TOWARD A RATIONALE FOR A NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM (U)

An Outline of Important Questions

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MARK R. I. FORSI
DIRECTOR, SECURITY MANAGEMENT OFFICE
NASA HQ

[Signature]

The RAND Corporation
1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

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This report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is designed to serve as background for a systematic study to be undertaken under the auspices of the NASA. The objective of this latter study is the construction of a rationale or policy-planning basis for a national space program.

The broad problem to be considered is, in the words of the Administrator of NASA:

"To identify national objectives to be served by a program of non-military space activities, to suggest the magnitude and scope of the program required to attain those objectives, and to determine the balance of emphasis to be placed on various phases of the program in both the short and long term future."

... From a memorandum by T. Keith Glennan, June 19, 1959, "On the Need for a Study to Develop a Supportable Position on Rate and Scale in Space Research."
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I. INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The non-military space program of the United States is predicated on five objectives:

1. To gain stature for the nation in the general struggle with world communism.
2. To contribute relevant technical knowledge and services to the national defense effort.
3. To advance science and technology generally.
4. To develop space systems for public welfare and commercial applications.
5. To cooperate with other nations in the use of space systems for peaceful purposes.

These objectives in many ways are mutually supporting.

SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM

To determine the dimensions of a suitable non-military program requires first an appraisal of the entire national space effort, including of course the military missile and space program. Moreover, it requires an appreciation of the way in which space activities, military and non-military, are related. The feature that gives unity to all space activities, despite their diverse objectives, is the fact that they all rely upon a common technology and, frequently, upon identical equipments and facilities. This interdependence must be recognized when physical requirements for either type of activity are considered.
THE PROPER EMPHASIS

The emphasis that should be placed on various phases of the program, in both the near and distant future, must grow out of an appraisal of our existing and potential capacities for space activities, and a reexamination of our national motives.

A RATIONALE FOR THE PROGRAM

Three broad questions seem important in working toward a rationale for the national space program:

1. (a) What is the value of world leadership in space science and technology?
   (b) What will be the price of equaling and surpassing the achievements of the Soviet Union?

2. How should the non-military space program relate to the total national space effort, including military missile and space activities?

3. How may the public interest be served by programs in space science, by international cooperation in space activities, and by public-service or commercial applications of space technology?

Other, more specific questions formulated in this report appear inevitably to lead back to these three; in consequence, these broad questions may be viewed as a point of departure for the discussion that follows.

SOME TENTATIVE GUIDELINES

The discussion presented in this report can help in reaching the ultimate decisions of policy on the hard questions of over-all level and rate of the national space effort; however, no formula is suggested for automatically assigning relative weights to such factors as the costs of possible space activities, the value of potential strategic, technical, or economic gains,
the risks of military and political losses, and the comparative worth of competing demands on available resources.

The guidelines listed below, then, in themselves do not comprise the rationale for a program. Rather, taken with the specific questions set forth in ensuing sections of the report, they may suggest to those charged with responsibility for policy decision logical courses of inquiry to follow in attacking the over-all problem.

- World leadership in space science and technology can be a potent political and psychological weapon in the struggle with communism. Much of its value as a cold-war weapon could be lost, however, if we do not act in the relatively near future; and regaining leadership may well prove increasingly difficult as time goes on.

- The minimum price of a substantial space effort depends largely upon the costs of vehicles and facilities; therefore, cost efficiency considerations indicate that vehicles and facilities which can serve interchangeably in military, scientific, public service, and other applications would offer large rewards.

- The rate of progress in space programs will be heavily influenced by national policy on the military and non-military parts of the program; e.g., whether the policy aims at mutual reinforcement of these two parts instead of the non-interference which has prevailed in the past.

- To obtain adequate public support of the relevant basic sciences is vital for maximum rate of progress in space technology. Since space activities involve nearly all of the sciences, public support of a space program amounts to support of science in general.

- A number of ways exist for the U.S. to take the initiative in international cooperation on space activities, including use of the
opportunities offered by world-wide networks for observation, tracking, communication, and recovery. Possibilities for cooperation may exist in monitoring nuclear tests, in using satellites for "open skies" observation, and in launching spacecraft from ICBM missile sites already established. (Similar opportunities are of course open to the Soviet Union.) International negotiations on space activities, in the United Nations and elsewhere, will bring increasing demands for participation in formal meetings and for implementation of agreements.

0 Minimum expenditures in international activities appear to depend on the need for a world-wide ground-station network. Some international cooperation is clearly indicated so that the scientific resources of the free world may be used. The conduct of high-cost international activities will doubtless depend upon expectations of political gains.

0 The rate of effort on public service or commercial application will depend upon public and industrial interest in exploring the possibilities with public and private funds, upon the degree to which pertinent military developments can be carried over to civil uses, and upon the outcome of current studies of the economic and competitive aspects of such systems.

The degree to which the above guidelines are applied must be determined by those charged with the ultimate responsibility for decision. The following discussion includes a more extensive consideration of the major issues and raises questions for which satisfactory answers appear to be needed; it thus moves toward developing the "rationale" for a national space program.
II. WORTH AND PRICE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE ACTIVITIES

In late 1957 and early 1958 the United States was caught lagging in what suddenly was thought of as a "space race," wherein over-all scientific standing was confused by the shifting criteria of "national prestige." Regardless of their ultimate validity, these criteria and their application are important politically, both on a national and an international scale.

It is important to examine the decisions to be made on pursuing, or abandoning, the contest for world leadership in space activities, because all courses of action in this matter are costly in one way or another: a vigorous competitive program will have a high dollar cost; an inadequate competitive program may result in unacceptable political losses.

The ensuing discussion deals in the main with the relative standing of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in space technology, and with the consequences of various courses of action that would affect this standing. Many other activities of course contribute to the relative standing of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the eyes of the many peoples whose opinions we must consider; but the spectacular popular appeal of space achievements, their considerable military implications, and the political use that has already been made of them by the Soviets place high political worth on this field of endeavor.

By employing a powerful propaganda apparatus behind an effective screen of secrecy, Soviet tactics have gained a large measure of credibility for the regime's military claims while effectively preserving its pose of peaceableness. The image of the Soviet space program that has been impressed upon much of the world is one in which science governs and political considerations do not intrude; space bodies are launched only when science will benefit, and the
launchings are invariably successful. In contrast, the image of the American program that Soviet propaganda fosters with some success is one of frenetic striving to catch up with the U.S.S.R.--a hopeless race in which science is subjected to the arbitrary commands of aggressive politicians and generals, and failure follows upon failure.

One basic Soviet propaganda tactic is employed to achieve these effects: plans for future Soviet space activities are characterized as wholly scientific and devoted to peaceful progress, while the military implications of past Soviet space successes are emphasized at certain times in warnings and declarations directed at selected countries and audiences. In contrast, plans for future U.S. space activities are depicted by the Soviets as serving military objectives, while past U.S. space successes are minimized and deprived of military significance. The Soviet Union thus has been exploiting the prestige gained through its augmented military strength and scientific achievements to intimidate lesser nations in the free world--and if possible the United States itself--without arousing the apprehensions of neutralists and pacifists.

The Soviet leaders seem to have exploited each successful space launching for political ends. In some cases these ends may have influenced the timing, or perhaps even the decision to attempt a particular space shot. For example, just a few days after Sputnik II was launched, leaders of the world communist movement assembled in Moscow to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The launching provided grounds for enthusiasm for the assembled communist leaders, who met at a time when the effects of the Hungarian rebellion, and of Polish insubordination, were still being felt in the communist world. Moreover, it enabled Khrushchev to boast of Soviet strength at a time when the world was inclined to speculate that Soviet military power had been weakened by the purge of Zhukov.
Apart from its use as an element in Soviet grand strategy, the space program has also proved very useful in domestic politics, particularly as a means whereby Khrushchev has consolidated his position as dictator by identifying himself with the Soviet space and missile programs in order to derive credit from their successes.

Whatever Khrushchev's role in the development of Soviet space and missile technology, there can be no question that he has been the principal agent of its exploitation for political ends. Inasmuch as he has consolidated his position as dictator, Khrushchev's penchant for this instrument suggests that it will play an increasing role in Soviet grand strategy.

An important feature of the space competition is the impact it may have on nations other than the chief competitors. If a third country interprets Soviet space leadership to mean the triumph of socialist over capitalist science and industry, the interpretation will color that country's expectations about the outcome of the cold war, its appraisal of the moral as well as the economic viability of the two systems, and perhaps its assessment of their ultimate military strength. These estimates may lead the third country to act in such a way as to help validate them; for example, by turning to the Soviet Union for technical assistance and by sending its students there for technical and scientific training.

Question: Assuming that the U.S. can raise foreign estimates of our future national strength by restoring the fact and the image of U.S. technical equality (if not superiority), how can it achieve this restoration without undermining belief in our peaceful intentions?

The Soviet government has played up its space achievements at home without restraint, so that astronautical ascendency is one of the outstanding facts of Soviet life and has been used as a prime illustration of the inherent
superiority of the government and of communism in general. This environment creates an opportunity to exploit the situation by means of impressive accomplishments by the United States. Such accomplishments could have a substantial impact on the Soviet population, and materially influence their views of the competing political systems.

**Question:** Within our present and programmed capabilities, how can the U.S. best capitalize on this opportunity?

Aiming at successes in the near future may have a higher political pay-off than aiming at developments in the more distant future. On several grounds, it appears to be important to keep from falling farther behind the Soviet Union in space technology. The effort required by the Soviets to maintain leadership over the U.S. could increase sharply if they were driven to special developments beyond those directly available in their military program. While quickly carrying competition to this level would require substantial increments in the U.S. budget in the near future, these increments might be difficult or painful for the U.S.S.R. to match. A decade or so hence, however, it may not be difficult for them to match our budget increases, and their growth may already be an established fact. If little is done by the United States now, the U.S.S.R. may later be able to match and offset almost any actions taken by the U.S.

Any detailed consideration of the economic feasibility to the U.S.S.R. of a heavy, sustained effort in space must proceed with the realization that the purchasing power of money in this activity in the Soviet Union is likely to be high in relation to its purchasing power in the economy as a whole, since expenditures for space activity may enjoy the artificially low price levels associated with Soviet military procurement.
The U.S. still has not brought its gross capabilities up to those displayed by the U.S.S.R. As a rough comparison, the Atlas satellite launched on December 18, 1958, carried a payload weighing about the same as that of Sputnik I launched on October 4, 1957, that is, less than 200 pounds. No U.S. space vehicles yet launched can be classed with the subsequent Soviet vehicles, which carried payloads weighing from 1000 to 3000 pounds.

The first test of a Soviet ICBM took place less than two years ago. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that development of these vehicles is still actively going forward and that the space capabilities available to the U.S.S.R. through exploitation of this development will grow markedly for quite some time.

The rocket performance displayed by launching Sputnik III on May 15, 1958, and again by Lunik/Mechat on January 2, 1959, will not be realized in the U.S. program until successful flight of the Atlas/Hustler rocket (ARPA/Air Force Project WS-117L), not expected to occur before late 1959 or early 1960, a system which is presently planned solely for military employment.

Question: Should plans be made for non-military employment of WS-117L equipment?

The first point in the present program at which the U.S. can expect to somewhat exceed the capability already demonstrated by Sputnik III is successful flight of the Atlas/Vega, not now expected before late 1960. The first opportunity to exceed the payload of Sputnik III by a substantial amount will depend upon successful flight of the Atlas/Centaur, not now expected before 1961, or a complete Saturn vehicle some time later.

Question: Should plans be made to accelerate development of Atlas/Vega, Atlas/Centaur, or Saturn?
These comparisons, based on payload weight, are not complete, since the perfection of auxiliary equipment is also important, and the use made of the payload capacity is a vital consideration. Many useful things can and will be done with smaller vehicles. However, payload weight is a very useful index because it sets the scale of possible activities—things can be done within a payload of 1000 pounds that cannot be done in 100 pounds or even in 10 packages of 100 pounds each. This factor is particularly relevant for manned flight, where about a ton of payload is required as a minimum.

System reliability is also a very important parameter since it sets the politically vital ratio of successes to failures. Achievement of high reliability is generally associated with thorough development and testing, and is not ordinarily displayed by a program involving a few each of many different items.

COSTS OF LEADERSHIP

The price of capturing and maintaining leadership will be determined by the cost of those programs likely to lead to a general view that the United States is "ahead" in astronautics; this price may be partly offset by the value accruing to other objectives from these programs. There are no formal rules to this curious game, but certain observations seem valid:

1. Being "ahead" will, for some considerable time, rest heavily on "firsts" (not stunts, but substantial accomplishments). Therefore, the development and other costs leading up to a new capability might fairly be charged entirely, or in part, to the leadership objective; a high fraction of the cost of subsequent sustained use of that capability, however, would have to be charged to some other objective.

2. In this new field there are many possible "firsts," but three may be judged to be of particular early importance:
a. Successful orbiting and return of a man.
b. Successful photography, of reconnaissance quality, from a satellite.
c. Successful landing of a working payload on the moon.

3. Payload size is an important index for assessing relative standing because it is essentially a forecasting parameter: possession of a larger payload capability implies better prospects for scoring significant "firsts" or other desirable accomplishments.

4. For some time to come, the dollar cost to the U.S. of the competition for leadership will be set by costs of development and initial operation of the vehicles and associated facilities required to maintain an adequate growth of payload capability and acceptable levels of reliability.

5. The vehicle development program must be supplemented by vigorous, but less costly, efforts to provide payload assemblies (scientific instruments, etc.) that will demonstrate useful employment of the vehicle. The objectives served by flight of these payload assemblies--scientific, military, public-service--will have to justify the cost of sustained use of the vehicles and facilities after the leadership potential has been exploited in initial operations.

6. If other objectives--scientific, military, public-service--adequately justify the cost of achieving capabilities that enable successful competition, then the price of leadership is slight. The Soviets can evidently enjoy "leadership" at very little apparent cost so long as the capabilities acquired directly from the military missile program are adequate.

In principle, the cost of leadership could be assessed in the following way:
1. Estimate the payload levels required to exceed materially the expected U.S.S.R. capabilities during the time period of interest.

2. Select the program actions that can best provide and use these required payload levels.

3. Estimate the fraction of the total program costs that can be fairly said to represent value to other national objectives.

4. Consider the remainder of the total program costs as chargeable to leadership.

Considering the magnitude of payload already demonstrated by the U.S.S.R., the problem of justifying a high fraction of program costs by other objectives may be severe. The operations that presently seem to imply actual requirements for large payloads are various military projects and the large-scale scientific activities, e.g., manned satellite laboratories, and lunar and planetary exploration.

**Question:** Do present plans for space activities, military and non-military, place suitable emphasis on the objective of capturing leadership?

**ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE "SPACE RACE"**

One line of reasoning that should not be overlooked stems from an assumption that it is undesirable to attempt to overtake the Soviet Union in space achievements in time to give any appreciable payoffs, or that even if we could do it within several years, it is not worth the expenditure of several billion dollars and the resulting drain on the economy and resources involved.

Some arguments that have been heard in support of this thesis include:

- The whole history of Soviet astronauts indicates that Soviet activity has, for nearly a generation, been pursued with determination, with a singleness of purpose, and with consistent support; and
therefore that the Soviets are so far advanced that it is unsound to think of overtaking them at an early date.

- To support the kind of effort in space achievements needed even to draw abreast of the U.S.S.R. at some early date will require an annual expenditure of something like a billion dollars for several years, a substantial share of which could better be put on other activities, science for example.

- The real value (other than military) of satellite operations and other expensive space missions is in no way comparable to their very high costs.

- Even the cost of avoiding our falling farther behind could be more profitably and more soundly invested in other projects offering greater long-term benefits to the national economy and national security than satellites and spacecraft ventures. For example, in the other technological field represented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, would the commitment of one billion dollars per year, for three years, to the development of large high-speed transport aircraft offer more benefits to the national economy and the national defense, say five years hence, than a similar amount devoted to exploring the moon and planets? Or would not the application of several hundred million dollars per year to the support of basic science yield a greater probability of real returns to national economy and defense than a similar expenditure for some of the proposed space missions it could buy?

Examination of issues of this kind will probably only emphasize the basic question of how much, and at what rate, the nation can afford to support space developments, rather than disclose whether any given amount should be put
on space or on something else. It might also lead to the conclusion that the degree of support of any such activity should be considered on its own merits rather than judged against other nationally supportable activities contributing to similar broad national objectives, like advancing science and technology.

Question: To what extent would the saving resulting from a considerably reduced space program insure that other activities, which might be considered more meritorious, would benefit?
III. RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS

One question pervades, even dominates, all phases of the problem of determining the direction, the rate, and the level of national effort to be put on space activities: the interrelationship of the civil and the military parts of the national program.

Public interest in satellite and space activities (beginning rather diffidently about 1954) in the United States was stimulated primarily by scientists through the agency of the National Academy of Sciences and related international activities, such as the International Geophysical Year. Military interest, which preceded public interest, concerned secret devices and applications; the scientific interest generally involved unclassified matters. As it developed, the national policy with respect to the relations between the military and non-military parts of the space program strove to keep the two parts separate. In short, the country seems to have followed, in all its major decisions, a philosophy of "non-interference" of the non-military with the military. Parenthetically, the Soviet Union clearly combined these two elements of their national program. The separation philosophy in the United States persisted through the Congressional consideration of the National Aeronautics and Space Act and resulted in a number of provisions in the Act for formal mechanisms to help discriminate the fields of responsibility for aeronautical and space activities to be exercised by the new agency and by the Department of Defense.

The intent of Congress in adopting a compromise wording is found in the Conference Report to accompany HR 12575, House of Representatives Report No. 2166, 85th Congress, second session.
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 is the basic statute that established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and laid the groundwork for civilian-military direction of space activities. In its declaration of policy and purpose, Section 102, the Act contains a general expression of the allocation of responsibility between NASA and the Department of Defense, as well as a statement of certain objectives bearing on the question of civilian-military cooperation. Subsection 102(b) states that aeronautical and space activities—

shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense; . . .

Among the national objectives noted in Subsection 102(c), items (6) and (8) have special relevance to the question of civilian-military cooperation:

(6) The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to the civilian agency established to direct and control non-military aeronautical and space activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or significance to that agency; . . .

(8) The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the United States, with close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United States in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment.

The Act also specifies certain machinery for formal coordination of aeronautical and space activities.

The fundamental allocation of responsibility for aeronautical and space activities within the Government is of course a compromise, which appears to
reflect several identifiable attitudes, beliefs, and policies. It may be useful to list some of those themes here briefly so as to bring out their interconnection and their unavoidable overlap.

1. There was a belief that the primary yield from the exploration of space would be scientific knowledge, and an assumption that governmental effort toward the acquisition of scientific knowledge should be primarily civilian because, so to speak, scientific knowledge was civilian in nature.

2. It was thought that the cooperation of the scientific community in the United States and abroad would be more successfully solicited by a civilian than by a military agency.

3. It was supposed that civilian direction would make the national space program look more "peaceful" abroad than military direction would.

4. A few persons looked on the public excitement evoked in the United States by the launching of the first Soviet satellites as affording an opportunity to establish a Department of Science in the Cabinet; for them, civilian control of space research and development was a minimum measure.

5. The operation of military space systems was acknowledged to be an exclusive concern of the military, to the extent that space systems could be identified as exclusively military.

6. It was believed that research and development for military space systems should predominantly, though not necessarily exclusively, be in the hands of the military. This belief was corroborated by or associated with considerations of special end-use requirements; special security (classification) requirements; established patterns of relationships with military end-users and with industrial contractors; and the momentum of established military programs and organization.
7. There may have been some dissatisfaction with the previous progress of ballistic and space technology under military guidance. Inconclusive disputes and recrimination over responsibility for past budget cuts and low program limits may have contributed to congressional support for a partial "fresh start."

8. There was considerable respect for the skills and achievement of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), a civilian organization that had done much research of military importance and had cooperated with the military in its research programming. The decision to make NACA the nucleus of the new space organization—with major changes in authorized missions and in contracting authority—implied a preference for civilian control of space research and development.

9. The certainty of overlapping jurisdictions was recognized. Conflicts, it was supposed, would be resolved through formal coordinating machinery and in the last resort by the President.

10. Duplication of research and development effort was ritually condemned, but some voices were heard in favor of some duplication as increasing the probability of payoff. (The statutory formula cited above deprecates "unnecessary" duplication.)

The enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space Act did not abolish the problem or terminate the discussions growing out of the themes that have just been enumerated. Presumably they will be evaluated periodically in the light of developing experience in the administration of the Act and the operations of NASA under it.
Although the National Aeronautics and Space Act was enacted on July 29, 1958, NASA did not assume responsibility for non-military space programs until October 1, 1958. Before October 1, all U.S. space programs were administered by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the Department of Defense. ARPA had been formed in February, 1958, as a transitional organization with authority of indefinite duration over military space programs and temporary authority over non-military space programs. Under the President's message to Congress of April 2, 1958, NACA and the Department of Defense were to review DOD programs to recommend which should be placed under the new civilian agency and which should be facilitated by cooperative arrangements between the new agency and DOD.

On October 1, 1958, by Executive Order 10783, the following programs were transferred to NASA:

1. Project Vanguard, with more than 160 scientists and technologists of the Naval Research Laboratory.

2. Five space probes which had been under the direction of ARPA.

3. Three satellite projects: 12- and 100-ft-diameter inflatable spheres and a cosmic ray experiment.

4. A number of ARPA and Air Force engine development research programs, including their work on nuclear and fluorine rocket engines and study and development of a 1.5-million-pound-thrust single-chamber rocket engine.

In December, 1958, by Executive Order 10793, the President transferred from the Department of the Army to NASA the functions and facilities of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated by the California Institute of Technology under contract. At the same time an agreement between NASA and the Army provided for the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, to carry out certain NASA project
Thus at present different space programs exhibit several different types of organizational arrangements:

1. Exclusive NASA management, e.g., cloud-cover surveillance, lunar probes.
2. Exclusive DOD management, e.g., satellite-borne advanced reconnaissance development, ballistic missile defense.
3. NASA management with ARPA support, e.g., Project Mercury (the manned satellite program).
4. Parallel NASA-ARPA research and development, e.g., NASA single-chamber engine, 1.5-million-pounds thrust; ARPA, clustered booster.
5. Combined operation, e.g., certain functions in management and operation of tracking facilities.
6. Separate decision with interagency clearance, e.g., financial support of certain basic research done outside government.

**STATUTORY MACHINERY FOR FORMAL COORDINATION**

The National Aeronautics and Space Act set up two new bodies for interagency coordination: the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee.

The National Aeronautics and Space Council is composed of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Chairman of the AEC, an additional member from the Federal Government appointed by the President, and three eminent men from private life also appointed by the President. Its sole function is to advise the President in the discharge of his statutory duties under Subsection 201(e) of the Act, which are to:

1. survey all significant aeronautical and space activities, including the policies, plans, programs, and accomplishments of all agencies of the United States engaged in such activities;
(2) develop a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities to be conducted by agencies of the United States;

(3) designate and fix responsibility for the direction of major aeronautical and space activities;

(4) provide for effective cooperation between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense in all such activities, and specify which of such activities may be carried on concurrently by both such agencies notwithstanding the assignment of primary responsibility therefor to one or the other of such agencies; and

(5) resolve differences arising among departments and agencies of the United States with respect to aeronautical and space activities under this Act, including differences as to whether a particular project is an aeronautical and space activity.

The other coordinating body set up by the Act is the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee. It now consists of a Chairman appointed by the President, four representatives assigned by the Secretary of Defense respectively from the Department of Defense and the three military services, and four representatives assigned by the Administrator of NASA. The Act provides in Subsection 204(b) that NASA and DOD --

through the Liaison Committee, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions relating to aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.

The original authority of the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee extended only to reporting conclusions, findings, and recommendations, including dissents and non-participation, to the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of Defense. On July 1, 1959, NASA and the Department of Defense announced Presidential approval of a revised charter for the Committee increasing its authority. The major change in what was called the "CMLC Terms of Reference" directs the Committee and its chairman to deal with jurisdictional differences
when they arise instead of permitting this mediatory action only upon the request of NASA or DOD.

OTHER COORDINATING MACHINERY

Non-statutory machinery has been devised for purposes of special co-ordination. For example, basic research at various outside institutions is supported independently by NASA, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, the Office of Scientific Research in the Air Force, and the Office of Ordnance Research in the Army. The agencies concerned exchange lists of projects received, projects approved, and amounts of money granted. From time to time their representatives meet to coordinate their grants.

Another example of special-purpose coordination is provided by ground-support facilities. The operation of space vehicles requires several different systems; some of the facilities and personnel involved in these systems can be used in common (see Section VII of this document). In the fall of 1958 a coordinating committee from NASA and DOD drew up an interagency agreement, since signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA, establishing a Space Flight Ground Facilities Board. Under the agreement, that Board is to review proposals for new ground instrumentation facilities where new tracking sites would be required or where a total Government investment of more than $250,000 is involved; to recommend the allocation of responsibility for funding, constructing, and operating those facilities; and to review annually the national budget for global tracking, data acquisition, and communications facilities. Each agency is to fund, construct, and manage facilities needed for the tracking, data acquisition, and communications support of its primary space missions, but certain common facilities are to be used "whenever feasible." Under specified conditions, site management may be divorced from the ownership and operation of instrumentation and...
communications equipment. Disagreements are to be reported to the Administra-
tor of NASA and the Secretary of Defense.

An additional method of coordination is that which is imposed by the
pressures of Congressional inquiry. Upon the receipt of separate requests
from NASA and DOD for authorizing or appropriating legislation, Congressional
committees have requested cross-waivers from the respective administrators,
each certifying that the other agency's program did not unnecessarily duplic-
ate his own. This practice has contributed to advance coordination between
the agencies in anticipation of the inquiry.

AREAS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION

When the techniques of military-civilian coordination of space activities
were considered by Congress in its deliberations on what later became the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the emphasis was placed on for-
mal mechanisms. The executive process of allocating responsibility for space
activities, as one Congressional committee put it, had to be altered from a
process of negotiation to a process of decision-making. The two organizations
mainly concerned--NASA and DOD--were thought to have separable areas of pri-
mary responsibility, with a relatively small overlap. That overlap, or "grey
area," was to be superintended by the coordinating machinery described above.

Up to now, the statutory prescriptions have been partially ineffective
and partially untested. The Civilian-Military Liaison Committee seems, on
the whole, to have been limited in its initial terms of reference, and by-
passed by: (a) the creation of several ad hoc or special-purpose committees,
of different degrees of formal structure and continuity, and (b) informal
day-to-day accommodation at the working level. The Space Council seems to
have been somewhat more active, but only as a registry for negotiated organi-
zational compromises between departmental heads; it appears to have served
neither as a Space Policy Board with power to impose broad managerial deci-
sions, as the Senate at one point desired, nor as an advisory committee to
the President and the Administrator of NASA in the sense envisaged by the
House of Representatives.

Questions:

1. In the light of experience to date with the Policy
   Council and the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee,
   how can they fulfill their statutory responsibilities
   as defined by Congress?

2. Would the Council be more effective with a strong
   supporting secretariat or a subordinate preparatory
   body? (E.g., would the implementation of the per-
   missive clauses of the Act providing for an execu-
   tive secretary appointed by the President and con-
   firmed by the Senate be desirable?)

3. Should the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee act
   as a subordinate or preparatory body to the Space
   Council?

4. Would the assignment of an active and experienced
   military officer as Chairman of CMLC (as provided
   in Sec. 204(d) of the Act) help harmonize the mili-
   tary and non-military parts of the program?

Relatively informal coordination is being practiced between NASA and
DOD on such matters as management of ground-support or booster develop-
ment; and these procedures are not formally codified by statutory amendment or even
by regulation. Day-to-day contact between the scientists, engineers, and
managerial staff of NASA and DOD, and growing familiarity with the nature of
the R & D problem and the related management problems, should help to antici-
pate many incipient difficulties.

However, mutual accommodation of the sort mentioned here, whatever its
merits, cannot be expected to resolve fundamental questions of space manage-
ment. For example, the decision on the size of the fraction of the gross
national product that should be devoted to governmental space activities
will not rest in the hands, however closely linked, of NASA and DOD alone. However, when they do take the initiative in proposing budget levels to the White House and ultimately to the Congress, the proposals should have more authority if NASA and DOD agree on them in advance.

Within the over-all budget for space activities, the division of funds and responsibility between NASA and DOD is, and will remain, partly outside the control of those agencies, because certain of the applicable policies will be decided by Congress or by higher executive authority. NASA and DOD, however, enter the decision-making process at several different stages: furnishing the necessary technical information, recommending over-all policy to the ultimate deciding bodies, applying and interpreting the necessarily general terms of the decisions, and recommending modifications (not excluding modifications in the size of the over-all budget for space activities). The combined weight of NASA and DOD action at all of those stages may be in practice nearly conclusive.

The "grey area" concept upon which Congress based its scheme of organizational accommodation may be administratively unsatisfying; but the line between military and non-military space activity cannot be clearly drawn on an objective basis in most cases. While military and non-military efforts may differ widely in intent, their physical requirements may not differ materially.

While there are serious disadvantages to many forms of duplication between NASA and DOD, these disadvantages do not necessarily extend to technical competition in research and development in the sense of competing programs toward the achievement of a common R & D goal. Simultaneous parallel efforts ("controlled duplication") may in fact ultimately mean a saving of time and money as compared with successive single attempts.
Therefore, space research and development activities of NASA and DOD are or can be made complementary and mutually supporting. For example:

1. One main area consists of the partial coordination of program planning through controlled duplication and what might equally well be termed "controlled non-duplication:" the agreed-on decision to abstain from research and development in a given area being covered by another agency. This would require adequate provision, not necessarily formal, for regular review and cross-communication of end-use needs.

**Question:** What criteria should guide planning for "controlled duplication?"

2. An important special case of controlled non-duplication may be afforded by considerations of the structure of DOD planning. A very large part of research and development in DOD is keyed to the concept of integrated planning of weapons systems.

There is a certain amount of research, development and testing that NASA can be expected to perform in direct participation in established military activities by virtue of unique skills and facilities resting within NASA.

**Question:** On the basis of NASA experience, and current indications of military activities, what level of direct support to DOD should be assumed in NASA planning?

In addition NASA can contribute materially to a forward-looking defense posture by engaging in research and development not associated with established weapon programs. The objective here should be simply to accumulate a large assortment of valid choices to explore in planning presently unknowable weapon system projects. This exploratory research and development effort may, therefore, frequently appear to be illogical.

**Question:** What criteria are appropriate for setting the rate of expenditure for research and development not clearly associated with an end use?
3. DOD and NASA may buy or rent certain machinery, equipment, and ground-support facilities from one another instead of building them (in-house or contracted-out).

Maximum exploitation of equipment and facilities developed under prior military programs can contribute substantially to a more effective effort in the non-military program because many items of heavy cost are largely avoided: initial development, provision of testing and production facilities, volume testing to establish functioning and reliability. A cost advantage will also usually accrue to purchase of equipment items from a larger production program. The improved reliability to be expected in an item subject to more extensive testing is also of considerable importance both in cost and in the favorable public impact of fewer failures.

4. Certain types of intelligence-gathering, both political and technological, may be more effectively performed by a civilian than by a military agency, and vice versa. Both agencies may be appropriate customers from some or all of the data yielded by each. The conduct of, and public statements concerning, the non-military space effort—particularly with respect to the international competitive aspects—will be more effective if relevant intelligence data are available. On the other hand, diagnosis of data acquired from observation of open non-military space experiments by others is a source of intelligence information with military value; for example, U.S. observation of Sputniks has yielded inferences concerning Soviet weapons. Perhaps some U.S. space activities, non-military and military, could be planned with an eye to provoking Soviet "reaction" most likely to yield information bearing on particular intelligence needs. None of this has to do with deception, espionage, or distortion of international cooperation.
Besides the areas of competition and collaboration, or competitive collaboration, between DOD and NASA, certain functions, while not inherently devoid of military or strategic relevance, can be better performed by a civilian agency (whether NASA, other-governmental, or non-governmental). They include the general field of international cooperation in "peaceful" space activities; commercial, public-service, or other economic applications of space science; and the maintenance and supervision of a program of space activity appropriate to the needs of science.

Moreover, in the struggle for national prestige, the scientific, non-military nature of NASA would seem to give it several important advantages for certain activities. Publicity can be given to U.S. space activities if they are non-military and scientific ventures with less opportunity for communist propaganda attack. Dissemination of the results of space research can more easily be portrayed as intended for the benefit of all mankind. The participation of foreign scientists, including those of neutralist and even Soviet-bloc countries, is facilitated; this in itself contributes to the desired prestige objectives.

It would seem clear that the national rate of progress, as well as the rate and level of effort, depends critically upon a course of action that harmonizes both the military and non-military phases of our national program: in short, adherence to a policy of "mutual reinforcement" instead of the "non-interference" that seems to have prevailed. It would also seem clear from a careful perusal of the Act and the declaration of intent of the Congress that there is ample latitude for executive action within the present terms of the Act to go far in this direction. The major questions on jurisdiction that have arisen in the past and that surely will continue to arise in the future will be those that require agreement between the Department of
Defense and NASA (or in absence of agreement, decision by the President) on
the interpretation of the degree to which certain activities may be "peculiar
to or primarily associated with the development of weapon systems, military
operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and
development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the
United States)."

National achievements based on clearly defined "space" objectives will
be difficult and expensive enough, even in the unlikely event that complete
harmony and agreement on joint requirements between the military and non-
military programs are attained. The cost in both time and money will be much
greater unless effective means are employed to make the requirements of the
two major elements of the national program complement and support each other.
Those concerned with the problem, therefore, would do well to obtain views on
it from the military departments as well as from NASA.

Question: How can joint development goals, satisfying
both military and non-military needs, be
established?

Assignment of responsibility to NASA or DOD for management of a given
program aimed at joint development goals will probably depend upon such
criteria as:

a. The relative importance or urgency attached to the military and non-
military phases of the joint development goal.

b. Improved program efficiency to be expected through use of unique
skills and facilities lying within the purview of one or the other
of the federal establishments.

c. Improved program efficiency to be expected through close integra-
tion with another project that is clearly related to the prime in-
terests of the military or non-military program.