Part 2 (L)
Recovery, Spacecraft Redefinition, and First Manned Apollo Flight
May 1968
1968
May 1
ASPO Manager George M. Low ordered LM Manager C. H. Bolender to
establish a firm baseline configuration for the LM ascent engine to use
during the entire series of qualification tests (including any penalty
runs that might be required). Low's memo followed a telephone
conversation the previous day with Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips. Low cited to Bolender the need for a rigid design control on
the engine. During a recent technical review, he explained, NASA
officials learned that most qualification tests had been performed on
one model (the E2CA injector), while all of the bomb stability tests
had used another (the E2C injector). Ostensibly, the only difference
between the two injectors was in the welding techniques. However, the
first E2CA injector that was bomb-tested showed a combustion
instability. Low emphasized that he was not charging that the different
welding technique had caused the instability. Nevertheless, "this
supposedly minor change [has] again served to emphasize the importance
of making no changes, no matter how small, in the configuration of this
engine." Once Bolender had set up the requested baseline
configuration, Low stated, no change either in design or process should
be made without approval by the Configuration Control Board.
Phillips followed up his conversation with Low a week later to express a
deep concern regarding the ascent engine program, particularly small
improvements in the engine, which could very likely delay the entire
Apollo program beyond the present goal. The sensitivity of the engine to
even minor design, fabrication, and testing changes dictated absolute
control over all such changes. The ascent engine, Phillips told Low, was
one of a very few Apollo hardware items in which even the most
insignificant change must be elevated to top-level management review
before implementation.
Memo, Low to Bolender, "Design freeze of ascent engine," May
1, 1968; ltr., Phillips to Low. May 6, 1968.
May 6
Lunar landing research vehicle (LLRV) No. 1 crashed at Ellington Air
Force Base, Tex. The pilot, astronaut Neil A. Armstrong, ejected after
losing control of the vehicle, landing by parachute with minor injury.
Estimated altitude of the LLRV at the time of ejection was 60 meters.
LLRV No. 1, which had been on a standard training mission, was a total
loss - estimated at $1.5 million. LLRV No. 2 would not begin flight
status until the accident investigation had been completed and the cause
determined. (The LLTV's had not completed their ground test phase and
were not included in this category.) MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth
appointed a Board of Investigation, composed of: Joseph S. Algranti,
Chief, Aircraft Operations Office, MSC; William A. Anders, Astronaut
Office, qualified pilot; Charles Conrad, qualified pilot (temporary
member, to be replaced by Donald L. Mallick); Donald L. Mallick, Chief,
Research Pilots Branch, Flight Research Center; George L. Bosworth,
Aircraft Maintenance - Quality Assurance Branch, Maintenance Officer;
and C. H. Roberts, Aircraft Operations Office, Acting Flying Safety
Officer. (See also May 16 and October 17.)
TWX, Richard H. Holzapfel, MSC, to NASA, Attn: B. P. Helgeson, May 7,
1968.
May 13
During an Apollo flight test program review at MSC, the question was
left unresolved whether or not to perform a
"fire-in-the-hole" test of the LM ascent engine (i.e., start
the engine at the same instant the two stages of the spacecraft were
disjoined - as the engine would have to be fired upon takeoff from the
lunar surface) on either the D or E mission. At the review, several
participants had suggested that the test be performed on the D mission
because that would be the last Apollo flight containing development
flight instrumentation (DFI). Later that day, ASPO Manager George M.
Low met with several of the Center's Associate Directors (Christopher
C. Kraft, Jr., Donald K. Slayton, and Maxime A. Faget) to pursue the
issue further. At that time, Faget stated that, although desirable, DFI
was not essential for the test objective. Most important, he said, was
obtaining photographs of the base of the ascent engine following the
burn. In view of Faget's contention - and because the fire-in-the-hole
test added greatly to the complexity and risk of the D mission at the
time the engine was first fired in space, Low and the others agreed not
to include such an ascent engine burn in the flight. Low asked Faget to
analyze ascent engine test experience and results of the LM-1 ascent
engine burn before making any decision on such a test during the E
mission.
Memo, Low to Faget, "Fire-in-the-Hole Test," May 13, 1968.
May 14
Robert R. Gilruth, MSC Director, announced reassignment of three
officials. John D. Hodge was assigned as Director of the newly
established Lunar Exploration Working Group. Aleck C. Bond, Manager of
the Reliability and Quality Assurance Office and the Flight Safety
Office, would be reassigned effective June 1 as Manager, Systems Test
and Evaluation, Engineering and Development Directorate. Martin L.
Raines, Manager, White Sands Test Facility, would become acting manager
of the Reliability and Quality Assurance Office and the Flight Safety
Office, in addition to his White Sands assignment.
MSC News Release 68-35, May 14, 1968.
May 16
NASA Headquarters established the LLRV-1 Review Board to investigate the
May 6 accidental crash of Lunar Landing Research Vehicle No. 1 at
Ellington Air Force Base. The Board would consist of: Bruce T. Lundin,
Lewis Research Center, chairman; John Stevenson, OMSF; Miles Ross, KSC;
James Whitten, Langley Research Center; and Lt. Col. Jeptha D. Oliver
(USAF), Norton Air Force Base. J. Wallace Ould, MSC Chief Counsel, would
serve as counsel to the group. The board would
- determine the probable cause or causes of the accident,
- identify and evaluate proposed corrective actions,
- evaluate the implications of the accident for LLRV and LM design and
operations,
- report its findings to the NASA Administrator as expeditiously as
possible but no later than July 15, and
- document its findings and submit a final report to the Administrator
with a copy to the NASA Safety Director. (See October 17.)
Memo, Thomas O. Paine to LLRV-1 Review Board, "Investigation and
Review of Crash of Lunar Landing Research Vehicle #1," May 16,
1968.
May 17
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC Director of Flight Operations, expressed
concern to ASPO Manager George M. Low over the escalation of E-mission
objectives; the flight now loomed as an extremely complex and ambitious
mission. The probability of accomplishing all the objectives set forth
for the mission, said Kraft, was very low. He did not propose changing
the mission plan, however. "If we are fortunate," he said,
"then certainly the quickest way to the moon will be
achieved." Kraft did suggest caution in setting mission priorities
and in "apply[ing] adjectives to the objectives."
Specifically, he advised a realistic allowance of delta V limits at
various points in the rendezvous portion of the mission, to ensure safe
termination of the exercise if required. Also, he saw little value in a
fire-in-the-hole burn of the ascent engine at stage separation of the
LM. He believed that ground tests were adequate to provide answers on
pressure and temperature rises on the ascent stage during launch from
the lunar surface. The situation Kraft said was indicative of the
engineer's desire to test fully all systems in flight in both normal
and backup modes. However, reliance must be placed largely on the
wealth of ground testing and analysis carried on to date in the Apollo
program.
Memo, Kraft to Manager, Apollo Program, "Apollo Flight Test
Program," May 17, 1968.
May 21
Following up on an earlier request to examine the potential for lunar
photography of the moon from the CSM during Apollo lunar missions (see
March 29), Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips asked MSC Director
Robert R. Gilruth to expand MSC's effort to include the potential for a
range of scientific investigations. Specifically, he asked that MSC
study the overall potential of the CSM for lunar science and the
modification needed to support increasingly complex experiment payloads.
Among experiments that might be carried out from the CSM Phillips cited
infrared spectrometer radiometer, ultraviolet absorption spectrometer,
passive microwave, radar-laser altimetry, and subsatellites.
Ltr., Phillips to Gilruth, "Lunar Scientific Experiments from the
CSM," May 21, 1968.
May 22
Twist-and-solder wire splices were evaluated for ASPO Manager Low by
Systems Engineering Division. The evaluation stated that
twist-and-solder wire splices with shrink sleeve tubing had been used
for many years and when properly done were adequate. It then listed
three advantages and six disadvantages of this kind of splice. In
summary, it stated that the splice could be phased into the LM program
but was not recommended by the division because:
- there are too many variables;
- the present solder splice (either heat or ZAP gun) had none of the
disadvantages or variables mentioned;
- a substantial amount of time would be required to establish and
implement qualification; and
- qualification testing had proven the present solder splices
adequate.
LM Program Manager C. H. Bolender had the memo hand-carried to George
Low's office, since he was temporarily withholding approval of an
engineering change proposal for Grumman to implement use of the ZAP gun
for solder splices. Low, in turn, sent an "Urgent Action"
note to his Assistant Manager for Flight Safety, Scott H. Simpkinson,
asking his views on the problem and saying, in part, "Personally,
I would only use the twist-and-solder splice - but I may be old
fashioned." Simpkinson replied to Low with an informal note on May
23, agreeing with the recommendations of the Systems Engineering
Division. Simpkinson said, ". . . The worst wire splice in the
production world is the twist-and-solder, and cover with
tubing. . . . I believe we should use the present LM splice method
which has been qualified." He recommended the ZAP gun, "which
controls the heat properly so that all the advantages of the present LM
wire splices can be realized," recalling the phrase, 'Let's not
improve ourselves into a new set of problems.'" On that same day
Low instructed Bolender to proceed with the ZAP gun Grumman splices.
Memo, Owen E. Maynard, Chief, Systems Engineering Div., ASPO, to
Manager, ASPO, "Evaluation of the twist-and-solder wire
splice," May 22, 1968; note, Lyle D. White, Systems Engineering
Div., to Low, May 22, 1968; Urgent Action note, Low to Simpkinson,
undated; note, Simpkinson to Low, May 23, 1968; note, Low to Bolender,
May 23, 1968.
May 24
Apollo Program Director Samuel C. Phillips requested from MSC Director
Robert R. Gilruth a recommended program for spacesuit modifications to
achieve greater astronaut maneuverability. The modifications were
required for lunar landing missions, because extravehicular activities
such as sampling and instrument deployment were difficult and time
consuming with the present suit configuration. Phillips asked for
trade-off studies to achieve optimized life support systems, an
analysis of mobility requirements and techniques to enhance mobility,
and studies of crew station requirements and problem areas such as suit
repair, storage, and checkout.
Ltr., Phillips to Gilruth "Improvement of Apollo Spacesuit for
Lunar Surface EVA Tasks," May 24, 1968.
May 25
ASPO Manager George M. Low informed Apollo Program Director Samuel C.
Phillips of recent MSC work on the effects of launch vehicle-induced
oscillations - i.e., "pogo" vibrations - on the spacecraft
and its subsystems. MSC had made two key personnel assignments in this
area:
- Rolf W. Lanzkron managed all MSC activities in connection with the
space vehicle dynamic integrity problem; and
- astronaut Charles M. Duke coordinated all MSC's efforts with related
work at MSFC.
Low also cited a number of decisions in the hardware and testing areas.
He had decided to use CM 002B, SM 105, and LM-2 for pogo dynamics
testing. Other ground test hardware included LTA-3 for manned drop tests
and for additional structural verification tests, CM 102 to verify
parachute-imposed loads on the spacecraft structure, and CMs 014 and 102
for additional structural tests at North American Rockwell. In deciding
upon uses for these and other spacecraft hardware items, MSC had
assigned first priority to the ground test program, second to another
potential unmanned Saturn V flight, and third to the dual launch
capability.
Ltr., Low to Phillips, May 25, 1968.
May 28
NASA and Grumman officials met to resolve the issue of the injector for
the LM ascent engine. Chief NASA Apollo spacecraft program officials
present included Director Samuel C. Phillips and MSC's ASPO Manager
George M. Low and LM Manager C. H. Bolender; Grumman LM directors and
engineers included LM Program Director Joseph G. Gavin. Several
alternatives seemed feasible: continue the program with the existing
Bell Aerosystems Co. engine and injector; furnish Bell Aerosystems Co.
engines to Rocketdyne to be mated to the Rocketdyne injector; or ship
Rocketdyne injectors to Bell for installation in the engine. After what
Low termed "considerable discussion," he dictated the course
to be followed:
- The LM ascent engine would comprise Bell's engine with the
Rocketdyne injector. Rocketdyne would be responsible for delivery of the
complete engine, and would thus become a subcontractor to Grumman. (Bell
could either remain as subcontractor to Grumman or become a
subcontractor to Rocketdyne.)
- An engine with the Rocketdyne injector would be immediately
installed in LM-3, as well as in LM-4 and LM-5, with minimum schedule
impact.
- Grumman was to proceed forthwith on contract negotiations with Bell
and Rocketdyne to cover these procurements.
- Rocketdyne was to continue qualification on the present injector
design, and engine firings at White Sands Test Facility in support of
LM-3 were to use the Rocketdyne injector.
Grumman participants at this meeting, as Low almost casually phrased
it, "indicated that they would interpose no objections to this set
of decisions." After long months of technical effort and almost
agonizing hardware and managerial debate, the issue of an ascent engine
for the LM was settled.
Memo for Record, Low, "Ascent engine injector," May 31,
1968.
May 29
NASA's North American Management Performance Award Board sent a summary
of its findings for the first interim period, from September 1967
through March 1968, to North American Rockwell's Space Division. The
review board had been charged with assessing the company's performance
under spacecraft contract NAS 9-150 and determining an award fee under
the contract's incentive agreements. Board Chairman B. L. Dorman wrote
Space Division President William B. Bergen that the Board had been
impressed by the attention of North American's top management to the
CSM program. Moreover, a cooperative attitude from top to bottom had
afforded NASA an excellent view into problem areas, while the company's
assessment of problems had helped to produce high-quality hardware. On
the other hand, several activities needed improvement: cost control;
tighter management control over change traffic; stronger management of
subcontractors; and better planning and implementation of test and
checkout functions.
Ltr., Dorman to Bergen, May 29, 1968.
During the Month
NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller
recommended to the Administrator several alternative uses for the LM-2
vehicle, since that spacecraft was no longer destined for flight. (The
successful LM-1 flight during the Apollo 5 mission in
January had obviated the need for a second such unmanned flight.)
Mueller suggested that LM-2 be used for nondestructive tests and for
documentary photography. Additional drop tests with the craft, he said,
would enhance confidence in the strength of the LM to withstand the
impact of landing on the moon, with all subsystems functioning. (The LM
drop test program using Lunar Test Article 3, Mueller said, would
verify the LM structure itself; however, LTA-3 contained no operational
subsystems, wiring, or plumbing and therefore could not verify the
total flight vehicle.) Among several other possible uses for the
vehicle examined but rejected, Mueller cited modifying the craft into a
manned configuration for Apollo or using it for an early Apollo
Applications flight. LM-2 was unsuitable for both these alternatives,
he stated, because of the extensive structural modifications needed to
make it a flightworthy Apollo spacecraft - and the attendant disruption
of vehicle flow within the Grumman production line - and because of the
many fire-proofing changes that would be required. The launch vehicle
(SA-206), LM adapter, and protective shroud were to be placed in
storage for further Saturn tests if needed.
Memo, Mueller to NASA Administrator, "Disposition and Usage of
AS-206/LM-2 Hardware," n.d.