3.5.3.5.5 Improvements Over Current
Like many other CSTS missions, significant improvements in reliability and cost per flight represent the most obvious required improvements over current systems.
Similarly, Figure 3.5.3.5-4 depicts a typical eastbound example, Tokyo to San Francisco, comparable to existing air freight markets. North-south markets would be represented by similar timelines, but with limited time zone advantages. One should also conclude from these timelines that the real routes for fast package delivery are in the very long distance markets where an appreciable (and therefore salable) improvement in door-to-door time can be realized. For example, coast-to-coast service within the continental United States may reduce total time by about 4 hours; conceptually, it is difficult to envision this reduction as a general enabler of new inter-U.S. markets.
3.5.3.6 Business Opportunities
3.5.3.6.1 Cost Sensitivities
Initial attempts at modeling the economics of this market revealed some amazing sensitivities.
First of all, a small, reusable vehicle is outside the bounds of current cost-estimating relationships. Fast package delivery will require more vehicles than any other market segment. As such, understanding the unit cost becomes important in determining the upfront expenditure required to begin service. Relatively small variations in estimated unit cost translate into success or failure of a venture seeking a 20% IRR.3.5.3.6.2 Programmatics
No programmatic analysis was performed for this market area.
3.5.3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
The fast package delivery concept is a promising market segment. Although it is not an orbital transportation system, the technological and operational synergism with other CSTS market segments is significant.3.5.4 Space Servicing and Transfer
3.5.4.1 Introduction/Statement of Problem
Vision statement: Commercial communications satellite operator ViaSpaceComm has been operating its LEO constellation for 6 years now. Some of its satellites have suffered minor failures and many are low on maneuvering propellant. They could replace the constellation, but the market doesn't require any more technology, not for another 7 or 8 years. Space Repair Inc. is asked to propose a servicing mission to the constellation. When ViaSpaceComm finds it is cheaper to repair than replace, they give the go ahead . . . .3.5.4.2 Study Approach
There exists no true commercial capability to perform space servicing and transfer (the space shuttle servicing missions represent a government-funded special case). No commercial venture could be interviewed for this market segment. As it was the consensus of the CSTS alliance that such missions would not be a major market, only limited exploration of the specific business opportunities were conducted.3.5.4.3 Market Description
3.5.4.3.1 Description Market Evaluation
Figure 3.5.4.3-1 describes the drivers for and against the introduction of a space servicing industry.
Note that lowering launch costs has both a positive and negative effect on creating a space servicing venture. While the cost of performing a servicing/transfer mission would be reduced, there is reason to believe lower transportation costs also results in less expensive spacecraft. This trend, described in more detail in Section 3.1, basically projects opting for heavier (less complex and hence less expensive) platforms as launch costs drop; at some point, the spacecraft operator would find it economically justifiable to replace rather repair or service an asset.3.5.4.3.2 Market Evaluation
To credibly evaluate the market for space servicing and transfer services, one needs to examine the aggregate traffic model for what will be in space at any given time. Furthermore, one needs to know what the orbital parameters are for all potential "customers" and some basics about what types of repairs and/or refueling could be performed physically on a given spacecraft.3.5.4.3.3 Market Assessment
No business assessment for a space repair and transfer enterprise was conducted within the time and resources of this study.
3.5.4.4 Prospective Users
Space servicing and transfer is not performed by any one company, and not at all as a private commercial venture. While some potential existing companies, such as Oceaneering and TRW, were thought to be likely candidates to expand into this business, it is more probable that a new venture would be established to provide a flexible response to a diverse customer base. Other than discussion with alliance members, no formal contacts were established during this phase of the CSTS.3.5.4.5 CSTS Needs and Attributes
When a full accounting is made of the possible spacecraft to be serviced, the required capability and characteristics of the transportation system will become apparent. 3.5.4.6 Business Opportunities
Analysis of a business opportunity was limited at this point. When a more complete portrayal of the total space based market is available, we can begin to model a venture (including the effect of transportation cost).3.5.4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Space servicing and transfer is a likely mission as part of a thriving commercial space infrastructure. The size of the business opportunity is speculative until a more detailed portrait emerges of the specific spacecraft that could use this service. For purposes of modeling the launch traffic associated with this market, we have assigned a multiplier of 0.02 to the aggregate traffic. That is, as a gross assumption, 2% of the functioning spacecraft would employ servicing or transfer services per year.3.5.5 Hazardous Waste Disposal
3.5.5.1 Introduction/Statement of Problem
Vision statement: In or around 2010, nuclear power plants will be operating in large numbers across the planet without the threat of nuclear proliferation or contamination from leaking nuclear waste containers. This is accomplished by collecting the used fuel rods and shipping them all to a central location, where they are chemically separated under United Nations supervision and the portion containing radioactive wastes is immediately loaded into safe-reentry casks for shipment to a transfer facility in low earth orbit (LEO). In LEO these canisters are loaded onto a lunar lander, which is in turn the payload of a space tug.
3.5.5.2 Study Approach
Nuclear waste disposal in space has been studied for many years (ref. 3). Rarely have these studies considered that such a venture could be conducted commercially; most of the study effort was devoted to the technical aspects of the solution. Rather than duplicate these studies (many of which represent more labor-hours of work than the entire CSTS effort), the results were compared and the solution judged most promising was selected as a baseline for economic analysis.
Repository Location Transport System Delta-V (km/s) Transit Time(Days) Stability/ Security of Location Future Recovery of Isotopes Astronomical Interference Earth orbit 10.6 0.12 <1,000 years Yes Yes Libration point(s) 11.5 3 Perturbations can cause Earth impact Yes Yes Solar orbit 10.9 5 Perturbations can cause Earth impact Maybe Some Lunar repository 11.5 3 Infinity Yes Yes near side, no far side Solar impact (direct) 38.0 65 Infinity No No Venus impact 13.4 146 Infinity No No
The lunar surface repository was selected as the baseline option for CSTS analysis, based on this comparison and consideration of the following qualitative benefits:
3.5.5.3 Market Description
3.5.5.3.1 Description Market Evaluation
The amount of nuclear waste (U.S.) to be disposed of as of the year 2000 is estimated to be 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and 10,000 metric tons of defense wastes. To be launched from Earth, the nuclear waste must be shielded to protect it during a possible launch failure, so the effective total mass to be launched is significantly higher.
3.5.5.3.2 Market Evaluation
Nuclear waste disposal is an expensive business. The DOE waste operations budget for 1990-1996 is $22.3 billion with an additional $2.2 billion for technology development. The Utility Waste Fund in 1993 is valued at greater than $6 billion. The waste fund is paid from a $0.001-kW/h nuclear waste disposal tax on nuclear power plants. At a current power production level of 100 gigawatts, the tax adds about $500 million a year. 3.5.5.3.3 Market Assessment
There is a tremendous stockpile of high-level nuclear waste in this country left over from 50 years of bomb building and 35 years of nuclear power generation. With the ending of the Cold War there is additional plutonium to dispose of in the safest way possible. In addition, the rest of the world, especially the former Soviet Union, has an abundance of high-level waste. Worldwide high-level waste will approach 100,000 metric tons by the year 2000 based on nuclear power generation data. Some of that waste is currently being processed (glassified) for above-ground storage (e.g., in France), but most will be sitting in temporary storage tanks in the year 2000.3.5.5.3.4 Market Infrastructure
The principal infrastructure required in addition to the space transportation system is a ground-processing facility to load the shipping canisters. We are planning only simple mechanical and chemical separation, but the Federal moratorium on processing has prevented any processing of spent fuel rods for the last 20 years. 3.5.5.4 Prospective Users
The U.S. customers for this service are the U.S. Government (in particular the Department of Energy) and the utility companies. It is possible that disposal of hazardous wastes could someday be an international concern and be controlled by the United Nations, but that is pure speculation at this time.3.5.5.5 CSTS Needs and Attributes
Nuclear waste canisters do not care when or how they get to the LEO transfer station. They can fly on regularly scheduled launches that are undersubscribed or they can fly on dedicated launches that fill in holes in the launch schedule. They are small and dense, so they are easy to integrate. 3.5.5.5.1 Transportation System Characteristics
Two scenarios for placing the waste canisters of the lunar surface were examined: a reusable spacecraft that travels round-trip from LEO to the surface of the Moon, and a partially reusable spacecraft that positions a dumb solid rocket lander on a precise lunar intercept trajectory and then returns to LEO.
Event Delta-V Delta-T (meters/sec) (hours) ACS separation/coast 6 0.8 MPS TLI burn 3300 0.3 ACS coast/corrections 10 84.0 MPS LOI burn 1075 0.1 ACS brake/tanks separation 12 0 MPS deorbit 60 0.1 MPS lunar descent/landing 1920 2.1 Cargo offload 0 12.0 MPS ascent 1822 2.0 MPS TEI burn 1075 0.1 ACS coast/corrections 18 84.0 Aero-assist maneuver 0 0.1 MPS orbit circularization 310 0.1 Rendezvous with LEO node 12 1.0 Total 9620 186.7 NOTES:
The second LEO-to-lunar transportation scenario involves a space-based reusable propulsion module (Fig. 3.5.5.5-2). In this scenario, nuclear waste is brought to LEO attached to small solid-rocket landers. Full tanksets are also launched to orbit, and the assembled vehicle delivers the landers to a lunar impact trajectory and expends its translunar injection tankset .
3.5.5.5.2 Transportation System Capabilities
It is obvious that the transportation system, perceived as the weak link in the disposal concept, will need to pay special attention to the safe delivery of its cargo. As scheduling the launches with certainty is not as important a capability as for other CSTS markets, the operator has some flexibility in launching when it is most prudent, Ideally, the launch system must be at least as safe and reliable as terrestrial delivery systems, such as rail transport.
Mass of high level waste 50,000 metric tons Shield to fuel ratio 0.83 Mass of shielding 41,000 metric tons Total mass to lunar surface 91,000 metric tons
With a payload to the moon of 91,000,000 kg, either vehicle must make several thousand trips (Fig. 3.5.5.5-3). For this reason, preprocessing of the waste at the launch site is very attractive. If three vehicles are used on a 9-day cycle, 100 missions can be accomplished in 300 days, leaving 65 days a year for maintenance and repair. Given a lifetime of 10 years for the spacecraft, only 12 transfer vehicles need to be built for the large round-trip lander, compared to 50 for the small one-way lander.
Parameter Round-Trip Lander Concept One-Way Lander Concept DELTA-V 9,620 m/s 6,432 m/s Cargo to lunar surface 25,000 kg 3,222 kg Total dry mass in LEO 48,000 kg 4,170 kg Total flights 3,000 28,260 Years to complete with 100 flights per year 30 283 Number of core stages 10 94
With preprocessing at the launch site, the number of missions and costs fall roughly by a factor of 30. This allows waste disposal over a reasonable time period using LEO delivery masses of interests to other users (Fig. 3.5.5.5-4).
Parameter Round-Trip Lander Concept One-Way Lander Concept DELTA-V 9,620 m/s 6,432 m/s NOWRAPCargo to lunar surface 25,000 kg 3,222 kg Total dry mass in LEO 48,000 kg 4,170 kg Total flights 100 942 Years to complete with 25 flights per year 4 38 Number of core stages 2 19
3.5.5.5.3 Ground Handling
Disposing of hazardous waste in space isolates it from our biosphere, removing the threat to future generations. However, to be economically practical we need to eliminate most of the nonhazardous material from the waste and only pay to launch the truly hazardous material.
Ground Processes Cost (1978 $/kg) Reactor to interim storage 3 Short-term interim storage 8 Removal of HLW and packaging in GPHS 60 Compaction of Zr clad 14 Storage of Zr/U as LLW 1 Noncombustible and failed equipment 20 Incineration of combustibles 6 Removal of gaseous products 13 Atmospheric protection system 2 Total $127/kg
To quantify the type and mass of the remaining material after the two-step processing discussed above, we will provide an example based on a series of ORIGEN computer runs provided by Sandia National Laboratory (ref. 4). This example includes the ORIGEN2.1 output for Sequoyah Unit 2, with the model based on a reactor power of 3411 MWth for 2 years.3.5.5.5.4 User/Space Transportation Interfaces
3.5.5.5.5 Improvements Over Current
3.5.5.6 Business Opportunities
The majority of nuclear waste is in the form of spent fuel rods, and they current belong to the electric utility companies. The government, in the form of the DOE, has committed to accept legal liability and responsiblity for this waste in 1998 and begin storing it in a semipermanent depository in 2010. That effort is not on schedule and becomes less likely all the time. Hence, there is a valid business opportunity to offer an alternative permanent solution that is cost competitive and more salable to Congress and the environmental movement.3.5.5.6.1 Cost Sensitivities
First-order cost estimates for the lunar transfer hardware were made using cost estimating relationships (CER) provided by General Dynamics (Fig. 3.5.5.6-1). The complexity factor is taken to be less for the expendable spacecraft than the reusable spacecraft. The costs of the expendable tanks are estimated separately for the reusable spacecraft because they will need to be replaced each flight. For units after the first, the cost is estimated using a learning curve. The cost is estimated for both cases using the dry mass of the vehicle.
DDT&E First Article Cost CER (cost =) 16.175*(WT^0.5) 0.4266*(WT^0.693) Complexity factor expendable lander 0.7 0.5 Complexity factor reusable spacecraft 1 1 Complexity factor expendable tanks 0.23 0.065
This cost estimate does not include the ground processing facility that would need to be developed, nor the LEO node where the space-based propulsion/avionics module is stored. In this estimate, we will assume $2 billion for developing the necessary ground and LEO facilities. The expendable lander option can be accomplished with payload sizes of interest to many users, and has a large DDT&E savings and lower life cycle costs relative to the reusable lander (Figs. 3.5.5.6-2 and -3). However, it does require more years to complete disposal.
Total Nuclear Waste, mT 50000 MPS Isp, sec 470 Waste fraction from grd process 0.03 Dry mass in LEO, mT 12.6 Waste fraction from LEO process 1 Mass in LLO, mT 17.13 Drop tank mass fraction 0.06 MPS ascent DV, m/s 1822 Total flights 109.8 Mass after unload, mT 25.44 Total drop tanks 659 LTS payload, mT 25 Drop tanks learning curve 0.85 MPS descent DV, m/s 1920 Drop tank TFU, $M 8.18 Mass in LLO, mT 78.08 Avg drop tank cost, $M 2.32 MPS LOI burn, m/s 1075 Grnd processing costs, $/kg 100 Coast mass, mT 99.84 Launch costs, $kg 1100 MPS TLI burn, m/s 3300 Launch costs waste to LEO, $B 3.02 LEO start burn Mass, mT 210.63 Launch-lunar prop and tanks, $B 20.9 Prop + tank mass/flight 173.03 Total launch costs, $B 23.92 Drop tank mass, mT 1.66 Total grnd process costs, $B 5 DDT&E costs, $B 5.2 Hardware costs, $B 1.68 Total disposal cost, $B 35.8 Delivery costs, $/kg 8713.15
Total nuclear waste, mT 50,000 MPS isp, sec 470 Waste fraction from grd process 0.03 Dry mass in LEO, mT 12.6 Waste fraction from LEO process 1 Mass in transfer orbit, mT 3.3 Drop tank mass fraction 0.06 LTS payload, mT 8 Total flights 343.125 Lander mass fraction 0.2 Total No. of DT and landers 343 Lander Isp, sec 300 Lander and DT learning curve 0.85 Lander descent DV, m/s 2520 Lander TFU, $M 11.17 Lander mass, mT 21.02 Ave lander cost, $M 3.69 Drop tank TFU, $M 8.38 Trans-lunar coast mass, mT 24.32 Ave drop tank cost, $M 2.77 MPS TLI burn, m/s 3300 Ground processing costs, $/kg 100 LEO startburn mass, mT 53.02 Launch costs, $/kg 1100 Stage mass/Flt deliv to LEO 42.52 Launch costs waste to LEO, $B 3.02 Drop tank mass, mT 1.66 Launch-lunar prop and tanks, $B 15.06 Flights/year 17 Total launch costs, $B 19.07 Mass to LEO/year, MT 866.702 DDT&E costs, $B 1.5 Ground processing, $B 5 Hardware costs, $B 2.22 Total disposal cost, $B 27.78 Delivery costs, $/kg 6946.24
Note that within these spreadsheets, assumptions were made as to the ground processing costs. The sensitivity of the total disposal cost to variations in average launch cost and ground processing costs is shown in Figure 3.5.5.6-4.
3.5.5.7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Disposal of hazardous waste could represent a huge market attainable with launch costs achievable using near term technologies. The political and public perception issues to overcome are enormous and should be addressed continuously, beginning now.
3.5.6 Space Tourism
The topic of space tourism is covered in several sections of this report. The intent of this section's discussion is to focus on the commercial viability of the transportation elements associated with space tourism. Tourism is a multibillion dollar business annually with a continuing annual growth increase. Space tourism is an extension of the current tourism market activity. Currently, people pay large sums of money for unique Earthbound adventures to satisfy their natural need for experiencing the unusual.3.5.6.1 Introduction/Statement of Problem
Recreational space travel for the average person has been a dream for decades. Technologically, we possess the knowledge to design and build a transportation system capable of routine and somewhat safe carriage of human passengers to and from Earth orbit. Many previous studies (ref. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,) have extolled the attractions of space tourism as one element of the huge tourism industry that exists in the world of today and in the projected future. 3.5.6.2 Study Approach
There are several ways to estimate the elasticity, or price/demand curve, for tourism. One method is to conduct a market survey, or opinion poll. There have been several surveys performed that included space tourism questionnaires. The most often cited study was performed by Society Expeditions in the mid 1980's4.
As a "sanity check," an independent but similar parametric model was developed based on the distribution of household income. This second model was based on an assumption that, for an expensive vacation, households were more likely to travel together than as individuals. These two models turned out to agree in the magnitude of the estimates of traffic and the resultant conclusions regarding the commercial viability of space tourism.3.5.6.3 Market Description
Before proceeding, it is helpful to postulate likely aspects of the space tourism industry. First, some general categories of likely tourism scenarios are outlined, followed by some discussions of broad groupings of requirements. These categories are technical, regulatory/legal, and risk control. Later on, when the model produces a cost value, for example, one should scrutinize that number with these other "requirements/ desirements" in mind.3.5.6.3.1 Description Market Evaluation
There are several potential paths for space tourism; which path is most likely to occur may be influenced less by pure technical considerations than by the desires of the investors in a space tourism enterprise. Categorizing alternative approaches here is intended to highlight some operational differences that have direct bearing on development cost and fleet size. The following list is approximately in order of complexity but may or may not be evolutionary: potential operators would conduct their own market analyses to ascertain what "niches" to pursue.
3.5.6.3.2 Market Evaluation
The world's appetite for tourism continues to grow at a rate higher than the average gross domestic product of the nations' economies. By the time a manned commercial space transport would become available early in the next century, humans will spend about a trillion dollars a year on tourism. Of course, there are many choices that the traveling public has in vacations. Given the response to previous opinion polls on space, it is safe to assume some reasonable percentage of that huge market would migrate to space tourism if it were available.3.5.6.3.3 Market Assessment
For space tourism to be a financially viable enterprise, not only must there be a sizable potential market of interested individuals from which to draw the passengers, but the price must also be affordable to these people. (For most, this will be a once-in-a-lifetime experience.) The challenge of space tourism is to provide a service that has sufficient attraction to a large number of people and to provide this service at a cost that is affordable to a large enough share of the potential market so that they will avail themselves of the opportunity.
Household Income Level 1990 Census Data (Millions) 1992 USA Statistical Handbook (Millions) USA 1989 Income Tax Statistics - Returns not Households (Millions) US Household 25-55 Age Group (Millions) Worldwide Household 25-55 Age Group (Millions) $50K 22.52 24.6 15.83 16.73 77.29 $75K> 8.74 9.7 5.92 6.67 30.81 $100K+ 4.04 2.87 3.75 17.33 $150K+ 1.44 1.50 1.67 7.72 $200K+ 0.52 0.78 0.94 4.34 $300K+ 0.47 0.56 2.59 $500K+ 0.17 0.194 0.896 $750K+ 0.10 0.0667 0.308 $1,000K+ 0.06 0.0375 1.73 $1,500K+
