PART 3 (C)
Lunar Orbit Rendezvous: Mode and Module
April 1962 through June 1962
1962 April
1962 May
1962 June
April 1-7
NAA was directed by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Project Office to begin a
study to define the configuration and design criteria of the service
module which would make the lunar landing maneuver and touchdown.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April
1-7, 1962.
April 2-3
A meeting to review the lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) technique as a
possible mission mode for Project Apollo was held at NASA Headquarters.
Representatives from various NASA offices attended: Joseph F. Shea,
Eldon W. Hall, William A. Lee, Douglas R. Lord, James E. O'Neill, James
Turnock, Richard J. Hayes, Richard C. Henry, and Melvyn Savage of NASA
Headquarters; Friedrich O. Vonbun of Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC);
Harris M. Schurmeier of Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Arthur V. Zimmeman of
Lewis Research Center; Jack Funk, Charles W. Mathews, Owen E. Maynard,
and William F. Rector of MSC; Paul J. DeFries, Ernst D. Geissler, and
Helmut J. Horn of Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); Clinton E. Brown,
John C. Houbolt, and William H. Michael, Jr., of Langley Research
Center; and Merrill H. Mead of Ames Research Center. Each phase of the
LOR mission was discussed separately.
The launch vehicle required was a single Saturn C-5, consisting of the
S-IC, S-II, and S-IVB stages. To provide a maximum launch window, a low
earth parking orbit was recommended. For greater reliability, the
two-stage-to-orbit technique was recommended rather than requiring
reignition of the S-IVB to escape from parking orbit.
The current concepts of the Apollo command and service modules would not
be altered. The lunar excursion vehicle (LEV), under intensive study in
1961, would be aft of the service module and in front of the S-IVB
stage. For crew safety, an escape tower would be used during launch.
Access to the LEV would be provided while the entire vehicle was on the
launch pad.
Both Apollo and Saturn guidance and control systems would be operating
during the launch phase. The Saturn guidance and control system in the
S-IVB would be "primary" for injection into the earth parking
orbit and from earth orbit to escape. Provisions for takeover of the
Saturn guidance and control system should be provided in the command
module. Ground tracking was necessary during launch and establishment of
the parking orbit, MSFC and GSFC would study the altitude and type of
low earth orbit.
The LEV would be moved in front of the command module "early"
in the translunar trajectory. After the S-IVB was staged off the
spacecraft following injection into the translunar trajectory, the
service module would be used for midcourse corrections. Current plans
were for five such corrections. If possible, a symmetric configuration
along the vertical center line of the vehicle would be considered for
the LEV. Ingress to the LEV from the command module should be possible
during the translunar phase. The LEV would have a pressurized cabin
capability during the translunar phase. A "hard dock"
mechanism was considered, possibly using the support structure needed
for the launch escape tower. The mechanism for relocation of the LEV to
the top of the command module required further study. Two possibilities
were discussed: mechanical linkage and rotating the command module by
use of the attitude control system. The S-IVB could be used to stabilize
the LEV during this maneuver.
The service module propulsion would be used to decelerate the spacecraft
into a lunar orbit. Selection of the altitude and type of lunar orbit
needed more study, although a 100-nautical-mile orbit seemed desirable
for abort considerations.
The LEV would have a "point" landing (±½ mile)
capability. The landing site, selected before liftoff, would previously
have been examined by unmanned instrumented spacecraft. It was agreed
that the LEV would have redundant guidance and control capability for
each phase of the lunar maneuvers. Two types of LEV guidance and control
systems were recommended for further analysis. These were an automatic
system employing an inertial platform plus radio aids and a manually
controlled system which could be used if the automatic system failed or
as a primary system.
The service module would provide the prime propulsion for establishing
the entire spacecraft in lunar orbit and for escape from the lunar orbit
to earth trajectory. The LEV propulsion system was discussed and the
general consensus was that this area would require further study. It was
agreed that the propulsion system should have a hover capability near
the lunar surface but that this requirement also needed more study.
It was recommended that two men be in the LEV, which would descend to
the lunar surface, and that both men should be able to leave the LEV at
the same time. It was agreed that the LEV should have a pressurized
cabin which would have the capability for one week's operation, even
though a normal LOR mission would be 24 hours. The question of lunar
stay time was discussed and it was agreed that Langley should continue
to analyze the situation. Requirements for sterilization procedures were
discussed and referred for further study. The time for lunar landing was
not resolved.
In the discussion of rendezvous requirements, it was agreed that two
systems be studied, one automatic and one providing for a degree of
manual capability. A line of sight between the LEV and the orbiting
spacecraft should exist before lunar takeoff. A question about
hard-docking or soft-docking technique brought up the possibility of
keeping the LEV attached to the spacecraft during the transearth phase.
This procedure would provide some command module subsystem
redundancy.
Direct link communications from earth to the LEV and from earth to the
spacecraft, except when it was in the shadow of the moon, was
recommended. Voice communications should be provided from the earth to
the lunar surface and the possibility of television coverage would be
considered.
A number of problems associated with the proposed mission plan were
outlined for NASA Center investigation. Work on most of the problems was
already under way and the needed information was expected to be compiled
in about one month.
[This meeting, like the one held February 13-15, was part of a
continuing effort to select the lunar mission mode.]
Minutes, Lunar Orbit Rendezvous Meeting, April 2-3, 1962.
April 4
Two views of a preliminary mockup command module build by North American's Space and Information Systems Division.
A mockup of the Apollo command module, built by the Space and
Information Systems Division of NAA, was made public for the first time
during a visit to NAA by news media representatives.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p.
6.
April 5
The X-15 was flown to a speed of 2,830 miles per hour and to an altitude
of 179,000 feet in a test of a new automatic control system to be used
in the Dyna-Soar and Apollo spacecraft. NASA's Neil A. Armstrong was the
pilot. The previous electronic control system had been automatic only
while the X-15 was in the atmosphere; the new system was automatic in
space as well.
Baltimore Sun, April 6, 1962.
April 6
The Thiokol Chemical Corporation was selected by NAA to build the
solid-fuel rocket motor to be used to jettison the Apollo launch escape
tower following a launch abort or during a normal mission.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p.
6.
April 6
The request for a proposal on the Little Joe II test launch vehicle was
submitted to bidders by a letter from MSC, together with a Work
Statement. Five launches, which were to test boilerplate models of the
Apollo spacecraft command module in abort situations, were called for:
three in 1963 and two in 1964. The first two launches in 1963 were to be
max q abort tests and the third was to be a high-altitude atmospheric
abort. The first launch in 1964 was to be a very-high-altitude abort and
the final launch a confirming max q abort [max
q - the point in the exit trajectory at which the launch
vehicle and spacecraft are subjected to the severest aerodynamic load].
(Evaluation of the proposals took place from April 23 to 27, and the
contractor was selected on May 11).
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Monthly Activity Report, April
1-30, 1962, p. 3; Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project
Apollo: Final Report, Vol. I, pp 1-2, 4-1.
April 11
President John F, Kennedy designated the Apollo program including
essential spacecraft, launch vehicles, and facilities as being in the
highest national priority category (DX) for research and development and
for achieving operational capability.
National Security Action Memorandum No. 144, McGeorge Bundy to the Vice
President (as Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space Council); The
Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Commerce; Administrator, NASA;
Director, Bureau of the Budget; Director, Office of Emergency Planning,
"Assignment of Highest National Priority to the APOLLO Manned Lunar
Landing Program," April 11, 1962.
April 16
Representatives of MSC made a formal presentation at Marshall Space
Flight Center on the lunar orbit rendezvous technique for accomplishing
the lunar mission.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 15-
21, 1962.
April 19-20
Discussions at the monthly NAA-NASA Apollo spacecraft design review
included:
- Results of an NAA study on environmental control system (ECS)
heating capabilities for lunar night operations were presented. The
study showed that the system could not provide enough heating and that
the integration of ECS and the fuel cell coolant system was the most
promising source for supplemental heating.
- The launch escape system configuration was approved. It embodied a
120inch tower, symmetrical nose cone, jettison motor located forward of
the launch escape motor, and an aerodynamic skirt covering the escape
motor nozzles. This configuration change in the escape rocket nozzle
cant angle was intended to prevent impingement of hot gases on the
command module.
- MSC senior personnel directed NAA to study the technical penalties
and scheduling effects of spacecraft design capabilities with direct
lunar landing and lunar rendezvous techniques.
NAA, Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, April
30, 1962, pp. 19, 59; Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly
Activity Report, April 15-21, 1962.
April 23
Ranger IV was launched by an Atlas-Agena B booster from the
Atlantic Missile Range, attained a parking orbit, and was fired into the
proper lunar trajectory by the restart of the Agena B engine. Failure of
a timer in the spacecraft payload caused loss of both internal and
ground control over the vehicle. The Goldstone Tracking Station
maintained contact with the spacecraft until it passed behind the left
edge of the moon on April 26. It impacted at a speed of 5,963 miles per
hour, the first American spacecraft to land on the lunar surface. The
Agena B second stage passed to the right of the moon and later went into
orbit around the sun. Lunar photography objectives were not achieved.
Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962, pp. 59, 61;
New York Times, April 24, 1962; Washington
Post, April 26, 1962.
April 24
Milton W. Rosen, NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Director of Launch
Vehicles and Propulsion, recommended that the S-IVB stage be designed
specifically as the third stage of the Saturn C-5 and that the C-5 be
designed specifically for the manned lunar landing using the lunar orbit
rendezvous technique. The S-IVB stage would inject the spacecraft into a
parking orbit and would be restarted in space to place the lunar mission
payload into a translunar trajectory. Rosen also recommended that the S-
IVB stage be used as a flight test vehicle to exercise the command
module (CM), service module (SM), and lunar excursion module (LEM)
[previously referred to as the lunar excursion vehicle (LEV)] in earth
orbit missions. The Saturn C-1 vehicle, in combination with the CM, SM,
LEM, and S-IVB stage, would be used on the most realistic mission
simulation possible. This combination would also permit the most nearly
complete operational mating of the CM, SM, LEM, and S-IVB prior to
actual mission flight.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 1.
April 24
MSC Associate Director Walter C. William reported to the Manned Space
Flight Management Council that the lack of a decision on the lunar
mission mode was causing delays in various areas of the Apollo
spacecraft program, especially the requirements for the portions of the
spacecraft being furnished by NAA.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 2.
April 24
The Manned Space Flight Management Council decided to delay the awarding
of a Nova launch vehicle study contract until July 1 at the earliest to
allow time for an in-house study of bids submitted and for further
examination of the schedule for a manned lunar landing using the direct
ascent technique.
MSF Management Council Minutes, April 24, 1962, Agenda Item 4.
April 25
The Saturn SA-2 first stage booster was launched successfully from Cape
Canaveral. The rocket was blown up intentionally and on schedule about
2.5 minutes after liftoff at an altitude of 65 miles, dumping the water
ballast from the dummy second and third stages into the upper
atmosphere. The experiment, Project Highwater, produced a massive ice
cloud and lightning-like effects. The eight clustered H-1 engines in the
first stage produced 1.3 million pounds of thrust and the maximum speed
attained by the booster was 3,750 miles per hour. Modifications to
decrease the slight fuel sloshing encountered near the end of the
previous flight test were successful.
New York Times, April 26, 1962; Astronautical and
Aeronautical Events of 1962, p.61.
April 30
The contract for the Apollo service module propulsion engine was awarded
by NAA to Aerojet-General Corporation. The estimated cost of the
contract was $12 million. NAA had given Aerojet-General authority April
9 to begin work.
Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 1, p. 19; MSC
Space News Roundup, May 2, 1962, p. 8; Aerojet-General
Corporation, Apollo Service Module Rocket Engine Monthly Progress
Report, October 1962, p. 1.
During the Month
John C. Houbolt of Langley Research Center, writing in the April issue
of Astronautics, outlined the advantages of lunar orbit rendezvous for a
manned lunar landing as opposed to direct flight from earth or earth
orbit rendezvous. Under this concept, an Apollo-type spacecraft would
fly directly to the moon, go into lunar orbit, detach a small landing
craft which would land on the moon and then return to the mother craft,
which would then return to earth. The advantages would be the much
smaller craft performing the difficult lunar landing and takeoff, the
possibility of optimizing the smaller craft for this one function, the
safe return of the mother craft in event of a landing accident, and even
the possibility of using two of the small craft to provide a rescue
capability.
Houbolt, "Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous and Manned Lunar Landing,"
Astronautics, 7 (April 1962), pp.26-29, 70, 72.
During the Month
The basic design configuration of the command module forward compartment
was changed by the relocation of two attitude control engines from the
lower to the upper compartment area, where less heat flux would be
experienced during reentry.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 79.
During the Month
Three major changes were made by NAA in the Apollo space-suit circuit:
- The demand oxygen regulator was moved downstream of the crew to
prevent a sudden drop of pressure when a crewman opened his face plate.
- The suit manifold would now have a pressure-controlled bypass to
prevent variable flow to other crew members if one crewman increased or
decreased oxygen flow. The manifold would also include a venturi in each
suit-inlet connection to prevent a loss of oxygen flow to other crew
members if the suit of one crewman should rupture. In this situation,
the venturi would prevent the damaged suit flow out from exceeding the
maximum flow of demand regulators.
- The circuit water evaporator and coolant loop heat exchanger of the
suit were integrated into one by fluid exchange to make it smaller. A
coolant-temperature control was also provided for sunlight operation on
the moon.
In addition, a suit inlet-outlet was added to the command module
sleeping quarters, and the cabin fan was shifted so that it would
operate as an intake fan during the post-landing phase.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, pp. 17-18,
65.
During the Month
NAA developed a concept for shock attenuation along the command module
Y-Y axis by the use of aluminum honeycomb material.
Cylinders mounted on the outboard edge of the left and right couches
would extend mechanically to bear against the side compartment
walls.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 68.
During the Month
NAA studies resulted in significant changes in the command module
environmental control system (ECS).
- Among modifications in the ECS schematic were included:
- Reduction in the cooling water capacity
- Combining into one command module tank the potable water and
cooling water needed during boost
- Elimination of the water blanket for radiation protection.
- More water would be generated by the fuel cells than necessary and
could be dumped to decrease lunar landing and lunar takeoff weight.
- Airlock valving requirements would permit two or more crewmen to
perform extravehicular operation simultaneously. Area control of the
space radiator to prevent coolant freezing was specified.
- A new concept to integrate heat rejection from the spacecraft power
system and the ECS into one space radiator subsystem was developed. This
subsystem would provide full versatility for both lunar night and lunar
day conditions and would decrease weight and complexity.
- Because of the elimination of the lunar supplemental refrigeration
system and deployable radiators, the water-glycol coolant system was
modified:
- Removal from the service module of the coolant loop regenerative
heat exchanger
- Replacement by a liquid valving arrangement of the gas-leak check
provision at the radiator panels
- Changeover to a completely cascaded system involving the
suit-circuit heat exchanger, cabin heat exchanger, and electronic
component coldplate.
In addition, a small, regenerative heat exchanger was added in the
command module to preheat the water-glycol. A separate coolant branch
to the inertial measurement unit section of the electronic system
provided for the more critical cooling task required in that area.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, pp. 15, 17,
21, 64-65.
During the Month
NAA determined that preliminary inflight nuclear radiation
instrumentation would consist of an onboard system to detect solar x-ray
or ultraviolet radiation and a ground visual system for telemetering
solar flare warning signals to the command module. The crew would have
eight to ten minutes warning to take protective action before the
arrival of solar flare proton radiation.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-3, p. 22.
A presentation on the lunar orbit rendezvous technique was made to D.
Brainerd Holmes, Director, NASA Office of Manned Space Flight, by
representatives of the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office. A similar
presentation to NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr.,
followed on May 31.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Monthly Activity Report, May
1-31, 1962.
May 4
The Source Evaluation Board for selecting Apollo navigation and guidance
components subcontractors completed its evaluation of bids and technical
proposals and submitted its findings to NASA Headquarters. Preliminary
presentation of the Board's findings had been made to NASA Administrator
James E. Webb on April 5.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, April 1-
7, 1962; MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director,
Manned Space Flight, April 29May 5, 1962, p. 12.
May 4-5
At the monthly Apollo spacecraft design review meeting at NAA, MSC
representatives recommended that NAA and Avco Corporation prepare a
comprehensive test plan for verifying the overall integrity of the
heatshield including flight tests deemed necessary, without regard for
anticipated hunch vehicle availability.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, June 3-9,
1962.
May 6
A preliminary Statement of Work for a proposed lunar excursion module
was completed, although the mission mode had not yet been selected.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 12.
May 3
A purchase request was being prepared by NASA for wind tunnel support
services from the Air Force's Arnold Engineering Development Center in
the amount of approximately $222,000. These wind tunnel tests were to
provide design parameter data on static stability, dynamic stability,
pressure stability, and heat transfer for the Apollo program. The funds
were to cover tests during June and July 1962. Approximately $632,000
would be required in Fiscal Year 1963 to fund the tests scheduled to
December 1962.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 13.
May 5
MSC processed a purchase request to increase NAA's spacecraft letter
contract from $32 million to $55 million to cover NAA's costs to June
30, 1962. [Pending the execution of a definitive contract (signed August
14, 1963), actions of this type were necessary].
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, April 29-May 5, 1962, p. 13; Oakley, Historical Summary,
S&ID Apollo Program, p. 9.
May 8
NASA announced the selection of three companies for the negotiation of
production contracts for major components of the Apollo spacecraft
guidance and navigation system under development by the MIT
Instrumentation Laboratory. The largest of the contracts, for $16
million, would be negotiated with AC Spark Plug Division of General
Motor Corporation for fabrication of the inertial, gyroscope-stabilized
platform of the Apollo spacecraft; for development and construction of
ground support and checkout equipment; and for assembling and testing
all parts of the system. The second contract, for $2 million, would be
negotiated with the Raytheon Company to manufacture the digital computer
aboard the spacecraft. Under the third contract, for about $2 million,
Kollsman Instrument Corporation would build the optical subsystems,
including a space sextant, sunfinders, and navigation display
equipment.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, May 5-11,
1962; Washington Evening Star, May 9, 1962.
May 11
NASA awarded a letter contract to General Dynamics/Convair to design and
manufacture the Little Joe II test launch vehicle which would be used to
boost the Apollo spacecraft on unmanned suborbital test flights. The
Little Joe II would be powered by clustered solid-fuel engines. At the
same time, a separate 30-day contract was awarded to Convair to study
the control system requirements. White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex., had
been selected for the Little Joe II max q abort and high-altitude abort
missions.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, May
13-19, 1962; Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle, NASA Project
Apollo: Final Report, Vol. I, pp. 1-2, 4-1; Astronautical
and Aeronautical Events of 1962, p. 82.
May 24
The Aurora 7 spacecraft, with Astronaut M. Scott Carpenter
as pilot, was launched successfully by an Atlas booster from Atlantic
Missile Range. After a three-orbit flight, the spacecraft reentered the
atmosphere. Yaw error and late retrofire caused the landing impact point
to be over 200 miles beyond the intended area and beyond radio range of
the recovery forces. Landing occurred 4 hours and 56 minutes after
liftoff. Astronaut Carpenter was later picked up safely by a
helicopter.
Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology, pp. 164-165.
May 25
D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA's Director of Manned Space Flight, requested
the Directors of Launch Operations Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, and
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to prepare supporting component
schedules and cost breakdowns through Fiscal Year 1967 for each of the
proposed lunar landing modes: earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit
rendezvous, and direct ascent. For direct ascent, a Saturn C-8 launch
vehicle was planned, using a configuration of eight F-1 engines, eight
J-2 engines, and one J-2 engine. MSFC was also requested to submit a
proposed schedule and summary of costs for the Nova launch vehicle,
using the configuration of eight F-1 engines, two M-1 engines, and one
J-2 engine. Each Center was asked to make an evaluation of the schedules
as to possibilities of achievement, major problem areas, and
recommendations for deviations.
Memorandum, Holmes to Director, Launch Operations Center; Director,
Manned Spacecraft Center; and Director, Marshall Space Flight Center,
"The Manned Lunar Landing Program," May 25, 1962.
May 26
The F-1 engine was first fired at full power more than 1.5 million
pounds of thrust) for 2.5 minutes at Edwards Rocket Site, Calif.
Rocketdyne Skywriter, June 1, 1962, p. 1.
May 29
A schedule for the letting of a contract for the development of a lunar
excursion module was presented to the Manned Space Flight Management
Council by MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth in anticipation of a possible
decision to employ the lunar rendezvous technique in the lunar landing
mission.
MSF Management Council Minutes, May 29, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
May 29
The Manned Space Flight Management Council approved the mobile launcher
concept for the Saturn C-5 at Launch Complex 39, Merritt Island, Fla.
MSF Management Council Minutes, May 29, 1962, Agenda Item 9.
During the Month
NAA completed a preliminary requirement outline for spacecraft docking.
The outline specified that the two spacecraft be navigated to within a
few feet of each other and held to a relative velocity of less than six
inches per second and that they be steered to within a few inches of
axial alignment and parallelism. The crewman in the airlock was assumed
to be adequately protected against radiation and meteoric bombardment
and to be able to grasp the docking spacecraft and maneuver it to the
sealing faces for final clamp.
NAA, Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300 4, May 31,
1962, p. 66.
During the Month
A feasibility study was completed by NAA on the ballistic (zero-lift)
maneuver as a possible emergency flight mode for lunar mission reentry.
Based upon single-pass and 12 g maximum load-factor criteria, the
guidance corridor would be nine nautical miles. When atmospheric density
deviations were considered (+/- 50 percent from standard), the allowable
corridor would be reduced to four nautical miles. Touchdown dispersions
within the defined corridor exceeded 2500 nautical miles.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 17.
During the Month
Telescope requirements for the spacecraft were modified after two study
programs had been completed by NAA.
A study on the direct vision requirement for lunar landing showed that,
to have a simultaneous direct view of the lunar landing point and the
landing feet without changing the spacecraft configuration, a periscope
with a large field of view integrated with a side window would be
needed. A similar requirement on the general-purpose telescope could
thus be eliminated, reducing the complexity of the telescope design.
Another study showed that, with an additional weight penalty of from
five to ten pounds, an optical drift indicator for use after parachute
deployment could easily be incorporated into the general-purpose
telescope.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, pp. 29-30.
During the Month
The first reliability prediction study for the Apollo spacecraft was
completed by NAA. Assuming all systems as series elements and excluding
consideration of alternative modes, redundancies, or inflight
maintenance provisions, the study gave a reliability estimate of 0.731.
This analysis provided a basis from which means of improving reliability
would be evaluated and formulated.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 26.
During the Month
Layouts of three command module observation window configurations were
made by NAA. A study disclosed that sufficient direct vision for lunar
landing was not feasible and that windows could not be uncovered during
reentry.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 66.
During the Month
NAA began compiling a list of command module materials to be classified
selectively for potentially toxic properties. These materials would be
investigated to determine location (related to possible venting of
gases), fire resistance, exposure to excessive temperatures, gases
resulting from thermal decomposition, and toxicity of gases released
under normal and material-failure conditions. Although a complete
examination of every material was not feasible, materials could be
grouped according to chemical constituency and quantity of gases
released.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 10,
During the Month
The basic spacecraft adapter structure was defined as consisting of six
aluminum honeycomb panels, six longerons, and forward and aft bulkheads.
The design of the honeycomb panels for the test requirements program was
complete.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4. v. 89.
During the Month
NAA decided to retain the inward-opening pull-down concept for the
spacecraft crew hatch, which would use plain through bolts for lower
sill attachment and a manual jack-screw device to supply the force
necessary to seat and unseat the hatch.
Concurrently, a number of NAA latching concepts were in preparation for
presentation to NASA, including that of an outward-opening, quick-
opening crew door without an outer emergency panel. This design,
however, had weight and complexity disadvantages, as well as requiring
explosive charges.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 68.
During the Month
The command module reaction control system (RCS) selected by NAA was a
dual system without interconnections. Either would be sufficient for the
entire mission.
For the service module RCS, a quadruple arrangement was chosen which was
basically similar to the command module RCS except that squib valves and
burst discs were eliminated.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 84.
During the Month
NAA evaluated the possibility of integrating the fuel cell and
environmental control system heat rejection into one system. The
integrated system proved to be unsatisfactory, being 300 pounds heavier
and considerably more complex than the two separate systems. A
preliminary design of separate fuel cell radiators, possibly located on
the service module, was started by NAA.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 82.
During the Month
NAA studies on the prototype crew couch included one on the use of the
center couch for supporting a crewman at the astrosextant during lunar
approach and another on the displacement of outboard couches for access
to equipment areas.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, p. 65.
During the Month
Two NAA analyses showed that the urine management system would prevent a
rise in the command module humidity load and atmospheric contamination
and that freeze-up of the line used for daily evacuation of urine to the
vacuum of space could be prevented by proper orificing of the line.
Apollo Monthly Progress Report, SID 62-300-4, pp. 10-11
Wernher von Braun, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, recommended
to the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight that the lunar orbit
rendezvous mode be adopted for the lunar landing mission. He also
recommended the development of an unmanned, fully automatic, one-way
Saturn C-5 logistics vehicle in support of the lunar expedition; the
acceleration of the Saturn C-1B program; the development of high-energy
propulsion systems as a backup for the service module and possibly the
lunar excursion module; and further development of the F-1 and J-2
engines to increase thrust or specific impulse.
"Concluding Remarks by Dr. Wernher von Braun about Mode Selection
for the Lunar Landing Program Given to Dr. Joseph F. Shea, Deputy
Director (Systems), Office of Manned Space Flight, June 7, 1962,"
undated.
June 10-11
NAA was directed by the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office at the monthly
design review meeting to design an earth landing system for a passive
touchdown mode to include the command module cant angle limited to about
five degrees and favoring offset center of gravity, no roll orientation
control, no deployable heatshield, and depressurization of the reaction
control system propellant prior to impact. At the same meeting, NAA was
requested to use a single "kicker" rocket and a passive
thrust-vector-control system for the spacecraft launch escape system.
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, MSC, Weekly Activity Report, June 8-1
4, 1 962.
June 16
NASA announced that the Apollo service module propulsion system would be
tested at a new facility at White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex.
Oakley, Historical Summary, S&ID Apollo Program, p.
7.
June 16-22
Results of a preliminary investigation by NAA showed that a 100 percent
oxygen atmosphere for the command module would save about 30 pounds in
weight and reduce control complexity.
NASA-Resident Apollo Spacecraft Project Office, NAA, Weekly Activity
Report for Week Ending June 22, 1962, p. 3.
June 18
As the result of considerable joint engineering effort and discussion by
NAA and MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, the location of the onboard
space sextant in the command module was changed from the main instrument
panel to the wall of the lower equipment bay. The instrument would
penetrate the hull on the hot side during reentry and the navigator
would have to leave his couch to make navigation sightings and to align
the inertial measurement unit.
David G. Hoag, personal notes, June 18, 1962.
June 22
MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth reported to the Manned Space Flight
Management Council that the selection of the ablative material for the
Apollo spacecraft heatshield would be made by September 1. The leading
contender for the forebody ablative material was an epoxy resin with
silica fibers for improving char strength and phenolic microballoons for
reducing density.
In addition, Gilruth noted that a reevaluation of the Saturn C-1 and
C-1B launch capabilities appeared to indicate that neither vehicle would
be able to test the complete Apollo spacecraft configuration, including
the lunar excursion module. Complete spacecraft qualification would
require the use of the Saturn C-5.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 2.
June 22
Joseph F. Shea, NASA Deputy Director of Manned Space Flight (Systems),
presented to the Manned Space Flight Management Council the results of
the study on lunar mission mode selection. The study included work by
personnel in Shea's office, MSC, and Marshall Space Flight Center. The
criteria used in evaluating the direct ascent technique, earth orbit
rendezvous connecting and fueling modes, and lunar orbit rendezvous
were: the mission itself, weight margins, guidance accuracy,
communications and tracking requirements, reliability (abort problems),
development complexity, schedules, costs, flexibility, growth potential,
and military implications.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
June 22
After an extended discussion, the Manned Space Flight Management Council
unanimously decided:
- Lunar orbit rendezvous, using the Saturn C-5 launch vehicle, should
be the mission mode for lunar exploration.
- The development of a lunar logistics vehicle, using the Saturn C-1B
or the C-5 launch vehicle, should be started and a six-month study of
this development should begin immediately.
- Time was too short and the expense too great to develop a parallel
backup mode.
- Study of the Nova vehicle should continue with the expectation that
its development would follow the C-5 by two or three years.
- The C-1B launch vehicle should be started immediately, looking
toward the first two-stage flight in mid- 1965.
- Development of a lunar excursion module should begin at once.
These decisions were to be presented to NASA Associate Administrator
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden, and
NASA Administrator James E. Webb for approval.
MSF Management Council Minutes, June 22, 1962, Agenda Item 12.
June 30
A thermal coverall for use in extravehicular space suit design was
completed in-house and would be shipped to Vought Astronautics for use
in the MSC evaluation contract.
MSC, Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space
Flight, June 24-30, 1962.
During the Month
Five NASA scientists, dressed in pressure suits, completed an
exploratory study at Rocketdyne Division of the feasibility of
repairing, replacing, maintaining, and adjusting components of the J-2
rocket while in space. The scientific team also investigated the design
of special maintenance tools and the effectiveness of different pressure
suits in performing maintenance work in space.
Rocketdyne Skywriter, July 13, 1962.
Summer-Fall
NASA and MIT agreed that the Instrumentation Laboratory would use the
microcircuit for the prototype Apollo onboard computer. The Fairchild
Controls Corporation microcircuit was the only one available in the
United States.
Interview with Ralph Ragan, Instrumentation Laboratory, MIT, April 27,
1966.
