Part 2 (A)
Developing Hardware Distinctions
August 30, 1963 through September 1963
1963 August
1963 September
August 30
NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., approved the Lunar
Orbiter program. Objectives of the program were reconnaissance of the
moon's topography, investigation of its environment, and collection of
selenodetic information. (See May 12, 1964.)
The document called for five flight and three test articles. The Lunar
Orbiter spacecraft would be capable of photographing the moon from a
distance of 22 miles above the surface. Overall cost of the program was
estimated at between $150 and $200 million.
NASA Office of Space Sciences (OSS) Review, "Lunar Orbiter Program
Status Report," September 4, 1963; Space Business
Daily, September 3, 1963, p. 327; NASA Project Approval Document,
"Research and Development Project: Lunar Orbiter," Cost No.
84-800-804, undated; memorandum, Dir., OSS, to Langley Research Center,
Attn: Floyd L. Thompson, "Implementation of the Lunar Orbiter
Project," August 30, 1963. See also Bruce K. Byers, "Lunar
Orbiter: A Preliminary History" (NASA HHN-71, Comment Edition), p.
30.
Week of August 30
North American defined the maximum, nominal, and minimum CM ablation
heatshield thicknesses for lunar reentry. The maximum and minimum limits
represented variations that might arise as studies progressed.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, August 30-September 4,
1963," p. 3.
During the Month
Grumman built a full-scale cardboard model of the LEM to aid in studying
problems of cockpit geometry, specifically the arrangement of display
panels. This mockup was reviewed by MSC astronauts and the layout of the
cockpit was revised according to some of their suggestions.
Also Grumman reported that a preliminary analysis showed the reaction
control system plume heating of the LEM landing gear was not a severe
problem. [This difficulty had been greatly alleviated by the change from
five to four landing legs on the vehicle. (See April 17 and May
20-22.)]
"Monthly Progress Report No. 7," LPR-10-22, pp. 7, 25.
During the Month
At a meeting at MSC, Grumman representatives submitted the cost proposal
for LEM test articles LTA-8 and LTA-9, and suggested a testing program
for the two vehicles: LTA-8 should be used for restrained integrated
systems testing in the altitude propulsion test facilities at the
Atlantic Missile Range; LTA-9 should be used for manned atmospheric
tethered operation tests. The contractor also recommended an early
flight demonstration program to verify the helicopter tether operation
potential, which promised greatly increased mission test capability over
fixed-base tether facilities. The tether method (helicopter or fixed-
base) should be determined after the verification. LTA-8 should be
considered as a constraint to LEM-5, and LTA-9 as a constraint to the
lunar landing mission.
Ibid., pp. 45, 46.
MSC reported that design of the control and displays panel for the CM
was about 90 percent complete. North American was expected to release
the design by September 20. Qualification testing of the panels would
begin around December 1.
MSC, "Weekly Activity Report for the Office of the Director, Manned
Space Flight, September 1-7, 1963," p. 3.
September 4
Director Robert R. Gilruth established the MSC Manned Spacecraft
Criteria Board to set up engineering, design, and procedural standards
for manned spacecraft and associated systems. The board was composed of
Maxime A. Faget, Chairman; James A. Chamberlin; Kenneth S. Kleinknecht;
F. John Bailey, Jr.; G. Barry Graves; Jacob C. Moser; and Norman F.
Smith, Secretary. Board criteria would become MSC policy; and - unless
specific waivers were obtained, compliance by project offices was
mandatory.
MSC Circular No. 85, "MSC Manned Spacecraft Criteria Board,"
September 17, 1963.
September 4
MSC Flight Operations Division (FOD) recommended a series of water
impact tests to establish confidence in the CM's recovery systems under
a variety of operating conditions. FOD suggested several air drops with
water landings under various test conditions. Among these were release
of the main parachutes at impact, deployment of the postlanding
antennas, actuation of the mechanical location aids, and activation of
the recovery radio equipment.
Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to Mgr., ASPO,
"Recommendation for a water landing operational qualification test
series using AFRM 005," September 4, 1963.
September 5-11
MSC began a study to define the stability limits of a 457-centimeter
(180inch) radius LEM gear configuration. The study, in two phases,
sought to examine factors affecting stability (such as lunar slope,
touchdown velocity and direction, and the effects of soil mechanics) in
direct support of the one-sixth model and full-scale drop test programs
and to complete definition of landing capabilities of the LEM. (See
October 2.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 5-11, 1963," pp.
7-8.
September 6
MSC announced a $7.658 million definitive contract with Kollsman
Instrument Corporation for the CM guidance and navigation optical
equipment, including a scanning telescope, sextant, map and data viewer,
and related ground support equipment. MSC had awarded Kollsman a letter
contract on May 28, 1962, and had completed negotiations for the
definitive contract on March 29, 1963. "The newly signed contract
calls for delivery of all hardware to AC Spark Plug by August 1,
1964."
MSC News Release 63-147, September 6, 1963; MSC, "Weekly Activity
Report for the Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, May 27-June
3, 1962," p. 12; Kollsman Instrument Corporation, "Apollo
Program Quarterly Progress Report No. 3," March 31, 1963, p. 2;
ibid., "Apollo Program Quarterly Progress Report No.
6," December 31, 1963, pp. 10-11.
September 6
MSC Flight Operations Division (FOD) established a 72-hour lifetime for
Apollo recovery aids. This limitation was derived from considerations of
possible landing footprints, staging bases, and aircraft range and
flying time to the landing areas. Primary location aids were the
spacecraft equipment (VHF AM transceiver, VHF recovery beacon, and HE
transceiver) and the VHF survival radio. Because of battery limitations,
current planning called for only a 24-hour usage of the VHF recovery
beacon. If electronic aids were needed beyond this time the VHF survival
radio would be used. If the spacecraft were damaged or lost, the VHF
survival radio would be the only electronic location aid available. MSC
had recently selected the Sperry Phoenix Company to produce the Gemini
VHF survival radio, which was expected to meet the Apollo requirements.
FOD recommended that the current contract with Sperry Phoenix be
extended to provide the units needed for Apollo missions.
Memorandum, Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, to ASPO, Attn: L. N.
McMillion, "Apollo VHF survival radio," undated (ca, September
1963).
September 6
At El Centro, Calif., CM boilerplate (BP) 3, a parachute test vehicle,
was destroyed during tests simulating the new BP-6 configuration
(without strakes or apex cover). Drogue parachute descent, disconnect,
and pilot mortar fire appeared normal. However, one pilot parachute was
cut by contact with the vehicle and its main parachute did not deploy.
Because of harness damage, the remaining two main parachutes failed
while reefed. Investigation of the BP-3 failure resulting in rigging and
design changes on BP-6 and BP-19.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-17, p. 11;
ibid., SID 62-300-18, pp. 15-16.
September 9
MSC ordered North American to make provisions in the CM to permit
charging the 28-volt portable life support system battery from the
spacecraft battery charger.
On the following day, the Center informed North American also that a new
mechanical clock timer system would be provided in the CM for indicating
elapsed time from liftoff and predicting time to and duration of various
events during the mission.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. Eighty-Two," September 9,
1963; ibid., "Contract Change Authorization No.
Eighty-Four," September 10, 1963.
A design engineering inspection (DEI) and Apollo program design review were held at NAA's El Segundo, Calif., facilities September 10-12, 1963. About 70 NASA personnel members participated in the DEI of boilerplate 12 before it was shipped to WSMR to test the launch escape system. The following two days approximately 100 NASA employees including personnel from most NASA Centers and Headquarters attended the program design review. Topics included structural design, the propulsion, power, and electrical systems, guidance and navigation, simulation and trainers, ground support equipment, and a program hardware summary.
September 12
NASA announced that, in the future, unmanned lunar landing spacecraft
e.g., Rangers and Surveyors) will be assembled in "clean
rooms" and treated with germ-killing substances to reduce the
number of microbes on exposed surfaces. These sterilization procedures,
less stringent than earlier methods, were intended to prevent
contamination of the lunar surface and, at the same time, avoid damage
to sensitive electronic components. Heat sterilization was suspected as
one of the reasons for the failure of Ranger spacecraft.
The Washington Post, September 13, 1963.
September 16
A tone warning signal was added to the CM instrumentation system. If a
system malfunctioned, this warning would be heard through both the
master caution and warning subsystem and the astronauts' earphones.
Letter, H, P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. Eighty-Nine," September 16,
1963.
September 16
The launch escape system was modified so that, under normal flight
conditions, the crew could jettison the tower. On unmanned Saturn I
flights, tower jettison was initiated by a signal from the instrument
unit of the S-IV (second) stage.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. Ninety-One," September 16,
1963.
September 16-18
NASA representatives held a formal review of Grumman's LEM M-1 mockup, a
full-scale representation of the LEM's crew compartment. MSC decided
that (1) the window shape (triangular) and visibility were satisfactory;
(2) a standing position for the crew was approved, although, in general,
it was believed that restraints restricted crew mobility; (3) the
controllers were positioned too low and lacked suitable arm support for
fine control; and (4) crew station arrangement was generally acceptable,
although specific details required further study. (See June 16-July 20
and August 27.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Status Report, September 19-25, 1963."
September 17
LTV presented the preliminary results of a manual rendezvous simulation
study. Their studies indicated that a pilot trained in the technique
could accomplish lunar launch and rendezvous while using only two to
three percent more fuel than the automatic system. (See May 6 and
October 10, 1963, and April 24, 1964.)
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director,
Manned Space Flight, September 22-October 19, 1963," p. 31.
September 18
The AiResearch Manufacturing Company announced that it had been awarded
a $20 million definitive contract for the CM environmental system.
[AiResearch had been developing the system under a letter contract since
1961. See Volume I, December 21, 1961.]
The Houston Post, September 19, 1963.
September 19
MSC made several changes in the CM's landing requirements. Impact
attenuation would be passive, except for that afforded by the crew
couches and the suspension system. The spacecraft would be suspended
from the landing parachutes in a pitch attitude that imposed minimum
accelerations on the crew. A crushable structure to absorb landing shock
was required in the aft equipment bay area.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. Ninety-Three," September
19, 1963.
September 19-25
The space suit umbilical disconnects were being redesigned to the
"buddy concept" and for interchangeability between the CM and
the LEM. (See September 29, 1964.) MSC was reviewing methods for a
crewman to return to the LEM following space suit failure on the lunar
surface. (See July 28August 3.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 19-25, 1963," p.
4.
September 19-25
North American incorporated an automatic radiator control into the CM's
environmental control system to eliminate the need for crew attention
during lunar orbit.
Recent load analysis at North American placed the power required for a
14-day mission at 577 kilowatt-hours, a decrease of about 80
kilowatt-hours from earlier estimates.
Ibid., pp. 2, 3.
September 19-October 16
Grumman directed Bell Aerosystems Company to establish the ablative
nozzle extension as the primary design for the LEM's ascent stage
engine. The radiation-cooled nozzle design, a weight-saving alternative,
must be approved by NASA. See March; also January and May 4-11, 1964.
MSC, "ASPO Monthly Activity Report, September 19-October 16,
1963," p. 18.
September 20
President John F. Kennedy, during an address before the United Nations
General Assembly, suggested the possibility of Russian-American
"cooperation" in space. Though not proposing any specific
program, Kennedy stated that, "in a field where the United States
and the Soviet Union have a special capacity - the field of space -
there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the
regulation and exploration of space. I include among these
possibilities," he said, "a joint expedition to the moon. . .
. Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our
two countries - indeed, of all the world - cannot work together in the
conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon, not the
representatives of a single nation, but the representatives of all
humanity."
During a news conference in Houston that same day, several NASA
officials commented on the President's address. Associate Administrator
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., stated that Kennedy's proposals came as no great
surprise. He said that many "large areas" for cooperation
exist, such as exchanges of scientific information and in space
tracking, but emphasized that no cosmonauts would be flying in Apollo
spacecraft. Deputy Associate Administrator George E. Mueller shared
Seamans' views, comparing future U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in space to
joint explorations in Antarctica. Scientists from both nations work
together, but "they get there in different ships." Just three
days earlier, MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth had told the National
Rocket Club that a joint American-Russian space flight - especially one
to the moon - would present almost insuperable technological
difficulties. "I tremble at the thought of the integration problems
. . . ," he said. Gilruth cautioned his audience that he was
speaking "not as an international politician," but as an
engineer. The task of mating American and Russian spacecraft and launch
vehicles would make such international cooperation "hard to do in a
practical sort of way." And at the September 20 MSC news conference
he added that such problems "are very difficult even when they
[hardware components] are built by American contractors."
Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA,
1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101), p. 288; Astronautics and
Aeronautics, 1963, pp. 343, 347; The Houston
Chronicle, September 19, 20, 21, 1963.
September 22-29
North American checked out the test fixture that was slated for the
astronaut centrifuge training program, resolving interfaces between test
fixture, centrifuge, and the test conductor's console, and familiarizing
astronauts with controls and displays inside the spacecraft.
On October 1, North American delivered the test fixture to the U.S. Navy
Aviation Medical Acceleration Laboratory, where the first phase of the
manned centrifuge program was scheduled to begin that month.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-48, pp. 4-5; MSC,
"ASPO Weekly Activity Report, October 3-9, 1963," p. 3.
September 24
MSC advised North American that the television camera in the CM was
being modified so that ground personnel could observe the astronauts and
flight operations. Television images would be transmitted directly to
earth via the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility.
Letter, H. P. Yschek, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems Div.,
"Contract Change Authorization No. Ninety-Five," September 24,
1963.
NASA Administrator James E. Webb examined a docked configuration of the Apollo spacecraft model during a visit to Houston September 24, 1963.
September 25-26
MSC representatives reviewed Grumman's program for thermal testing for
the LEM, to be conducted with the test model 2 (TM-2) vehicle. Because
the vehicle's configuration had changed so extensively, the Center
canceled the currently planned TM-2 ascent stage and ordered another
stage to be substituted. TM-2's descent stage needed only small design
changes to make it suitable for the program.
MSC," ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-October 2,
1963," p. 12.
September 26
At a meeting at MSC, Grumman representatives presented 18 configurations
of the LEM electrical power system, recommending a change from three to
two fuel cells, still supplemented by an auxiliary battery system, with
continued study on tankage design. On December 10, ASPO authorized the
contractor to proceed with this configuration.
Letter, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, "Contract
NAS 9-1100, Electrical Power Subsystem Configuration Recommendation,"
December 10, 1963; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-
October 2, 1963," p. 11.
September 26
OMSF, MSC, and Bellcomm representatives, meeting in Washington, D.C.,
discussed Apollo mission plans: OMSF introduced a requirement that the
first manned flight in the Saturn IB program include a LEM. ASPO had
planned this flight as a CSM maximum duration mission only.
- Bellcomm was asked to develop an Apollo mission assignment program
without a Saturn I.
- MSFC had been asking OMSF concurrence in including a restart
capability in the S-IVB (second) stage during the Saturn IB program.
ASPO would agree to this, but only if the H-1 engine were uprated from
85,275 to 90,718 kilograms (188,000 to 200,000 pounds) of thrust,
resulting in a 907-kilogram (2,000-pound) payload gain.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-October 2,
1963."
September 26-27
MSC representatives visited Grumman for a preliminary evaluation of the
Apollo space suit integration into the LEM. A suit failure ended the
exercise prematurely. Nonetheless, leg and foot mobility was good, but
the upper torso and shoulder needed improvement.
On October 11, MSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) tested the suit's
mobility with the portable life support system (PLSS). CSD researchers
found that the PLSS did not restrict the wearer's movement because the
suit supported the weight of the PLSS. Shifts in the center of gravity
appeared insignificant. The PLSS controls, because of their location,
were difficult to operate, which demanded further investigation.
Ibid.; MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the
Office of the Director, Manned Space Flight, September 22-October 19,
1963," p. 48.
September 26-October 2
North American recommended that the portable life support system in the
CM be deleted. Current planning placed two units in the LEM and one in
the CM.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Activity Report, September 26-October 2,
1963," p. 3.
September 30
MSC awarded Texas Instruments, Inc., a $194,000 contract to study
experiments and equipment needed for scientific exploration of the lunar
surface. The analysis was to be completed by the end of May 1964. (See
March 17, 1964.)
MSC, "Consolidated Activity Report for the Office of the Director,
Manned Space Flight, September 22-October 19, 1963," p. 41;
"Apollo Quarterly Status Report No. 6," p. 34; MSC News
Release 63-171, October 16, 1963.
September 30
Qualification testing began on fuel tanks for the service propulsion
system (SPS). The first article tested developed a small crack below the
bottom weld, which was being investigated, but pressurization caused no
expansion of the tank. During mid-October, several tanks underwent proof
testing. And, on November 1, the first SPS helium tank was
burst-tested.
MSC, "ASPO Status Report for Period Ending October 16, 1963";
"ASPO Status Report for Period October 16-November 12, 1963";
"ASPO Status Report for Period Ending October 23, 1963."
David G. Hoag, technical director of the Apollo guidance and navigation system design program at MIT's Instrumentation Laboratory, inspected a mockup of the inertial measurement unit in the system.
Director of the Laboratory Dr. C. Stark Draper posed beside a mockup of the guidance and navigation system.
During the Month
The interrelationships between all major LEM test vehicles, including
all test constraints and documentation requirements, were developed.
This logic study, prepared by Grumman and forwarded to MSC, stressed the
feasibility of alterations in the LEM test program as needed.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 8," LPR-10-24, p. 45.
