Section 3 is the Market Assessment/Market Analysis section, it contains the following sections:
3.1 Communications Market 3.2 Space Manufacturing 3.3 Remote Sensing 3.4 Government Missions 3.5 Transportation Missions
3.6 Entertainment 3.7 New Missions 3.8 Space Utilities 3.9 Extraterrestrial Resources 3.10 Advertising

Table of Contents for Section 3.4

3.4 Government Missions
3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.2 Existing Government Missions
3.4.3 Treaty Verification
3.4.4 Increased Space Station Missions
3.4.5 Law Enforcement
3.4.6 Human Planetary Exploration
3.4.7 Asteroid Detection/Negation
3.4.8 Emerging Nations Missions
3.4.9 Space Science Outwards
3.4.10 Space Testbed Market Segment
The Full Section Index is at the end of this Section

Commercial Space Transportation Study

3.4 Government Missions

3.4.1 Introduction

The government missions market area consists of missions that are predominantly funded by the Federal government budgets. These include existing government missions (primarily DOD, space science, space station, space testbed, asteroid detection, emerging nations, law enforcement, and treaty verification. Most of these missions do not have a commercial customer (the most notable exception is space testbed), although space launch services may be acquired commercially.

3.4.2 Existing Government Missions Introduction

The government missions market area was established to account for currently planned civil (NASA) and DOD missions. These payloads are not commercial revenue-generating; however, it is important to account for them because of the potential anchor tenancy arrangements that may contribute to the viability of a commercial space transportation system. These missions will be used in conjunction with commercial markets where payload form factors and attributes are compatible. Study Approach

A significant amount of information is available for this group of missions. Since many projects have been conducted to study future system requirements, data are readily accessible for both NASA and DoD missions. Typically, future requirements are tabulated databases for near-term activities (present to about 2000) as well as far-term projection (beyond 2000 to 2010 or 2020). The DOD missions used here are an updated version of the NLS mission model. The civil missions are a combination of the mixed fleet manifest (present to 1998), midterm (1998 to 2010) captured in the Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB), and placeholders for 2010 through 2020 (also in the CNDB).

The combined total mission model includes all U.S. government missions. For CSTS a preliminary screening was performed to remove missions that were accounted for in other CSTS market areas. CSTS has defined the global space launch market in terms of market areas; those U.S. government missions falling into market areas other than "Government Missions" were transferred to the appropriate categories (discussed later in this paper). For example, deployment and resupply of space station missions were deleted from this market area since they have been assigned their own market area.

Many DOD missions remained intact under the government missions market area because most DOD requirements are unique and divorced from commercial and civil space. There is some recent (late 1993) evidence that the military space role may be changing, allowing both commercial and civil applications to benefit from DOD assets and technologies. This change in DOD philosophy may be incorporated in specific market assessments (e.g., remote sensing), however, our assessment of government missions is based upon the assumption that DOD requires separate assets and capabilities from the civil and commercial needs. We expect DOD to maintain a steady and sizable space presence.

After developing a representative market area of government missions, we performed several processing steps before actually quantifying the final market. As missions are destined for different places in orbit, we normalized all projected traffic mass to equivalent low Earth orbit (LEO) for consistency. Although this method is quick and simple, it has its own drawbacks, as will be discussed later in this paper. Normalizing the payload mass involved assuming a certain delivery/upper stage beyond the booster for delivery of the payloads to their operational destinations. When examining results, it is important to remember that the normalized mass also contains delivery stages, not just payloads. Market Description

The resultant average annual LEO equivalent mass to orbit of the above-mentioned mission model is 240,000 lb. Figure shows the flight rate, mass, and velocity requirements for the NASA portion of this mission model. Figure shows the flight rate, mass and velocity requirements for the DOD portion of this mission model Note: The names, destination, launch site, and launch vehicle have been withheld; however, the data are still useful to mission capture analyses and launch vehicle requirements definition.

Figure NASA Mission Requirements (Excluding Space Station Missions)

Figure DOD Mission Requirements for the Period Between 2000 and 2020

To provide a common basis for comparison, and to accumulate missions requirements across all market areas, the mission model was converted to low Earth orbit/low inclination (28.5 deg) equivalent masses. The result is a 21-year (2000-20) annual average of 240,000 lb LEO equivalent mass. This result is clearly dependent on the launch vehicle type assumed, especially for missions requiring upper stages. This assessment used equivalence ratios from the National Launch System study, which are typical of two-stage launch vehicles.

CSTS's division of the entire space launch market into separate areas (53 initially) created overlap of some market areas. This is particularly true for NASA missions, most of which are covered by other markets areas (i.e., Increased Space Station, Space Science Outwards, Human Planetary Exploration, Space Manufacturing, and Remote Sensing). The only NASA mission in this area that has not been covered elsewhere is the communication system deployment (i.e., TDRS and TDRS follow-on). This assumes that NASA will continue to deploy its own comsats and will not be solely tied into an existing commercial system/network.

Conversely, few of the DOD missions are covered by other market areas. Those covered in other market areas include GPS, GPS follow-on, and Landsat missions. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was thought to be different enough from its civil counterpart, NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) satellites, to keep them separate. All of the other missions are unique to this market area, with the assumption that DOD continues to provide its own weather, surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, and space test assets.

The result (after elimination of the redundant missions) was the time-phased, LEO equivalent mass requirements seen in Figure An 11-year average for the period 2000-10 (which seems reasonable to use, since beyond 2010 is predominately placeholders) results in delivery requirements of 167,000 lb (LEO equivalent mass). The 21-year average for the period 2000-10 results in a yearly traffic mass of 176,000 lb, which is a 5% difference from the 11-year value.

Figure Summary of the Government Missions (NASA and DOD) LEO Equivalent Masses Market Evaluation

We focused on identification of top-level trends and driver missions, instead of using a bottom-up approach of examining each mission and then seeing how it impacted the whole market. In light of this, most government missions trends are driven by DOD requirements. NASA's TDRS will not have much effect on the total government outlook, although TDRS will always enjoy high priority (in terms of both satellite and launch service acquisition). Therefore, the following discussions concentrate mainly on the DOD requirements.

There are difficulties in discussing DOD missions, primarily due to their sensitive (and often classified) nature, which ultimately resulted in a lack of available information. Thus, for this analysis we cite general observations based on our previous experience with DOD missions, together with more current development gathered from public sources.

TDRS is expected to continue to operate at geostationary orbit (GSO) locations. Likewise, the DOD's missions are expected to continue at a full range of inclination orbits and altitudes. Figure indicates that government annual launch rates will be in the range of eight per year from the East Coast and four from West Coast.

One major event that could change these launch trends is the size and capability of satellites in the future. Many factors can drive a change in satellite size, mass, and constellation. They include improved technology, reduced needs, reduced budget, higher demand for integrated satellite assets, and national policy. It is not necessarily true that satellite size will reduce over time. There are reasons they may reduce in size, and equally probable reasons they would increase in size. Reduction in satellite size could occur due to a reassessment of satellite needs, limited budgets, and/or introduction of microtechnologies to allow producing smaller satellites for flight on less costly launch systems.

Growth in satellite size could occur due to combining capabilities from multiple satellites into a single system (this could also be triggered by reduced budgets). Also, growth could occur if a low-cost, heavy-lift launch system were available. This concept is known as "trading weight for dollars," where satellite costs go down because of reductions in tolerances and less costly manufacturing processes. Only continuous tracking of the market can tell the real trends.

Figure Projected Government Missions From 2000 to 2020 Space Application Description

It is expected that NASA and DOD will continue their given charters in space activities, with minor modifications due to shifts in policy or world situation. For the TDRS system, NASA will maintain and upgrade the constellation. TDRS serves two major roles: providing data relay services for the space shuttle missions and supporting a number of DOD requirements. TDRS receives significant support from Congress, NASA, DOD, and the users. It is also expected that TDRS use will increase as space missions around the world evolve.

Similar justification applies to DOD missions. Currently the DOD space missions encompass six main objectives: communications, early warning, global positioning, weather forecasting, intelligence-gathering, and testing. These are in existence with a single goal of providing support for the fighting forces. Because of this, it is projected that all DOD missions must continue in one form or another. It may be possible to consolidate some satellite functions in the future, but operationally the missions have conflicting requirements. Efforts are continuing to identify which satellite functions, if any, can be consolidated and in what form. The outcome may potentially include both larger (multipurpose) and smaller (more specialized) satellites. Continuous tracking of the market can help define these new requirements for government missions as they evolve. Market Assessment

As discussed above, government missions are expected to continue in a business-as-usual mode in terms of mission goals and objectives. The projected sustained market size is as shown in Figure for the four main launch system weight classes. However, the market itself is transforming to cope with changes around the world and to take advantage of new technologies and meet fiscal realities. For near-term considerations, we see within the next 5 to 10 years changes in the industry in the following areas:

Figure Projected Market Size by Launch System Weight Class From 2000 to 2020

  • A. LEO small satellites may become the dominant concept of choice for the small users because of their low cost, quick availability, and affordable launch. New and existing space users can take advantage of small satellites when technology allows, but it is expected both NASA and DOD will maintain their fleet of large satellites for the major missions. For this reason, we see a continued need for launch services in the future, providing a consistent and justifiable basis for new launch systems or upgrades of existing launch systems.

  • B. On the other end of the technology spectrum are those technologies that will allow orders of magnitude improvement and/or addition of end user services. These may come with a price of more complex and larger satellite systems, but if returns can be proven, the users may be willing to pay for it and have a smaller constellation of satellites.

  • C. There currently are new and better satellite systems that can last longer due to better launch services, more efficient propulsion systems, and more accurate guidance and attitude control, among other things. The DOD has slipped some of its launch-on-demand satellites, possibly to take advantage of this trend. Launch schedules can be stretched out due to longer satellite life, resulting in an overall reduction in annual launch rate.
  • At this time we cannot predict which scenario (or combination of scenarios) will occur; thus we have not included any modifications to the mission model. Foremost with government missions is the ability to launch on schedule. This calls for a flexible support infrastructure (discussed in the next section). Within the government missions area itself, we see varying degrees of payload integration complexity, reducing our ability to satisfy the market with a single launch system. Rather, the existing launch availability format of small, medium, intermediate, and large classes of launch systems may continue to be practical. Finally, fixed budget projections over the next several years indicate a no-growth situation for this market area. Infrastructure

    The support infrastructure for government missions is in place. Ongoing modifications of this infrastructure have ensured its availability and operational status. The existing launch infrastructure can be considered satisfactory for the near-term needs. Our observation indicates that the support infrastructure elements are being continuously improved for various programs, and this trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Prospective Users

    NASA and DOD differ in the way they establish mission requirements. In general, NASA's different code organizations originate mission requirements, which are screened through prioritization steps, then stored in the CNDB. The CNDB is continually scrutinized and continually updated. For DOD missions, specific users from the services generate their own requirements, which are then managed by the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM). USSPACECOM also has assistance from the Aerospace Corporation in compiling this classified mission model. These official sources were used to develop the market assessment. CSTS Needs and Attributes Transportation Systems Characteristics

    Based on our analysis, future government missions requirements call for the following characteristics in new transportation systems:
  • A. The system is unmanned, at least within the definition of the CSTS government missions market area. All payloads identified in this section require only delivery to orbit without special human operations or human presence.
  • B. Launch capability exists to both low and high inclinations spanning LEO (90 to 100 NM) up to GSO (about 19,930 NM). As expected, both East and West Coast launch sites are required for these missions, with a launch rate of about eight per year from the East coast and four per year from the West Coast. A single site, or alternative locations are acceptable as long as performance and security requirements are met.
  • C. Government missions tend to require the following class of mass capability from the launch system:
      1. 8,000 to 10,000 lb to geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) and up to 12,500 lb to GSO,
      2. 18,000 to 20,000 lb and up to 40,000 lb to LEO due East,
      3. 14,000 to 16,000 lb and up to 32,000 lb to polar orbit.
  • D. The launch system must be able to launch on demand for national security payloads. The requirements come in terms of callup days, the number of days between callup authorization for the launch, and the actual launch date. The specific callup time varies with particular payloads, but for the GPS and DMSP the callups have been on the order of 30 to 45 days.
  • E. The launch system must be reliable but also affordable. Both of these parameters cannot be quantified presently, but future launch systems, old or new, must inherently provide better reliability than current systems at a lower cost. Considerations of reliability and affordability will be addressed as specific launch concepts are being designed.
  • F. Standardization of payload interfaces has progressed continuously, although slowly, as satellite users look for ways to reduce payload processing and integration costs.
  • Ground Segment

    As discussed previously, the ground segment infrastructure currently exists for all current classes of launch vehicles. Upgrades to this ground facility network will satisfy many of future launch needs. User/Transportation Interfaces

    Other than the trend toward standardized payload interfaces, we anticipate little change in the interaction between users and the launch provider for this market area. Improvements Over Current

    Since the launch capabilities were found to be sufficient for the projected needs, improvements for the government missions fall mainly in the areas of cost reduction and improved reliability and operability. Management and Policy

    We find that both NASA and DOD have been improving and changing their organization and management policies that work in supporting this market area. Both have gone through major organizational, responsibility, and operational overhauls. Some resulted in immediate impacts, others resulted in slower changes. We expect that both agencies will share responsibilities of launch assets, drawing from the same stable of available launch systems. We project that NASA and DOD will continue to fund and manage spacecraft development and launch within their agencies, with other considerations secondary to the primary objective. How policies would change with the introduction of a new launch system is hard to predict, but it is unlikely to change policies significantly. Business Opportunities Cost Sensitivities

    We found that government missions are not very sensitive to launch costs because the payload costs account for the major programs cost. On the other hand, for the same reason, they are very sensitive to launch system reliability, especially since government payloads are rarely insured. Programmatics

    It is expected that the launch schedule identified earlier will change over time. Since the mission functions must continue, the mission themselves will exist in one form or another. If a new system is brought on line, it will be phased in over a period of time much as was done for the space shuttle. Again there is no specific unclassified milestone that a new capability must be available. Conclusion and Recommendations

    Many of these missions reflect vehicle interface requirements for existing launch systems, and will fly long before a new launch system is available. A portion of this market could be available for capture by a new system if transition planning was in place early. The government programs identified in this section represent a current snapshot of planned government missions. As budgetary cycles pass, programs will enter and exit this manifest. Obviously, reduction in any, or all, of these areas would provide additional budget to potentially increase this or other market segments.

    Because the government missions were created to be only a representative manifest of DOD and civil requirements, we will not be continually updated for minor program changes. If there is a substantive change it will be captured in our market area analysis.

    3.4.3 Treaty Verification Introduction

    A treaty is defined as "a formal agreement between two or more states." In addition to this traditional definition of border disputes, we enlarged the market area to include agreements/commitments made by a government to its people and international oversight (e.g., human rights and pollution control). Treaty verification was partitioned into seven market segments, and then we assessed what satellite services were required for each of the market segments.

    It was determined that treaty verification required four fairly traditional types of services: communication, navigation, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This market can be satisfied by space assets/constellations defined in the communications and remote-sensing market areas, and thus no independent requirements were defined in this market area. It is important to stress that in addition to the space assets, a significant ground infrastructure must be developed before a market for treaty verification emerges. Study Approach

    We defined the following eight step approach to defining the treaty verification market area:
  • A. Market Definition-Determine how broad a market area should be encompassed under treaty verification.
  • B. Satellite Service Requirements-Make a first-cut evaluation of potential satellite capabilities required to satisfy each market segment under the treaty verification market area.
  • C. Satellite Service Research-Develop an understanding of the technical aspects of the satellite services we want to discuss with potential customers.
  • D. Customer Contacts-Phone and visit customers with current or potential applications under treaty verification.
  • E. ROM Market Analysis-Quantify the potential treaty verification space launch market over time based on a continuum of launch costs.
  • F. Supplementary Markets-Discuss supplementary markets to the treaty verification space launch market (e.g., ground data processing centers for remote processing satellites) and their potential growth over time.
  • G. Corollary Markets Assessment-Examine other market areas being studied under CSTS and determine if they require identical and/or similar services. Examine the potential for satisfying multiple market areas with a single, combined satellite capability.
  • H. Review and Refine Results-Review with potential customers, satellite service providers, and CSTS alliance. Update as appropriate.
  • Market Description

    The strict definition of "treaty" is "a formal agreement between two or more states." After brainstorming this area, we decided to open up the definition to include binding agreements. This allowed us to examine agreements/commitments made by a government to its people and international oversight (e.g., human rights and pollution control). The top half of figure shows the breakdown of treaty verification into seven market segments, followed by examples within each segment.

    Figure Treaty Verification Market Segments and a First Cut
    at Potential Satellite Services Required by Each Segment. Market Evaluation

    Once we had established our market segments we took a first cut at delineating potential satellite services for each segment. We split remote sensing into two categories, reconnaissance and surveillance. We differentiated between the two, since surveillance has the added requirement of tracking the subject, requiring rapid data processing, and the ability to adjust our view based on a subject's movements. The lower half of
    Figure shows the mapping of satellite services to market segments.

    It is important that this market area decomposition for treaty verification be reviewed with the other market areas. There is definitely overlap with the law enforcement area (e.g., illegal immigration, drug trade, and maybe more), and there is a good chance some of these segments were addressed in the remote-sensing area. Space Application Description

    Treaty verification requires a fairly traditional set of space assets and supporting infrastructure. Communication, navigation, and remote-sensing reconnaissance are traditional space applications. Remote-sensing surveillance most likely is being performed by DOD, under classified programs. It is important to determine if this is the case, and what the likelihood is of sharing this technology for other applications, such as treaty verification. Market Assessment

    Remote sensing is required for each of the seven market segments in one form or another. Three of the segments require communication and navigation capabilities. The communication would clearly be mobile communication. Since communication and navigation are considered secondary capabilities for treaty verification, we assumed work being performed in other market areas would more than satisfy our requirements (corollary markets). Even though there is a market area dedicated to remote sensing, because the entire treaty verification market area would be predicated on a remote-sensing capability we performed additional research into this field.

    Today, the remote-sensing market is approximately $200 million per year worldwide (split 50-50 between government and commercial customers) with a projected growth of 20% per year1. Commercial users are beginning to see significant benefits to remote sensing information (e.g., mineral and petroleum industry, agriculture, forestry2, civil engineering, and others), but do not want the responsibility of processing raw data. They want to ask a question and get back an answer, not a pile of images/photos.

    Europe is leading the way in remote sensing for commercial markets, and for the Envisat-I project, 30% of the total program budget is for the ground segment (information processing)3. This would imply that 70% is for spacecraft and launch services.

    Unfortunately, by the end of the decade over 20 terabytes per week (equivalent to 20 million books of data) will be returned to earth, thus there will be few new satellite programs like Envisat-I. Clearly the focus will be on information processing. Those interested in using remote sensing for treaty verification, and they have limited available budgets, stated an unwillingness to procure their own satellite capability. Thus, this market would rely on data (hopefully, processed data) from other sources. Infrastructure

    As stated in Section, no changes to satellites are required to satisfy the needs of this market area. To fully satisfy those looking to utilize space for treaty verification, a sophisticated ground segment would be required. This would require combining GPS data with a mobile communications network, and the ability to obtain near-real-time remote sensing information.

    The cost of establishing the required ground infrastructure could be significant, and this market could not justify the required investment. Clearly, work is going on to make individual components happen. Motorola, Loral, Qualcomm, and a number of other companies are investing in a number of competing mobile communications systems. Lockheed, Worldview, and others are looking at true commercialized remote sensing. What is needed is to tie these efforts together into an integrated capability for treaty verification, law enforcement, and other applications. Prospective Users

    Working with the law enforcement (Section 3.4.5) market area effort, we have contacted the Justice Department to discuss the border dispute market segment (illegal immigration, drug trafficking, etc.). The arms verification market segment has not been researched because of its classified nature and our belief that those space assets are in place. We had conversations with Greenpeace to discuss the resource agreements market segment. CSTS Needs and Attributes

    As stated in Section, there are no immediate changes required to satellites, and thus no impacts to the current launch vehicles or the process of launching satellites. As satellite technology and constellation strategies change, launch systems must evolve to meet the new requirements. Launch system requirements for this new generation of satellites are covered in appropriate market areas (e.g., communications and remote sensing). Business Opportunities

    The amount of remote sensing data information returned to earth each year is staggering (see Section above). The near-term market to support treaty verification is clearly in information processing on earth. The requirements for satellite launches would primarily be for replacement satellites, which would be once every couple of years.

    We are not completely without hope. Most remote-sensing satellites are in a polar or sun-synchronous orbit. In the best case, we are receiving information on a particular location every 90 minutes. For a number of the market segments under treaty verification we would like information more frequently. To satisfy these consumers, additional polar satellites (a constellation approach) or even new satellite constellations in a lower inclination orbit (providing a higher dwell time) may be required. In addition, some segments require active tracking (surveillance), which is a little tougher than just "taking pictures." Finally, if the entire remote-sensing commercial market expands rapidly through the entrepreneurial efforts of those focusing in on value-added remote-sensing information processing, we may see a trend away from large, multicapability satellites to single instrument, rapid-response monitoring satellites for a single user.

    There would be the potential for a significant remote-sending market under a scenario in which a ground infrastructure is established to rapidly process remote sensing information allowing commercial users to obtain answers to their specific problems. It would use existing space assets, and would occur during the next 10 years. After seeing the power of this information, customers want more information, primarily in terms of shorter duration between samples and more specific data. Satellite manufacturers are able to provide low-cost, single-mission (single-instrument) satellites. A low-cost, dependable (launch +/- a couple of days) launch service supports single-purpose satellite demand.

    With the little work we have done, we would estimate this market anywhere from 6 to 20 launches per year. Of these, two to four would support treaty verification. This information was supplied to the remote-sensing market analysis effort, and thus treaty verification requirements are covered in their total remote-sensing market. Conclusion and Recommendations

    Treaty verification does not require unique capabilities or space assets. It requires mobile communications tied in with GPS for location. In addition, it is desired to have both a reconnaissance and surveillance remote-sensing capability. The primary problem is establishing the immense ground infrastructure to obtain and distribute the required information to mobile locations in near real-time.

    This market can be satisfied by space assets/constellations defined in the communications and remote-sensing market areas, and thus no independent requirement is defined in this market area. It is again important to stress that in addition to the space assets, the ground infrastructure must be developed before a market for treaty verification emerges.

    3.4.4 Increased Space Station Missions

    The Space Station program, now a joint US/Russia/International venture5 , has tremendous potential as a growth transportation market. The additional resources of the combined Mir II and Alpha Station will speed the testing and development of new manufacturing and research processes. It is projected that reduced transportation costs will allow more frequent visits to the station as well as usher in the viability of free-flying platforms which will offload the matured processes and experiments from the station. The main, if not only, users for the space station will be governments and their agencies, each contributing its own share of investment. Although we expect the station to have a wide range of use, they would mostly fall under the areas of technology development, testing, and demonstration. Introduction/Statement of Problem

    The currently planned space station deployment and maintenance scenario requires more than $21.6 billion in launch cost on the space shuttle through 2006 (see Fig. This represents about 47% of the total station budget (program cost + launch cost) required in the same timeframe. Examination of the resupply phase reveals a more lopsided picture of station costs. Between 1994 and 2001, which is when the station is expected to achieve permanent human capability (PHC), transportation cost is about 31% of total station budget. Most of the money goes into developing and deploying the initial station elements.

    * Based on NASA 1994 budget projections.

    Figure Current Funding of Station DDT&E, Operations, and Transportation

    Beginning in 2002 when resupply flights are required to replenish the station, transportation cost become 65% (or $2.8 billion) of the annual station budget. This is due to an increased in shuttle flights to support and maintain the station, and it is a major portion of the costs. It is therefore important to reduce shuttle cost to help the space station program in several ways:
  • A. Assure that transportation cost alone will not hinder effective long-term station operation.
  • B. Make station access affordable for ongoing users; at the same time, attract new users.
  • C. Free up funding for new payloads and experiments, or increased shuttle access to the station, or both.
  • Study Approach

    Our approach is to assess the current estimate by the user community (NASA HQ Codes C and U, ESA, and the National Space Development Agency of Japan, or NASDA) to determine the types of resources required, the payload classes, and what would be desirable in a transportation system to increase/improve use of the station. Since the deployment phase of the station will not likely be affected by transportation cost changes because it is in the near-term future, our main analysis emphasis will be on the post PHC resupply time frame. Market Description

    The Space Station Utilization Conference6 in Huntsville, Alabama (Aug. 3, 1992), explored what the users envision the space station as being and what their dreams of the future would mean for station growth. Most of the applications fall within the area of experiments in various scientific fields and technology development for commercial and other uses. Although requiring specialized interface, handling, and operations, these provide for a steady demand on transportation access to the station. This demand is expected to increase with reduced transportation costs. Three scenarios emerged as the driving force for the market. They are:
  • A. Phased approach to build an orbiting facility for technology development, from shuttle-based experiments to space station-based activities to work performed on free flyers. For a particular technology, the following possible phased events might take place:
    1. 1. Test a process/technique on an STS flight (Spacelab, Microgravity Lab).
      2. Develop and learn to automate the process on the station.
      3. Move it off to free flyers for actual production or long-term testing.
  • B. The entire laboratory is in space, so specimens and samples would not have to be returned to Earth for analysis, which sometimes compromises the integrity of the experiment. This option calls for a facility that can accommodate all necessary end-to-end functions for the experiments. This means data collection, storage, processing, and analysis capabilities must be available on board. As one can expect, transportation needs to support this version of the station would be much greater than in scenario 1, above.
  • C. A third possibility is driven by frequent access to the station to collect experiment data and to allow the lead scientists involved in the experiments to spend a couple of weeks at the station conducting their experiments. This scenario ensures high data quality and keeps the investigators close to their experiments.
  • These are seen as three potential scenarios for space station utility. For each scenario, the transportation market can be summarized as consisting of the initial buildup of the facility and resupply transportation to the station with both unpressurized payloads and pressurized payloads (including people). As mentioned before, for the purpose of this analysis, transportation requirements will be discussed with emphasis on the resupply missions. As time progresses one must revisit the station requirements because they are intimately tied to technological, socioeconomic, and political forces (including current funding/budget and operational trends). For now, the identified requirements provide a basis for how the space station might grow and what role transportation could play in this process. Market Evaluation

    There are several areas expected to drive the transportation market for the space station. These are all related to the fact that the station must be supported so it will function as designed. The following transportation drivers are seen as important considerations for a space station resupply launch system:
  • A. Regular access to the station. This general requirement is the major driver of transportation to the station. It is critical to maintain space station operations and ensure user access to what the station was built for in the first place, experiments and their data. The bottom line is that the launch system must be able to launch on schedule and possibly on demand, as called for by the space station resupply plan. This leads to the next driver, resupply of the station.
  • B. Resupply of the station. Regular visits to the station, either manned or unmanned, are required to ensure station operations. This includes replenishing, checking out, and fixing all the different functions of the station. Propellants must be refueled, power system maintained, guidance and control system maintained and upgraded, EVA equipment checked out, and so forth. Maintaining the station alone is expected to be continuous throughout the life of its utility.
  • C. Delivery and return of people. Since this is envisioned to be a manned facility, delivery, return and maintenance of the integrity of the living environments are critical for the station's success. The launch system must provide support for human to live in space. Currently the space shuttle provides sufficient access capability to space. But it is not capable of increasing launch rate or launching on demand. As a result a new (or upgraded) system may have to be considered.
  • D. Delivery and return of experiments, their specimens, and data. At the heart of the station utilization are the multitude of experiments the users will be conducting either inside or outside of the pressurized station modules. These experiments must be delivered and in many cases returned to Earth for processing and analysis. Due to a variety of applications (to be discussed in the next section), each experiment is expected to require its own environmental support and interface. Vibration, temperature, cleanliness, and datalink are just some of the various interfaces required by a particular experiment. Most, if not all of these, will probably be provided by the launch system.
  • Space Application Description

    Major applications for the space station fall in the areas of microgravity experiments, life science experiments, space physics, astrophysics, Earth science and applications, solar system exploration, and other technology research activities. Payload interfaces with the space station lab support equipment will be simple, and experiment packages will be highly contained. The research facilities will feature international standard payload racks (ISPR), arranged in various configurations and sizes throughout the different station modules.

    Each experiment will have control of its own environment and activities. However, the station will provide a multitude of services to the experiments in terms of power, environmental control, data collection, storage and transfer, and even limited data processing and analysis. The transportation system that will deliver the experiment payloads to and from the station will have many of the services for the payloads in the quiescent mode. Actual experimentation is not expected to occur during transit, except for a limited few.

    One unique requirements of the experiments is the need for early or late access. This calls for access to the payload as late as 10 hours before launch, and as early as 2 hours after landing. This is driven by the quality of data or experiment results, many of which become invalid after prolonged exposure to gravity after landing. Market Assessment

    The key to growth will be the ability to efficiently move experiments in and out of the station to maximize use of the resources. For the United States, the pressurized cargo will be delivered at 90-day intervals. Experiments must therefore be timed around these flights. For protein crystals, deterioration begins within hours after the crystal is removed from its solution. Ideally, the payloads would return when they were ready rather than based on the crew rotation schedule. The reduction of transportation costs (at one-tenth the current shuttle level of approximately $10,000/lb) will allow the flexibility to move payloads through the station at a greater efficiency and timeliness. These lower costs would allow individual organizations and agencies to plan and pay for their own missions and be in better control of the progress being made.

    The reduction of launch costs to the one one-hundredth level would allow the delivery and servicing of free flyers and thus allow the natural evolution of the station payload process. Man-tended free flyers would allow industries to customize a facility for their own needs and provide the personnel to support and maintain it. Frequent access would be required for some processes, while others would require undisturbed periods measured in months.

    Currently, the pricing policy concept is under development, but it is expected that shuttle and Spacelab policies will be adopted, or at least be used as the basis. There may be two standard service packages that the user can buy. One is for round-trip transportation and integration. The other is on-orbit operations. The former affect the launch market directly, the latter indirectly. Round-trip transportation and integration price will be based on weight, volume and length of the payload, with standard interfaces provided for by the launch vehicle. On-orbit operations price will be based on space required (or volume), energy usage, crew time needs, and length of stay in orbit. All of these impact how often the transportation system must visit the station. Obviously optional services will be offered as well at additional costs. The key to a successful transportation in the station resupply market will be in providing timely launch services and on-orbit operations at an affordable price to the users. Infrastructure

    The infrastructure must be assessed from two points of view. From the users' standpoint, only minor infrastructure modification will be needed, if even that. The users normally operate their own laboratories (either government, private, or university) where many experiments will be built. The principal investigator and his/her project team usually reside at these same facilities; therefore preflight and postflight preparation and analysis will be done there too. At the launch site, these small payloads are expected to require simple integration operations, which can readily use existing payload processing facilities. Only minor payload specific hardware and equipment will be required, which will be supplied by the users.

    From the launch provider's standpoint, the infrastructure will be whatever is inherently required to process, launch, and refurbish the vehicles, with the assumption that the system will be reusable. If the shuttle (or some upgraded version) will continue to fly, then it is foreseen that only minor infrastructure impact will occur, mostly in the areas of improved operations and reliability. If at some future date a new system will be brought on line, then the impact to the infrastructure will be high with major new infrastructure required. Prospective Users

    Prospective users of the space station market are expected to consist of only U.S. and foreign government entities, and research and educational establishments. In general, the partners in building and deploying the station will be its main users. These include the functions within NASA, other U.S. agencies such as NOAA and Department of Energy, the European Space Agency (ESA), the NASDA, and potentially as-yet unidentified Russian agencies. Our main contacts have been the following sources:

    Code C:James Fountain (MSFC), Kay Enman (MSFC)
    Code U: Betty Segal (HQ)
    General: Vance Houston (MSFC), Jason Otashi (Ames), Carl Gustaferro (Ames), Stan Parkson (Ames), Rich Rodriquez (Crew Reqts, JSC), Doug Sander (MOD, JSC), ESA & NASDA requirements provided through Boeing Station Contract. CSTS Needs and Attributes Transportation System Characteristics

    The station currently is built based on deployment and resupply capabilities of the space shuttle. As a result, by default, most shuttle capabilities become the required transportation system characteristics. In fact, in many cases the transportation system ends up driving what the payloads can and cannot do. If the shuttle is going to be replaced by some new system in the future, the latter should also have many of the shuttle's characteristics because it will fly shuttle payloads. Among the standard shuttle capabilities, the following are considered very important for improvements for space station support:
  • A. Increase payload weight to support high traffic, high inclination orbits.
  • B. Provide higher reliability for delivery and return of high valued cargoes and people.
  • C. Have more flexible schedule for launch-on-schedule and launch-on-demand.
  • D. Offer improved ground processing for quicker refurbishment and turn-around.
  • E. Maintain affordable per flight cost to the customers.
  • Another operational characteristic to be considered is the early and late payload access capabilities. Our research has shown that many users have late/early access requirements on the cargo (30% of crew, 30% of ESA, 54% of NASDA, 100% of Code C, and 50% of Code U). Additionally, much of the remaining cargo requires conditioning or thermal control of some sort. As it stands today, the shuttle at 28.8-deg inclination can only meet 30% of the user requirements.

    At 51.6-deg, this is expected to be even less. Therefore, the critical characteristics for a transportation system to support increased station missions would also include extensive late/early access capability (>72 hours) and sufficient power and thermal capabilities (either in the vehicle or as kits) to meet the payload demands. Ground Segment

    Most of the ground segment issues were discussed in Section, "Infrastructure." Specific payload ground facilities and infrastructure needs will be closely related to payload access, on-orbit control, and postflight processing. Specific launch system ground segment components depend on the vehicle in operation at the time. For the shuttle it is not expected to require major ground facilities and infrastructure network. For the payload, the ground segment to support the significant amount of late/early access will require on-pad payload access. Also, close monitoring of power and payload temperatures prior to, during, and after launch will be critical. In general, we do not foresee major ground segment addition as the station design stands at present time. User/Transportation Interfaces

    Many of the user/transportation interfaces fall in the areas of mission planning and mission operation. Mission planning in this sense includes all activities leading up to the actual flight of the payloads. Negotiation of launch price and services, and crew training for the mission, also fall within this area. This is important because it is inherently tied to the pricing policy and payload manifest of resupply to the station. In the mission operation area, interfaces between the payloads/experiments and the vehicle are expected to be driven not so much by payload mass but by services provided to the payloads. For example, power and thermal capabilities for refrigerators and freezers during all phases of flight must be provided by the vehicle. Also, animal transportation requires in-transit access for visual monitoring. These and other environmental, electrical, and data interfaces will determine whether the experiments are successful in providing quality results to the scientists. Management and Policy

    Since the station program and its resupply transportation are and will remain under the control of NASA and other government partners, it is expected that management and policy of this market will continue to follow government regulations. Just as in recent years, the station budget will need to be justified to the U.S. Congress for approval in the coming years. However, once the resupply phase begins in the early 2000s, we expect the program to receive stable support from the lawmakers. Even though Russia will become a major partner, we expect the station program will continue to be run under U.S. management and policy. Improvements Over Current

    As discussed above, the space station users will include mostly government and educational entities. To enable lower cost per flight for space station resupply, the U.S. government agencies (including NASA) will act as an anchor tenant, thereby providing a base transportation needs for the transportation system. With this anchor tenancy, other users such as foreign governments and private and educational users can take advantage of the low transportation cost to use the station's capabilities. An average of seven shuttle flights per year to the station is projected with the aforementioned main users. Depending on the launch rate capabilities of the launch vehicle, additional users may begin to conduct experiments in orbit while taking advantage of the lower launch cost. The cost sensitivities of the market will be discussed in Section Business Opportunities

    The following two sections present an overview of our assessment of the space station business opportunities. Emphasis will be placed on the transportation aspect of the market. Cost Sensitivities

    Figure shows the cumulative cost of the station program, including deployment phase and the following 5 years of resupply. The impact of reducing transportation costs by one-tenth and one one-hundredth are included for comparison. One can see the large savings resulted from reducing launch costs to one-tenth of current values. However, the benefit of reducing below one-tenth of current launch costs provides little added value, but most likely would require significantly more development dollars. Figure shows the annual cost difference for the same cases. Since the post-PHC resupply flights have the lowest operations cost segment and largest transportation costs, the benefit of reducing launch costs by an order of magnitude are greatest. The savings would be $2.5 billion per year for a reduction of one-tenth in launch costs. This would be sufficient to:
  • A. Develop 50 new integrated science racks.
  • B. Develop 250 new technology or commercial racks.
  • C. Fly 60 additional flights.
  • D. Some combination of the above.

  • Figure Projected Cumulative Station Costs (Deployment + Resupply)

    Figure Projected Annual Savings of Reduced Launch Costs (Deployment + Resupply)

    The highest probability (and most austere) case for the savings would be to maintain the affordability of the station program and would result in little additional growth. A periodic additional flight to increase the user payload throughput could be easily justified.

    A more optimistic case could assume that some percentage of the savings would be available for growth of the station. The addition of a Hab and Lab module would significantly increase the output of the station. Figure parametrically assesses the growth in requirements with the addition of Hab and Lab modules, which directly reflect in crew size and additional experiment volume for the crew to work with. Since crew time is one of the most limiting factors, it is used here as the basis for growth.

    The impacts of the additional Russian hardware and crew are uncertain at this time. The PHC station configuration is now anticipated to have 110 kW of power, twice that of the previous U.S. only options. Power should therefore no longer be a limiting consideration, at least for early growth.

    Figure Parametric Growth Estimates of the Hab and Lab Modules

    A low-probability option would be that the major portion of monies saved by the reduced transportation costs would be available for station growth and evolution (i.e., addition of man-tended free flyers). The $2.5 billion annual savings is more than the DDT&E and nontransportation deployment costs planned for the space station. Significant growth in resources and capabilities would be possible.

    Figure Reference Logistics Mission Payload and Costs

    Figure shows reference station logistics missions that can be used to quantify the above growth options. We assumed that payload costs will average $10,000 per pound. While this is high for clothing and food, it is low for integrated science and user payloads; so is a good overall estimate. Based on the cargo capabilities of a shuttle mission with pressurized or unpressurized cargo only (due to performance limitations to 51.6 deg and overhead), the reference cost of a pressurized mission is $98 million, and an unpressurized mission is $93.2 million.

    Figure High-, Medium-, and Low-Probability Funding Scenarios

    Figure shows the rationale for high-, medium-, and low-probability funding/growth scenarios and potential results. Note for the low-probability scenario (large funding) that half the funds are going into facilities additions/upgrades. If launch cost can be reduced by an order of magnitude, the high- to medium-probability cases indicate that between 7.5 and 11.5 flights annually can be expected. Programmatics

    The shuttle is the only existing launch system with space station support capabilities and is expected to continue operation at least through the mid-2000s. Following the development phase, the station elements will be deployed between 1997 and 2001, achieving permanent human capability (PHC) in 2001. The traffic to the station beginning in 2002 will consist mainly of resupply and crew rotation missions. As
    Figure shows, the deployment requires about four flights per year, while the baseline resupply missions will total seven shuttle flights per year.

    Figure Space Station Deployment and Resupply Schedule Conclusions and Recommendations

    By design, transportation to the space station will be on a regular basis. The sponsoring governments will provide anchor tenancy for the transportation system, which will help stimulate other users to take advantage of the lower launch cost. We examined three possibilities of how the launch cost savings could be reinvested back into the program, ranging from no reinvestment to 80% reinvestment. For the conservative high- and medium-probability cases (no reinvestment and 20% reinvestment), we have projected that up to 12 launches per year to the station is a possibility.

    Three aspects of the space station launch market are summarized as follows:

  • A. Space station utilization. The space station will be a major orbital facility built for the purpose of conducting high-technology experiments and development. A variety of applications are envisioned for the station to include life science, microgravity experiments, manufacturing techniques, material development, and space sciences just to name a few. These high-valued payloads require delivery to the station and return to Earth for analysis.
  • B. Launch vehicle requirements. A dependable and reliable launch system is required to deploy and resupply the station. It must provide delivery and return services for the experiment payloads, at the same time satisfying stringent payload interface requirements and late/early payload access requirements. Because of the criticality of resupplying the station, the launch system must launch reliably at up to 12 launches per year.
  • C. Launch cost reduction goals. Our assessment indicates large launch cost savings to reach the one-tenth cost goal. Additional work to reach the one one-hundredth would not result in much more cost savings, while potentially requiring very high launch system development dollars.
  • 3.4.5 Law Enforcement Introduction

    This market area covers all needs associated with communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and surveillance dictated by local, state, Federal, and international law enforcement agencies. Currently this market area only utilizes GPS for location, and standard space- and ground-based communication networks.

    U.S. plans included a dedicated capability for communication and position tracking (personnel and asset), but Justice Department studies describing this requirement are classified, and we were unable to examine them during this phase of CSTS. As a standalone market, law enforcement is small, but combined with other markets (e.g., treaty verification), it provides substantiation for growth in the communications and remote-sensing market areas. Study Approach

    A literature search was performed to determine efforts to date in utilizing space assets for law enforcement, which agencies were at the forefront in utilizing space, and to characterize and categorize worldwide law enforcement. Based on this information, telephone interviews of key personnel in several agencies were performed. Market Description

    Law enforcement space market consists of the use of space platforms/satellites to provide real-time support to individuals for tracking, communications, and surveillance. This market area would service the following customers:

    Most current capabilities are classified and were not discussed by potential customers. However, basic requirements can be derived and would be applicable to all potential customers. The Justice Department conducted the classified Constellation Interoperability Working Group (CIWG) study to determine the feasibility of utilizing dedicated space assets for all Federal law enforcement requirements.

    Options investigated include one or two geostationary satellites to provide such a service. Launch costs were expected to be $100 million; satellites in the $150 million or more range; and real-time ground support $200 million per year. Interestingly, the infrastructure costs for the extensive ground support network, not launch costs, were the tall pole in their study. Constrained budgets have put implementation on hold. Market Evaluation

    The commercial market (e.g., insurance and security) would be driven by the successful implementation of an equivalent government-sponsored system. Critical technologies would have to be proved before commercial markets could be developed. The primary driver for growth of this market for both government and commercial would be the decrease in ground infrastructure costs.

    Law enforcement can be aided by the use of space-based tracking, surveillance, and communications, but it has been hampered on a national level by constrained budgets. The required technologies are in hand, with the exception of low-cost ground-based infrastructure. Launch costs were considered of minimal impact compared to the yearly investment in ground infrastructure required. Commercial exploitation of associated technologies is not expected to occur in the near term (5 to 10 years), due almost exclusively to limited ground infrastructure. Space Application Description

    Law enforcement requires a fairly traditional set of space assets and supporting infrastructure. Communication, navigation, and remote sensing are traditional space applications, and the procedures are in place to operate them. The ground infrastructure necessary to retrieve and distribute necessary data in near real-time is not currently in place. As mentioned above, this would require a yearly investment of $200 million to operate. Market Assessment

    A cursory market analysis (without examining the Justice Department's classified mission model) indicates a requirement for no more than two satellites every 10 years (assumes a 10-year satellite life). Growth would be based on the potential synergism between domestic and international needs; however near-term requirements dictate separate, secure systems. A lower probability growth market would include commercial applications, but it is currently cost-prohibitive. Infrastructure

    As stated in Section, no changes to satellite technology are required to satisfy the needs of this market area. To fully satisfy those looking to utilize space for law enforcement, a sophisticated ground segment would be required. The cost in establishing the required ground infrastructure could be significant, and this market could not justify the required investment. Prospective Users

    A number of contacts were made with the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, and the Drug Enforcement Agency.
    In the Coast Guard they are:
  • A. Cmd. Ben Thomason, Ellington Field.
  • B. Jack McCready, Research and Development Center.
  • C. Michael Lewis, Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations.
  • D. C.W. McMahon, Operations Security Manager.
  • In U.S. Customs they are:
  • A. Patricia McCauley, District Director, U.S. Customs Service.
  • B. John Hensley, Commission for Enforcement.
  • C. M. Bower, Enforcement Support.
  • In the Drug Enforcement Agency they are:
  • A. Louis Cegala, Office of National Drug Enforcement.
  • B. Jack Mayer, Director of Operations.
  • C. Mike Horn, Technical Operations
  • . CSTS Needs and Attributes

    As stated in
    Section, there are no immediate changes required to satellites, and thus no impacts to the current launch vehicles or the process of launching satellites. As satellite technology and constellation strategies change, launch systems must evolve to meet the new requirements. Launch system requirements for this new generation of satellites is covered in appropriate market areas (i.e., communications and remote sensing). Business Opportunities

    There is a sound business opportunity if an all-up combined mobile communication, navigation, and near real-time remote-sensing network were in place. These agencies do not have significant one-time development budgets, but could afford the yearly operating costs if a proven system were available on a subscription basis. A number of efforts are under way to provide necessary space assets, but there is not a large ongoing effort to develop the immense ground infrastructure required. Conclusion and Recommendations

    Law enforcement does not require unique capabilities or space assets. It requires mobile communications tied in with GPS for location. In addition, it is desired to have both a reconnaissance and a surveillance remote-sensing capability. The primary problem is establishing the immense ground infrastructure to obtain and distribute the required information to mobile locations in near real-time.

    This market can be satisfied by space assets/constellations defined in the communications and remote-sensing market areas, and thus no independent requirements is defined in this market area. It is again important to stress that in addition to the space assets, the ground infrastructure must be developed.

    3.4.6 Human Planetary Exploration Introduction

    Exploration of both near-Earth and more distant heavenly bodies has been one of mankind's most inspired dreams for many years. Recently, NASA and the U.S. government have led several studies to help pave the way for the next steps in space exploration by man and manmade machines. Almost all exploration scenarios studied concentrated on missions to the moon and Mars exclusively, with manned involvement at various levels of activities. Whether they will occur in the near- or far-term future, many believe exploration missions are man's destiny.

    Within the context of CSTS, exploration missions to the Moon and Mars are not in the same class as other Earth missions. They command their own requirements with unique technology and capability needs from the transportation systems. These combine to make up two main characteristics that differentiate exploration missions apart from other missions.

    Unlike other commercial or revenue-generating missions, exploration missions are conducted purely for scientific and technology development reasons. As such, the missions require a large amount of cash outlay with unknown returns. The associated amount of risk is also very high, which therefore means that only government agencies can afford this type of missions. Another characteristic is the tremendous mass that must be delivered to orbit to support lunar and Mars missions.

    It is not surprising to find, as a result of the mission requirements, a launch system on the order of 250 metric ton (MT) or 550 Klb payload to orbit. Taking into consideration the technology required to travel to these planetary bodies, living and working there for an extended period of time, and coming back to Earth safely, one can see the enormous investment exploration missions call for.

    In this white paper we offer a general overview of the lunar and Mars exploration missions, discuss their top-level mission and system requirements, and provide a framework on how they can potentially benefit from a transportation system within the context of CSTS goals. We do not expect exploration missions to drive a particular vehicle design. Instead we think these missions provide a valuable backdrop for secondary considerations such as anchor tenancy or technology commonality between the eventual candidate systems. Study Approach

    Our approach was to review documented NASA studies performed in the recent past and extract appropriate information to create three baseline scenarios used in this study. The scenarios are the First Lunar Outpost (FLO), the Lunar Base, and the Lunar Base and Mars Exploration scenarios. Various NASA lunar and Mars mission alternatives were considered to create these scenarios.

    For each of these cases, we identified mass-to-orbit, number of flights, and other mission parameters. We also estimated the launch cost impact on each scenario if Earth-to-orbit (ETO) transportation could be reduced. Only the initial and steady-state missions are considered, because precursor missions are already treated in other market segments. Market Description

    The transportation market within space exploration is very much focused on satisfying the main goals of delivery of cargoes to the destinations (the Moon or Mars), and delivery of humans and their safe return to Earth. For each of these piloted and cargo missions, one can also break the transportation into two main segments for CSTS's purposes. One is the delivery of people and cargo from Earth to Earth orbit; the other is trans-lunar, trans-Earth, and near-Moon transportation.

    Although we discuss the latter to some extent, most of the analysis concentrated on ETO delivery. Figures, -2 and -3 present the annual mass to orbit for each of the three scenarios. Of this large annual mass to orbit, people account for a negligible amount and therefore do not appear in the figures. However, we stress that both manned and unmanned launch vehicles will be required to fully support exploration missions. As can be seen, exploration missions are not typical commercial, revenue-generating missions but are more suitable as national programs.

    Figure First Lunar Outpost (FLO) Projected Annual Mass to LEO

    Figure Lunar Base (LB) Projected Annual Mass to LEO

    Figure Lunar Base and Mars Exploration (LBME) Projected Annual Mass to LEO

    A brief description of the three scenarios is provided in
    Section Market Evaluation

    The three described scenarios represent levels of probability that exploration missions will occur. As shown in Figure, relatively speaking, the FLO scenario at 1.65 Mlb annual mass to orbit is defined as high probability, the LB at 2.20 Mlb is medium, and the LBME at 3.39 Mlb is low.

    Figure Level of Probability of Three Exploration Scenarios

    Obviously the scenarios are intimately tied to level of funding available. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the scenarios are created not based on funding availability, but on the amount of science the end users requested. This results in three mission models, as shown in
    Figures, -6, and -7.

    Note that for lunar piloted missions in all three scenarios, the crews are launched on the same expendable ETO system used to launch the cargoes. For the Mars missions in the LBME case, the crews must be taken to orbit by a manned ETO delivery system to meet the trans-Mars vehicle. This is appropriately shown as STS flights in Figure

    Figure FLO Annual Cargo and Crew ETO Flights

    Figure Lunar Base Annual Cargo and Crew ETO Flights

    Figure Lunar Base and Mars Mission Annual Cargo and Crew ETO Flights Space Application Description

    The following paragraphs describe the three scenarios. Our goal is to examine various levels of exploration activity, ranging from relatively simple mission requirements such as in the First Lunar Outpost (FLO) to the all-up Lunar Base and Mars Exploration (LBME) scenario. It should be pointed out that these are generic cases for study purposes and do not represent approved NASA philosophy. All scenarios call for a launch vehicle capability of 250 mT or 550,000 lb to LEO.

    First Lunar Outpost (FLO). The goal for FLO is to establish a continuing human presence on the lunar surface. Science and exploration activities will be conducted exceeding those of the Apollo programs. We expect significant return very early in the program with a limited investment strategy. Only three cargo-only flights to the Moon will be implemented to bring large payloads to the Moon's surface.

    The steady-state operations will each employ piloted missions with crews of four. Surface stay duration will be 45 days (lunar day-night-day), and revisit intervals will be every 5 to 6 months. The first cargo flight to the Moon is planned for 1999, followed by the first piloted mission in the same year. Typical mass to the surface will be 36 mT (about 79,400 lb) for either cargo and piloted mission.

    Lunar Base (LB). The Lunar Base scenario represents the next level of activity beyond the FLO. Permanent facilities on the Moon surface will be established together with lunar transportation infrastructure to support frequent missions to the Moon. Major objectives will be to build the facilities towards life-support self-sufficiency capabilities. These include breathing gases and food production, waste management for extended human presence, sufficient and comfortable living space for routine activities with limited independence from Earth, and reliable communication and video link with Earth for science and education.

    Permanent human presence on the Moon will give impressive scientific capability. Use of surface pressurized rovers and robotics assistants will extend human reach for great distances across the lunar surface. To achieve this extensive capability on the Moon, Lunar Base program will employ one cargo and one piloted flight beginning in 2004. Flight activities will step up in 2006 with one cargo and three piloted flights per year and continue at this steady-state mode throughout the time period considered in this analysis (1999 to 2030).

    Figures and -9 show generic piloted and cargo transfer vehicles with their payload configuration during trans-lunar injection (TLI). The cargo flight will be one-way, while the piloted flight includes the trans-Earth injection (TEI) stage to return the crew. The crew module will be designed to accommodate four to six people on each flight.

    Figure Generic Lunar Piloted Transfer Vehicle

    Figure Generic Lunar Cargo Transfer Vehicle

    Lunar Base and Mars Exploration (LBME). This scenario is composed of the Lunar Base case described above, plus missions to Mars beginning in 2012 with a cargo flight on a one-way trip. Once the cargo mission success has been verified, a crew of four to six people will follow on a fast transfer opposition mission in 2014. This split-sprint mission concept will be used for the rest of the Mars missions when launch opportunities arrive about every 2 years. Nuclear thermal or other advanced propulsion concepts are required to enable Mars transits.

    Figure presents the Mars cargo and piloted mission configurations. Once at Mars, mission objectives will include extensive studies and exploration of the Martian system. Emphasis will be placed on returning the significant scientific data never before obtained. Surface stay for the first human visit will be up to 100 days, while subsequent stays of up to 600 days may be possible.

    Figure One Concept of Mars Piloted and Cargo Transfer System Market Assessment

    This market calls for an on-going capability to reliably launch cargo and people to low Earth orbit (LEO). This is critical in order to support and maintain existing activities on the Moon and Mars. As such the launch market should receive very high political and scientific priority if the exploration program is actually initiated. On the down side is, again, the noncommercial nature of the market, driven again mainly by political and scientific decisions. We do not expect commercialization of exploration missions to become viable in the time period considered, nor the launch market for these missions to be profit-driven.

    The launch system requirements arrived at from this analysis will be examined within the context of commercial launch system compatibility. In other words, if it makes sense to build new launch systems that can provide economic transportation for both exploration missions and other commercial missions, then they will be identified as among the best concepts for further consideration in CSTS. Infrastructure

    For exploration missions, the total infrastructure would include telecommunication, navigation, and information management assets beside the "normal" infrastructure required by other missions, such as launch facilities, and mission control. Telecommunication assets include relay satellites, receiving stations, and other communications capabilities; navigation assets include navigation satellites and extraterrestrial control stations; and information management assets include transmitting and receiving stations, data processing center, and relay satellites.

    However, for CSTS purposes, these are treated as part of the payloads delivered to LEO. This is because the mission for the ETO launch vehicle ends at LEO, so it is a valid assumption. As a result, the Earth-based infrastructure would include only those facility assets that directly support the launch of exploration payload elements to LEO. The infrastructure to support a 550,000-lb payload would require many new facility assets. Among them are new transport capabilities (cargo planes, trucks, or barge), larger and more automated processing and checkout facilities (for larger cores, booster segments, propulsion systems and payload fairings), and larger payload processing and integration facilities (larger payload in terms of mass and volume).

    Furthermore, new launch facilities must be built for these launch systems to maintain a combined crew and cargo launch rate of 6 per year (FLO), 7 per year (LB) and up to 12 per year (LBME). Other more specialized facilities unique to exploration missions are crew training and mission simulation facilities, expanded mission control, communications, and data management centers. Prospective Users

    Our input came mainly from NASA documentation. There was not enough time available for specific user contact and interview. Again we expect that the U.S. government and its agencies, together with other nations' government agencies, to be the only users. CSTS Needs and Attributes Transportation Systems Characteristics

    Our analysis shows the following as the most important characteristics for exploration missions ETO transportation systems. They are divided into manned and cargo system characteristics. An actual system design, when it is time to be considered, may include a mix of these characteristics for cost savings through system commonality.

    Manned ETO delivery and return system. Crew delivery to orbit and return to Earth require highly reliable vehicles. Further studies have indicated additional features such as crew escape and abort capabilities to ensure crew safety at all segments of the ETO mission. The system must be available for scheduled launches, with contingent launch-on-demand for emergency situations. An upgraded space shuttle may provide for these capabilities in the near term. However, for steady-state exploration activities, a much more robust and dependable system must be built. Since most cargoes will be launched by the heavy lift booster (discussed below), the crew delivery and return system can have only small payload capability.

    Again the emphasis for this system should be on reliability, dependability, and availability. Crew launches range from three per year for the FLO scenario to three to four per year for the LBME scenario (see Figure

    Cargo ETO delivery system. As described in Section, an ETO launch system of 250 MT or 550 Klb payload and a usable fairing size of 25 by 60 ft could satisfy all the three scenarios examined. The main differences are in the launch schedules, which range from three cargo ETO launches per year for FLO up to nine per year for the LBME case. It should be pointed out that this is based on the lunar and Mars vehicles shown in this report; any other vehicle design would require different launch booster. Figure shows both lunar and Mars launch vehicles.

    Figure Summary of ETO Flights

    Figure Generic Lunar and Mars Class ETO Launch Systems Ground Segment

    All existing facilities (e.g., at Eastern Test Range) are expected to be fully utilized to support exploration missions. Many of the Shuttle facilities were actually upgraded Saturn facilities, so it should be no surprise that existing facilities will be modified for lunar and Mars mission support. However, since very large launch systems and payloads will have to be accommodated, we expect some major work to be done to the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB), the launch pad, the Payload Processing Facility (PPF), and so forth.

    Other totally new facility elements may have to be built. These include integration facilities for the larger core and booster segments, integration facilities for the lunar and Mars payloads (including for the possible use of nuclear engine in the Mars Transfer Vehicle), and the Mobile Launch Transporter, which is necessary for transport the vehicle stack from the assembly building to the launch pad. Detailed analysis of the ground segment requirements and their cost has not been performed in this analysis. However, we expect them to take a major cost portion of the exploration program. User/Transportation Interfaces

    There are standard interfaces for both manned and unmanned cargoes. The lunar and Mars payloads are not expected to require any added services from the launch vehicles compared to existing scientific payloads. The standard fluid, data, power, and environmental services will all be provided by the launch system. Those payloads to be flown on the cargo or piloted flights leaving Earth are expected to be similar in physical characteristics. The astronauts are to be launched either with their cargoes (as in the FLO scenario) or separately to LEO by a manned launch vehicle. Improvements Over Current

    Because of the inherent requirements of manned exploration missions, the launch systems must be designed to have higher launch rate, more dependable and reliable performance, and higher mass to orbit capability. This alone makes the new system a great technological improvement over existing systems. It is a much different story when it comes to system costs, since there is nothing to compare the new system to, as existing systems are not in the same class as lunar and Mars launch systems; our largest existing booster (the Titan IV) is rated at 40,000 lb to LEO. This is not even 10% of the performance required for exploration missions (550,000 lb to LEO).

    Our findings indicate that reducing launch cost does not necessarily impact the whole exploration program in any major way. This is because in a program as big, expensive, and high-risk as the exploration missions, the most important issues are those related to ETO, transfer and lander vehicle system performance, crew safety, amount of science returns, and total mission success. In this instance ETO launch costs are of secondary importance. Therefore we think, for exploration missions, cost improvements over current assets are not applicable. Management and Policy

    As mentioned previously, lunar and Mars missions are expected to be mainly a government program. There may be joint efforts between partnering governments, and it is very unlikely to become a commercial operation involving profit-driven missions and operators. We also think that such missions will very likely require top priority in government programs once the program reaches steady state. This is to ensure continued mission and crew support on the Moon and Mars. Technological challenges aside, the most important factor that will make exploration missions possible may be commitment for long-term and stable funding. Without this policy, technological breakthroughs alone won't take people off planet Earth. Business Opportunities Cost Sensitivities

    As explained throughout this paper, we think exploration missions are somewhat insensitive to ETO launch costs. In other words, payloads delivered to the Moon and Mars serve specific scientific goals that are independent of ETO launch costs. For example, the FLO program is based on technological constraints that resulted in planned revisits every 6 months with a 45-day stay time per sortie. In addition, the surface payload is driven by the level of activities defined for the scenario, which is again independent of ETO launch costs.

    For Mars missions we have similar mission definitions that govern the mass delivered to the Martian surface. On top of this there are only specific launch opportunities to launch to Mars. Large ETO launch cost reduction (as shown in Fig. does not directly improve launch opportunities. Rather it may enable larger ETO payloads (larger transfer vehicles, more propellant, etc.) which allows larger mass delivered to the destination, a consideration that has not been addressed in the present analysis.

    Figure Per-Launch Cost Goals for Lunar and Mars ETO Systems Programmatics

    Figure shows the launch schedules for the three scenarios. Included are both the planetary mission schedules and their associated ETO support flights. Note that these schedules represent steady-state operations and do not include precursor missions, which will be necessary for establishing landing sites and other mission parameters.

    We have identified three main issues that will make or break any one of these exploration programs. The problem is not in the lack of interests or goals. Rather, the issues are:

  • A. Political support. Political support is one of the biggest hurdles before an exploration program can take shape. With the high-cost, high-risk characteristics associated with lunar and Mars missions, decision-makers will not approve such programs.
  • B. Technology development. Advanced technologies such as in propulsion, environmental, and control systems must be developed. Many technology areas-too numerous to mention-here have been identified as providing both enabling and enhancing capabilities. Most of them must be available in the aggressive timeframe called for.
  • C. Funding. Both of the above-mentioned issues are related to the question of whether or not money is available for such project. In fact all issues come right back to this one issue, for with enough funding many technological and political problems can be overcome.

  • Figure Launch Schedules of the Three Scenarios Conclusion and Recommendations

    Exploration missions push the ETO launch requirements above and beyond any existing capability. It is expected that all new systems must be built to carry out these missions. Existing Earth ground facilities are expected to contribute to the infrastructure required to support exploration missions with appropriate modifications.

    In summary, exploration missions are mainly government missions with heavy emphasis on science and technology development together with manned activities in space and on the moon and Mars. They do not lend themselves readily to commercial applications, nor do they provide for a viable commercial launch market. Findings on transportation requirements for this market segment should not be used as a standalone blueprint for a future launch system. Rather they should be considered as secondary design requirements after more realistic near-term missions.

    3.4.7 Asteroid Detection/Negation Introduction/Statement of Problem

    Within the past few years, there has been a general increase in awareness (by astronomers and by the general public) of the potential threat to Earth from the impact of extraterrestrial bodies. There have been proposals for large efforts to detect and defend against "Dinosaur Killer Comet Impacts." A more probable scenario is a continuing effort for the ground detection of these objects, with some possible future space-based detection efforts. No short-term defense measures are likely to be undertaken, unless there is a specific hazard detected.

    In the year 1800, the first of a new class of objects was discovered, Ceres, which was termed an "asteroid." There are now more than 30 asteroids known with diameters between 200 km and the 940-km diameter of Ceres; one of these, Chiron, was discovered as recently as 1977. There are more than 4,000 smaller asteroids we know enough about to justify assigning a number to them. At first, asteroids attracted little attention; they were small, and far away, between Mars and Jupiter, and they seemed to have little practical effect, except for occasionally streaking an astronomical plate. Though there has been only minimal effort at deliberately finding asteroids, not only is the number of discoveries increasing, but the rate of discovery is accelerating.

    In 1976 an unusual asteroid (named Aten) was discovered that has a mean distance from the Sun less than that of the Earth. In ordinary scale illustrations, it is impossible to distinguish Aten's orbit from that of the Earth; fortunately, it has a somewhat different inclination from ours. In the intervening years, a total of a dozen Aten class (mean distance less than Earth) asteroids have been discovered, despite the difficulty of observing them (most asteroids are discovered when they are near opposition, the point directly away from the Sun as viewed from Earth).

    As new discoveries of asteroids were made, not only did they come closer to Earth, but they expanded in other directions as well, further away from the sun. Chiron, for example, is always beyond the orbit of Saturn. It was further found that asteroids overlapped with a number of other previously known phenomena. It is now recognized that asteroids are merely another manifestation of the same class of objects as most meteors and meteorites, and that they also are not clearly distinguishable from comets, which are another class of "minor members" of the solar system. Comets are thought of as being "dirty snowballs" in very eccentric orbits, and being characterized by a tail.

    "Typical" asteroids are stony or metallic and are located between Mars and Jupiter. It is now known that there is considerable overlap, and some "asteroids" are comet cores, which have lost most of their volatiles, and both comets and asteroids can be in a much wider range of orbits than was previously recognized. It has also become recognized that impact craters, far from being rare, are a distinctive and common feature of nearly every body in the solar system, including the Earth. Much publicity has been associated with the theory that a large event approximately 65 million years ago was responsible for widespread environmental change on the Earth and massive extinctions, including the dinosaurs. There are more than 100 features on Earth that are recognized as impact craters.

    This is a small number compared to the Moon, for example, due to atmospheric shielding, and weathering, but it is sufficient to make it reasonable to assume that the impact rates are similar for Earth as for other planets.

    There are still many uncertainties in the hazard that impacts of the Earth by comets and asteroids represent, and even greater uncertainty with the specifics of mitigating such potential impacts, by deflection, for example. Though no one is definitely known to have been killed by the impact of any extraterrestrial object, it has been calculated that averaged over a long period of time, these objects could be responsible for more deaths than commercial airplane accidents.

    The hazard can be considered in two parts; local events (resulting in one to many fatalities in a relatively confined region), and global events (potentially killing most or all humans and resulting in the extinction of many species). There is considerable disagreement about the relative risks of events of various sizes. Everyone agrees that the effects of a global event are of great concern, the ultimate catastrophe. Estimates of the size of object which would cause such an event range from less than a kilometer to no more than 10 kilometers.

    It is likely, based on a number of sources of data, that a 2-kilometer object (with an equivalent yield of about 1 million tons of TNT), should impact the Earth about once every million years. An impact of this size is roughly in the middle range of estimates of global extinction events. Since the number of known extinction events is much lower than that, we may be due for a run of bad luck. There are a number of known asteroids of considerably larger sizes than is required for global extinction events.

    It is known that while none of the very large asteroids are in orbits that can impact Earth in the space of a few centuries, some, such as Chiron, are in potentially unstable orbits that could have potential for Earth impact in relatively short time periods. In addition, there are many objects much farther out from the Sun than the known asteroids (e.g., long-period comets), and so far as the present state of knowledge is concerned, the size of these objects is not bounded. Very small-size impactors are very common, and do little or no damage. They are also difficult, if not impossible, to detect very much before impact, and therefore are essentially impossible to defend against.

    The largest impact in this century, at Tungusha in 1908, is now believed to have been a very ordinary chunk of stony asteroid, probably about 50 meters in diameter with a yield of perhaps 10 megatons, sufficient to destroy all the buildings in a 25-km radius (large enough to destroy a city the size of Los Angeles). Note that this size is well below the threshold that experts think can be detected or defended against.

    However, the odds of the impact occurring in a heavily populated area are small (the actual Tungusha is not known to have resulted in any fatalities, and there is some evidence that the Earth is impacted by one "Hiroshima" size object every year, but few are noticed). The best estimate is that on the average an impact of that size would "only" kill 5,000 people (those in a 20-km radius). It is estimated that the recurrence interval for Tungusha-size events is about 300 years. Some estimates are that the odds of a major U.S. population center being hit by a Tungusha-size event are so low that all of them will be destroyed by a larger event, all at once, before any one of them is destroyed by an impact this size.

    Currently the most infamous event is the "KT boundary impact" (dinosaur extinction theory) which is thought to have been approximately 10 kilometers in diameter, with a yield of around 108 megatons! Events of that size are predicted to occur about once every 10 million years, which could indicate that some have occurred and were not noticed, or that some are missing. It is this size object, or a bit smaller, that would be most likely to be detected in time for defensive action, and for which a defense would be technologically possible, in the foreseeable future.

    At the upper limit of impact size, there is a very small (but not zero) possibility, of a very large-sized long-period object, one that has never (or at least not in the last several millennia) entered the inner solar system, appearing "over the celestial horizon" at any moment; if it were on an collision trajectory, it would be only a few months from impact. Long-period comets can enter the solar system in such a way that they are always near the Sun, from an Earth perspective, and therefore may never be visible until very shortly before they impact Earth. Such an object might not be deflectable by nuclear devices, even ones that are many orders of magnitude greater in yield than any which have yet been constructed.

    This is true even if very large nuclear devices were instantly available for launch, and even if the launch vehicle had performance far in excess of any present system. In other words, the worst possible scenario is not preventable with present (or even presently foreseeable) technology.

    In the mid sizes, around 1 kilometer, deflection might be possible with systems that could be available on notice of a few years (if the deflection can be made years in advance, very small velocity changes are sufficient to cause safe misses). The most probable class of impactor in the 1-km size range is a "near Earth" asteroid. It has been estimated, based on several approaches, including the size distribution of larger asteroids, that only 5% of the potentially species-threatening 1-km-diameter objects have been observed.

    Another hazard posed by asteroid/comet impacts is the possibility of mistaking the airburst of a small object for a nuclear attack. On October 1, 1990, DOD sensors detected a 40-kiloton explosion over the southern Pacific Ocean. Had the object exploded not in the south Pacific but over the Middle East, it could have been mistaken for a nuclear attack. For this reason it is of interest to catalog even the smaller objects. Study Approach

    Options for detection and negation were discussed with experts in the field to ascertain the rough parameters and launch rates of probable space-based assets. Market Description Description Market Evaluation

    One class of objects that are a potential major threat, and which are difficult to find by ground search are the Aten class asteroids. These are Earth-crossing asteroids that have mean orbits inside that of Earth. Since the most effective way of observing asteroids is by looking directly away from the Sun, and since the Atens are usually between the Earth and the Sun, they are very difficult to observe.

    The first was found in 1976 and there are only about a dozen known, but due to the bias in the observing techniques, there could be many more, any of which could be a potential impactor, very likely from "out of the Sun," a direction from which even a large object might not be observed before impact.

    It has been proposed that a very suitable location for a space-based optical asteroid detection system would be in orbit around Venus. From that location, it would be in an ideal location to observe asteroids in the vicinity of Earth, and would also benefit from the shadow of Venus when observing "at opposition" (away from the Sun.)

    Additional optical systems would possibly be advantageous at other points in space. The Earth-Sun system Lagrange point, L1 (the "interior" or "halo orbit point") has been suggested. L4 and/or L5 of the Earth Sun system or L3 of the Venus-Sun system (the "anti Venus" point) might also be candidates. Some of these locations might be especially valuable for detecting long-period comets on Earth-impacting trajectories that are too difficult to see from Earth because the viewing angle is always too close to the Sun.

    Since advance warning is of the utmost importance with these objects, it will likely be considered worthwhile to investigate detection methods, other than optical. One such technique that has been proposed is that of radio waves ("Alfven Waves") caused by the flow of the solar wind over any impermeable object. These waves are of low frequency and do not penetrate the Earth's ionosphere.

    Although suggestions have been made that the international community should immediately adopt a program that would include very ambitious programs in deflection devices, and very advanced "Orion" type propulsion systems to deliver them, others have expressed the concern that such a program, and the problems of control of devices that are very similar to weapons that could be used against more conventional terrestrial targets, would be a greater hazard than the extraterrestrial threat they are designed to meet.

    At some point, possibly in 5 years to two decades, there may be sufficient interest to justify one to four space-based optical systems, which would possibly be of the Hubble (2.4-meter aperture) class, or slightly less (say 1 to 2 meters aperture). These would be placed in locations, probably at or inside the Earth's orbit, with large average circumferential displacements (to minimize "blind spots") being desirable. Venus orbit is probably the most likely location for a first deployment. These observatories would require probably no more than one equivalent shuttle launch each, and would likely be distributed over a span of a decade to put in place. Maintenance is unlikely, and some eventual replacement of failed systems would be expected to be required.

    Subsequently, systems using other advanced detection techniques, such as radio waves, might be deployed. These would likely be deployed no sooner than 5 years after the first of the optical observatories, and probably at no higher launch rate (say one every other year for 10 years) .

    It seems very unlikely that any pre-positioned, Earth-based, or space-based deflection devices or delivery systems would be deployed prior to the development and deployment of significant space-based detection systems. If a threat were to be detected by the detection systems, then the development of deflection devices, and deployment systems could be expected to proceed with high priority.

    The most likely scenario for actually deflecting an incoming object is thought to be that we will have years or decades of warning. An object will be discovered to have an orbit that will evolve into a collision course only after several subsequent orbits. These objects will be able to be studied by precursor missions to determine the best way to deal with them. Most likely, they will be able to be diverted at their perihelion by Delta-V's of only cm's/s. For a 1-km-sized object, this translates to only modest power requirements (dependent on the physical properties but likely no more than a few kilotons on the high side). These can be met by chemical rockets and conventional explosives, although the larger objects would require nuclear bursts.

    Leadtimes on the order of only a year or two pose much greater difficulty. High-energy upper stages (well out of scope for other CSTS missions) and high-energy explosives would be required to divert such an object.

    Leadtimes of only weeks or days would leave very few options. Only incredibly powerful space-based defenses could hope to avert disaster and such attempts are not given a very high probability of success. Although with sufficient radar data, the object's entry can be modeled and an impact point be estimated, contact binaries make the accuracy of such modeling even lower than it currently is. Therefore, evacuation may not be very efficient. The possibility may exist to divert the object to a less populated region, although the political implications are not very savory. Also, if a mistake were made, the new impact site could result in more damage than if the object's course not been altered. Newly available data from DOD sensors that record several airbursts per year may make modeling of the entry of impactors more accurate in the future.

    If an object large enough to cause a global catastrophe is detected only days or weeks out, an attempt may be made to fracture the object, even if it meant there would now be several (albeit smaller) pieces. It would certainly seem desirable to reduce the threat from a global one that threatens civilization to a few regional ones.

    Figure is an example of the increasing difficulty of dealing with short warnings. This figure assumed a near-Earth object (NEO) 2 km across. The body is assumed to have been fractured in half. The energy shown is that required to impart sufficient Delta-V to both halves so that they miss Earth, assuming interception occurs at the specified range. Although no estimate is made of the energy required to fracture the object in half, it should be noted that such energy may actually be quite small if the phenomenon of contact binaries turns out to be the rule rather than the exception, as newly discovered evidence seems to indicate.

    Actual scenarios for diversion are also greatly varied. Concepts involving explosives include surface bursts, standoff bursts, and subsurface bursts. Surface bursts seem to be the best. The explosive vaporizes material in the formation of the crater and the ejecta provides the impulse to divert the offending object. A standoff burst would be used for an object like a comet that it was feared could fracture into several lethal pieces. Such a burst would use the neutrons to heat a surface region and blow off material for impulse.

    However, such an explosion would likely have to be two orders of magnitude greater than a surface burst imparting an equal impulse. Subsurface bursts would require penetrators that could be prohibitively large depending upon the desired depth and size of the explosive device. Also, some physical knowledge of the object would be required, depending upon if the desire was to simply deliver an explosive just deep enough to blow more material off than a surface burst or if the penetrator is aiming for the center of mass in an attempt to destroy as much of the object as possible.

    With increasing leadtime come increasing options. Some more exotic proposals include laser deflection, solar sailing, mass drivers, rail guns, and mining. These all require considerable development.

    Figure Interception Range Versus Explosive Energy Market Evaluation

    Before considering any defensive measures, potential threats must be detected. Various detection methods have been investigated, and a proposal made for an Earth-based system that would quickly detect most of the 1-km size, Earth-approaching objects. The full system would cost $50 million, a very small cost in terms of any possible near-term space-based system. This system would consist of six telescopes of 2- to 3-meter aperture with advanced charge-coupled device (CCD) detector arrays, and associated computers.

    Technology advances in computers, electronic devices, and telescope construction will probably ensure that much of the proposed program for ground-based systems will be accomplished, regardless of the level of support by any particular government. This is an area in which many nations, and even nongovernmental organizations and individuals, can make contributions. It has been estimated that there are hundreds to thousands of objects in this class that are already recorded on existing telescopic survey plates and which require only scanning and computer analysis for discovery.

    However, in 5 to 20 years, it is thought that a point of diminishing returns will have been reached for ground-based search techniques. At that point, space-based systems would be more cost effective at searching space without interference from our atmosphere. Market Assessment

    Initial market assessment can be based on the results of an NEO detection workshop The summary of the workshop presented a plan for increasing the detection of NEOs. The proposal called for the construction of six 2- to 3-meter aperture ground-based telescopes, three in each hemisphere. Within 25 years, the system (Spaceguard) should detect virtually all the near-Earth asteroids (NEA) 1 km and larger. This size was somewhat arbitrarily chosen as the threshold at which an impact had global repercussions. Hundreds of thousands of smaller size NEAs (these included short-period but not long-period comets) would also be detected.

    The cost of such systems, deemed adequate for detecting virtually all threats except long-period comets, has been estimated at $50 million for capital and $10 to $15 million operating costs. Because of the international nature of the problem, the committee assumed a U.S. budget of $16 million for two of the six telescopes, $2 million for the operations center, and operating costs of $5 million per year.

    The requirements for space-based telescopes were not defined in the workshop and are not really defined anywhere, but some inferences can be made from the recommendations for ground-based telescopes. Any space-based telescope that is more than a few (less than 10) light minutes (round-trip time) from Earth would need to have the computing capability to autonomously process all the data it collects. This is because a larger portion of the sky must be scanned, since fewer telescopes would probably be built. The onboard computers must have the capability to analyze the CCD images for moving images and identify nonstellar objects.

    After several scans, ephemeric data must be produced and compared to the database of known objects. Anything that may pose a threat to Earth must be instantly relayed to ground controllers. All data would ultimately be desirable, as they would augment existing databases. A telescope near Venus or Mercury designed to spot Atens could have a relatively short design life if it were designed to detect most of the Atens in a short period of time. However, because long-period comets usually make only one appearance, the telescopes used to detect them must have long lives and be continually replaced. This is because the threat from new long-period comets is constant. Support and replacement missions would be necessary for such devices.

    Despite the fact that long-period comets are estimated to be 25% of the threat, it is doubtful that extensive space-based detection systems will be advocated or funded in the near future. The currently proposed ground-based Spaceguard system should provide adequate detection for global-catastrophe- sized objects well into the next decade, and has an even chance of detecting the next "Tungusha" sized object as well.

    For a rough estimate, it is assumed that one 30,000 lbm-LEO equivalent payload is launched every 5 years. Market Infrastructure

    There will be some interface with tracking and data collection sites, such as the Deep Space Network. In addition to scheduled launches of detection platforms, there may be the occasional unscheduled (short callup) launch to investigate and/or deflect a threatening object, requiring some flexibility at the launch site. Prospective Users

    Although the initial space-based system is not too expensive, the customers will still be a government or governments, perhaps in the form of the United Nations. Of course, asteroid impacts are a global concern, and perhaps all nations could contribute proportionally. It has been suggested that insurance companies may be interested, but the cost of a deflection/negation system would probably be so huge that only governments could afford it.

    In preparation of the technical aspects of this market segment, contacts were made with Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of Planetary Sciences at the University of Arizona. CSTS Needs and Attributes Transportation System Characteristics

    Emplacement of the space-based emplacement assets is within the technology and size of today's launch vehicles. Scheduling is somewhat flexible, although missing a window could degrade the integrity of the sensor constellation. Reusable upper stages are probably not realistic, given the location of the assets.

    No estimate is made here for the size or capability of the transportation system associated with deflection/negation. Transportation System Capabilities

    For detection concepts, including optical platforms up to the Hubble Space Telescope class, the Delta-Vs to get to the anti-Venus point is approximately 11 km/s. Ground Handling

    For space-based sensor systems, no unique ground facilities are contemplated. If one considers active deflection/negation flights, there will be a considerable quantity of high explosives, propellants, or nuclear weaponry integrated at the launch site. User/Space Transportation Interfaces

    Interfaces would look like any other interplanetary payload with an expendable upper stage. Improvements Over Current

    For the initial detection phase, current performance, reliability, and cost would be acceptable. Negation missions would require very high reliability, as there would be only one "shot" to perform the mission. Business Opportunities Cost Sensitivities

    No cost analysis was performed as relates to the cost of transportation. It is suspected that, if some governments undertake such a project, the market is inelastic to launch cost. Programmatics

    The timing of this market segment will be driven by the public's perceived need for such a system; it is not technology driven in the observation/detection phase. Negation missions are so variable in their size and complexity that there is no way to credibly estimate programmatic requirements. Conclusions and Recommendations

    A wide variety of opportunities exist for CSTS from asteroid detection/negation scenarios, although none are likely to be funded by the U.S. Government in the near term. They range from missions achievable with current or near-term technologies to those requiring years of development. The most likely customers are governments, although certainly not limited to the U.S. Government.

    Other countries have stakes in detection and deflection as well, since the threat is global in nature, although few countries are equipped to deal with them alone. In any event, asteroid detection/negation is not a driver mission for a new commercial vehicle.

    3.4.8 Emerging Nations Missions Introduction/Statement of Problem

    This section describes the market for space launch services of emerging nations. Emerging nations include those countries that are rapidly moving away from undeveloped status towards industrialization, for example, South Africa, South Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan. This market postulates that these nations will create a demand for space launch services as they reach industrialized status. Study Approach

    Our approach started with an identification of nations with a growing industrial base and space activities either in the formative stages, or in operation. However, many of these activities are redundant to other market areas like remote sensing, communications, and space science. After review of these redundant areas it was determined that there were no separate and distinguishable missions in this market.

    A few countries were assessed as having indpendent space transportation programs. These market areas were not addressable CSTS markets for a new, low-cost space transportation system, since these space transportation programs are not driven by economic factors. Space transportation developments in these nations appear to be driven by national pride and prestige, and military considerations more than economics. All of the potential missions from these countries are covered in the other market areas. Conclusions and Recommendations

    Since we could not find missions for this market area that were not covered by another market area it is recommended that this market be defocused. The reader should refer to the functional market area for a discussion on the contribution of emerging nation missions to the entire demand.

    3.4.9 Space Science Outwards Introduction/Statement of Problem

    Scenario (Launch Control commentary):

    . . . four . . , three . . , two . . , one . . , we have liftoff! ! ! We have liftoff of Erudition 1 with its payload, Parhelion I spacecraft! This launch marks the maiden flight of the Erudition launch vehicle! A new era in space science research has dawned! Erudition, the new and astoundingly low-cost space launch vehicle for small-sat class payloads, is streaking heavenward with seeming indifference!

    . . . At 25 seconds into the flight, Erudition's main engine is burning well. Parhelion I is the first in a series of six University of Academia/General American Astronautics (UA/GAA) contracted research science missions that will fly graduate student projects aboard Erudition launch vehicles over the next 2 years. The objectives of the Parhelion missions are to increase man's knowledge of our nearest stellar neighbor and to increase awareness of our dependence upon the Sun, whose strong gravity pull maintains the orbit of Planet Earth and whose radiation energy flux maintains all chemical reactions, including life itself.

    . . . At 1 minute 15 seconds into the flight, Erudition is approaching maximum dynamic pressure, or Max. Q. UA students, responsible for development and operation of the spacecraft, report that the telemetry data indicate that all flight parameters are nominal. Erudition 1 continues to burn well.

    Erudition is lifting the Parhelion I spacecraft into a low Earth orbit, where the spacecraft's upper stage will take over and inject the satellite into a heliocentric orbit. Parhelion I will employ a new guidance and navigation software package developed by graduate student John.

    . . . At 5 minutes and 30 seconds into the flight, everything still looks very good! All planned events to this point in the flight have happened right on time!

    Erudition's low cost and service-oriented philosophy have universities and contractors scrambling to convert their newfound launch cost and schedule savings into additional missions.

    For the purposes of this research we have defined space science outwards (SSO) as any mission with a scientific focus on celestial bodies (other than Earth) and on space physics. This includes missions whose goal it is to advance knowledge in the areas of:

  • A. Astronomy.
  • B. Solar/space physics.
  • C. Unmanned planetary exploration.
  • D. Celestial/orbital mechanics.
  • E. Near Earth objects.
  • Other space science areas such as remote sensing, space technology demonstrations, space manufacturing/processing, microgravity research, and life sciences are covered under other market segments.

    The purpose of SSO missions is to conduct pure scientific research to increase mankind's understanding of the universe in which we live. In principle, the opportunities for SSO missions are unlimited because the science content of the universe is unbounded (at least from mankind's current perspective).

    However, these missions are not commercial in nature and as such do not produce immediate sources of revenue for companies to exploit for profit. Funding for SSO missions is normally dependent upon federal governments and, to a much smaller extent, local governments (for example, states) and personal grants. Our analysis approach will account for the budget limitations imposed by the finite nature of tax revenues and competition for those funds. Study Approach

    Our approach to understanding the SSO demand elasticity as a function of launch vehicle costs is presented in figure The methodology was composed of five primary steps. They are described below.

    Figure Space Science Outwards (SSO) Study Methodology

    Step 1
    Identify Global Space Science Annual Budgets. Understanding the current expenditures in this area will establish the bounds from which we may extrapolate, based upon existing trends, to provide future projections.

    Step 2
    Identify Space Science Missions. This step produces a database of historic space science payloads. Included in the database will be the programmatic name, destination, payload size/mass, and flight dates. From this database we can construct general classes of missions and we can incorporate more recent trends to define the market payloads and launch vehicle requirements.

    Step 3
    Identify Varying Levels of Space Activities and Associated Budgets. Since these missions are dependent upon federal government sources of funding, we need to establish budget allocation estimates for the varying probabilities of space science activities.

    Step 4
    Calculate Number of Missions Based Upon Funding Levels With Launch Cost Savings. The number of missions demanded for each class of space science payload are based upon the amount of available funding minus the cost to develop, launch, and operate the payloads (see
    Fig. If the cost of launches were to be reduced then more missions could be flown for the same amount of money (contingent upon budget availability for more development and operations).

    Step 5
    Create Elasticity Curves. Based upon the knowledge of the budgetary limitations, the space science payload costs (development, operations, and launch), and an assumed reduction in launch costs, we can calculate the affordability of new missions and hence the increase in demand for launch services.

    Figure Budget wedges resulting from launch cost reductions can be applied toward additional space science missions. Market Description

    The Market Description section is separated into four subsections: Market Description, Market Evaluation, Market Assessment, and Market Infrastructure. The Market Description subsection will identify the SSO budget environment and the types of payloads flown. The Market Evaluation subsection will formulate scenarios of varying probability to which the budget projections and payload classes will be applied, in the Market Assessment subsection, to generate elasticity of demand curves. The Market Infrastructure will discuss the operational and organizational relationships characteristic of this market. Market Description

    Space Science Budgets. Given the current economic environment, any increase in space science mission activity can be realized only by using existing funds in a more productive manner. Ways to increase the scientific return given fixed or shrinking budgets include:
  • A. Encouraging more cooperative or joint programs (i.e., between universities, industry, and countries).
  • B. Reducing spacecraft costs.
  • C. Reducing launch costs.
  • D. Reducing spacecraft operations costs.
  • This study will examine the potential for increasing mission activity for the space science outwards market segment through launch cost reductions. Thus, given that current budgets will not likely expand, the savings derived from launch cost reductions could be reinvested into additional missions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand what is being spent on space science missions today.

    Utilizing various sources (shown), we have compiled a list of global space agency expenditures and the portion of that budget spent on space science (see Figure This table shows that the global space expenditures exceed $26 billion per year. Approximately 12% of that is allocated to space science efforts ($3 billion). The primary driver for this analysis is, of course the United States, which accounts for more than 56% of the total space expenditures (excluding military efforts) and 60% of space science.

    Figure Global Space Budget and Space Science Expenditures by Nation

    The following ground rules and assumptions were used to develop the global space agency and space science expenditures:
  • A. Only civil programs were accounted for (i.e., no military space programs).
  • B. An attempt was made to separate out ESA contributions from independent operations; however, many sources conflicted or were confusing on this subject. As will be explained in the next section (Market Evaluation) this does not impact the low- or medium-probability cases.
  • C. CIS activities were based upon a published exchange rate of $0.00085/ruble (Space News, November 15-28, 1993). The level of activity (i.e., payloads, launches, mass to orbit) in CIS does not compare to other countries with the same level of expenditures.
  • D. Some sources did not provide programmatic breakdowns for all countries. Where information was available, it was noted. When confronted with no further information one of two groundrules was selected: (1) For countries with significant and recognizable independent space science efforts, 10% of the annual space agency expenditures were used for the space science, or (2) for countries without significant independent space science efforts, 1% of the annual space agency expenditures were used for the space science.
  • Space Science Missions. The research into current and historic space science payloads has resulted in the identification of three generalized classes of spacecraft (based upon development cost and payload mass). These three classes are Flagship, Discovery, and Small-Sat. Figure shows the approximate grouping of these payloads into their respective classes. Figure shows the same data in a more readable format.

    Figure Space Science Satellite Groupings

    Figure Satellite Weight and Cost Data

    The data in
    figures and -3 are a small subset of the data gathered and analyzed. These items were selected because they most closely correlated with the current or planned programmatic trends. An output of the raw data spreadsheet has been appended to into section for reference. This database has over 90 entries. While concentrating primarily on space science satellites, data were also included for a few communications and Earth-observation satellites for comparison purposes.

    The original intent was to be able to develop a weight-based cost estimating relationship (CER) from the satellite data that could be used to predict costs for future payloads in the various mission scenarios. However, the regression analysis indicated that there is little correlation between weight and cost on the selected satellites, or in other words, weight is not a very good parameter to use in creating estimates of the cost for space science spacecraft.

    This may not be surprising due to the unique nature of these missions (infrequent missions, nonstandard instruments, inhospitable environments, long duration, etc.) and since past programs have always had "meeting the science objectives" as their number one goal. A greater correlation may exist between the type of mission (e.g., astronomy, planetary orbiter, planetary lander); however, it would be more difficult to project the flight frequency and mission capture with that type of a characterization.

    Flagship Class. This class of space science program includes large LEO observatories or large interplanetary type missions. They usually require a Titan IV or shuttle launch (approximately 40,000 lb LEO equivalent). The interplanetary missions require the use of an upper stage, which has to be included in the LEO equivalent performance and the spacecraft cost assumption. Based upon the space science payload database we have assumed the following:

  • A. Development cost $1,500 million
  • B. Launch cost $500 million
  • C. Operations cost $100 million
  • A few examples of these Flagship class missions are the Hubble Space Telescope, Magellan, and Mars Observer. Recent history has shown that the flight rate for such missions is approximately one every 3 years.

    Discovery Class. Discovery class missions are a new philosophy to space science research. The programmatic ground rules for such missions are 3-year developments and costs of no more than $150 million including launch costs. The current Discovery missions are MESUR and NEAR, although there have been similar classes of missions in the past (without the new programmatic ground rules). These missions can be launched on a Delta or Atlas vehicle. These payloads typically fall within the 10,000- to 15,000-lb range, LEO equivalent. Using the new programmatic ground rules we have assumed the following:

  • A. Development cost $80 million
  • B. Launch cost $50 million
  • C. Operations cost $20 million
  • Currently, two flights every 3 years are planned.

    Smallsat Class. These missions are launched on a Pegasus class launch vehicles. These payloads are in the range of 1,000 lb or less, LEO equivalent. Based upon the space science payload database we have assumed the following:

  • A. Development cost $20 million
  • B. Launch cost $20 million
  • C. Operations cost $5 million
  • Examples of Smallsat class missions are Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer (FAST) and Small Explorer (SMEX). Currently, the planned flight rate for Smallsat missions is three or four per year. Market Evaluation

    Our desire to understand the universe and our place in it will ensure a constant flow of ideas for potential space science missions. However, because there is no immediate gain in terms of commercial revenues, this market segment is constrained to operate within a government-allocated budget. As was shown previously in Figure, of its nearly $15 billion budget, the United States currently spends approximately $2 billion (excludes $1 billion for shuttle-based spacelabs and general overhead expenses) in the space science area. In addition, international space agencies spend approximately $1 billion on SSO missions.

    Based on our research and discussions with potential space science users of a new commercial space transportation system, we have projected three possible future budget scenarios. They have also been rated as to their probability of occurrence using the standard CSTS approach (high, medium, or low). The economic forecasts for the SSO market with their associated probabilities of occurrence are:

    ScenarioU.S. Activity LevelProbabilityBudget

    Scenario 1 - The projection for this scenario assumes a decrease in science emphasis over current U.S. SSO levels of activity, from $2 billion to $1 billion. This is considered a low U.S. capture scenario and may be realistic considering budget constraints and a seemingly greater emphasis on technologies that have a dual use (government and commercial). This scenario was purposely developed to be extremely conservative and is therefore deemed to have a very high probability of occurrence (90% or more).

    Scenario 2 - This scenario assumes the U.S. will maintain its current level of space science activity, approximately $2 billion per year. This is considered to be medium probability of occurrence (approximately 50%).

    Scenario 3 - The most optimistic forecast calls for a $3 billion annual budget for space science missions. This can be considered full capture of U.S. plus international missions or an increased U.S. space science level of activity. Market Assessment

    The scenarios developed in the previous section will be used to scope the level of demand for space science mission flights. All savings from launch cost reductions will be transformed into new missions. The costing assumptions listed in Section will be used to identify the number of new missions made possible while constraining the total budget to stay within the scenario assumptions. When selecting which class of mission to fly with the freed-up budget the emphasis will move away from Flagship class missions toward more Smallsat missions. For this assessment we examined launch cost reductions of one and two orders of magnitude (one-tenth and one one-hundredth launch costs).

    The results of this assessment are presented in Figures and . These figures show the number of payload events and LEO equivalent mass delivered per year for each class and each probability (budget scenario). These results are described on a probability basis.

    Figure Space Science Payload Events Elasticity of Demand by Payload Class

    Figure Space Science LEO Equivalent Mass Elasticity of Demand by Payload Class

    High Probability (Scenario 1). In this scenario, there are no new Flagship class missions. The budget savings are not large enough to allow an additional Flagship mission (nor even one-tenth of a new mission). There is a small increase in the number of Discovery missions (from 2.3 years to 2.5 per year).

    Ironically, this small increase in missions would be a big boon for scientists and graduate students. The Smallsat missions have the greatest increase, from four per year to eight. However, since the Smallsats are very lightweight, the greatest mass increase comes from the Discovery payloads (see Fig.

    Medium Probability (Scenario 2). In this scenario, there are still no new Flagship class missions. With the additional budget provided by scenario 2, approximately three more Discovery missions are possible over scenario 1. However, only two more missions are enabled by reductions in launch costs. Smallsats show a significant increase, 11 over scenario 1 and a doubling of payload events, as launch costs are reduced. The same trends exist for this scenario as in scenario 1.

    Low Probability (Scenario 3). In this scenario, Flagship class missions increase to approximately one mission every other year. With the additional budget over scenario 1 there is nearly an order of magnitude increase in missions (5 per year instead of 2.3 years). As launch costs are reduced, Discovery mission nearly double (from five to nine per year).

    Nine Discovery missions per year would bring back a wealth of science knowledge equivalent to a decades worth of data currently gathered by similar missions. Once again the Smallsat class missions show the greatest growth potential. These missions could climb as high as 45 per year if launch costs were reduced by two orders of magnitude.

    The cumulative impact, in terms of LEO mass delivered per year, is displayed in Figure This figure shows that with a single order of magnitude decrease in launch costs, the amount of mass delivered to LEO on an annual basis would grow from 20K lb to nearly 160K lb. More important, and more difficult to quantify, is the resultant increase in knowledge of our universe and the potential stimulation of the world's educational systems from these programs. Note again that the LEO equivalent mass includes the spacecraft and the appropriate upper stage for the particular mission application.

    Figure Space Science LEO Equivalent Mass Elasticity of Demand, Cumulative Market Segment

    To evaluate the effect of launch cost reductions at points other than one and two orders of magnitudes, interpolation may be used to determine the desired value.

    As is evidenced by the data, the Smallsat mission classification would stand to benefit the most from launch cost reductions given any economic scenario. This is not completely surprising when one compares the launch cost percentage of total budget for each mission classification, as shown in Figure

    Figure Percentage Breakdown of Cost by Mission Classification Market Infrastructure

    This section will describe two components of the space science market infrastructure, technical and organizational. Technical infrastructure deals with the infrastructure necessary for the mission to perform its technical function. Organizational infrastructure covers the management, organization, and working relationships established to enable the mission.

    Responsibilities for SSO missions (both technical and organizational) are generally divided among NASA (or other space agency), universities, and contractors. Figure shows how these responsibilities are traditionally delegated. Differences between the mission classification (Flagship, Discovery, and Smallsat) exist but are not highlighted here.

    Figure Traditional Space Science Working Relationships and Functions

    Technical Infrastructure
    Command and Control. SSO missions require ground-based, human interactive control. This function is exercised through small mission control centers (relative to launch vehicle control centers) located at NASA centers (predominantly JPL or Goddard) or, to a lesser degree, at universities (e.g., Cal Tech or University of Colorado).

    Tracking and Data Acquisition. Tracking and telemetry, although they usually use the same node as the control center, may require the support of an orbital asset (e.g., TDRS) or a remote location (e.g., Deep Space Network). NASA normally provides these services as part of its support or charges a nominal fee for non-NASA missions. Some futuristic planetary lander missions may require the use of an in situ orbital relay satellite. This would be accounted for in the programmatic costs or separated as its own mission.

    Organizational Infrastructure
    Organizational relationships for SSO vary significantly from mission to mission. Although there are no standards for these organizational relationships this section will characterize the types of relationships that have been demonstrated in the past or proposed for some missions.
    Figures, -10 and -11 depict the general organizational relationships for Flagship, Discovery, and Smallsat mission classes, respectively.

    Because of the complex integration and high costs of Flagship class missions, NASA usually takes on a much more active role in the program. Figure shows NASA interfacing directly with all participants within the program.

    Figure Flagship Program Organization

    Discovery class missions usually have a secondary program manager who interfaces with the NASA equivalent and leads the subcontractors in performance of their separate tasks. Figure shows this generalized relationship.

    Figure Discovery Program Organization

    Smallsat class missions have a unique opportunity to involve students in the day-to-day process of payload conception, development, design, production, integration, launch, and operation.
    Figure shows how this arrangement might be structured.

    Figure Smallsat Program Organization Prospective Users

    As mentioned in the introduction, in contrast to space technology development, there is no commercial interest in SSO missions. The cost is too great and the payoffs are indeterminate and too long term. Governments, and to a small extent academia (through government funding and private grants), are the sole sponsors of space science research. In other words taxpayers are the principal investors in space science research.

    In the SSO area, the sponsors and the users turn out to be the same people. Governments and universities are the principal participants in the space science area. It is solely up to the government and to the universities to keep pushing the space science frontier back.

    When it comes to mission classifications, governments are the primary player in the Flagship and Discovery class arena. The government also is a key player in the Smallsat arena, but universities are also potential users. CSTS Needs and Attributes

    This section defines the space science mission requirements that would be imposed upon a new commercial space transportation system. Transportation System Characteristics

    Upper Stage. Many SSO missions require the payload to be delivered beyond LEO; therefore, they require an upper stage. For the purposes of this study it was assumed that if an upper stage was required its cost was included in the cost of the spacecraft.

    Unmanned. SSO payloads are generally unpressurized, unmanned, and have no return-to-Earth needs (with a few shuttle-related exceptions). As with the Hubble Space Telescope, some SSO missions may be upgraded during orbit to extend their capabilities and life expectancies. The majority of SSO payloads, however, are one-time-up experiments that have the capability to transmit their acquired data back to Earth.

    Reliability. Although improved reliability is desirable, these missions would still fly (and are flying) at current system reliabilities.

    Flight Environment. Although a more benign flight environment (e.g., vibration, heating, acceleration loads) would be desirable, conditions at least as good as current ELVs would be sufficient. Transportation System Capabilities

    The SSO mission launch requirements range in equivalent mass to LEO capabilities from less than 1,000 lb up to 40,000 lb. Performance capability needs, in terms of Delta-V, are highly dependent upon payload size and mission destination. Generally, most SSO missions have destinations beyond LEO and require upper stages.
    ClassLEO Equivalent Mass
    Flagship40,000 lb
    Discovery10,000 lb
    Smallsat1,000 lb

    Figure Class and LEO Equivalent Mass Ground Handling

    Transportation and Integration. Many SSO payloads have sensitive instruments/optics on board requiring delicate transportation and handling. Current procedures and equipment can satisfy these requirements. On-Pad Services. Standard thermal conditioning and power support of SSO payloads while on the pad should provide an adequate environment.

    Special Facilities. Many SSO payloads require a cleanroom facility while final processing, checkout, and payload integration into the fairing are completed. In addition, most Flagship class payloads require the processing and launch facilities to be capable of processing/checkout of a radioisotope thermionic generator (RTG) or other nuclear power source. User/Space Transportation Interfaces

    Many of the interface requirements will be dictated by the launch vehicle configuration. For example, shuttle payload services while on the ground, during ascent, and on orbit differ dramatically from an expendable launch vehicle like Atlas. Therefore, the following interface requirements are generalized for the space science mission market but could vary depending upon the launch vehicle solution.

    Mechanical. The spacecraft will require some standardized mechanical attach-points with a separation capability for the time of deployment.

    Power. Most spacecraft transition from ground power to internal power prior to launch. There are no indications that a change is needed unless the configuration of the launch system would dictate a change (e.g., no umbilical access to payload prior to launch).

    Telemetry/Communication. The spacecraft will require two-way communications, through the launch vehicles telemetry system, to the ground control facilities. Transmission of data to the ground control regarding the payloads condition and readiness is required. It is also necessary to provide for commands to the payload from the launch vehicle for sequencing of events and in the event of a need to destruct the payload.

    Fluids. Most SSO do not need fluids loading after encapsulation. Improvements Over Current

    Reduced Launch Costs. Although spacecraft costs are the single biggest cost contribution, reduced launch costs would enable a higher frequency of SSO launches. This would result in greater standardization of spacecraft buses or components and allow the manufacturers to come further down their rate and learning curves.

    Shorter Mission Planning. One of the more critical technical goals is the ability to get a launch opportunity within a reasonable amount of time. Providing quick access to space will allow graduate students and researchers to get necessary data returned from a SSO mission to complete their studies. This will maintain a high level of interest, build confidence in the national science programs, and generate return business.

    Availability to More Users. This requires that a system have sufficient flight opportunities to let customers know that they have a good chance of getting a flight when they need one, so they will proceed with their preliminary planning and design efforts. Business Opportunities Cost Sensitivities

    As we have seen, launch costs, although important, are not always the predominant cost component. In addition, this market is budget limited and does not have commercial forces driving it. Therefore the space science market has not demonstrated a high degree of demand elasticity. There is an opportunity to significantly increase the efficiency of national space science expenditures and return a greater wealth of knowledge to humankind with a significant decrease in launch costs. A majority of these new missions reside in the Smallsat class (in terms of payload events). Programmatics

    There exists a unique opportunity within the space science market that could result from a reduction in space launch costs. That is the delegation of responsibility down to extremely low levels, to students. There are several universities that have active student participation in space science activities; however, a reduction in launch costs will enable more universities to sponsor their own programs. The experience of managing design and hardware programs will introduce more capable engineers/scientists into the workforce. Conclusions and Recommendations

    Launch cost reductions will free up room for significant growth for Smallsat class missions, moderate room for growth for Discovery class missions, and little room for growth for Flagship class missions. This growth will allow for an increased investigation of the universe and eventually return significant benefits to humankind. However, these missions will still be budget limited, since there is no immediate commercial application for these sciences. In the long term, new technologies (with terrestrial commercial applications) will be spawned from the science investigations made today. Predicting these new technologies is difficult; however, they may include fusion and other energy sources, antigravity, better weather prediction and control, and so forth.

    It is important to continue to understand the impact on space science missions because it impacts the future workforce capabilities and is the building block for future technologies. Getting greater participation from universities across the country and around the world into the analysis would enhance the credibility and quality of the analysis. In addition, the University of Colorado has recommended the establishment of a computer bulletin board to enable a national discussion on this topic. Space Science Payloads Database

    Figure and -2 document the space science outwards payload database used in the Commercial Space Transportation Study.

    Click here to view the image.
    It's less than 50k, but it is 1054x590 pixels.

    Figure Space Science Payload Database, Part I

    Click here to view the image.
    It's less than 50k, but it is 1054x590 pixels.

    Figure Space Science Payload Database, Part II

    3.4.10 Space Testbed Market Segment Introduction

    Spacecraft and their components are subjected to an exhaustive series of tests to determine if they will perform as required in a space environment. Environmental testing is used to space qualify subsystem components prior to being exposed to on-orbit effects of zero gravity, hard vacuum, cyclic heating, radiation, or atomic oxygen. Technology validation testing is used to verify new technologies intended for use on future spacecraft. Most environmental testing currently takes place preflight on the ground, whereas technology validation testing is conducted both on orbit and on the ground.

    Ground testing typically uses a facility that simulates the space environment. These facilities can only approximate the actual environment that the spacecraft will experience, thus degrading the accuracy of the results. This white paper addresses the following issues associated with space based testing: (1) what current ground tests can be done more accurately in space? (2) among those tests, at what launch cost is it economically viable to use space testing? and (3) what is the space testbed market sensitivity to launch costs? Study Approach

    Previous studies identified several potential markets for space testing. The space testbed missions were divided into four submarket areas: (1) all-up stages and spacecraft; (2) large space structures, (3) component testing; and (4) materials qualification. These four submarket areas include examples of current and potential future uses of both environmental and technology validation testing. All-Up Stages and Spacecraft-R&D Flights

    Because the complexity of the subsystems required to validate an all-up stage or spacecraft, including main engines, any new testbed would require complexity approaching that of the element to be validated. It makes more sense to fly the actual design and avoid developing a new testbed. In this case, the term "space testbed" should be replaced with the traditional term, "R&D flight." Return of the stage is probably not required, but a full telemetry downlink is required. Most of these missions could be carried on Delta class or smaller launch vehicles if tested in LEO. Large Space Structures

    Gravity environments of 1g present several testing problems for the makers of spacecraft that have large trusses, antennas, or solar arrays. Analytic structural models that are used to predict on-orbit shape of antennas can not be verified easily with ground testing due to static deformation of the structure in 1g gravity. Instead, considerable time and effort is spent constructing and testing a test article that is modified to compensate for 1g effects. The analytical models are then updated with the test data. Missions to LEO would provide the environment needed to test the actual configuration in zero gravity. No payload return, and only limited telemetry, would be required.

    Control structure interaction technology validation is a current research activity that many makers of large space structures are pursuing. Among the technologies being studied are vibration suppression, active shape control, beam pointing, and structural identification. Both ground and on-orbit testing are currently being used; however, the ground test results are subject to inaccuracies due to 1g gravity effects. Component Testing

    The following environmental testing is conducted on spacecraft components and subsystem elements prior to being space qualified: (1) thermal, (2) pressure, (3) radiation, (4) electromagnetic, and (5) vibration.

    These tests could be carried out on orbit, probably bundled together similar to materials testing. Component technology validation testing is currently used to test new sensor, communications, and other hardware-dependent technologies. Examples of this kind of mission are SDI programs validating components and sensors. Depending on the payload, telemetry or full recovery may be required. Materials Qualification

    LDEF (Long Duration Exposure Facility) is a good example of a space testbed to validate materials. LDEF also bundled together large numbers of small materials experiments in a given flight, which should be true of future space testbeds aimed at materials tests. (There is no reason that future space testbeds would be packaged as large as LDEF). Sample return is probably required, but significant telemetry is not.

    The space testbed is distinctive from space materials manufacturing in that testbed components are intended for use in space, and are probably manufactured on the ground, and space manufactured goods are manufactured in space, and are probably intended for use on the Earth's surface. R&D missions to validate space manufacturing processes prior to actual production (which might be considered as testbed missions) have not been included in this analysis. Market Description

    Our ability to undercut ground testing costs may be limited, even with an order of magnitude decrease in delivery cost. To determine when the benefits of space testing are economically feasible, one must consider all of the elements involved with the current test environment. In some cases, a significant amount of telemetry may be required to replace the data collection techniques used on the ground. Some testing currently requires human work. To conduct this testing in space would, at some point, require a manned launch vehicle or a robotic assembly at substantially higher costs. In some cases the cost of the test article is orders of magnitude higher than current launch costs, making launch costs insignificant at any rate.

    The key to the space testbed is in providing a test capability that cannot be provided on the ground. Programs constantly must make hard decisions about how much reliability they are willing to risk versus how much validation testing they are willing to pay for. The reliability benefits of added testing are unfortunately hard to quantify compared to on-orbit testing that would replace ground testing on a one-for-one basis. Reduced launch vehicle cost will open the door for greater high-fidelity on-orbit testing and improved system reliability, though it should not represent an explosive growth market. Increased Earth-to-orbit activity in general (based on other new markets identified under CSTS) should have a multiplier effect on the number of systems needing space qualification, and in turn, should further increase the demand for on-orbit testbeds.

    Figure summarizes recent missions that can be classified as space testbed. The majority of the missions are in the component testing submarket area and have been sponsored by the SDIO program or flown as mid-deck experiments aboard the shuttle. With the recent cutbacks in the SDIO budget, continued demand for testbeds or the sensitivity of this market to launch costs is uncertain; however, the funding may be used for testing in other market areas.

    Name Mass (lb) Orbit(nmi) Date Vehicle Cost ($) Market Area Comments
    SDIO Delta 180 ? 120,28 9/86 Delta 150M Comp Total pgm cost
    SDIO Delta 181 3600 ? 2/88 Delta 250M Comp Total pgm cost
    SDIO Delta Star 5984 270, 47 3/89 Delta 140M Comp Total pgm cost
    SDIO RME/LACE 3487 297,43 2/90 Delta 38M Comp Launch costs
    SDIO Losat-X 166 197,40 7/91 Delta ? Comp Launch costs
    SDIO MSTI 1-2 330 239.97 11/92 Scout 15M Comp Launch costs (ea)
    SDIO MSTI 3-6 330 239,97 3/94 Conestoga 15M Comp Launch costs (ea)
    SDIO MSX 6490 480 Sun 3/94 Delta 400M Comp Tot pgm cost
    AF Clementine 968 Lunar 1/94 Titan 2G ? Comp
    NASA SPAS-1 ? 195,28 6/83 STS-7 ? Comp Remote sense, alloy
    NASA LDEF 21351 313,28.5 4/84 STS-41C ? Materials
    NASA WING ? 184,28 8/84 STS-41D ? Comp/LSS Lt wt solar arrays
    NASA IRCFE ? 203,28 9/88 STS-26 ? Comp IR comm eqpmt
    NASA SHARE ? 184,28 3/89 STS-27 ? Comp Heat pipe/radiator
    NASA SPAS2/STP ? 161,57 4/91 STS-39 ? Comp Optical disk
    NASA MODE 200 184,28 6/91 STS-40 ? LSS 0g dynamics
    NASA SHARE-2 ? 184,28 8/91 STS-43 ? Comp
    NASA MODE 200 355,57 9/91 STS-48 ? LSS
    NASA TSS-1 ? 271,28 7/92 STS-46 ? Comp Tethered satellite
    NASA ACTS 3243 GSO 9/93 STS/TOS ? Comp Adv comm tech sat
    NASA LITE ~30K ? 9/94 STS-64 400M Comp Lidar In-space Tech
    NASA Comet 450 300,40 3/94 Conestoga 45M Materials
    NASA MACE 200 LEO 6/94 STS ? LSS Mid-deck active control

    Figure Recent Space Testbed Missions

    The data in
    Figure give some indication of the current market for testbed missions, but no insight to the cost sensitivity. To assist in determining overall sensitivity, an effort was made to identify which CSTS market segments would benefit from space testing, and to categorize that testing into the four market areas. Shown in Figure, this information is used to determine the multiplier used for growth of other CSTS markets. The multiplier effect is determined by estimating what contribution, in terms of flights/year and lb/year at a given launch cost, each market segment would contribute to a space testbed submarket area.

    R&D FlightsLarge Space StructuresComponent TestingMaterial Qualification
    TelecommunicationsAcademic ResearchTelecommunicationsAcademic Research
    Mobile communicationsTelecommunicationsSurvey & LocateGeo. Platforms
    Human planetary explorationHuman planetary explorationGlobal Digital Data
    Space Solar PowerGeo. Platforms
    Orbiting BillboardsSpace Manufacturing
    Direct Broadcast TVAcademic Research
    R&D Facilities
    Remote Sensing
    Govt. Missions
    Space Debris Managmt

    Figure CSTS Market Segments That Benefit From Space Testbed Prospective Users

    The following individuals were contacted to determine the potential uses of space testing. These contacts are representative of the four submarket areas in both technology validation testing and environmental testing. A summary of their inputs is contained in
    Space Qual. TestingWyle LabsRon Bollo
    NASA/Goddard Bill Cas
    Satellite Primes/ Users Hughes Space &ComDave Robinson
    MMC-Astrospace Carl Marchetto
    Large Space Structures NASA LaRCBill Grantham
    CSI Program Office
    Component/Subsystem Honeywell-Sat Syst. OpsJackie Crobuck
    Qualification Allied Signal AerospaceDick Smise
    Hughes Space&CommSteve Sylvester CSTS Needs and Attributes

    There are significant impacts on current launch vehicles for the R&D flights and large space structures submarket areas. Based on discussions with the satellite makers, a less than 1-1/2-year leadtime requirement for a satellite test may be a greater impediment to R&D tests than current launch vehicle prices. Similarly, deployment testing of large antennas requires a 6- to 9-month leadtime. A reduction in the operations turnaround time of current launch systems would be required to capture these markets. Some technology validation testing requires human effort. If a robotic system is not substituted, then a man-rated launch system like the shuttle is required. Business Opportunities All-Up Stages and Spacecraft-R&D Flights

    Hughes and MMC-Astrospace each tell us that they develop new classes of satellite about every three years. If we assume that the other satellite makers combined do the same, this represents a maximum of one satellite R&D flight/year at the current utilization of space. A key factor is the multiplier effect in space utilization (and space qualification) if other CSTS market segments grow. A summary of this market is shown in
    Figures and -1b. Makers of telecommunications satellites typically have production runs that do not provide large profit margins. The costs of constructing a prototype that would return any valuable data for these manufacturers could be substantially higher than the launch costs, and not be feasible. Manufacturers of smaller satellites designed to operate in large constellations such as for mobile communications could probably afford one R&D flight per production run.

    Figure R&D LEO Equivalent Mass Demand


    Figure R&D Flight Demand

    Pratt & Whitney, the maker of the RL-10 engine, does not see the likely use of a separate space testbed for main rocket engines. However, R&D flights of new stages and launch vehicles could again take place with reduced launch cost. Historically, R&D flights with no actual payload were common. But in recent years first flights of new launch vehicles and variants have carried payloads, but they may be discounted. If we assume new U.S. stage development at one every 2 years, this is the potential capture of R&D flights. (It is likely that there would be no multiplier effect for stages since CSTS economics partly depend on higher flight rates for fewer launch vehicles.) Capture of 100% would likely occur when prices dropped to approximately the amount that first flights might be discounted . Large Space Structures

    Three types of large deployable space structures represent a special market for a space testbed: large antennas, truss structures, and large solar arrays. Hughes gave a recent example of a large antenna with a cost overrun of >$50 million and a 6- to 8-month schedule slip primarily due to ground testing challenges of the large antenna. (Hughes said large antennas will become even more common with the emergence of the direct broadcast TV market.)

    Martin Marietta Astrospace also indicated a potential market in this arena. Even at current launch costs testing of the example Hughes antenna would make sense. The key limitation is leadtime, not cost. Hughes and MMC indicated leadtime requirements of 6 and 9 months respectively, something that the current launch vehicle fleet cannot provide.

    Validation of LSS technologies such as vibration suppression and active control represents another testing challenge. Comparison of ground and on-orbit test results indicate that the ground test structural mode frequency estimates are off by 10% to 20% due to the 1g testing environment. From an accuracy point of view, it would be more desirable to conduct these experiments in a 0g environment. Ground testing will always be used, however, due to the relative ease in changing the structural configurations and collecting the data. A manned launch or a robotically conducted experiment could perform some of the ground test functions, but at significant additional cost.

    For some programs the launch costs are insignificant when compared with the total program costs. There is not much sensitivity to launch costs for these programs. In addition, many testbed missions are NASA programs that are given free rides aboard the shuttle. The launch costs are transparent to the program, although the taxpayer eventually foots the bill.

    At lower launch costs some of the market would grow. As overall space activity increased in other key market segments, the multiplier effect would increase the number of large structures to be space tested, as shown in Figures and -2b.


    Figure Large Space Structures LEO Equivalent Mass Demand


    Figure Large Space Structures Flight Demand Component Testing

    A current example of this kind of mission is the NASA Advanced Communication Technology Satellite (ACTS) program to validate new communication technology. Also in this category are the numerous similar SDI programs validating components and sensors from suborbital sounding rockets.

    In general, ground testing of components for space qualification is relatively inexpensive. Spacecraft thermal testing, typically conducted in vacuum chambers or by filling the shroud with LN2, and takes 2 to 3 weeks. Spacecraft EOL thermal environments that can be easily simulated in the chamber cannot be replicated in space.

    If the testing were conducted in space, extensive additional instrumentation would be required for telemetry. Test article recovery would be required in order to effect a thermal system redesign or repair. The advantage of space-based testing is that heat pipe configurations would not have to be designed for test in a 1g environment. This would allow for more design options, but is not a big cost driver.

    Radiation/EM testing in space would require long (5 to 10 years) exposure times. This length of time is prohibitive to obtaining any useful data for spacecraft design/manufacture, and therefore does not represent a promising market. The space testbed market should remain limited until a substantial reduction in launch costs is realized. As overall space activity increased in other key market segments, the multiplier effect would further increase the number of components to be space qualified, as seen in Figures and -3b.


    Figure Component LEO Equivalent Mass Demand


    Figure Large Space Structures Flight Demand Material Qualification

    A series of CMSE (Extended Duration Space Environment Candidate Materials Exposure) experiments are manifested to fly at a rate of one per year through the late 90s. This follows the LDEF, delivered in 1984 and returned in 1990, and Limited Duration Exposure Facilities (LDCE), which flew in 1992. At a flight rate of once per year for these secondary payloads, even the inclusion of a multiplier effect due to increased space activity will lead to a fairly modest potential market, as shown in
    Figures and -4b.

    Figure Material Qualification LEO Equivalent Mass Demand


    Figure Material Qualification Flight Demand Conclusions and Recommendations

    The space testbed market segment has some potential for growth; however, the current market is not very sensitive to launch costs. The amount of new hardware requiring space testing is proportional to the size of the overall market growth identified in the other CSTS market segments. It is recommended that an additional iteration of estimating the multiplier effect on the space testbed market be carried out when more detailed estimates of the overall CSTS effort are available.


    1 "Getting Down to Earth," SPACE, July/August 1993
    2 "New Sensors Eye the Rain Forest," National Geographic, September 1993
    3 "Getting Down to Earth," SPACE, July/August 1993
    4 "Getting Down to Earth," SPACE, July/August 1993
    5 Alpha Station Program and System Definition, Joint Program Directive, SSP-JPD-002, Oct. 27, 1993
    6 Space Station Freedom Utilization Conference, Aug 3-6, 1992, Huntsville, AL. Sponsored by SSFP, NASA HQ
    7 Station Alpha Decision Package, Italian Pressurized Cargo Carrier versus Mid-deck Refrigerator/Freezer Implementation, Boeing, Nov 2, 1993

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    3.4 Government Missions
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