Advanced Design, Fabrication, and Testing
March 1965
1965
March 1
ASPO organized a new management group, the Configuration Control Board,
to oversee proposals for engineering changes. The board comprised groups
representing management, the three Apollo modules, and critical Apollo
systems (guidance and navigation, spacecraft checkout equipment, and the
extravehicular mobility unit).
MSC, "Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Configuration Management
Plan, March 1, 1965," Revision A, March 19, 1965.
LEM descent stage.
March 2
MSC decided in favor of an "all-battery" LEM (i.e., batteries
rather than fuel cells in both stages of the vehicle) and notified
Grumman accordingly. Pratt and Whitney's subcontract for fuel cells
would be terminated on April 1; also, Grumman would assume parenthood
of GE's contract (originally let by Pratt and Whitney) for the
electrical control assembly. MSC ordered an immediate cessation of all
other efforts involved in the fuel-celled configuration. During the
next several weeks, Grumman issued study contracts to Yardney Electric
and Eagle-Picher for cost proposals. On April 1, the spacecraft
manufacturer presented its proposal for an all-battery LEM; MSC's
concurrence followed two weeks later.
A portable life support system (PLSS) battery charger would no longer be
required, but three additional nonrechargeable PLSSs would be carried to
provide for extravehicular activities. This change would now require a
total of six nonrechargeable batteries.
On this same date, MSC ordered Grumman to end its work on a
supercritical helium system for the LEM's ascent stage, and to
incorporate an ambient mode for pressurization. All work on a
supercritical system for the stage should be halted. However, Grumman
should maintain the supercritical approach for the descent stage, while
continuing parallel development on the ambient system. To permit the
incorporation of either approach into the final design of the descent
stage, components must be interchangeable.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Implementation of Electrical Power Subsystem
and Supercritical Helium Pressurization Configuration Changes,"
March 2, 1965; memorandum, Owen E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief,
Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division, "LEM Power
generation system," March 15, 1965; GAEC, "Implementation of
LEM All-Battery Configuration," April 1, 1965; letter, Rector to
GAEC, Mullaney, "Contract NAS 9-1100, Implementation of
All-Battery Configuration," April 15, 1965; "Monthly Progress
Report No. 25," LPR-10-41, pp. 1, 20; GAEC, "Monthly Progress
Report No. 26, "LPR-10-42, April 10, 1965, pp. 1, 31; TWX, James
L. Neal, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, March 11, 1965.
March 2
MSC Structures and Mechanics Division presented their findings on the
possibility of qualifying the spacecraft's thermal protection in a
single mission. While one flight was adequate to prove the ablator's
performance, the division asserted, it would not satisfy the
requirements as defined in the specification.
Memorandum, Joseph N. Kotanchik, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Adequacy of the SA 501 Mission to Qualify the Apollo
Thermal Protection System," March 3, 1965, with enclosures.
March 3
NASA and General Motors' AC Spark Plug Division signed the definitive
contract (cost-plus-incentive-fee type) for primary guidance and
navigation systems for the Apollo spacecraft (both CMs and LEMs). The
agreement, extending through December 1969, covered manufacturing and
testing of the systems.
NASA News Release 65-33, March 3, 1965.
March 3
To prevent radiator freezing - and consequent performance degradation -
in the Block I environmental control system, MSC ordered North American
to supplement the system's coolant. Forty-five kg (100 lbs) of water
would be stored in the SMs of airframes 012 and 014.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, "Contract Change Authorization No. 309," March 3,
1965.
March 4
North American gave boilerplate 28 its third water drop test. Upon
impact, the spacecraft again suffered some structural damage to the
heatshield and the core, though much less than it had experienced on
its initial drop. Conditions in this test were at least as severe as in
previous ones, yet the vehicle remained watertight.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 4-11, 1965."
March 5
Newton W. Cunningham, NASA's Ranger Program Manager, notified Apollo
Program Manager Samuel C. Phillips that the Ranger investigators and
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Ranger Project Office had submitted their
unanimous choice of targets for the Ranger IX mission. The
first two days of the launch windows were omitted from the plan; Day
III: Crater Alphonsus; Day IV: Crater Copernicus; Day V: Crater Kepler;
Day VI: Crater Aristarchus; Day VII: near Crater Grimaldi.
NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight agreed with Days IV-VII, but
recommended a smooth highland area for Day I, a highland basin area for
Day II, and the Flammarion highland basin for Day III.
Memorandum, Newton W. Cunningham, NASA, to Gen. Samuel C. Phillips,
"Ranger 9 Target Selection," March 5, 1965; "Ranger D
Target Selection," March 8, 1965.
March 5
Researchers at Ames Research Center began testing the stability of the
Block II CM and escape tower (with canards) in the Center's wind tunnel.
Tests would be conducted on the CM itself and while mated with the
tower.
NAA, "Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, May 1,
1965, p. 3.
March 8
Preliminary investigation by Grumman indicated that, with an all-battery
LEM, passive thermal control of the spacecraft was doubtful. (And this
analysis did not include the scientific experiments package, which, with
its radioisotope generator, only increased the problem. Grumman and MSC
Structures and Mechanics Division engineers were investigating alternate
locations for the batteries and modifications to the surface coatings of
the spacecraft as possible solutions.
Memorandum, Lee N. McMillion, MSC, to Owen E. Maynard,
"Radioisotope power generator," March 5, 1965.
March 8
Northrop-Ventura began qualification testing of the CM's earth landing
sequence controller.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 4-11, 1965."
March 8
Missiles and Rockets reported a statement by Joseph F.
Shea, ASPO manager, that MSC had no serious weight problems with the
Apollo spacecraft. The current weight, he said, was 454 kg (1,000 lbs)
under the 40,823 kg (90,000 lb) goal. Moreover, the increased payload
of the Saturn V to 43,091 kg (95,000 lbs) permitted further increases.
Shea admitted, however, that the LEM was growing; recent decisions in
favor of safety and redundancy could raise the module's weight from
13,381 kg to 14,575 kg (29,500 lbs to 32,000 lbs).
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 113.
March 9
Avco found that cracking of the ablator during cure was caused by
incomplete filling, leaving small voids in the material. The company
ordered several changes in the manufacturing process: a different shape
for the tip of the "filling gun" to facilitate filling those
cells that were slightly distorted; manual rather than automatic
retraction of the gun; and x-raying of the ablator prior to curing.
Using these new methods, Avco repaired the aft heatshield and toroidal
corner of airframe 006, which was then re-cured. No cracking was
visible. The crew compartment heatshield for airframe 009 came through
its cure equally well. Voids in the ablator had been reduced to about
two percent. "It appears," Structures and Mechanics Division
reported, "that the problem of cracking . . . has been solved by
better manufacturing."
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 4-11, 1965"; MSC,
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 11-18, 1965";
memorandum, C. H. Perrine, MSC, to B. Erb and Leo Chauvin,
"Attached draft of letter to NASA Headquarters on use of Block I
Command Modules for Block II Heat Shield Qualification," March 9,
1965, with attachment.
March 9
Initial flights of the LLRV interested MSC's Guidance and Control
Division because they represented first flight tests of a vehicle with
control characteristics similar to the LEM. The Division recommended the
following specific items for inclusion in the LLRV flight test program:
- The handling qualities of the LEM attitude control system should be
verified using the control powers available to the pilot during the
landing maneuver. The attitude controller used in these tests should be
a three-axis LEM rotational controller.
- The ability of pilots to manually zero the horizontal velocities at
altitudes of 30.48 m (100 ft) or less should be investigated. The view
afforded the pilot during this procedure should be equivalent to the
view available to the pilot in the actual LEM.
- The LEM descent engine throttle control should be investigated to
determine proper relationship between control and thrust output for the
landing maneuver.
- Data related to attitude and attitude rates encountered in landing
approach maneuvers were desirable to verify LEM control system design
limits.
- Adequacy of LEM flight instrument displays used for the landing
maneuver should be determined.
Guidance and Control Division would provide information as to control
system characteristics and desired trajectory characteristics. D. C.
Cheatham, a member of the Lunar Lander Research Vehicle Coordination
Panel, would coordinate such support.
Memorandum, Robert C. Duncan, MSC, to Chief, Flight Crew Support
Division, "Recommended items for LLRV Flight Test Program,"
March 9, 1965.
March 10
NASA announced that it had awarded a$3,713,400 contract to Raytheon
Company for digital systems for the Apollo program. The equipment,
which would be installed at control and tracking stations, would
display information telemetered from the spacecraft, and thus would
support mission decisions on the ground.
NASA News Release 65-79, "NASA Names Raytheon for Apollo Digital
Display Equipment," March 10, 1965.
March 11
MSC directed North American to incorporate the capability for storing a
kit-type mapping and survey system into the basic Block II
configuration. The actual hardware, which would be installed in the
equipment bay of certain SMs (designated by MSC), would weigh up to 680
kg (1,500 lbs).
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, "Contract Change Authorization No. 317," March 11,
1965.
March 11
MSC notified Grumman that a device to recharge the portable life support
system's (PLSS) batteries was no longer required in the LEM. Instead,
three additional batteries would be stored in the spacecraft (bringing
the total number of PLSS batteries to six).
TWX, James L. Neal, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, March 11,
1965.
March 11
MSC's Structures and Mechanics Division was conducting studies of lunar
landing conditions. In one study, mathematical data concerning the
lunar surface, LEM descent velocity, and physical properties of LEM
landing gear and engine skirt were compiled. A computer was programmed
with these data, producing images on a video screen, allowing engineers
to review hypothetical landings in slow motion.
In another study, a one-sixth scale model of the LEM landing gear was
dropped from several feet to a platform which could be adjusted to
different slopes. Impact data, gross stability, acceleration, and
stroke of the landing gear were recorded. Although the platform landing
surface could not duplicate the lunar surface as well as the computer,
the drop could verify data developed in the computer program. The
results of these studies would aid in establishing ground rules for
lunar landings.
MSC News Release 65-42, March 11, 1965.
March 11-18
MSC concurred in North American's recommendation that the 27½
degrees hang angle during parachute descent be retained. (Tests with
one-tenth scale models of the CM indicated that, at the higher impact
angles, excessive pressures would be exerted on the sidewalls of the
vehicle.) Provisions for a "dual hang angle" were still in
effect for Block I spacecraft up to airframe 017. Beginning with that
number, the face sheets on the aft heatshield would be modified to
conform to the 27½ degree impact angle.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 11-18, 1965."
March 11-18
Crew Systems Division (CSD) engineers were studying several items that,
though intended specifically for the Gemini program, were applicable to
Apollo as well:
- During recent tests of the urine nozzle by McDonnell, microorganisms
had been found in the sample. This indicated that explosive
decompression into very low temperatures had failed to sterilize the
urine. To determine possible shifts in the microbial pattern, CSD was
examining samples both before and after dumping.
- Division researchers completed microbiological examinations of
Gemini food bags. They found that, even though disinfectant tablets were
not completely effective, storage of the containers for periods up to
two weeks was nonetheless feasible. (These studies thus reinforced
earlier findings of bacterial growth in the bags.)
CSD engineers also evaluated the Gemini-type water dispenser and found
it suitable for the Apollo CM as well.
Ibid.
March 11-18
During the flight of boilerplate (BP) 23, the Little Joe II's control
system had coupled with the first lateral bending mode of the vehicle.
To ensure against any recurrence of this problem on the forthcoming
flight of BP-22, MSC asked North American to submit their latest
figures on the stiffness of the spacecraft and its escape tower. These
data would be used to compute the first bending mode of BP-22 and its
launch vehicle.
Ibid.
March 12
During a pad abort, propellants from the CM's reaction control system
(RCS) would be dumped overboard. Structures and Mechanics Division
(SMD) therefore established a test program to evaluate possible
deleterious effects on the strength of the earth landing system's nylon
components. SMD engineers would expose test specimens to RCS fuel
(monomethyl hydrazine) and oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide). This testing
series would encompass a number of variables: the length of exposure;
the time period between that exposure and the strength test; the
concentration of propellant; and the rate and direction of the air
flow. Testing was completed near the end of the month. SMD reported
that "no significant degradation was produced by any of the test
exposure conditions."
Memorandum, Robert B. West, MSC, to Paul E. Fitzgerald,
"Preliminary report on minimum ELS requirements in the pad abort
mode," March 12, 1965; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March
11-18, 1965"; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March
18-25, 1965."
March 15
MSC defined the functional and design requirements for the tracking
light on the LEM:
- The light must be compatible for use with CSM scan telescope sextant
optics in visual mode during darkside lunar and earth operations.
- The light must provide range capability of 324.1 km (175 nm) for
darkside lunar operations when viewed with the CSM sextant.
- The probability of detection within three-minute search time at
maximum range when viewed with CSM sextant must exceed 99 percent for
worst lunar background.
- The light must flash at the optimum rate for ease of detection and
tracking (60 flashes per minute ±5 fpm).
- Brightness attenuation must be available for terminal phase
operation and for minimizing spacecraft electrical energy drain.
- The light must be capable of inflight operation for continuous
periods of one hour duration over four cycles.
- The light must have a total operating life of 30 hours at rated
output with a shelf life of two years.
- The light was not required to be maintainable at the component
level.
- The total system weight including cooling and electromagnetic
interference shielding, if required, should not exceed 5.44 kg (12 lbs).
Letter, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Functional and design requirements for LEM tracking light,"
March 15, 1965.
March 15
In November 1964, MSC asked Grumman to conduct a study on the
feasibility of carrying a radioisotope power supply as part of the LEM's
scientific equipment. The subsequent decision to use batteries in the
LEM power system caused an additional heat load in the descent stage.
Therefore, MSC requested the contractor to continue the study using the
following ground rules: consider the radioisotope power supply a
requirement for the purpose of preliminary design efforts on descent
stage configuration; determine impact of the radioisotope power supply -
in particular its effect on passive thermal control of the descent
stage; and specify which characteristics would be acceptable if any
existing characteristics of the radioisotope power supply had an adverse
effect. The radioisotope power was used only to supply power for the
descent stage.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, subject:
"Radioisotope Power Supply for Lunar Scientific Experiments,"
March 15, 1965.
March 15
An evaluation was made of the feasibility of utilizing a probe-actuated
descent engine cutoff light during the LEM lunar touchdown maneuver.
The purpose of the light, to be actuated by a probe extending 0.9 m (3
ft) beyond the landing gear pads, was to provide an engine cutoff
signal for display to the pilot. Results of the study indicated at
least 20 percent of the pilots failed to have the descent engine cut
off at the time of lunar touchdown. The high percentage of engine-on
landings was attributed to
- poor location of the cutoff switch,
- long reaction time (0.7 sec) of the pilot to a discrete stimulus (a
light), and
- the particular value of a descent rate selected for final letdown (4
ft per sec).
It was concluded that a 0.9-m (3-ft) probe would be adequate to ensure
pilot cutoff of the descent engine before touchdown provided the pilot
reaction time could be reduced to 0.4 sec or less by improving the
location of the cutoff switch.
Richard Reid, MSC, MSC-IN-65-EG-10, "Simulation and Evaluation of
Landing Gear Probe for Sensing Engine Cutoff Altitude During Lunar
Landing," March 15, 1965.
March 15-17
North American conducted acoustic tests on the spacecraft's interior,
using boilerplate (BP) 14. Noise levels generated by the spacecraft's
equipment exceeded specifications. Prime culprits appeared to be the
suit compressor and the cabin fans. North American engineers asserted,
however, that the test vehicle itself, because of its sheet metal
construction, compounded the problem. These tests with BP-14, they
affirmed, were not representative of conditions in flight hardware.
Data on communications inside the spacecraft were inconclusive and
required further analysis, but the warning alarm was sufficiently loud
to be heard by the crewmen.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 18-25, 1965."
March 16
MSC estimated the number of navigational sightings that Apollo crewmen
would have to make during a lunar landing mission:
- Translunar coast
- four maneuvers to align the inertial measurement unit (IMU)
- 20 navigational sightings requiring 10 maneuvers
- Transearth coast
- four maneuvers for IMU alignment
- 50 sightings, 25 maneuvers
- Lunar orbit
- 10 maneuvers for IMU alignment
- 24 sightings, 24 maneuvers.
[The Manned Space Flight Network was the primary source for
navigational data during the coasting phases of the mission; and
although the network could supply adequate data during the circumlunar
phase as well, onboard capability must be maintained.]
Letter, C. L. Taylor, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, Attn: J. C. Cozad, "Contract NAS 9-150, Navigational
Sightings Required for the Lunar Landing Mission," March 16,
1965.
March 16
Because the adapter panels, when deployed to 45 degrees, would block
the command link with the LEM, a command antenna system on the adapter
was mandatory. MSC therefore directed North American to provide such a
device on the adapters for spacecraft 014, 101, and 102. This would
permit command acquisition of the LEM in the interval between panel
deployment and the spacecraft's clearing the adapter.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, "Contract Change Authorization No. 322," March 16,
1965.
March 16
MSC directed North American to include nine scientific experiments on SA
204/Airframe 012: cardiovascular reflex conditioning, bone
demineralization, vestibular effects, exercise ergometer, inflight
cardiac output, inflight vector cardiogram, measurement of metabolic
rate during flight, inflight pulmonary functions, and synoptic terrain
photography. On June 25, the last five experiments were deleted and a
cytogenic blood studies experiment was added.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division (S&ID), "Contract Change Authorization No. 323,"
March 16, 1965; letter, Alldredge to S&ID, "Contract Change
Authorization No. 323, Revision 1," June 25, 1965.
March 16
MSC eliminated the requirement for relaying, via the LEM/CSM VHF link,
transmissions from a moon-exploring astronaut to the earth. This change
allowed the 279.0 megacycle (Mc) transmitters in both vehicles to be
eliminated; cleared the way for a common VHF configuration; and
permitted duplex voice communications between astronaut and spacecraft.
For communicating with the LEM, MSC directed North American to provide a
259.7 Mc transmitter in the CSM.
Letter, J. B. Alldredge, MSC, to NAA, Space and Information Systems
Division, "Contract Change Authorization No. 320," March 16,
1965.
March 16
ASPO proposed deletion of a liftoff light in the Block II CM. The Block
I design provided a redundant panel light which came ON at liftoff as a
part of the emergency detection system (EDS). This light gave a cue to
the pilot to verify enabling of the EDS automatic abort, for which
manual backup was provided. The Block II CM would incorporate improved
EDS circuitry without manual backup. Deletion of the liftoff light in
the CM was proposed to save weight, power, space, and reliability, and
to eliminate a crew distraction during the boost phase of flight.
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Assistant Directors for Flight Crew
Operations and Flight Operations, "Deletion of Lift-off Light,
Apollo Command Module," signed William A. Lee, March 16, 1965.
March 16-April 15
North American dropped boilerplate 1 twice to measure the maximum
pressures the CM would generate during a high-angle water impact. These
figures agreed quite well with those obtained from similar tests with a
one-tenth scale model of the spacecraft, and supported data from the
model on side wall and tunnel pressures.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, p.3.
March 17
After extensive analysis, Crew Systems Division recommended that the
"shirtsleeve" environment be kept in the CM. Such a design
was simpler and more reliable, and promised much greater personal
comfort than wearing the space suit during the entire mission.
Memorandum, Maxime A. Faget, MSC, to Manager, ASPO, "Crew Systems
Division recommendation on establishment of suit wear criterion,"
March 17, 1965.
March 18
Russia launched Voskhod II from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in
Kazakhstan, piloted by Colonel Pavel Belyayev and Lt. Colonel Aleksey
Leonov into an orbit 497 by 174 km (309 by 108 mi) high. During
Voskhod II's second orbit, Leonov stepped from the vehicle and
performed mankind's first "walk in space." After 10 min of
extravehicular activity, he returned safely to the spacecraft
(apparently leaving and entering through an airlock). On the following
day, the two cosmonauts landed near Perm, Russia, after 17 orbits and
26 hours of flight.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 131-132, 136,
157.
March 18
Because of continuing developmental problems, Hamilton Standard chose
B. F. Goodrich to replace International Latex as subcontractor for the
garment portion of the Apollo space suit.
Letter, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to NASA Headquarters, Attn: George E.
Mueller, "Extravehicular Mobility Unit subcontractor change,"
March 18, 1965.
March 18
Grumman officials presented their findings on supercritical versus
gaseous oxygen storage systems for the LEM [supercritical: state of
homogeneous mixture at a certain pressure and temperature, being
neither gas nor liquid]. After studying factors of weight, reliability,
and thermal control, as well as cost and schedule impacts, they
recommended gaseous tanks in the ascent stage and a supercritical tank
in the descent stage. They stressed that this configuration would be
about 35.66 kg (117 lbs) lighter than an all-gaseous one. Though these
spokesmen denied any schedule impact, they estimated that this approach
would cost about 2 million more than the all-gaseous mode. MSC was
reviewing Grumman's proposal.
During the latter part of the month, Crew Systems Division (CSD)
engineers also looked into the several approaches. In contrast to
Grumman, CSD calculated that, at most, an all-gaseous system would be
but 4.08 kg (9 lbs) heavier than a supercritical one. CSD nonetheless
recommended the former. It was felt that the heightened reliability,
improved schedules, and "substantial" cost savings that
accompanied the all-gaseous approach offset its slim weight
disadvantage.
During late April, MSC ordered Grumman to adopt CSD's approach (gaseous
systems in both stages of the vehicle). [Another factor involved in this
decision was the lessened oxygen requirement that followed substitution
of batteries for fuel cells in the LEM. See March 2.]
GAEC, "Monthly Progress Report No. 27," LPR-10-43, May 10,
1965, p. 17; MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 18-25,
1965"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 25-April 1,
1965"; "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 22-29,
1965."
March 18
Lawrence B. Hall, Special Assistant for Planetary Quarantine, Bioscience
Programs, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA Headquarters,
listed preliminary requirements for space in the Lunar Sample Receiving
Station as recommended by the Communicable Disease Center of the Public
Health Service. The estimates were based on CDC experience involving the
design, construction, and operation of similar biological facilities and
called for net space amounting to 7,201 sq m (77,492 sq ft) for
laboratories, scientific support service facilities, offices and other
areas, and did not reflect requirements of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture or experimenters who could justify their work being done
under quarantine conditions. Hall noted that Dr. Randolph Lovelace and
the Chief of CDC were in agreement that the facility should be isolated,
certainly not in or near a metropolitan area, and that an island would
be favored.
Memorandum for Record, Lawrence B. Hall, "Primary barrier for
lunar quarantine," March 18, 1965.
March 18-25
Structures and Mechanics Division engineers were studying several
schemes for achieving the optimum weight of Block II CMs without
compromising landing reliability: reducing velocity by retrorockets or
"explosions" in the parachutes; controlling roll attitude to
0 degrees at impact through a "rotatable pot" structure;
changing landing medium (i.e., shape hole in water and/or aeration of
the water).
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 18-25, 1965."
March 18-25
Crew Systems Division (CSD) engineers, continuing their evaluation of
liquid-cooled garments (LCG), tested Hamilton Standard's newest version
(the LCG-8). The manufacturer had modified placement of the tubes and
had used a stretchable, more closely knit fabric. CSD found this style
an improvement over its predecessor (the LCG-3): it was more efficient,
more comfortable, and easier to don and doff. CSD officials accordingly
froze the configuration of the garment around this latest model.
Further design work would be minimal (chiefly interface modifications
and improvements in fabrication techniques).
Ibid.
March 18-25
The Atomic Energy Commission evaluated proposals by Radio Corporation of
America and General Electric (GE) for an isotope generator for the
Surveyor lunar roving vehicle, and assigned follow-on work to the latter
firm. GE's concept, it was felt, was compatible with the possible
requirement that the fuel source might have to be carried separately
aboard the LEM. MSC's Propulsion and Power Division reported that the
generator's "prospects . . . look[ed] very promising."
Ibid.
March 19
Bell Aerosystems Company reported that a study had been made to
determine if it were practical to significantly increase simulation time
without major changes to the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV). This
study had been made after MSC personnel had expressed an interest in
increased simulation time for a trainer version of the LLRV. The current
LLRV was capable of about 10 minutes of flight time and two minutes of
lunar simulation with the lift rockets providing one-sixth of the lift.
It was concluded that lunar simulation time approaching seven minutes
could be obtained by doubling the 272-kg (600-lb) peroxide load and
employing the jet engine to simulate one-half of the rocket lift needed
for simulation.
A major limiting factor, however, was the normal weather conditions at
Houston, where such a training vehicle would be located. A study showed
that in order to use a maximum peroxide load of 544 kg (1,200 lbs), the
temperature could not exceed 313K (40 degrees F); and at 332K (59
degrees F) the maximum load must be limited to 465 kg (1,025 lbs) of
peroxide. On the basis of existing weather records it was determined
there would be enough days on which flights could be made in Houston on
the basis of 544 kg (1,200 lbs) peroxide at 313K (40 degrees F), 465 kg
(1,025 lbs) at 332K (59 degrees F), and 354 kg (775 lbs) at 353K (80
degrees F) to make provisions for such loads.
Letter, John Ryken, Bell Aerosystems Company, to Ronald Decrevel,
"Preliminary Study of Methods of Increasing LLRV Lunar Simulation
Time," March 19, 1965; letter, Ryken to Decrevel, "Effect of
Houston Temperatures on Allowable LLRV Weight and Flight Time,"
March 23, 1965.
March 21
NASA launched Ranger IX, last of the series, from Cape
Kennedy aboard an Atlas-Agena vehicle. The target was Alphonsus, a
large crater about 12 degrees south of the lunar equator. The probe was
timed to arrive when lighting conditions would be at their best. The
initial trajectory was highly accurate; uncorrected, the craft would
have landed only 400 miles north of Alphonsus. On March 23, a midcourse
correction increased Ranger IX's speed and placed it on a
near-perfect trajectory: the spacecraft impacted the following day only
four miles from the original aiming point.
From 2,092 km (1,300 mi) out until it was destroyed on impact,
Ranger IX's six television cameras took 5,814 pictures of
the lunar surface. These pictures were received at Jet Propulsion
Laboratory's Goldstone, Calif., Tracking Laboratory, where they were
recorded on tape and film for detailed analysis. They also were
released to the nation's three major television networks in "real
time," so millions of Americans followed the spacecraft's descent.
The pictures showed the rim and floor of the crater in fine detail: in
those just prior to impact, objects less than a foot in size were
discernible.
A panel of scientists presented some preliminary conclusions from
Ranger IX at a press conference that same afternoon.
Crater rims and ridges inside the walls, they believed, were harder and
smoother than the moon's dusty plains, and therefore were considered
likely sites for future manned landings. Generally, the panel was
dubious about landing on crater floors however. Apparently, the floors
were solidified volcanic material incapable of supporting a spacecraft.
Investigators believed several types of craters were seen that were of
nonmeteoric origin. These findings reinforced arguments that the moon
at one time had experienced volcanic activity.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 140, 142, 143,
146, 148-149; NASA News Release 65-25, "NASA Readies Two Ranger
Spacecraft for Moon Missions," February 4, 1965; NASA News Release
65-96, "Ranger IX to Send World's First Live Moon Photos,"
March 23, 1965.
March 22
Glynn S. Lunney was named by MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth as Assistant
Flight Director for Apollo missions 201 and 202. Lunney would continue
to serve as Chief of the Flight Dynamics Branch, Flight Control
Division, and as MSC Range Safety Coordinator with the U.S. Air Force
Eastern Test Range.
MSC Announcement 65-33, "Appointment of Assistant Flight Director
for Apollo 201 and 202 Missions," March 22, 1965.
March 22
The change from LEM fuel cells to batteries eliminated the need for a
hard-line interstage umbilical for that system and the effort on a
cryogenic umbilical disconnect was canceled. The entire LEM pyrotechnic
effort was redefined during the program review and levels of effort and
purchased parts cost were agreed upon.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 18-25, 1965."
March 22
Jet Propulsion Laboratory scientists W. L. Sjogren and D. W. Trask
reported that as a result of Ranger VI and Ranger
VII tracking data, Deep Space Instrumentation Facility station
locations could be determined to within 10 m (10.9 yds) in the radial
direction normal to the earth's spin axis. Differences in the longitude
between stations could be calculated to within 20 m (21.9 yds). The
moon's radius had been found to be 3 km (l.86 mi) less than was
thought, and knowledge of its mass had been improved by an order of
magnitude.
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, p. 160.
March 22
ASPO summarized their requirements for entry monitoring and backup
reentry range control:
- The flight crew would monitor the entry to detect a skip or
excessive "g" trajectory early enough to allow manual
takeover and safe reentry.
- The entry corridor should be verified and indications of too steep
or shallow an entry displayed to the crew.
- The spacecraft guidance and control systems should provide manual
range control capability after failures in the primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS) prior to reentry, and after discrete or
catastrophic failures in the PGNS during reentry.
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Chief, Guidance and Control
Division, "Requirements for Command Module entry monitoring and
backup reentry ranging capability," March 22, 1965.
March 22
MSC ordered Grumman to halt development of linear-shaped charge cutters
for the LEM's interstage umbilical separation system, and to concentrate
instead on redundant explosive-driven guillotines. By eliminating this
parallel approach, and by capitalizing on technology already worked out
by North American on the CSM umbilical cutter, this decision promised to
simplify hardware development and testing. Further, it promised to
effect significant schedule improvements and reductions in cost.
Memorandum, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to Contracting Officer, LEM,
"Request for PCCP-MDF Driven Guillotine," March 22, 1965.
March 23
A two-stage Titan II rocket boosted Gemini III and its
crew, astronauts Virgil I. Grissom and John W. Young, into an
elliptical orbit about the earth. After three orbits, the pair manually
landed their spacecraft in the Atlantic Ocean, thus performing the
first controlled reentry. Unfortunately, they landed much farther from
the landing zone than anticipated, about 97 km (60 miles) from the
aircraft carrier U.S.S. Intrepid. But otherwise the
mission was highly successful. Gemini III, America's first
two-manned space mission, also was the first manned vehicle that was
maneuverable. Grissom used the vehicle's maneuvering rockets to effect
orbital and plane changes.
NASA News Release 65-81,"NASA Schedules First Manned Gemini Flight
from Cape Kennedy," March 17, 1965; James M. Grimwood and Barton
C. Hacker, with Peter J. Vorzimmer, Project Gemini Technology and
Operations: A Chronology (NASA SP-4002, 1969), pp. 189-191;
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, pp. 145-46; "MSC
Fact Sheet 291-A, Gemini 3 Flight" [Ivan D. Ertel], April 1965.
March 23-24
Part I of the Critical Design Review of the crew compartment and the
docking system in the Block II CM was held at North American. Systems
Engineering (SED) and Structures and Mechanics (SMD) divisions,
respectively, evaluated the two areas.
- Crew compartment:
- The restraint harness, acceptable in the Block I vehicle,
interfered with attachments for the suit umbilicals. These attachments
were critical for suit ventilation and mobility; the harness location
was likewise critical for crew impact tolerances. Evaluation of
alternate locations for the harness and umbilical fittings - or both
- awaited the availability of a couch mockup. Manned sled tests might
be needed to verify any harness changes.
- Restraints at the sleep station must be redesigned. At present,
they did not allow sufficient room for a crewman in his pressure suit.
- To save weight, North American planned to strap crew equipment to
shelves and bulkheads (rather than stowing such gear in compartments,
as was done on the Block I vehicle).
- Most serious, in an earth landing, when the attenuator struts
compressed, the couches would strike a portable life support system
(PLSS). "No analysis has been made," SED reported, "to
show that this is acceptable." For in such an occurrence, the crew
could be injured or killed, the oxygen tank in the PLSS (under about
409 kg [900 lbs] of pressure) could explode, and the aft bulkhead might
be ruptured. North American was scheduled to report on this problem on
April 27.
- Docking system:
- SMD approved the probe and drogue concept, but recommended that
fittings be standardized throughout (so that only one tool was needed).
- The division also approved North American's design for the outer
side hatch (i.e., limiting its deployment to 90 degrees), pending MSC's final word on deployment requirements.
- The division recommended that the forward hatch mechanism be
simplified. (North American warned of schedule delays.)
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 18-25, 1965"; MSC,
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 25-April 1, 1965";
letter, H. G. Osbon, NAA, to NASA MSC, Attn: C. L. Taylor,
"Contract NAS 9-150, R&D for Apollo Spacecraft Minutes of
Critical Design Review No. 2, Phase I conducted on 23- 24 March,
1965," June 15, 1965.
March 24
Grumman ordered Space Technology Laboratories to increase the lifetime
of the thrust chamber in the LEM's descent engine. This required
substantial redesigning and was expected to delay the engine's
qualification date about seven months.
MSC, "ASPO Weekly Management Report, April 1-8, 1965."
March 24
ASPO requested the Structures and Mechanics Division (SMD) to study the
problem of corrosion in the coolant loops of the CM's environmental
control system, and to search for effective inhibitors. Current efforts
at North American to lessen corrosion included improved hardware and
operating procedures, but stopped short of extensive redesigning; and
it would be some time before conclusive results could be expected.
Early in May, Owen E. Maynard, chief of the Systems Engineering
Division, directed SMD immediately to begin its search for inhibitors.
If by July 1966 the corrosion problem remained unresolved, SMD could
thus recommend stopgap measures for the early spacecraft.
Memorandum, Joseph N. Kotanchik, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, "Water/glycol corrosion," March 24, 1965, with
enclosure: "Detailed Plan of Investigation on Corrosion Effects of
Water/ Glycol Mixtures on Spacecraft Radiators"; memorandum, Owen
E. Maynard, MSC, to Chief, Structures and Mechanics Division,
"Water/ Glycol Corrosion," May 4, 1965.
March 24
MSC contacted Grumman with reference to the LEM ascent engine
environmental tests at Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC),
scheduled for cell occupancy there from May 1, 1965, until September 1,
1965. It was MSC's understanding that the tests might begin without a
baffled injector. It was pointed out, however, that the first test was
expected to begin July 1, and since the recent baffle injector design
selection had been made, time remained for the fabrication of the
injector, checkout of the unit, and shipment to AEDC for use in the
first test.
Since the baffled injector represented the final hardware configuration,
it was highly desirable to use the design for these tests. MSC requested
that availability of the injector constrain the tests and that Grumman
take necessary action to ensure compliance.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, March 24,
1965.
March 24
ASPO Manager Joseph F. Shea said that the first major test of an Apollo
spacecraft AFRM 009 tended to pace the CSM program and therefore had
taken on a special program significance. Reflecting this significance,
both MSC and North American had applied specific additional senior
management and project engineering effort to that spacecraft. In the
fall of 1965, Robert O. Piland, ASPO Deputy Manager, was assigned to
give priority to AFRM 009 to complement and support the normal ASPO
project engineering activities. North American simultaneously gave a
special assignment regarding 009 to Assistant Program Manager Charles
Feltz.
Recently North American had assigned a Chief Project Engineer to a
full-time assignment on 009. ASPO's current management and project
engineering plan for the spacecraft was: Piland would continue to give
priority attention to 009, in addition to his normal duties, and would
deal directly with Feltz. The ASPO Chief Project Engineer Rolf W.
Lanzkron would be responsible for all ASPO project engineering
activities for all spacecraft to be launched at KSC. He would give
priority attention to all Block I spacecraft, ensuring schedules
through adequate planning, timely decisions, and rapid referral of
problems to the Deputy Manager where appropriate. Lanzkron would
coordinate with North American's Chief Project Engineer, Ray Pyle, on
matters pertaining to 009. Lanzkron would be supported in the Block I
project engineering effort by a group headed by William Petynia.
Memorandum, Joseph F. Shea, MSC, to Distribution, "MSC Management
and Project Engineering for AFRM 009," March 24, 1965.
March 25-April 1
After further design studies following the M-5 mockup review (October
5-8, 1964), Grumman reconfigured the boarding ladder on the forward
gear leg of the LEM. The structure was flattened, to fit closer to the
strut. Two stirrup-type steps were being added to ease stepping from
the top rung to the platform or "porch" in front of the
hatch.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 25-April 1, 1965";
letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Line Item 4-Lunar Excursion Module, M-5
Review, Chits 1-4 and 1-13," April 30, 1965.
March 25-April 1
North American completed negotiations with Ling-Temco-Vought for design
support on the environmental control radiators for Block II CSMs.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, p. 8;
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 25-April 1, 1965."
March 25-April 1
Crew Systems Division confirmed the feasibility of commonality of
personal communications equipment for the entire Apollo program.
"ASPO Weekly Management Report, March 25-April 1, 1965";
memorandum, Richard S. Johnston, MSC, to Chief, Systems Engineering
Division, Attn: R. Williams, "Apollo space suit communications
program definition," April 5, 1965.
March 26
North American began a series of water impact tests with boilerplate 1
to obtain pressure data on the upper portions of the CM. Data on the
side walls and tunnel agreed fairly well with those obtained from 1/10
scale model drops; this was not the case with pressures on the top
deck, however.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, p. 3.
March 27
Test Series I on spacecraft 001 was completed at WSTF Propulsion
Systems Development Facility. Vehicle and facility updating in progress
consisted of activating the gimbal subsystem and installing a baffled
injector and pneumatic engine propellant valve. The individual test
operations were conducted satisfactorily, and data indicated that all
subsystems operated normally. Total engine firing time was 765 seconds.
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, pp. 13, 18;
memorandum, Spacecraft 001 Project Engineer, to Distribution,
"Review of S/C 001 and TF-2 Test Results," April 19, 1965.
March 29
MSC decided upon a grid-type landing point designator for the LEM.
Grumman would cooperate in the final design and would manufacture the
device; MIT would ensure that the spacecraft's guidance equipment could
accept data from the designator and thus change the landing point.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Item 3; LEM Landing Point Designator,"
March 29, 1965.
March 29
William F. Rector, the LEM Project Officer in ASPO, replied to
Grumman's weight reduction study (submitted to MSC on December 15,
1964). Rector approved a number of the manufacturer's suggestions:
- Delete circuit redundancy in the pulse code modulation telemetry
equipment
- Eliminate the VHF lunar stay antenna
- Delete one of two redundant buses in the electrical power system
- Move the batteries for the explosive devices (along with the relay
and fuse box assembly) from the ascent to the descent stage
- Reduce "switchover" time (the length of time between
switching from the oxygen and water systems in the descent stage to
those in the ascent portion of the spacecraft and the actual liftoff
from the moon's surface). Grumman had recommended that this span be
reduced from 100 to 30 min; Rector urged Grumman to reduce it even
further, if possible. He also ordered the firm to give "additional
consideration" to the whole concept for the oxygen and water
systems:
- in light of the decisions for an all-battery LEM during
translunar coast; and
- possibility of transferring water from the CM to the LEM.
But ASPO vetoed other proposals to lighten the spacecraft:
- Delete the high intensity light. Because the rendezvous radar had
been eliminated from the CSM, Rector stated flatly that the item could
"no longer be considered as part of the weight reduction effort."
- Combine the redundant legs in the system that pressurized the
reaction control propellants, to modularize" the system. MSC held that
the parallel concept must be maintained.
- Delete the RCS propellant manifold.
- Abridge the spacecraft's hover time. Though the Center was
reviewing velocity budgets and control weights for the spacecraft, for
the present ASPO could offer "no relief."
And lastly, Rector responded to Grumman's proposals for staging
components of the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU). These proposals
had been made on the basis of a LEM crew integration systems meeting on
January 27, at which staging had been explored. Those discussions were
no longer valid, however. MSC had since required a capability for
extravehicular transfer to the LEM. In light of this complicating
factor, MSC engineers had reevaluated the entire staging concept.
Although staging still offered "attractive" weight
reductions, they determined that, at present, it was impractical.
Accordingly, Rector informed Robert S. Mullaney, the LEM Program
Manager at Grumman, that his firm must revert to the pre-January 27
position - i.e., the EMU and other assorted gear must be stored in the
ascent stage of the spacecraft.
Letter, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney,
"Contract NAS 9-1100, Weight Reduction Study Status," March
29, 1965.
March 29-April 4
Beech Aircraft Corporation stopped all end-item acceptance tests of
hydrogen and oxygen tanks as a result of interim failure reports issued
against three tanks undergoing tests. Failures ranged from exceeding
specification tolerances and failure to meet heat leak requirements to
weld failure on the H2 tank. Beech would resume testing when corrective
action was established and approved by North American.
NAA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Test Program Weekly Activity
Report (Period 29 March 1965 through 4 April 1965)," p. 4;
"Apollo Monthly Progress Report," SID 62-300-36, p. 12.
March 31
MSC requested that Grumman incorporate in the command list for LEMs 1,
2, and 3 the capability for turning the LEM transponder off and on by
real-time radio command from the Manned Space Flight Network. Necessity
for capability of radio command for turning the LEM transponder on after
LEM separation resulted from ASPO's decision that the LEM and Saturn
instrument unit S-band transponders would use the same transmission and
reception frequencies.
TWX, W. F. Rector III, MSC, to GAEC, Attn: R. S. Mullaney, March 31,
1965.
During the Month
MSC directed Grumman to use supercritical helium only in the descent
stage of the LEM; Grumman completed negotiations with AiResearch for
the storage system.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 26," LPR-10-42, p. 1.
During the Month
Bell Aerosystems Company received Grumman's go-ahead to resume work on
the thrust chamber of the LEM ascent engine. Bell conducted a dozen
stability tests using an injector fitted with a 31.75 mm (1.25 in),
Y-shaped baffle. Thus far, the design had recovered from every induced
disturbance (including widely varied fuel-to-oxygen ratios). Also, to
ease the thermal soakback problem, Bell planned to thicken the chamber
wall.
"Monthly Progress Report No. 26," LPR-10-42, pp. 8, 17.
During the Month
Grumman recommended to MSC that the stroking gear pad be used on the LEM
and that design effort to refine crushing performance should continue.
Ibid., p. 1.
During the Month
Grumman reported the status of their development program on the LEM
landing gear. The firm was:
- Continuing hardware design on the 424-cm (167-in) gear.
- Testing honeycomb crushing characteristics at velocities up to 7.62
m per sec (25 fps).
- Studying high-density honeycomb materials that would still be
compatible with a lightweight secondary strut.
- Studying the possibility of strengthening the rim of the fixed (non
stroking) footpad.
- Designing a boilerplate footpad for use in drop tests.
- Planning drops of a 406-cm (160-in) gear.
- Continuing testing on primary and secondary struts.
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
During the Month
Space Technology Laboratories' major problems with the LEM descent
engine, Grumman reported, were attaining high performance and good
erosion characteristics over the entire throttling range.
Ibid., p. 19.
During the Month
Three flights were made with the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle (LLRV)
for the purpose of checking the automatic systems that control the
attitude of the jet engine and adjusting the throttle so the jet engine
would support five-sixths of the vehicle weight.
On March 11 representatives of Flight Research Center (FRC) visited MSC
to discuss future programs with Warren North and Dean Grimm of Flight
Crew Support Division. A budget for operating the LLRV at FRC through
fiscal year 1966 was presented. Consideration was being given to
terminating the work at FRC on June 30, 1966, and moving the vehicles
and equipment to MSC.
A contract was placed (on March 17) to erect a 12.19 x 12.19-m (40 x 40
ft) building at the south base area of FRC, where the LLRV was flown.
Construction was expected to be complete in 60 days and the building
should reduce LLRV interference with Air Force operations and enhance
the preflight procedures.
Letter, Office of Director, FRC, to NASA Headquarters, "Lunar
Landing Research Vehicle Progress Report No. 21 for period ending March
31, 1965,"sgd. De E. Beeler for Paul F. Bikle, April 7, 1965.